The Spanish Holocaust (77 page)

Vázquez Baldominos, Valentí and the Brigada Especial returned to Madrid. Six days later, Ortega sent an order for Valentí and seven members of his Brigada Especial, including Jacinto Rosell Coloma and Andrés Urresola Ochoa, to report to him in Valencia. According to another of the JSU members in the Brigada Especial, Javier Jiménez Martín, the squad was led by ‘a Brazilian named José’: ‘José was someone who we thought was Russian. He spoke Russian and you could really see that he was the almighty power in the organization.’ There can be no
doubt that the ‘Brazilian named José’ was Grigulevich.
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In Valencia, they were ordered by Ortega to go to Barcelona and arrest Andreu Nin. Ortega later admitted that, throughout, he had been following instructions from Orlov.
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Since Zugazagoitia had never trusted Ortega because he was a Communist and incompetent, he had appointed the Civil Governor of Almería, the Socialist Gabriel Morón Díaz, as Inspector and deputy Director General of Security to watch over Ortega. However, on the day of Nin’s arrest, Ortega had got Morón out of the way by sending him to Ciudad Real on a pretext. On 15 June, Valentí and his men, accompanied by Grigulevich, went to Barcelona. On 16 June, Nin, and later that day the other members of the POUM executive, were arrested by local police commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Burillo.
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The POUM newspaper,
La Batalla
, had been banned on 28 May. Now the POUM itself was declared illegal and the POUM militia disbanded. The procedure was justified by a communiqué stating that the DGS had seized from POUM HQ ‘cyphers, telegrams, codes, documents concerning money and arms purchases and smuggling, and with incriminating documents showing that the POUM leadership, namely Andrés Nin, was mixed up in espionage’. Orlov himself reported to Moscow that the Madrid police considered the falsified document ‘absolutely genuine in its double aspects’ – that is to say, both regarding the original Falangist plans for rebel occupation of Madrid and the additions in invisible ink.
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The Catalan President Lluís Companys and his head of propaganda, Jaume Miravitlles, in contrast, thought that the idea of Nin as a fascist spy was absurd and deeply damaging to the Republic. They wrote a letter to the Valencia government to this effect. When Ortega tried to convince Miravitlles by showing him the doctored street map, he burst out laughing saying that it was the first time in history that a spy had signed an incriminating document with his own name.
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Nin was taken first to Valencia and then transferred to Madrid.
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There then arose the problem of how to obey Ortega’s order that Nin be kept isolated during his interrogation and in a place suitable for a prisoner of his category. All possible places of confinement in the capital were already occupied by the fifth columnists arrested in the Golfín case. He was kept in the offices of the Brigada Especial until ‘one of the senior foreign technicians’, no doubt Orlov, offered to hold him in a house at Alcalá de Henares. Vázquez Baldominos accepted Orlov’s offer and proposed that several of his agents guard him. Orlov brushed aside the idea as likely to attract unwanted attention and offered to take responsibility for Nin’s safety. On 17 June, Vázquez Baldominos signed the order
for Nin’s transfer to the house and for just two agents to be posted. Orlov undertook to supply their rations.
⁹⁹

