The Triple Agent (32 page)
Authors: Joby Warrick
This book is the result of a year’s worth of conversations with men and women who, by necessity, live and work in the shadows. A great many of the primary sources were either active members of intelligence agencies—chiefly the Central Intelligence Agency and Jordan’s General Intelligence Department, but also others—or members of the military Special Forces units. Some were trusted sources developed over years of reporting on intelligence matters for the
Washington Post
. Others were current or former senior officials in intelligence agencies who agreed to discuss the Khost tragedy and the larger war on terrorism on the condition that they not be quoted or identified directly as sources. The insistence on anonymity, while unfortunate, could be broadly justified by the classified nature of the events and programs at the center of the story. The Khost base, its primary mission, and even the identities of many of its operatives are protected under U.S. government secrecy provisions. Moreover, America’s use of unmanned aircraft to strike terrorist targets in Pakistan, though a well-known fact in both countries, is officially a classified program that cannot be publicly acknowledged by CIA or White House officials. Finally, in addition to government sources, several relatives of slain officers asked not to be associated by name with specific anecdotes and facts. These requests were driven by concern
that the speaker might unwittingly divulge sensitive information or complicate ongoing interactions with intelligence agencies.
Because so many sources are anonymous, I have gone to great lengths to separately corroborate each of the essential facts in this narrative, conducting more than two hundred interviews in the places where the events occurred—Afghanistan, Jordan, Turkey—and in various locations in the United States. Memories and documents, including private e-mails and texts, were shared by intelligence officials and operatives from three countries. Other recollections and important contextual details were provided by current and former members of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, as well as diplomatic officials and U.S. military personnel who either served at the Khost base or were colleagues or friends of the fallen officers. Relatives and friends of each of the individuals killed in the Khost attack provided critical, and often enthusiastic, support. In attempting to understand the thoughts and motivations of Humam al-Balawi, I relied on interviews with family members and former colleagues of his at the Marka clinic or elsewhere, as well as a large body of interviews, essays, and video statements by Balawi himself. I also spoke directly, or through my assistants in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with members of the Taliban and other jihadist groups who either met with Balawi or were personally informed about his activities during his ten months in the Pakistani tribal region.
Despite the diversity of viewpoints, the sources agreed in most cases on the essential details. On the rare occasions when differing accounts could not be reconciled, I made judgments based on which source appeared to have a clearer view of the facts in question. Where sources could not be named in the text or footnotes, I sought to explain the source’s relationship to the characters and events as clearly as possible while honoring promises not to reveal identifying details.
Chapter 1: Obsession1.
The man was called Osama al-Kini: The details of the CIA’s operation against al-Kini were provided in author interviews with two current and two former agency officials with direct knowledge of the events.
2.
“This is now a bona fide threat to the homeland”: Author interview with former U.S. government official present at the White House meeting.
3.
“If you had to ask for permission”: Ibid.
4.
“simultaneous notification”: The basis of the new U.S. policy was described to the author in interviews with two former senior intelligence officials involved in the policy discussions, and confirmed separately by a congressional official briefed on the policy change at the time.
5.
a massive truck bombing: For details on the Marriott Hotel attack, see Bill Roggio, “Bombing at Islamabad Marriott Latest in String of Complex Terror Attacks,”
Long War Journal
, Sept. 21, 2008,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/bombing_at_islamabad.php
.
6.
a commander named Sheikh Saeed al-Masri: Details of al-Masri’s expanded role within al-Qaeda beginning in 2007, as well the competition among rival commanders, were supplied to the author in interviews with one former and two current CIA officers involved in counterterrorism operations during the period.
7.
Hayden’s initial meeting with his successor: Events described to author in interviews with two intelligence officers who witnessed the exchange.
1.
chief liaison on counterterrorism to Britain: Details of Matthews’s experiences in London and her previous work at CIA headquarters and Thailand were recounted in author interviews with eight former agency colleagues as well as two relatives who were in frequent communication with her during the relevant periods.
2.
sophisticated double suicide bombing: Separate accounts of the attack were obtained from International Security Assistance Force incident logs for Afghanistan’s eastern district on Jan. 19, 2009, and an interview with a Khost regional police commander who investigated the incident. The ISAF records were first posted by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks in July 2010.
3.
Inspector General, had launched a wide-ranging investigation: For details of the redacted report, see CIA Office of Inspector General, “Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” June 2005,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001499482/DOC_0001499482.pdf
.
4.
list of names remain classified: For a fuller description of the CIA’s deliberations over the release of names, see “CIA OIG [Office of Inspector General] Timeline” at
HistoryCommons.com
,
http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?investigations:_a_detailed_look=complete_911_timeline_cia_oig_9_11_report&timeline=complete_911_timeline
, accessed on Sept. 30, 2010.
5.
attempted to distill his advice: Author interview with former senior CIA official.
1.
