The Triple Agent (33 page)
Authors: Joby Warrick
1.
Nuclear devices:
This unreported event was described in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and a separate interview with one Obama administration official, all of whom were actively involved in the response to the threat.
2.
“Are you sure this was the right choice?”: Author interview with a U.S. official present during the White House exchange about Panetta’s candidacy.
3.
Panetta’s stance on the so-called torture memos: Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Under Panetta, a More Aggressive CIA,”
Washington Post
, March 21, 2010.
4.
change a missile’s trajectory in midflight: Capabilities of advanced munitions used by Predators described in author interviews with two current and one former senior intelligence official.
5.
inadvertently killed nine people: Ibid. For alternative views on civilian casualties, see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Revenge of the Drone,” New America Foundation, Oct. 19, 2009,
http://www.newamerica.net/files/appendix1.pdf
.
6.
“I don’t take it lightly”: Account of Panetta’s personal views and experiences described in interviews with three senior intelligence officials
and an Obama administration official who participated in conversations in which the matters were discussed.
7.
that group included Hanson: Hanson’s work duties, personality, and character described in multiple author interviews with five former agency colleagues and two family members.
8.
the top items on the agenda were Mehsud: New details about National Security Adviser James L. Jones’s trip to Pakistan described in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials involved in preparatory meetings for the visit.
9.
The Taliban leader was officially blamed: Although Mehsud denied involvement in the Benazir Bhutto assassination, communications intercepts pointed to his foreknowledge of the attempt on her life. See Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination,”
Washington Post
, Jan. 17, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/17/AR2008011703252.html
.
10.
Before sunrise on June 23: Details of the June 23, 2009, operations described in author interviews with two intelligence officers briefed on the events. For more on the attacks, see Bill Roggio, “Scores of Taliban Killed in Second US Strike in South Waziristan,”
Long War Journal
, June 23, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/06/seventeen_taliban_ki.php
.
11.
“It created a havoc”: Unsigned report by
Dawn
news staff, “Missile Attacks Kill 50 in South Waziristan,”
Dawn
, June 24, 2009,
http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-suspected-us-drone-strikes-swaziristan-qs-03
.
1.
Humam al-Balawi arrived alone: Accounts of Balawi’s early weeks in Pakistan were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials briefed on the events.
2.
“You have made us proud”: bin Zeid’s words, as recalled by Balawi in Dec. 26, 2009, video interview, op. cit.
3.
I want to study medicine:
Defne Bayrak’s account of her husband’s explanation for his travels to Pakistan, as told to al-Jazeera in Feb. 5, 2010, interview, op. cit.
4.
from his Taliban interviewer: Interview excerpts, as published in “An Interview with the Shaheed,” posted by al-Sahab Web site on Feb. 28, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
5.
The two had a mutual acquaintance: Descriptions of Balawi’s relations with Mehsud and his early interactions with the Pakistan Taliban provided interviews with a Tehrik-i-Taliban member and two Pakistani intelligence officers who later investigated the Balawi affair after the Khost bombing. Additional insights are drawn from Balawi’s accounts of his meetings with the Taliban chief.
6.
Qari had beheaded a kidnapped Polish geologist: For a description of the incident, see Bill Roggio, “Taliban Feud over Murder of Polish Hostage,”
Long War Journal
, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/taliban_feud_over_mu.php
.
7.
I could go to FATA:
Description of Balawi’s offer of his spying services in Pakistan provided in author interviews with two Jordanian and four U.S. intelligence officials. A detailed account of Balawi’s meetings and conversations with bin Zeid about the assignment is related in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.
8.
the “father of smoke”: For more on the terrorist Imad Mughniyeh and the circumstances of his death, see Matthew Levitt and David Schenker, “Who Was Imad Mughniyeh?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy online, Feb. 14, 2008,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2716
.
9.
who had killed Abdullah Azzam: For more on the influential cleric and the circumstances of his death, see Aryn Baker, “Who Killed Abdullah Azzam?”
Time
(June 18, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1902809_1902810_1905173,00.html
.
10.
the logistics of Balawi’s journey came together: Details about the arrangements for Balawi’s insertion into Pakistan were described by two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials personally knowledgeable or privy to classified briefings on the events.
11.
he could make out a familiar form: Balawi describes his encounter with the guard Ahmad, a disabled Taliban fighter, while sleeping outdoors in a videotape essay titled, “O Hesitant One: It Is an Obligation!” posted by al-Qaeda’s media arm, as-Sahab, April 30, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
12.
“We pray to God”: For a fuller description of the interview with Baitullah Mehsud, see Nick Schifrin, “More Dangerous than Osama: Militant Leader Claims He Is Fighting a ‘Defensive’ Jihad to Destroy the White House,” Brian Ross Reports, Jan. 28, 2008, ABC News online,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4199754&page=1
.
13.
capturing an entire garrison: For a discussion of Baitullah Mehsud’s defiance of Pakistan’s government, see “Baitullah Mehsud,” a Times People Topic,
New York Times
, Aug. 25, 2009,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/baitullah_mehsud/index.html
.
