The Theory and Practice of Hell (63 page)

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being shipped out. But the influence of these few clerics was only clandestine and thus extremely limited.

There can be no question but that the merest rudiments of spiritual care, especially among the Poles, could have prevented much moral disintegration, much brutality, much unhappiness. It might have reassured thousands, succored hundreds in their last minutes, given countless sick and maimed new inner strength and the will to recover. But in stead, these blessings remained confined to an infinitesimally small circle of men who were unusually courageous and already endowed with strength of character. Only among the Dutch and French at Buchenwald, and then only during the very last period, did an
ecclesia abscondita>
an underground ministry, become possible, shedding at least a ray of light on the dying on their way to the crematory. The Dachau con centration camp formed a real exception, likewise illegal. As already mentioned, thousands of Catholic priests and a con siderable number of Protestant pastors of the Confessional Church were there quartered in special barracks. Some of them unfolded vigorous pastoral activity among their fellow prisoners. But by and large religious work in the camps was without practical significance.

Direct sabotage, such as damage to machinery or weapons, was possible only in isolated instances. Generally speaking, sabotage had to assume forms that were hard to recognize. The primary possibility was manpower utilization. Naturally the prisoners preferred to assign skilled workers only to plants that were not directly concerned with arms production. The latter were sent mainly unskilled help. Reliable anti-Fascist experts, however, were wormed into positions where they could practice systematic sabotage.

The German civilian foremen and engineers in charge of production were poor in technique and organization since they were almost without exception regular Nazis. They often had to depend on their prisoner experts. As a result it was possible to conduct a comprehensive program of sabotage by means of faulty planning and building, delays in procuring machinery, tools and materials, fostering internal jurisdic tional disputes, applying official regulations and test stan dards to the letter and similar methods.

Such sabotage was by no means confined to the armament

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plants. It pervaded the whole structure o f the concentration camps. Insofar as it consisted of slowing down the work, this was quite in keeping with the understandable disinclination of the prisoners to do any more work than was absolutely necessary. Some quite impressive records in loafing and dawdling were hung up.

To maintain and carry out this entire program of illegal ac tivity an effective defense organization had to be built up. When power had been consolidated, this also served to prepare for the end of the camps. All the larger nationality groups created formations of this kind—the Czechs, the Yugoslavs, the Poles, the Russians, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch. For every conceivable reason and pretext, ad ditional auxiliaries to the Camp Police or other institutions that might be of value in emergencies were called into being—special fireguards, in addition to the permanent fire brigade, a first-aid unit, an emergency unit and similar out fits, until in the end Buchenwald numbered more than one thousand carefully disciplined men at the disposal of the camp underground and only waiting for its orders.

The SS never succeeded in obtaining a clear picture of this powerful organization, its growth and its significance. The courage, the ruthless assumption of responsibility even against conflicting forces inside the camp, the skill and in finite patience required of the anti-Fascist forces to build up this effective system of self-protection in constant un derground struggle—all these can be imagined. The example that was set, the influence that was gained were so great that political prisoners in other camps terrorized by the greens sent appeals for help. Organizers were dispatched by Buchenwald in outgoing shipments, and although they were unable to work any basic changes at their destination, they were able to help bring relief.

When the end came, it was not in the way that had been an ticipated. But the preparations at Buchenwald proved so ef fective that the situation there in 1945 was brought under con trol in better fashion than in most of the other concentration camps.

Chapter Twenty-One THE END OF THE CAMPS

At an early date the leading minds among the prisoners in all the concentration camps endeavored to prepare for the various contingencies that might arise when the camps were evacuated or liberated. The average prisoner anticipated this event, which always loomed in the background, with a sense of fear that bordered on panic. It was generally assumed that Himmler would issue a timely order for the liquidation of all concentration-camp inmates and, as time went on, that he might use Allied air attacks as a “ cover-up.” Poison, gas, machine-guns and air raids by German planes were considered possibilities.

But whenever such possibilities were examined in detail, the conclusion became inescapable that they would not be easy to put into effect successfully. Without a doubt any plan to poison all the inmates could have been forestalled, though that would have jeopardized continuance of the food supply. Any attempt to mow down the prisoners from the towers by means of machine-guns or flame-throwers would have provoked uprisings in many places. The electrically charged barbed wire would have been razed. Hundreds and perhaps

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thousands would have fallen, but still more would have escaped, though their further fate throughout the country would have been extremely uncertain.

The least protection seemed to be available against a Ger man Air Force bombardment. Fear of such action was moderated, though not completely banished, by such general considerations as the temper of the population and the com mand situation in the air force, which might not permit such a thing. The camps were even more defenseless against mass liquidations by gas, whether on the spot, where gas chambers were available, or by shipment to other places. Concerted and individual escape en route, resistance immediately outside the gas chambers—these seemed to be the only possible defense measures, and their effectiveness was not considered great.

The argument that ultimately proved correct was at first ignored altogether and even later put forward by only a few. This was that a central liquidation order was quite unlikely since in the final stages of dissolution the concentration camps would have become no more than a marginal concern of Himmler and his staff and the chain of command would no longer be functioning at full efficiency.

It had become clear that progressive demoralization had long since deprived the rear-echelon SS of effective striking power against masses of men. But this realization seemed too uncertain to depend on. With the turning of the tide of war against the Nazis, the situation of the SS in the camps grew in creasingly chaotic, especially as more and more of their ar mament plants were bombed by the Allies. The industrial in stallations adjoining Sachsenhausen, Dachau, Buchenwald and Auschwitz were all seriously damaged in 1944. In most cases the United States and Royal Air Force bombers really did precision work. Though the SS men were already bitterly complaining about their own leaders, and most of them no longer believed in a Nazi victory, they might, in typical Ger man fashion, pull machine-gun triggers and throw hand grenades to lay us low if the appropriate order were issued with sufficient vigor. Definite and reliable precautions, however, against such an eventuality could be taken in only a few camps—as far as I know, only in Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Dachau, Mauthausen and Lublin.

The first concentration camp to fall into Allied hands was

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Lublin. From incoming prisoners we learned that with the ap proach of the Russian front the SS had taken to its heels, leaving to the enemy some six thousand prisoners who had not been evacuated and who had evidently succeeded in creating a defense organization. There were wild rumors that on taking the camp the Russians had strung up prisoner functionaries guilty of offenses against their fellows or that they had surren dered them to prisoner vengeance. Some of the big shots among the Buchenwald prisoners began to worry seriously about their own fate. Men who were enmeshed in in criminating circumstances quietly made plans for putting out of the way reputable witnesses who might testify to their sorry deeds.