The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (115 page)

8.
Persian Gulf Operations
, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tapes 1, 2.

9.
Captain David Chandler, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 12, 2005.

10.
Ibid.

11.
Ibid.

12.
Persian Gulf Operations
, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tape 3.

13.
Unfortunately, the
Wainwright
did not transmit “rounds complete,” which was the cue for SEALs to move in. This created a ten-minute delay as the UH-60 and embarked SEALs—already confused by the
Simpson
’s unexpected participation in the bombardment—remained unsure if the ship’s prep fire was over. CNSWTG, “After Action Report,” p. 2.

14.
Commander Norman Carley, USN (Ret.), interview with author, June 28, 1995; Rear Admiral Thomas Richards, USN, interview with author, August 11, 1995; also Middle East Force Naval Special Warfare Task Unit Atlantic message to CJTFME, “After Action Report at Sirri DTG” (072315), May 1988.

15.
USS
Wainwright
message to CJTFME, “OPREP-3 Feeder After Action Report, Operation Praying Mantis” (190730Z), April 1988, p. 1. After the action, Richards and other SEALs voiced strong objections in their after-action reports and a series of “Personal For” messages about the “mishandled” operation, venting their irritation at just about every command in the Gulf. The force package for Sirri had been far too light, with at least a full SEAL platoon needed. The lack of an A-6 gunship supporting the insertion seriously risked the assault force. Command and control between the special operations force and the surface group was not “clearly delineated.” Both Richards and May believed that after the first salvo by SAG C, the assault force should have been inserted immediately while the Iranians’ “heads were down.” But the lack of command and control between SAG C and the SEALs delayed their insertion, and the surface warfare officers did not fully comprehend the importance of timing the prep fires with this insertion of the SEALs. Ultimately, this poor coordination led to the “unnecessary” additional salvos that destroyed Sirri. In short, as Commander Richards’s after-action report bluntly stated: “Planning was not done with SOF in mind…. JTFME staff were not fully versed in the use and limitations of Special Warfare assets. They treated the personnel boarding as an add-on requirement, not the primary focus.” CNSWTG MEF message (20044), May 1988, “Praying Mantis After Action,” p. 2; CNSWTG, “After Action Report,” p. 2.

16.
CINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Update” (190900Z), April 1998, p. 3.

17.
COMDESRON 22 message to CJTFME, “Operation Praying Mantis Post Mission Timeline” (210215Z), April 1988, p. 2;
Rear COMDESRON TWO TWO
, unclassified VHS tape of Persian Gulf Operations, Timeline 10-52, copy shown to author by Rear Admiral Dyer.

18.
CT801.1 message to CINCCENT, “Praying Mantis OPREP-3 Feeder 002” (DTG 180645Z), April 1988, Naval Historical Center, Box 20, Folder 9 Praying Mantis Messages.

19.
Dyer interview.

20.
CJTFME message to USS
Wainwright
, “SAG Instruction” (DTG 180728Z), April 1988, JTFME/MEF General Attorney Files, JTFME/MEF Messages 1985 and January 20–April 19, 1988, Operations Archives, Naval Historical Center, Box 14, Series IV.

21.
Chandler interview; Captain Martin Drake, USN, interview with author, September 1, 2005.

22.
USS
Wainwright
message to JTFME, “Operation Praying Mantis” (241748Z), April 1988, Naval Historical Center, Box 20, Folder 9, pp. 2, 5; Perkins, “The Surface View.”

23.
Chandler interview; Drake interview.

24.
JTFME message, “SAG C Summary of Operations, 18 April” (201223Z), April 1988, p. 2; USS
Wainwright
message to JTFME, “Operation Praying Mantis First Impressions/Chronology” (202320Z), April 1988; Craig Symonds,
Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 305.

25.
Symonds,
Decision at Sea
, p. 305.

26.
Drake interview.

27.
USS
Wainwright
message to CJTFME, “Operation Praying Mantis First Impressions/Chronology” (DTG 202330Z), April 1988, Operations Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 20, Folder 9 Praying Mantis Messages.

