The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (111 page)

6.
Loren Jenkins, “Italian Ships Join Red Sea Mine Hunt,”
Washington Post
, August 29, 1984, pp. A1, A20.

7.
Comments by Dr. Scott Truver, “The Gulf of Suez Mining Crisis: Terrorism at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Seminar, May 30, 1985, transcribed, pp. 32–33.

8.
In February 1984 the Iranians mined Majnoon Islands, and two years later, in February 1986, the same unit mined the waters off the al-Faw Peninsula to support the Val Fajr VIII offensive. CENTCOM History Office,
Command History, 1988
, March 27, 1990, p. 76.

9.
Quainton interview.

10.
Ibid.

11.
General Crist message to Admiral Crowe, “Mining in Northern Gulf” (11620Z), June 1987.

12.
It comprised: a nine-man EOD detachment; a six-man area point search system team complete with precise navigation transponders and a sophisticated side-scanning sonar; and a three-man assistance team to provide expertise to the Kuwaiti military on countermining operations. The U.S. military operation was called Pneumatic Hammer. In addition to the team sent to Kuwait, on June 16 five RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters along with their crews and maintenance personnel from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 (HM-14) in Norfolk, Virginia, were placed on a seventy-two-hour alert for possible deployment to the Persian Gulf. As their use would amount
to a tenfold increase in the U.S. military presence in Kuwait, not to mention an overt and public commitment of U.S./Kuwaiti military cooperation, it remained an unacceptable option to the Kuwaiti government in all but the most dire of situations. Both CENTCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed HM-14 would be sent only if there was evidence of widespread mining throughout the channel. Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14,
Command History, 1987
, entry for June 16, 1987; General Herres message to General Crist, “Mining in Northern Persian Gulf: APF/MNM Assistance Team” (DTG 242120Z), June 1987, Earnest Will Activation, p. 1.

13.
One mine was found by a Kuwaiti helicopter and subsequently destroyed by Kuwaiti divers. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, “Support of Middle East Force Operations—Sitrep 6,” July 24, 1987, p. 1; Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iranian Mining Threat in the Persian Gulf,” June 11, 1987, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, WB-7 Intelligence Files, Box 1, Series II.

14.
Admiral Crowe message to General Crist, “Security of U.S. Military Forces in the Persian Gulf” (172330Z), July 1987.

15.
Captain James Brodie, U.S. Coast Guard, memorandum, “Kuwaiti Tanker Reflagging,” February 23, 1987.

16.
“Reflagged Kuwaiti Tankers,” Earnest Will Activation, p. 3; Colin Powell memorandum, “Reflagging,” July 10, 1987; American Embassy Kuwait cable, “Confirmation of Reflagging Dates” (081039Z), July 1987. The eleven reflagged ships, their new redesignated names, and dates of reflagging were as follows:

17.
These two meetings were on July 2 and July 14, 1987.

18.
Weinberger,
Fighting for Peace
, pp. 410–11.

19.
Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, notebook, entry for July 15, 1987.

20.
Quainton interview. The flag raised had been flown over the U.S. Capitol and brought to the Gulf by a congressman from Kentucky who insisted he raise it on the first reflagged tanker. As this would have been completely unacceptable to Kuwait, Quainton defused the embarrassing political situation by raising the flag himself.

21.
Quainton interview.

22.
Admiral William Crowe message for General Crist, “Threat to Reflagged Ships at Khor Fakkan” (171605Z), July 1987.

23.
The air force tanker support for the navy headquarters Strategic Air Command message, “Tanker Support for Earnest Will” (DTG 301804Z), June 1987, p. 2; CINCPAC message, “Earnest Will Tanking” (DTG 100001Z), July 1987, p. 1.

24.
The mission was code-named Giant Scale III. This would be the first of four such missions during Earnest Will. Paul F. Crickmore,
Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed
(London: Osprey Aerospace, 1993), pp. 154–56; Pfister interview; “Giant Scale III/Earnest Will/Giant Express,” Air Mobility Command Document, excerpts from an unspecified command history, undated, p. 2.

25.
Alan Cowell, “Navy Enters the Gulf without Incident,”
New York Times
, July 23, 1987.

26.
Bernsen interview; Grieve interview.

27.
Interview with Captain Frank C. Seitz, Jr., U.S. Merchant Marine, “SS
Bridgeton
: The First Convoy,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, May 1988, p. 52; COMIDEASTFOR message to CINCCENT, “After Action Report on Earnest Will Escort 770001, 22–24 July 1987” (310500Z), July 1987.

28.
Bernsen interview; Strasser interview; Admiral William Crowe letter to the New York Yacht Club, March 27, 1987.

29.
Harold Lee Wise,
Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 72.

30.
Rear Admiral Bernsen message to General Crist, “Iranian Mines” (240824Z), July 1987.

31.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Hashemi-Rafsanjani Political Sermon,” July 24, 1987,
Case Concerning Oil Platforms
, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibit 50, June 23, 1997, p. 2.

