The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (39 page)

The US government was unwilling to settle for a revived military containment system, however. A year later, Washington rejected the renewed weapons monitoring programme and launched its ill-fated invasion. As analysts weigh the costs and consequences of the Iraq war, it will be important to remember that viable alternative means were available, and were functioning effectively, to contain the threat from Saddam Hussein without the use of military force.

The Iraq saga was only one of eighteen distinct cases of Security Council sanctions imposed between 1990 and 2006. Of the eighteen post-Cold War cases under review, most involved targeted or selective measures. In only three cases – Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia (1992–5) – were comprehensive trade sanctions applied. In one other case, Angola, the combination of selective UN sanctions imposed over the years (arms and oil in 1993, travel and diplomatic in 1997, and diamonds in 1998) amounted to a nearly comprehensive trade embargo on territory controlled by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In all other cases, sanctions were partial and
selective in nature: nine examples of financial restrictions (always in combination with other measures); six cases of commodity boycotts (most involving petroleum products,
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three involving diamonds, and one on lumber products), ten uses of travel sanctions (also in combination with other measures), and fifteen cases of arms embargoes.
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Diplomatic sanctions or restrictions on international participation were also employed in several instances.
Appendix 4
summarizes the cases and types of sanctions employed and assesses general impact.

Sanctions did not produce immediate and full compliance in any of the cases examined. But in a number of cases they resulted in partial compliance and/or generated bargaining pressure. In Yugoslavia (1991–5), sanctions exerted leverage on the Belgrade regime that led to the Dayton Accords. In Libya, sanctions were a central factor in the negotiations that eventually brought suspected terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. In Liberia, sanctions denied legitimacy to the Charles Taylor regime. In most of these cases UN member states made at least some attempt to comply with Security Council sanctions. In the cases where the Council imposed only stand-alone arms embargoes – Sudan, Liberia (until 2001), Rwanda, Yugoslavia (after 1998), and Ethiopia–Eritrea – sanctions had little or no impact. The limited measures imposed in Afghanistan prior to 2001 also had no discernible effect on the Taliban regime. In the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d’Ivoire, arms embargoes were not well enforced. In approximately one-third of the cases examined, therefore, Security Council sanctions had some impact. In these cases the pressure of sanctions was sufficient to produce at least partial progress in achieving Security Council objectives.
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Much of the debate about sanctions has centred on their humanitarian impacts. In the case of Iraq, sanctions contributed to severe humanitarian suffering among innocent and vulnerable populations. For the first six years of sanctions in Iraq, comprehensive sanctions cut of all trade and shut down oil exports, which
shattered the country’s economy. The combination of sanctions and Gulf War bombing damage caused a severe humanitarian crisis, resulting in hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths among children.
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Infant and child mortality rates in south/central Iraq more than doubled, according to a study from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine published in
The Lancet
.
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Relief from the humanitarian crisis did not come until after the oil-for-food programme took effect. Although the relief programme was plagued by corruption, substantial deliveries of civilian goods began to arrive in the late 1990s, gradually easing some of the hardships suffered by Iraqi civilians.

The desire to avoid humanitarian suffering caused by the imposition of economic sanctions became a dominant feature of Security Council policy-making during the 1990s. The ambassadors of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council wrote to the President of the Council in 1995 that ‘further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regimes should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.’
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In 1995, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs commissioned a report on the impact of sanctions on humanitarian assistance efforts.
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Efforts to assess and mitigate the humanitarian impacts of sanctions became a priority concern.

In 1997, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs developed a methodology and series of specific indicators for assessing humanitarian impacts.
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Many of the recommendations in this study became the basis for an ongoing humanitarian assessment methodology developed by its successor agency, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Efforts to assess the humanitarian impact of particular sanctions cases became a regular feature of UN sanctions policy. In 2003, OCHA updated its indicators and methodology in light of recent cases and based on the success of the earlier venture.
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Assessment reports and missions to examine the impact of sanctions are now a routine feature of sanctions
cases. They provide the Security Council with an opportunity to anticipate and prevent potential humanitarian problems and respond to adverse impacts in a timely manner.

The Security Council responded to the controversies surrounding the humanitarian impact of sanctions by altering the design of sanctions. General trade embargoes were abandoned in favour of more targeted sanctions. After the imposition of comprehensive sanctions on Haiti in 1994, all subsequent sanctions involved targeted measures, and in each of the categories of targeted sanctions – finance, travel, arms, and commodities – the Security Council introduced important innovations. Targeted sanctions apply coercive pressure on specific decision-making elites and the companies or entities they control, thereby avoiding unintended humanitarian consequences. They also deny access to specific products or activities that are necessary for repression and war. By imposing costs specifically on those responsible for violations of international law, rather than on innocent bystanders, the Security Council thus seeks to serve its primary mission of enhancing peace and security without jeopardizing its parallel mission of enhancing the human condition.