28.
Chandler interview.

29.
USS
Wainwright
message to CTF 800, “SSM Engagement Data” (200246Z), April 1988, p. 1. At the time of the
Joshan
’s Harpoon launch, the
Wainwright
was in a broad weave and the starboard side was angled more toward the Iranian boat, thus her port chaff would not have been of any use.

30.
Richards interview.

31.
USS
Wainwright
, SSM Engagement message, p. 2.

32.
The
Wainwright
did not detect the missile seeker of the Iranian Harpoon. U.S. experts later speculated that this may have been due to age and poor maintenance on the missile, which meant the missile never worked. Captain Chandler believed it was the electronic countermeasures that prevented the missile from hitting. Less interview; also CJTFME “Final Report,” p. 2; CJTFME message, “Final Report, Operation Praying Mantis” (DTG 030855Z), June 1988, p. 2.

33.
PTG
Joshan
, JTFME/MEF J-3, “Praying Mantis Brief,” 1988.

34.
USS
Wainwright
,
Command History, 1988
, entry for April 18.

35.
USS
Wainwright
message (202330Z), April 1988, p. 2; USS
Wainwright
message to CJTFME, “After Action Report, Operation Praying Mantis” (181638), April 1988, p. 1.

36.
American Embassy Abu Dhabi message to CJTFME, “Status of Americans in Mubarak Field” (181732Z), April 1988, p. 1;
Command History, 1988
, p. A6; Navias and Hooton,
Tanker Wars
, p. 171.

37.
There are some discrepancies about the number of Iranian aircraft involved. Captain Chandler recalled three while others interviewed recalled that one or two had headed south from Bandar Abbas, with one turning toward SAG C. The final after-action report states that only one Iranian aircraft had ever headed south and ended up being engaged by the
Wainwright
. JULLS Report, p. 7.

38.
JULLS Report, p. 7.

39.
Initially there were indications of possibly two Iranian aircraft, one landing at Kish Island and the other at Bandar Abbas. Later U.S. officials determined that there had been only one Iranian jet, and it had landed at Bandar Abbas.

40.
Message from COMDESRON 22 to CJTFME, “Operation Praying Mantis—Post Timeline 15” (DTG 210215Z), April 1988, April 20–22, 1988, Operations Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 20, File 11, Praying Mantis Messages; JTFME message to CINCCENT, “SPOT Report 021-88” (291950Z), April 1988, p. 1.

41.
The
Sahand
was a sister ship of the
Sabalan
. The shah had bought four of these 1,250-ton warships from Great Britain in the early 1970s.

42.
CTG 800.1 message, “Praying Mantis Ops—Summary of Lessons Learned,” p. 1.

43.
COMDESRON 22 message, “Timeline,” p. 2.

44.
The second F-14 ran short of fuel and had to break off to refuel with an air force tanker. Carlucci interview; Crist interview; Crowe interview; CAG 11, “Chronology,” p. 3. The basic facts of this incident are undisputed and, from what the author can discern, were first revealed by the CBS correspondent David Martin. But there are different versions as to why they needed the president’s permission to attack the Boghammers. Craig Symonds, in his book
Decision at Sea
, attributes this to ROE concern surrounding hot pursuit into Iranian territorial waters; see Symonds, pp. 311–12. The events happened quickly and were all done via telephone conversations. But the key ROE question clearly centered around a preemptive attack based upon a then closely guarded signals intelligence success in determining Iranian intentions.

45.
The bomblet weighs 1.32 pounds and has a 0.4-pound shaped-charge warhead of high explosives, which produces up to 250,000 psi at the point of impact, allowing penetration of approximately 7.5 inches of armor. Rockeye is most efficiently used against area targets requiring penetration to kill.