The raiding party gathered: Details of Humam al-Balawi’s arrest, detention, and interrogation were provided in author interviews with two family members present during the relevant events; three current Jordanian intelligence officers and one former intelligence officer who were present during the events or were given detailed briefings; and a senior CIA officer who was similarly briefed. Additional details were drawn from Balawi’s videotaped statements about his arrests, as provided to the author by SITE Intelligence Group, a private group that monitors Web sites associated with extremist groups and provides
analysis to government agencies, news organizations, and other customers on a restricted-access basis.
2.
“Your handcuffs will be as silver bracelets”:
English excerpts from Balawi’s Internet blogs as Abu Dujana al-Khorasani were provided, along with analysis, by Jarret Brachman, a terrorism expert, author, and government consultant.
3.
He was also an instant hit: For analysis of Balawi’s impact as jihadist blogger, see Brachman’s monograph “Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” in publication.
4.
Defne, began to worry: Insight into Balawi family dynamics is provided in press interviews by Defne Bayrak, including her February 5, 2010, interview with al-Jazeera Television’s
Today’s Interview
program. English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group. Additional corroboration provided in author interviews with two of Defne Bayrak’s journalist colleagues in Istanbul, Turkey.
5.
Abu Dujana was a seventh-century Arab warrior: For more on Balawi’s namesake, see “Abu Dujana, Stories of the Sahaba,” as reprinted in
http://www.articlesbase.com/spirituality-articles/abu-dujana-stories-of-the-sahaba-1532056.html
.
6.
Code-named Turbulence, it is a five-hundred-million-dollar-a-year network: For an authoritative account of the NSA’s secret data-collection network, see James Bamford,
The Shadow Factory
(New York: Anchor Books, 2008).
7.
he was known among his peers as Sharif Ali: Biographical details about Ali bin Zeid and his interaction with the Balawi case were shared with the author in interviews with three bin Zeid family members and two of his Mukhabarat colleagues.
8.
“He wasn’t flirty like some of the others”: Author interview with former patient of Balawi’s, Marka refugee camp, Amman, Jordan.
9.
so closely reflected Zawahiri’s own views: Author interview with Jarret Brachman.
10.
coordinated attacks on hotels in Amman: For details on the Amman hotel bombings, see Hassan Fattah and Michael Slackman, “Hotels Bombed in Jordan; at Least 57 Die,”
New York Times
, Nov. 10, 2005.
11.
Zarqawi, who had spent five years as the Mukhabarat’s prisoner: For more on Zarqawi’s radicalization and later exploits, see Lee Hudson Teslik, “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations
backgrounder, “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” CFR online, June 8, 2006.
1.
He was in a small cell: In addition to the primary sources on Balawi’s interrogation as described in Chapter 2 notes, further insights into the Mukhabarat’s detention facility and procedures were provided in author interviews with two former Mukhabarat officers and an Amman jihadist who related his personal experiences in repeated incarcerations and interrogations.
2.
Balawi remembered his dream: Balawi describes his dream while in Mukhabarat custody in a Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview obtained by SITE Intelligence Group. English translation courtesy of SITE.
3.
On the third day of Humam al-Balawi’s incarceration: Circumstances of Balawi’s release described in author interviews with two Balawi family members in Amman, Jordan.
1.
The report bore an Arabic caption: Report described to the author in interviews with a Jordanian and a U.S. intelligence officer who reviewed its contents.
2.
with a known terrorist organization in Turkey: The Balawis’ interaction with the IBAD-C was described to the author by two of Defne Bayrak’s colleagues, who were aware of the couple’s contacts with the organization at the time. For more on the group, see
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/eastern-raiders.htm
.
3.
“I liked his personality”: Defne Bayrak interview with al-Jazeera, Feb. 5, 2010, op. cit.
4.
peculiar to privileged young adults: For more on this phenomenon, see Delia Lloyd, “Smart Bombers: Do Universities Breed Terrorists?”
Politics Daily
, Jan. 2010,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/19/smart-bombers-do-universities-breed-terrorists/
.
5.
The couple named their older girl: Author interview with a Balawi family friend, Istanbul, Turkey.
6.
a promise to redraw the country’s counterterrorism priorities: For
an insider’s view of the administration’s early priorities, see speech by White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, “A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans,” Aug. 6, 2009, before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as published on the White House’s Web site,
WhiteHouse.gov
.,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Center-for-Strategic-and-International-Studies
.
7.
Balawi was gradually checking out of his old life: Details about Balawi’s activities in his final weeks in Amman were described in author interviews with two family members and a colleague at the Marka clinic.
8.
bin Zeid tucked a case of dog food under his arm: Balawi describes his meetings and discussions with bin Zeid in his Dec. 26, 2009, interview, SITE, op. cit.
9.
I think we should talk to our father about this
: Airport departure described in author interviews with two Balawi family members.