As the Council shifted toward imposing targeted sanctions in cooperation with member states, it developed the capacity to develop and publish lists of designated sanctions targets. The entities and individuals on these designation lists were subjected to asset freezes and travel bans. The Security Council was empowered to impose financial sanctions and visa bans on lists of designated targets in the cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, DRC, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. This practice would later prove significant in the UN Security Council’s approach to handling terrorism.

In the earlier cases of Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia, financial sanctions were imposed only on government assets. Beginning in 1994, all financial sanctions were targeted against designated individuals and entities. This pattern continued through the Angola and Afghanistan cases in the latter part of the decade. In the cases of the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, the Council was authorized to apply targeted
measures against designated individuals. The counter-terrorism financial sanctions mandated in Resolution 1373 were also directed against entities and individuals.
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The Security Council also attempted to make improvements in the design and implementation of arms embargoes. Measures to halt the flow of weapons and military-related goods are the most frequently employed form of economic sanctions. The Security Council imposed arms embargoes in all but two of the sanctions cases established after 1990.
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In theory, arms embargoes are an ideal form of targeted sanction. They deny aggressors or human rights abusers the tools of war and repression, while avoiding harm to vulnerable and innocent populations. However, although frequently employed, arms embargoes have been the least effective form of sanction. In the four instances where arms embargoes were imposed as a stand-alone measure – Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia–Eritrea, and Yugoslavia (1998–2001) – the impact of these measures was minimal. Only in the case of Iraq, where the US and other countries made a major commitment to enforcement, did restrictions on the supply of arms and dual-use technologies have a significant military-political impact.
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To overcome the problems resulting from inadequate implementation of arms embargoes, the Security Council adopted a number of policy innovations. The language and technical terms employed in the Council’s arms embargo resolutions became more precise. Arms embargo resolutions included prohibitions, not only against the supply of arms and ammunition, but also against training, military cooperation, and various support services, including air transportation.
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This refinement of terms and broadening of covered items helped to close loopholes and reduced the ambiguities that previously impeded enforcement. More vigorous efforts also were made to monitor compliance with arms embargoes. Member states were encouraged to criminalize violations of UN arms embargoes and to strengthen export control laws and regulations. These initiatives helped to create a firmer foundation in the domestic law of member states for penalizing companies and individuals convicted of violating UN arms embargoes. In 2004, the Council directed UN peacekeeping forces in the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire to assist with the
monitoring of arms embargoes in these countries.
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This added significant new responsibilities to the mission of UN peacekeepers in these countries.

Commodity-specific boycotts have also been imposed more frequently. Oil embargoes were imposed as part of the sanctions against Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, UNITA in Angola, and the military junta in Sierra Leone.
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An embargo on the export of logs was imposed against the government of Liberia. Following the documentation by NGOs and human rights groups of the role of diamond smuggling in financing the armed rebellions in Angola and Sierra Leone, a diamond embargo was imposed by the Council for the first time against UNITA rebels in Angola in 1998, followed in 2000 by an embargo on the sale of ‘blood diamonds’ from Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor’s government in Liberia. As a means of enforcing these measures, the United Nations worked with diamond exporting countries, the diamond industry, and NGOs to establish the Kimberley Process, an international agreement among dozens of countries to combat the trade in conflict-related diamonds. Through the Kimberley Process, governments created certificate-of-origin systems designed to protect the legitimate diamond trade by screening out blood diamonds. Targeted diamond sanctions became a tool used by the Security Council to shrink the financial base sustaining armed conflict in Africa, and they became a model for commodity-focused embargoes of the future.
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One of the most important lessons learned from the sanctions cases of the early 1990s was the need for more effective international monitoring and enforcement of member state compliance. This was evident from the success of multinational
efforts during the 1991–5 Security Council sanctions imposed on the Belgrade government. A network of sanctions assistance missions (SAMs) were organized by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (predecessor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) and the European Community. The SAMs system represented a significant innovation in the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions.

Soon after sanctions were imposed, the CSCE and the European Commission (EC) formed a Sanctions Liaison Group to provide technical assistance for sanctions implementation, concentrating on the states immediately surrounding Yugoslavia. In October 1992, customs officials were dispatched to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to form the first SAMs. SAMs were also established in Albania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Ukraine. The EC established a Sanctions Assistance Mission Communications Centre (SAMCOMM) at its headquarters in Brussels and created the post of Sanctions Coordinator. By March 1995, the SAMCOMM staff had grown to twenty-six people.
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SAMCOMM developed a computerized satellite communications system linking its headquarters in Brussels with the UN Sanctions Committee in New York. This system, made available and maintained by the US, enabled customs officers in the field to verify shipping documents and prevent the use of forged or falsified documents.
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These measures established a substantial institutional capacity for monitoring and enforcing sanctions. It was the first time that major regional organizations stepped in to assist the United Nations in providing staff and financial resources for the implementation of UN sanctions.