THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES (141 page)

92
. Quoted in Henry Kissinger, “Reflections of Bismarck,” in
Philosophers and Kings
, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow (Braziller, 1970), 918.

93
. Kessel, Moltke, 747 – 748; quoted by Rothenberg, 310.

94
. James McPherson,
Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution
(Oxford University Press, 1990), viii; see also Harold Hyman,
A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution
(Knopf, 1973).

95
. Bevin Alexander,
Robert E. Lee's Civil War
(Adams Media Corp., 1998).

96
. Shelby Foote,
The Civil War: A Narrative History
(Random House, 1986).

97
.
New Cambridge Modern History
, vol. 11, 273, 284 – 294.

98
. See Paul M. Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
, which documents the repeated bankruptcies of kingly and territorial states.

99
. Osiander, 312, n. 165, speech by Wilhelm before the Brandenburg regional parliament, February 24, 1892, quoted in Christian Graf von Krockow,
Die Deutschen in ihren Jahrhundert, 1890 – 1990
(Rowohlt, 1990), 17.

1
. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt,
Tragic Choices
(New York: Norton, 1978).

2
. See also Hendrick Spruyt, “Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order,”
International Organization
48(1994): 527.

3
. Jeremy Black,
War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents
, 1450 – 2000 (Yale University Press, 1998), 133. “War is not always won by the big battalions and the determinist economic account that would explain success in international relations in terms of the economic strength of particular states… is open to question.” See also Niall Ferguson,
The Pity of War
(New York: Basic Books, 1999).

1
. In his essay “The Future of the Nation-State,” David Beetham makes a similar assertion: “If we consider European history, then it is only the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century that saw the definitive emergence of the centralized state, successfully claiming a monopoly of lawmaking and enforcement power over unified geographical territory and independence from any external authority…. If that process of state formation is comparatively recent in historical terms… it was only as late as the nineteenth century that the idea became widely accepted that the proper boundaries of the state should coincide, not with the particular territory that had been historically acquired by dynastic alliance or conquest, but with a given people, who constituted a nation.” David Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in
The Idea of the Modern State
, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall (Open University Press, 1984), 209.

2
. Michael Howard,
War and the Nation-State
(Clarendon Press, 1978), 103.

3
. Gregor Dallas,
At the Heart of a Tiger: Clemenceau and His World, 1841 – 1929
(Macmillan, 1993), 501.

4
. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe
(Doubleday, 1948), 259.

5
. Stalin issued orders to proceed with the development of a Soviet atomic bomb in June 1942, possibly because of information relayed by Klaus Fuchs concerning the Manhattan Project, on which he was working at Los Alamos.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist
(December 15, 1967); Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Mandate for Change
(New American Library, 1963), 82, n. 5; and David Holloway, “Research Note: Soviet Thermonuclear Development,”
International Security
4 (1979 – 1980): 192 – 197.

6
. “Tojo Ordered Japan's Own Atomic-Bomb Project: Report,”
Agence France-Presse
, July 20,1995.

7
. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,”
Political Science Quarterly
7 (1994).

8
. Martin van Creveld,
The Rise and Decline of the State
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), 399 – 401.

9
. As exemplified by Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. See Tom Kenworth and Lois Romano, “Nichols Prosecutor Cites ‘Avalanche of Evidence‘; Closing Arguments Underway in Bombing Trial; Defense Paints Star U.S. Witness as Drug User,”
Washington Post
, December 16, 1997, A8.

10
. Daniel R. Headrick,
The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851 – 1945
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

11
. See e.g., Keegan,
A History of Warfare
, 305 – 306; and Harvey A. DeWeerd, “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian,”
in Makers of Modern Strategy
, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton University Press, 1944), 289.

12
. Mary Fulbrook,
The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918 – 1990
(Oxford University Press, 1991), 296.

13
. Eric Helleiner,
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

14
. Ralph Bryant, “Global Change: Increasing Economic Integration and Eroding Political Sovereignty,”
Brookings Review
12 (1994): 42.