14.
the real target would be a decoy: This controversial story was described in detail by an official of the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban alliance, and related separately by two other Taliban associates, suggesting that it is a widely shared story that was used to establish Balawi’s credibility. There is no independent corroboration of the event by the CIA or other U.S. sources.
15.
“Every drone strike”: Quote related in interview with Taliban official close to Mehsud.
16.
his every move was being recorded: Detailed description of the attack on Baitullah Mehsud provided in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials involved in the planning or oversight of the operation.
1.
Taliban leader was “alive, safe and sound”: “Taliban Ask Gov’t to Prove Mehsud Death Rumors,” AFP/Reuters, in
Nation
online, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/11-Aug-2009/Taliban-ask-govt-to-prove-Mehsud-death
.
2.
his staff was caught up in the drafting of a proposal: Details of the CIA’s proposal for strengthening its campaign against al-Qaeda, and of the White House’s reaction to the plan, were provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and one administration official involved either in the planning meetings or in the presentation.
3.
helicopter gunships swept the Taliban’s valley: For a discussion of the Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan from its faltering start in June 2009 to its final phase in October, see Bill Roggio, “What Lies Ahead in Waziristan,”
Long War Journal
, Oct. 17, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_what_lies_a.php
.
4.
touched off several bloody rounds of:
Wall Street Journal
online, Aug. 10, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124976257139816985.html
.
5.
Shadow Army, a paramilitary force: Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,’ ”
Long War Journal
, Feb. 9, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php
.
6.
technology had helped turn the tide against Iraq’s insurgents: Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,”
Washington Post
, Sept. 8, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/AR2008090701847.html
.
7.
“We don’t know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is”: Defense Secretary Robert Gates interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’
This Week
, Dec. 5, 2009,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/12/where-is-bin-laden-secretary-gates-says-no-intel-in-years.html
.
8.
One of the most promising involved: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.
9.
The Taliban’s defeat had been engineered by a small group of CIA officers: For perhaps the most authoritative description of the CIA-led offensive, see Gary Berntsen,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2005).
10.
“will have flies walking across their eyeballs”: Jane Mayer,
The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War
(New York: Anchor Books, 2009).
11.
shut down for good: Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Closes Unit Focused on Capture of bin Laden,”
New York Times
, July 4, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/04/washington/04intel.html?_r=1
.
12.
She arrived in Kabul in August: Details of Hanson’s time in Afghanistan provided in author interviews with two agency colleagues and two family members.
1.
attempted to bury an IED: An account of the premature mine explosion is contained in International Security Assistance Force incident logs for Afghanistan’s eastern district for Sept. 19, 2009, and released publicly by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks in July 2010.
2.
She would be safe at Khost: A detailed description of Matthews’s experiences and conversations during her early weeks at Khost was provided in author interviews with eight former agency colleagues as well
as two relatives who were in frequent communication with her during the relevant periods.
3.
“the only women in a sea of men”: A narrative of Matthews’s early years in the CIA was drawn from accounts provided in interviews with six agency colleagues who knew her professionally and socially during that period, with additional insights provided in interviews with family members.
4.
The officers … drew up contingency plans for killing bin Laden: For an authoritative account of pre–September 11 failures in the pursuit of al-Qaeda, see the final report of the so-called 9/11 Commission,
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm
. Report released in July 2004.
5.
“We’re at war now, a different kind of war”: Former CIA counterterrorism director Cofer Black’s words as remembered by a former CIA officer, in John Kiriakou and Michael Ruby,
The Reluctant Spy
(New York: Random House, 2010).
6.
the case became the center of a roiling controversy: See Mayer,
The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War
, loc. cit.
7.
Zubaida was never truly an al-Qaeda leader: For an assessment of Zubaida’s role in al-Qaeda, see Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots; Waterboarding, Rough Interrogation of Abu Zubaida Produced False Leads, Officials Say,”
Washington Post
, March 29, 2009.
8.
Teams of SAD officers and Special Forces commandos spearheaded the assault: See Berntsen,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda
, loc. cit.
9.
They arrived in Khost at 2:00
A.M
.: An account of the CIA’s first days at Khost was provided in author interviews with one current and one former agency officers who were present at Khost during the events.
10.
Green Beret sergeant named Nathan Chapman: For more on Chapman, see the Special Forces tribute site to him:
http://www.quietpros.com/Afgan/chapman_nathan_ross_5sfg.htm
.
11.
Haqqani had spent years on the CIA’s payroll: For a comprehensive history of the network and its founder, see Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” Afghan Report No. 6, Institute for the Study of War, October 2010,
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network
.
12.
“It’s just rudimentary, baseline, box-checking training”: Author interview with retired CIA instructor who led training courses and exercises for CIA officers at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia.
13.
There were three thousand of these soldiers in the eastern half of Afghanistan: For an account of the CIA-trained Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, see Bob Woodward,
Obama’s Wars
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).
