Authors: Christopher Clark
Russia apparently partial mobilization. Extent not yet discernible with certainty. Military districts Odessa and Kiev fairly certain. Moscow still uncertain. Isolated reports regarding mobilization of the Warsaw military district not yet verified. In other districts, notably Vilna, mobilization not yet ordered. Nevertheless, it is certain that Russia taking some military measures also on the German border which must be regarded as preparation for a war. Probably proclamation of her âPeriod preparatory to War', proclaimed for the whole empire. Frontier guard everywhere equipped for combat and ready to march.
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This dramatic worsening of the situation, further reinforced by the news of partial mobilization on 29 July, injected an element of panic into German diplomacy: worried by messages from London and by the steady stream of data on Russian military preparations, Bethmann suddenly changed his tack. Having undermined Wilhelm's efforts to restrain Vienna on 28 July, he now attempted to do so himself in a series of urgently worded telegrams to Ambassador Tschirschky the next day.
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But his efforts were rendered futile in their turn by the speed of Russian preparations, which threatened to force the Germans into counter-measures before mediation could begin to take effect.
After the news of Russia's mobilization on 30 July, it was merely a matter of time before Berlin responded with military measures of its own. Two days earlier, the minister of war Erich von Falkenhayn had succeeded, after a struggle with Bethmann, in getting troops in training areas ordered back to their bases. The early preparatory measures ordered at this time â buying wheat in the western attack zone, setting special guards on railways and ordering troops to garrisons â could still be kept secret, and could thus, in theory, proceed in parallel with diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict. But the same did not apply to the State of Imminent Danger of War (SIDW), the last stage of preparedness before mobilization. The question whether and when Germany should adopt this measure, which had been in force in Russia since 26 July, was one of the central bones of contention within the Berlin leadership during the last days of peace.
At a meeting on 29 July, the day of Russia's partial mobilization, there was still disagreement among the military chiefs: Falkenhayn, the minister of war, was in favour of declaring the SIDW, while the chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg were for merely extending guard duties on important transport structures. The Kaiser appears to have oscillated between the two options. In Berlin, as in St Petersburg, the deepening concentration of the political leadership on momentous and controversial
sovereign
decisions enabled the head of state to re-emerge as a central participant in the policy-making process. The telegram Wilhelm had received that morning from the Tsar threatening âextreme [Russian] measures that would lead to war' disposed him at first to support the minister of war. But under pressure from Bethmann, he changed his mind, and it was decided that the SIDW would not be declared. Falkenhayn regretted this outcome, but noted in his diary that he could understand the motivations for it, âbecause anyone who believes in, or at least wishes for, the maintenance of peace can hardly support the declaration of the “threat of war”'.
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On 31 July, after further wavering over military measures, news arrived from Ambassador Pourtalès in Moscow that the Russians had ordered total mobilization from midnight on the previous evening. The Kaiser now ordered by telephone that the SIDW be declared, and the order was issued to the armed forces by Falkenhayn at 1.00 p.m. on 31 July. The responsibility for mobilizing first now lay squarely with the Russians, a matter of some importance to the Berlin leadership, who were concerned, in the light of pacifist demonstrations in some of the German cities, that there should be no doubt about the defensive character of Germany's entry into war. Of particular concern was the leadership of the Social Democrats (SPD), who had secured more than a third of all German votes in the last Reichstag elections. Bethmann had met on 28 July with the right-wing SPD leader Albert Südekum, who had promised that the SPD would not oppose a government obliged to defend itself against Russian attack (anti-Russian feeling was as strong within the SPD as it was in the British liberal movement). On 30 July, the chancellor was able to reassure his colleagues that they need not fear, in the event of war, subversion from within by the organized working class.