32.
Alan Cowell, “A Kuwaiti Tanker under U.S. Escort Hits Mine in the Persian Gulf,”
New York Times
, July 25, 1987.

33.
The helicopters would use landing helicopter assault (LHA) and landing platform helicopter (LPH) ships, both designed to carry and launch helicopters. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Daily Schedule, July 24, 1987.

34.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message to USCINCCENT, “Kuwaiti Mine Threat and Countermeasures” (14011Z), July 1987.

35.
Caspar Weinberger letter to George Shultz, July 27, 1987.

36.
Larry Martz et al., “Ollie Takes the Hill,”
Newsweek,
July 20, 1987, p. 14.

37.
Poindexter interview.

38.
Ibid.

39.
Siegel, “A Chronology of Events,” p. 12; Bernsen interview.

40.
Captain Jerry Manley, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 17, 1996; Captain Robert McCabe, USN, interviews with author, May 10 and August 16, 1995; Grieve interviews; Captain Conway Ziegler, USN (Ret.), interview with author, June 15, 1995.

41.
Bernsen interview; Captain Bruce van Belle, USN, interview with author, May 2, 1996.

42.
Captain Frank DeMasi, interview with author, August 10, 1995.

43.
Commander Steven Nerheim, USN, interview with author, August 11, 1995.

44.
Edwin Simmons, “Mining at Wonsan and in the Persian Gulf,”
Fortitudine
, Summer 1987, pp. 3–7.

45.
Tamara Melia,
Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures
(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991), p. 76.

46.
Commander Steven Nerheim, “Enabling the Enabling Force: A Naval Mine Countermeasure Force for the Twenty-First Century,” Marine Corps War College Paper, Marine Corps University, May 1993.

47.
Crowe notes; USS
Illusive
(MSO448),
Command History
, 1987, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, p. 3. The actual deployment order came from the Joint Staff on August 14. General Robert Herres memorandum for Secretary William Taft, “Deployment of Ocean-Going Minesweepers to the Persian Gulf,” August 20, 1987.

48.
The six ships that deployed to the Gulf were:

49.
Manley interview; van Belle interview; Ellis Casteen, interviewed by Paul Stillwell, Unaccessioned Oral Interviews, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, January 15, 1988, p. 12.

50.
DeMasi interview; Captain Steven Holmes, interviewed by Paul Stillwell, Unaccessioned Oral Interviews, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, January 15, 1988.

51.
COMIDEASTFOR message, “MCM/AMCM Concept of Operations in Support of Earnest Will” (081315Z), August 1987.

C
HAPTER 14
A W
INDOW OF
O
PPORTUNITY

1.
Crowe interview.

2.
CINCPACFLT message to CINCPAC, “Window of Opportunity for Contingency Operations” (120410Z), August 1987.

3.
Weinberger interview; Lyons interview; Armitage interview; Captian Kevin Healy, USN (Ret.), interview with author, 2006.

4.
Vistica,
Fall from Glory
, p. 261.

5.
Carlisle Trost, interview with author, December 9, 2006.

6.
CINCPACFLT message, “Window of Opportunity for Contingency Operations,” p. 1.

7.
Admiral James Lyons letter to Admiral William Crowe, August 7, 1987.

8.
Captain Morris Sinor, USN (Ret.), interview with author, May 12, 2007.

9.
Lyons interview.

10.
Transcript of phone conversation between Admiral Lyons and Vice Admiral Howe, August 5, 1987.

11.
Admiral Ronald Hays, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 6, 1996; Lyons interview; Strasser notebook, entry for August 14, 1987.

12.
James Brewer, “Iran Warning as
Bridgeton
Begins Loading,”
Lloyd’s List
, August 1, 1987, p. 1.

13.
Siegel, “A Chronology of Events,” p. 13.

14.
Crowe and Lyons conferred afterward and both supported the decision to jam the Silkworm site: “It is important for the on-scene command to take all prudent steps to defend against a successful Iranian fire of a Silkworm missile at U.S. forces or escorted ships,” Crowe wrote.

15.
Kahlili interview.

16.
Reza Kahlili,
A Time to Betray
(New York: Threshold, 2010), pp. 252–53.

17.
Strasser notebook.

18.
Chief of Naval Operations message, “Persian Gulf Threat Alert” (032242Z), August 1987.

19.
Alan Cowell, “Iran Warns It Has Extended Maneuvers in the Gulf,”
New York Times
, August 7, 1987; Daily notebook of General George Crist, entry for August 7, 1987.

20.
Ziegler interview; Admiral Crowe message for General Crist, “Threat to Reflagged Ships at Khor Fakkan” (081907Z), August 1987; Bernsen interview.

21.
Ziegler interview; Bernsen interview. A brief description of this is also contained in
Case Concerning Oil Platforms
, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, p. 25.

22.
Ibid. This was confirmed by another conversation between the author and a U.S. naval officer.

23.
This was a clear indication of the Iranian left hand not knowing what its right hand was doing. Tehran laid mines to catch the next U.S. convoy and the first vessel hit was a tanker loaded with its own oil.