The Theory and Practice of Hell (59 page)

254
EUGEN KOGON

•
Addition*
D
eath*

Y
**r B
i m
Inert*** or

S
trength
N
umber
%
1 Number D*cr****

Totals...........
1,232,900
665,200
512,100^
+
153,100

Ann. A v . . . .
411,000
221,750
170,700
+
51,000

1943
525,600 70*
369,000
25 223,650 + 145,350

1
944 670,950 70®
4
69,650 30
3
42,200 + 127,450

1945*
798,400
[
2010
159,700
4011
383,250 - 223,550

- 223,550 (

'Totals.. . . . . 1,771,400
998,350
949,100 + 49,250

Ann. A v . . . . 590,450 332,800
316,350
+ 16,400

Gr. T o ta l... 2,151,200 1,626,650 Deaths at Auschwitz...................................... 5,500,000

Original Base Strength.................................. 50,000

Total Death Victim s...................................... 7,125,000

Total Admissions, “ Regular” Camps. • • . 2,200,000 Base Strength, Extermination Camps. . • . 120,000 Additions, Extermination Cam ps.............. 5,500,000

Total Concentration Camp Inmates......... 7,820,000 Survivors
l K
......... ..................... ..................... 700,000

1 O f base strength.

* O f base strength and additions combined.

* Mass arrests o f Austrians, Sudeten Germans, and Jews.

4 Mass arrests o f Germans at outbreak o f war, also o f Poles.

I
Starvation and epidemics.

6 Mass arrests o f Yugoslavs, Ukrainians, Russians. 7 Mass arrests o f French, Belgians, and Dutch.

8 Mass arrests o f foreign workers in Germany, and o f Hungarian Jews.

* First quarter. 10 Per quarter.

II Mass liquidations and death shipments in camp evacuation. u Includes prisoners discharged before the end.

Chapter Twenty

THE UNDERGROUND STRUGGLE

Camp headquarters was never able to control the tens of thousands of men whom it held in subjection except by primitive methods, based mostly on the element of surprise. The SS men never actually knew what went on behind the barbed wire. They sensed it—and grew to fear it in the dark hours of the gradual decline—but they could never put their fingers on this anonymous spirit. They tried, by means of in formers, to gain insight into the internal situation in the camps, especially opposition sentiment and organization. Even SS officers occasionally went into the camps in prison garb, a puerile endeavor to collect information, for they remained in ignorance of countless trifles of daily camp life. They were always recognized at once and kept under sur veillance. The only result was to heighten the prisoners’ vigilance and distrust.

Nor did the Gestapo and the SS gain much from the em ployment of Nazi stool pigeons among the prisoners. If a newcomer had any record of Nazi or similar affiliations, his dossier would be known to the underground leaders among the prisoners before he even set foot in the compound proper.

2 5 6
EUGEN KOGON

From the first moment eyes and ears that were hard to fool were turned on the new men, who for hours and days had to run through stages during which their true mettle could be tested by their fellows. Nazis in camp remained isolated until they had either been rendered harmless or had proved that they could be relied on—something that happened in only a very few cases.

The only successes the SS scored with informers were with those recruited right in camp—convicts, “ asocials” and even political prisoners. Such “ squealers” usually drifted into collaboration with the SS of their own accord, by virtue of positions that brought them into constant touch with the SS, or from motives of personal vengeance. The urge for power and prestige also played a prominent part. A handful of prisoners were pressed into service as informers against their will.

Buchenwald saw the most famous and notorious case of voluntary denunciation. This was in 1941 when the White Russian 6migr6, Gregory Kushnir-Kushnarev, allegedly a former general, who had spent months insinuating himself into the confidence of wide circles in camp, began to betray his fellows, especially Russian prisoners of war. This Gestapo agent became responsible for the death of several hundred prisoners. He did not shrink from denouncing anyone with whom he had ever had even the most trivial dispute. As already mentioned in another connection, his main job was to ferret out Russian prisoners of war according to the secret directives of the Reich Main Security Office. For a long time it proved impossible to catch him alone, which would have meant his instant death. The SS kept him under its special protection. In the end he was actually made foreman of the prisoner Orderly Room. In this position he not only eliminated everyone in camp who ran afoul of him, but in many respects prevented utilization on behalf of the prisoners of the machinery of self-government.