Before being transferred to Alcalá de Henares, Nin was questioned in Madrid four times by Jacinto Rosell as secretary of the Brigada Especial on 18, 19 (twice) and 21 June. Nothing about Rosell’s questions or Nin’s answers in the transcript signed by Nin and published by the POUM itself suggests anything other than a legally conducted interrogation without torture. The often unreliable Jesús Hernández claimed that Nin was tortured and interrogated by Orlov and others for several days, in an effort to make him sign a ‘confession’ of his links with the fifth column. This is highly unlikely; a confession was needed as the basis for a trial and, for that, Nin would have to be seen to be in good physical shape and testify that he had not been tortured. On 21 June, on the orders of Ortega, Vázquez Baldominos sent Rosell and other members of the Brigada Especial to Valencia to collect other POUM prisoners, including Andrade, and escort them to Madrid. At that point, Nin was transferred to Alcalá de Henares.
¹⁰⁰
Because Nin had not confessed, there was little prospect of the desired show trial. Thus Orlov took the decision to eliminate him. A charade was choreographed at the house. On 22 June, between 9.30 and 10.00 p.m., in a heavy rainstorm, some men in military uniform arrived headed by a ‘captain’ and a ‘lieutenant’ who spoke Spanish with a heavy foreign accent. They presented orders for Nin’s hand-over with the forged signatures of Vázquez Baldominos and Miaja. Allegedly, Vázquez Baldominos’s agents resisted but were overpowered, tied up and gagged and, in the struggle, the intruders dropped incriminating ‘evidence’, including banknotes from rebel Spain and German documents. The agents later stated that the ‘captain’ spoke in a friendly way to Nin and called him ‘comrade’. When Vázquez Baldominos began to investigate these events, Orlov could not be contacted.
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It is impossible to say whether the struggle took place or was merely reported as having done so, since it may be that there were members of the Brigada Especial whose loyalty was to Orlov rather than to Vázquez Baldominos. What is certain is that a car containing Orlov, Grigulevich, an NKVD driver, a German NKVD agent and two Spaniards had arrived. Between them, they could have knocked out the two guards, seized Nin and left the incriminating documents. What is not in doubt is that Nin was taken away and shot near the main road halfway between Alcalá de Henares and Perales de Tajuña.
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The impulse for the elimination of Nin came from the Russians and not from the Republican authorities. On the basis simply of Orlov’s
mendacious statements to the FBI after his defection, the American historian Stanley Payne has claimed that ‘Stalin issued a handwritten order, which remains in the KGB archives, that Nin be killed.’
¹⁰³
This is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, as has been seen, Nin had been made the target of a
liter
operation. Moreover, once Nin had refused to sign a false confession, Orlov was not about to have him simply released, even if he had not been tortured. Orlov made oblique reference to what happened in his report about ‘operation NIKOLAI’ sent to Moscow on 24 July 1937. This report describes, ‘in the characteristically cryptic terms he used for
liter
operations’, the seizing of Nin from the house and his murder. As well as revealing that Grigulevich forged the documents used to incriminate Nin, it underlines the participation in the operation of Orlov himself. Grigulevich’s police credentials, as a member of the Brigada Especial, facilitated the passage through controls on the roads.
¹⁰⁴

There is a relevant note in Orlov’s files allegedly written by Grigulevich. Transliterated into English, it refers to ‘N. from Alcala de Enares in the direction of Perane de Tahunia, half way, 100 metres from the road, in the field. [Present were] BOM, SCHWED, JUZIK, two Spaniards. Pierre’s driver VICTOR.’ This means that the scene of the crime and where Nin was buried was between Alcalá de Henares and Perales de Tajuña. The executioners were thus Orlov (Schwed), Grigulevich (Juzik), the German NKVD agent Erich Tacke (BOM), the two unidentified Spaniards and Victor Nezhinsky, an NKVD agent. ‘Pierre’ was Naum Eitingon, head of the NKVD sub-station in Barcelona, and not, as has been suggested, Ernö Gerö.
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Shortly after the disappearance of Nin, Negrín was visited by Orlov, who had been introduced to him many months before as ‘Blackstone’. Orlov claimed to have come to report on the success of his men in establishing what had happened to Nin. He based his version of Nin being kidnapped by Falangists disguised as International Brigaders on incriminating documents allegedly dropped by them and by Nin himself. Orlov asked Negrín if this was enough proof for him to drop the formal investigation. When Negrín said that it was up to the judicial authorities, Orlov asked him if he was convinced personally. Orlov was mortified to be told by the Premier that the story was so neat as to resemble a cheap detective story. Furiously, he shouted that Negrín had insulted the Soviet Union, at which point he was invited to leave. Some hours later, Negrín was visited by the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires, Sergei Marchenko, who said that he had heard of the disagreeable incident of that morning and had come to express his apologies. He offered to have Orlov punished and,
when Negrín replied that the incident was closed, said that Orlov was no longer on the Embassy staff.
¹⁰⁶