46.
Captain James Engler, USN (Ret.), interviews with author, July 16 and August 16, 2005.

47.
Dyer interview.

48.
Langston interview; CAG 11, “Chronology,” p. 4.

49.
George Burke, message posted to online forum, March 1, 2002,
http://ussjosephstrauss.org/posted_messages.htm
, accessed December 12, 2005; USS
Joseph Strauss
(DDG 16),
Annual Command History, 1988
, Enclosure 1, p. 2, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center.

50.
Chandler interview; Dyer interview; CTG 800.1 message to CJTFME, “Praying Mantis Ops—Summary of Lessons Learned” (231800Z), April 1988, p. 4; JTFME/MEF J-3, “Praying Mantis Brief, Blue on Blue”; JULLS Report, “Praying Mantis,” p. 7; COMDESRON, “Post Mission Timeline,” p. 2. Following Praying Mantis, Joint Task Force Middle East looked at the cause of the near friendly-fire incident, but came to no real conclusions, as it faded quickly from memory except by those involved. It is quite clear that the A-7 did not properly check in with the surface forces, but from what can be determined, none of the War at Sea strike force did either. It certainly was not given authority by the
Wainwright
or SAG D. To the CAGs’ credit, they reported trouble all day contacting the ships, and once they informed JTFME that they were launching the strike package to sink the
Sahand
, they operated under the assumption that this was their assigned mission and everyone knew it. The carrier had, perhaps, the best JOTS picture and had a clear idea of where the U.S. surface forces were located. Compounding the problem, the
Joseph Strauss
was not equipped to download the air tracks relayed by the E-2, and had to rely on its own organic systems to delineate the friendly-air picture.

51.
Although prior planning between the air group and Dyer had been nonexistent for this ballet of destruction, it nevertheless was the first coordinated air-surface missile attack by the U.S. Navy, a much heralded subject in postengagement wrap-ups. CJTFME message to CINCCENT, “SITREP” (DTG 181245Z), April 1988; CJTFME message to CINCCENT, “SITREP” (DTG 181308Z), April 1988, p. 1; Dyer interview; Langston interview.

52.
CTF 800.1 message to CJTFME, “Praying Mantis Ops, Chronological Report” (DTG 210600Z), April 1988, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 20, Folder 15, p. 4; CTG 800.1 message to CJTFME, “Ordnance Delivery Summary” (DTG 191845Z), April 1988, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 20, Folder 15, pp. 1–3; JTFME/MEF J-3, “Praying Mantis Brief: Ordnance Expenditure.” The list of ordnance used on the
Sahand
is as follows:

53.
USS
Joseph Strauss
deck log, entry for Time 1601, April 18, 1988; Dyer interview. During my interview with Admiral Dyer, he showed the entire videotape taken by the Lamps and provided commentary. This was actually the second time the Lamps approached the
Sahand
for BDA. It closed with it following the first three Harpoons, but was quickly ordered away as the War at Sea strike package arrived.

54.
During the day, a key support for the navy aircraft came from the air force’s KC-10 refueling tankers of ELF-One. Just prior to H-hour, last-minute diplomacy by the U.S. government obtained overflight rights for U.S. support aircraft from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and, most important, Oman. After the attacks began, U.S. aircraft generally flew over Oman entering or exiting the Gulf, greatly shortening the flight route and avoiding the Iranian military’s concentration around the Strait of Hormuz. At CENTCOM’s request, the State Department obtained Omani permission for this later in the day, but Muscat had already agreed in all but formalities. Likewise, the UAE offered the United States blanket overflight clearance for two days. Over the course of the day, successive KC-10 tanker aircraft assumed a refueling track over Oman, south of the action but close enough to supply the SUCAPs within the Gulf. During the first twelve hours of Praying Mantis, the air force provided the navy with more than seven hundred thousand pounds of fuel. When the ELF-One stockpile of JP-5 aviation fuel at Dhahran ran short—used by the U.S. Navy because its higher flash point was safer on board ship—the Saudis volunteered an unlimited amount of Jet A-1 fuel to keep operations going.