At last, early in 1942, the informer had a slight in disposition. He was unwise enough to report to the hospital, thus placing himself at the mercy of his enemies. With the per mission of Camp Medical Officer Hoven, who had long been worked on in this matter and sided with the leading func tionaries among the prisoners, Kushnir’s ailment was at once

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HELL
257

diagnosed as infectious and he was put in the isolation ward. Soon afterward he was killed by means of a fatal injection. I well remember the sigh of relief that passed through the whole camp when the news spread with lightning rapidity that Kushnir-Kushnarev had died at 5:10
p
.
m
.
in the hospital.

The danger of serious consequences to all the prisoners from informers and denunciations was so great that preven tive measures were taken even against the mere possibility of treachery. Anyone who came into contact with SS confidants, even without knowing the whole picture, endangered his very life. Only in rare cases could the nature of the contact be im mediately known, nor could it be foreseen in what direction it would develop, even against the will of the innocent prisoner. This led to errors of judgment which taken by themselves seem inexcusable, though they become comprehensible when the whole atmosphere of danger is taken into account. On oc casion it took the most painstaking and incriminating mediation to extricate a man who was really innocent from the deadly network. A few became squealers only as a result of unfair persecution among the prisoners. In their despair and inexperience they saw no way out except through the SS, which, of course, sooner or later dropped them when they had served their purpose.

There were a number of effective means by which the prisoners could assert their interests. They were all based on two essential prerequisites: power inside the camp, and a well-organized intelligence service. The pre-eminent task was always to place reliable anti-Fascists in all important positions. When self-government in the prisoner hospital was discussed in this book, it was mentioned that political rather than technical qualifications determined who was to assume the key positions in camp, in the barracks, and in the details. Outsiders and men forced on the prisoners by the SS \tfere seldom able to maintain themselves for any length of time. The machine built up by the old concentrationaries was far too strong for undesirable elements to escape it in the long run. The harsh realities of the merciless struggle for survival, the group interests of the prisoners and the individual’s own pursuit of power and relief, all combined in the same direction.

Functional cohesion was insured by the prisoner in telligence service. Such a system was built up in every camp

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EUGEN KOGON

from the very outset. Reliable key members of the ruling group—or the group seeking power—were systematically wormed into all the important posts, sometimes only after bitter and complex maneuvering. There they were able to ob serve everything that happened in the ranks of the SS and the prisoners, to obtain information on every personnel shift and policy trend, to overhear every conversation. Everything that seemed of the slightest significance was under constant scrutiny. Reports were made not merely at night, when all the prisoners returned to camp from their work, but in important cases immediately. Every detail had its official “ runners,” ostensibly appointed in order to maintain liaison with the numerous scattered SS offices. Actually three-fourths of their time was taken up by work on behalf of the prisoners.

Posts of paramount importance, such as in the Political Department, the prisoner hospital, camp headquarters, or the adjutant’s office were often assigned to capable orderlies of disarming appearance, who were in constant touch with the runners from certain details. A prisoner orderly might be unobtrusively sweeping out an office or a hall, apparently minding only his own business, the SS men never dreaming that his attention was focused on anything but the broom in his hand. It is no exaggeration to say that nothing of any im portance happened in a concentration camp, including even secret information, that did not come to the attention of the prisoners either immediately or else in a very short time. All reports converged on the underground leaders and the circles around them. But only a very few prisoners saw the picture as a whole. These few learned of every internal camp detail, while the mass of the prisoners subsisted on slogans, rumors and gossip.

The elastic wall that separated the SS from the prisoners could be maintained only if the prisoners themselves kept the camp under strict organization and uniform leadership. This alone made it possible to control and even protect those elements that remained outside the organization, knew nothing of it, refused to submit to discipline. It was the Ger man Communists who brought the best qualifications to the accomplishment of this task. In contrast to men of liberal views, they had always been inured to absolute party discipline, and in methods and means they were almost the