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In view of developments in Russia, Wilhelm could hardly continue to block declaration of the SIDW, but it is interesting to note that, according to the testimony of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary von Wenninger, this decision had to be âwrung out of him' by Falkenhayn. By afternoon, the sovereign had regained his sang-froid, mainly because he had persuaded himself that he was now acting under external constraint, a matter of great import to nearly all the actors in the July Crisis. During a meeting at which War Minister Falkenhayn was present, Wilhelm gave a spirited exposé of the current situation, in which the entire responsibility for the impending conflict was laid at Russia's door. âHis demeanour and language,' Falkenhayn noted in his diary, âwere worthy of a German Emperor, worthy of a Prussian king' â these were striking words from a soldier at the forefront of those hawks who had excoriated the monarch for his love of peace and his fear of war.
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When the Russian government refused to rescind its mobilization order, Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914.
During the last days of July, the German Kaiser's attention remained focused on Britain. This was partly because, like many Germans, he saw Britain as the power at the fulcrum of the continental system, upon which depended the avoidance of a general war. Wilhelm shared in a broader tendency both to overestimate Britain's weight in continental diplomacy and to underestimate the degree to which its key policy-makers (Grey in particular) had already committed themselves to a specific course. But there was surely also a psychological dimension: England was the place where Wilhelm had desperately sought â but only sometimes achieved â applause, recognition and affection. It represented much that he admired â a navy equipped with the best guns and equipment that modern science could build, wealth, sophistication, worldliness and (at least in the circles he encountered on his visits) a kind of aristocratic, poised comportment that he admired but found impossible to emulate. It was the home of his dead grandmother, of whom Wilhelm later remarked that, had she lived on, she would never have allowed Nicky and George to gang up on him like this. It was the kingdom of his envied and detested uncle, Edward VII, who had succeeded (where Wilhelm had failed) in improving the international standing of his country. And of course it was the birthplace of his mother, now dead for thirteen years, with whom he had had such a troubled and unresolved relationship. A tangle of emotions and associations was always in play when Wilhelm attempted to interpret British policy.
The Kaiser was hugely encouraged by a message from his brother Prince Henry of Prussia on 28 July, suggesting that George V intended to keep Britain out of the war. Early on the morning of the 26th, Henry, who had been yachting at Cowes, rushed to Buckingham Palace to take his leave from the British king before returning to Germany. A conversation had taken place between the two men, in which Henry claimed that George V had said: âWe shall try all we can to keep out of this and shall remain neutral.'
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These words were cabled to the Kaiser as soon as the prince reached Kiel harbour on 28 July. William viewed this statement as tantamount to an official assurance of British neutrality. When Tirpitz challenged him on his reading, Wilhelm replied, with a characteristic blend of pomposity and naivety, âI have the word of a king, and that is enough for me.'
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Whether the British king had in fact uttered these words is unclear. His diary is predictably uninformative on the subject â it states simply: âHenry of Prussia came to see me early; he returns at once to Germany.' But another account of the meeting, probably composed by the monarch at the request of Edward Grey, provides more detail. According to this source, when Henry of Prussia asked George V what England would do in the event of a European war, the British monarch replied:
I don't know what we shall do, we have no quarrel with anyone, and I hope we shall remain neutral. But if Germany declared war on Russia, & France joins Russia, then I am afraid we shall be dragged into it. But you can be sure that I and my Government will do all we can to prevent a European war!
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There was, then, a stiff measure of wishful thinking in Henry's report of the exchange, though we cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that George V adjusted his own account of the meeting to the expectations of the foreign secretary, in which case the truth may lie somewhere between the two. In any case, Henry's telegram was enough to replenish the Kaiser's confidence that Britain would stay out, and his optimism seemed to be borne out by the reluctance of the British government, and specifically of Grey, to make known their intentions.
Wilhelm was thus shocked to learn, on the morning of 30 July, of a conversation between Grey and the German ambassador, Count Lichnowsky, in which the former had warned that whereas Britain would stand aside if the conflict remained confined to Austria, Serbia and Russia (a bizarre notion), it would intervene on the side of the Entente if Germany and France were to become involved. The ambassador's dispatch provoked a rush of enraged jottings from the German monarch: the English were âscoundrels' and âmean shopkeepers' who wanted to force Germany to leave Austria âin the lurch' and who dared to threaten Germany with dire consequences while refusing to pull their continental allies back from the fray.