When first questioned by Zugazagoitia about what had happened to Nin, Ortega rather gave the game away, saying, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll find him dead or alive.’ Zugazagoitia responded that he was not interested in the corpse of Nin and wanted him found alive. Later the same day, questioned further by the Minister, Ortega claimed that Nin was an agent of the Gestapo whose agents had taken him so that he could not be interrogated by the Republic’s security services. When Zugazagoitia asked how he knew this, Ortega said it was simply something that had crossed his mind. The Minister immediately told Negrín of his suspicions that Ortega was involved in foul play concerning Nin. Negrín told him to get reports about what exactly had happened. According to Fernando Valentí, Vidarte and Zugazagoitia himself, the latter demanded a report from Vázquez Baldominos, who produced two drafts. In the first ‘official’ document, he examined three possibilities – that Nin had been kidnapped by Falangists, by Gestapo agents or by the POUM. In the second, secret, report for Zugazagoitia only, he expressed his opinion that the disappearance of Nin was nothing to do with the Gestapo or the Falange but was rather the result of the conflict between the POUM and the PCE encouraged by the various Russians who were operating in the DGS. It is likely that Vázquez Baldominos reached this conclusion after he was unable to locate Grigulevich or Orlov to discuss the case with them. Grigulevich had already returned to Russia. At this point, Vázquez Baldominos thought that Nin was still alive.
¹⁰⁷

The forged documents were published in a book by the non-existent ‘Max Rieger’, with a preface by José Bergamín demanding the immediate execution without trial of the arrested men. ‘Max Rieger’ was the collective pseudonym of the French Communist journalist Georges Soria, the recently arrived Comintern delegate, the Bulgarian Stoyan Minev, alias Boris Stepanov, and the Spanish Communist intellectual Wenceslao Roces.
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This Comintern version was recited parrot-fashion by Ortega when he was questioned by Zugazagoitia’s under-secretary, Juan-Simeón Vidarte. The incredulous Vidarte responded: ‘Listen, Colonel, are you an idiot or do you think I am?’ Jesús Hernández also claimed to have laughed when Orlov had explained his scheme for framing Nin. When Negrín informed Azaña of Orlov’s version, the President responded that it was all too neat. In fact, on 29 June, Prieto had already told Azaña about the kidnapping of Nin and shared his conviction that Ortega was both an idiot and a Communist.
¹⁰⁹

At first, Negrín had interpreted Ortega’s behaviour as the incompetence of a non-commissioned Carabinero officer promoted beyond his ability. As soon as he was informed that Ortega was a Communist, Negrín and Zugazagoitia agreed that he must be replaced. To minimize friction with the Communist ministers over his removal, they concocted the fiction that he was urgently needed at the front. Morón, the Inspector and deputy Director General of Security, became acting Director General.
¹¹⁰
In response to the international outcry provoked by Nin’s disappearance, Negrín authorized Irujo to set up a judicial investigation to investigate the case. Morón is alleged to have said to Zugazagoitia: ‘Given that the Prime Minister wants to know the truth, you can tell him that the truth is that the kidnapping of Andrés Nin was planned by the Italian Codovila, Comandante Carlos, [Palmiro] Togliatti and the leaders of the Communist Party, Pepe Díaz among them. The order to torture him was given by Orlov and they have all done their best to satisfy Stalin’s desire for the disappearance of the secretary and confidant of the creator of the Red Army. Tell Negrín and if he wants them arrested, I’ll have them all in prison tomorrow.’ Vidarte’s account suggests that Morón’s information came from David Vázquez Baldominos.
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There was an attempt on Vidarte’s life. The front axle on his car had been cut and he crashed into an elm tree.
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For his inquiry into the case, Irujo gave plenary powers to a state prosecutor, Gregorio Peces Barba del Brío, who had Vázquez Baldominos, Fernando Valentí, Jacinto Rosell Coloma and Andrés Urresola Ochoa arrested. Convinced that Vázquez Baldominos was not the guilty party, a furious Gabriel Morón denounced Irujo as a ‘poor lunatic’ and immediately had them released, and they were not rearrested. Although Negrín approved of Morón’s directness, he felt he had to be replaced.
¹¹³
In mid-November he was succeeded by Paulino Gómez Sáiz, who had been highly successful as the government delegate in Catalonia since early June.
¹¹⁴
Negrín, though he supported the sacking of Ortega and had far-reaching suspicions of Orlov, was not prepared to see further revelations undermine the unity of the cabinet. He took the difficult decision to suspend Irujo’s investigation because, just as he opposed the unofficial repression, he also believed that the reckless and indeed treasonous rebellion of the POUM could not be tolerated in wartime.