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When news arrived of the Russian general mobilization on the following day, Wilhelm's thinking turned once again to Britain. Seen in combination with Grey's warnings, the Russian mobilization âproved' to Wilhelm that England now planned to exploit the âpretext' provided by the widening conflict in order to âplay the card of all the European nations in England's favour against us!'
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Then, shortly after 5 p.m. on the afternoon of Saturday 1 August, came sensational news. Just a few minutes after Berlin had issued the order for a general mobilization, a telegram arrived from Lichnowsky in London describing a meeting that morning with the British foreign secretary. It seemed that Grey was offering not just to stay out of the war if Germany refrained from attacking France, but to vouch for French neutrality as well. The text of the cable was as follows:
Sir Edward Grey has just sent word to me by Sir W. Tyrrell that he hopes that he will be able this afternoon, as a result of a council of ministers that is just taking place [Lichnowsky dispatched the telegram at 11.14 a.m.] to make a statement to me which may prove helpful in preventing the great catastrophe. To judge by a remark of Sir W. Tyrrell's this seems to mean that in the event of our not attacking France, England, too, would remain neutral and would guarantee France's passivity. I shall learn the details this afternoon. Sir Edward Grey had just called me upon the telephone and asked whether I thought I could give an assurance that in the event of France remaining neutral in a war between Russia and Germany we should not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility for such a guarantee and he will use this assurance at today's Cabinet meeting. Supplementary: Sir W. Tyrrell urgently begged me to use my influence to prevent our troops from violating the French frontier. Everything depended upon that. He said that in one case where German troops had already crossed the frontier, the French troops had withdrawn.
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Stunned by this unexpected offer, the decision-makers in Berlin got busy drafting a warmly positive reply to the note. But the draft was incomplete when a further telegram arrived from London at around 8 p.m.: âAs follow-up to [my previous telegram], Sir W. Tyrrell has just been to see me and told me that Sir Edward Grey wants this afternoon to make proposals for England's neutrality, even in the event of our being at war with France as well as with Russia. I shall be seeing Sir Edward Grey at 3.30 and shall report at once.'
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The messages from London set the scene for a violent dispute between the Emperor and the chief of the General Staff. The German mobilization was already underway, which meant that the vast machinery of the Schlieffen Plan was in motion. After seeing Lichnowsky's first telegram, Wilhelm took the view that although the mobilization
order
could not for the moment be revoked, he would be willing to halt any move against France in return for a promise of Anglo-French neutrality. Supported by Bethmann, Tirpitz and Jagow, he ordered that there were to be no further troop movements until the arrival of a further message from London clarifying the nature of the British offer. But whereas Wilhelm and Bethmann wished to seize the opportunity to avoid war in the west, Moltke took the view that, once set in motion, the general mobilization could not be halted. âThis gave rise to an extremely lively and dramatic dispute,' one oberver recalled. âMoltke, very excited, with trembling lips, insisted on his position. The Kaiser and the Chancellor and all the others pleaded with him in vain.'
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It would be suicidal, Moltke argued, to leave Germany's back exposed to a mobilizing France; in any case the first patrols had already entered Luxembourg and the 16th Division from Trier was following close behind. Wilhelm was unimpressed. He had the order put through to Trier that the 16th Division be halted before the borders of Luxembourg. When Moltke implored the Kaiser not to hinder the occupation of Luxembourg on the grounds that this would jeopardize German control of its railway route, Wilhelm retorted: âUse other routes!' The argument reached a deadlock. In the process, Moltke had become almost hysterical. In a private aside to Minister of War Erich von Falkenhayn, the chief of the General Staff confided, close to tears, âthat he was a totally broken man, because this decision by the Kaiser demonstrated to him that the Kaiser still hoped for peace'.
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