15
. Quoted in Jeffrey A. Friden,
Banking on the World: The Politics of International Finance
(Harper & Row, 1987), 114 – 115; see also Walter Wriston, “Technology and Sovereignty,”
Foreign Affairs
67 (1988): 63.

16
. The Bush administration that took office in 2001 was, in this respect, a continuation of its predecessor, the Clinton administration. Clinton and Blair were joined in the pursuit of this new order by the Schroeder government in Germany as well. William Boston, “The Battle for Berlin: Does Gerhard Schroeder Have What It Takes to Modernize Europe's Largest Economy?”
Wall Street Journal
, September 29, 1999, R12; and William Drozdiak, “U.S. Urges ‘Third Way' between European Left and Right,”
Washington Post
, August 20,1998, A23.

17
. Mancias, 192: “The ideology of democracy, freedom and equality provided much of the conceptual material for the legitimation of the state. But it may be that… these ideas now persuade too much.”

18
. See, e.g., “State of the First Amendment Survey” conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Connecticut, Feb. 26 – Mar. 24, 1999; see also Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, July 19, 1991, Virginia Commonwealth Poll, match #4.

19
. In Poland, the media “raised expectations, then fueled frustration. It spread official propaganda; it also provided alternative information.” Tomasz Goban-Klas,
The Orchestration of the Media: The Politics of Mass Communications in Communist Poland and the Aftermath
(Westview Press, 1994), 4.

20
. Or in unusual cases like the BBC, partly independent, partly government controlled, the media organization is driven to seek audiences of the size of those captured by those networks that are seeking consumers.

21
. Michael Howard, “Reflections on Strategic Deception,” Faculty Seminar on British Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1994.

22
. See the excellent essay by A. Michael Froomkin, “The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage,”
Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure
, ed. Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

23
. Robert Skidelsky,
John Maynard Keynes: A Biography
(London: Macmillan, 1983).

24
. Mark V. Tushnet, “The Supreme Court 1998 Term, Foreword,” 113
Harvard Law Review
(1999), 26; see also Betty Sue Flowers, “The Economic Myth” (Center for International Business Education and Research, Graduate School Business, University of Texas at Austin, December 1995).

25
.
Hopwood
v.
State of Texas
, 999 F. Supp. 872 (1998).

26
.
U.S. v. Lopez
, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
Roe v. Wade
, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); and
Griswold v. Connecticut
, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).

27
. Michael Walzer, “The Concept of Civil Society,” in
Toward a Global Civil Society
, ed. M. Walzer (Berghahn Books, 1995), 13,17 (emphasis supplied).

28
. Ibid., 13.

29
. See Peter Drucker,
The Post-Capitalist Society
(Harper Business, 1993) and Peter Drucker, “The Post-Capitalist World,”
Public Interest
109 (1992): 89; Peter Drucker, “The Age of Social Transformation,”
Atlantic Monthly
, November 1994, 53.

30
. It is often said that we owe to Einstein and the theory of relativity the new and characteristic point of view of this century, perhaps, it is said, even something of our “relativism” in ethics. Like the Copernican revolution that reoriented man in the solar system, this intellectual breakthrough is thought to have reoriented contemporary man. I doubt this.
In the first place (unlike the ideas of Copernicus and Kepler), there is nothing in the general or special theories of relativity that has much to do with the ordinary perceptions of everyday life. Second, there is nothing in Einstein's theories—except possibly the names of the theories themselves—that bears on relativism. Einstein's point, in fact, seems if anything rather the opposite: energy and mass can be related by virtue of their common relation to a constant, the speed of light. Third, there is another candidate that is more appropriate to this role. Einstein believed, when he presented the special theory of relativity, that the universe was composed of a single galaxy. Hubble has shown us that this is not the case, indeed that it is so far from being the case that our peripheral position in a peripheral galaxy appears to reduce us to cosmic insignificance. It is Hubble's observations that have, and will have, a profound effect on the attitude of every person to his or her life. How each person reacts to this repositioning is partly a matter of temperament, I suppose, but everyone will feel something, perhaps something like nothingness.

31
. Michael Howard,
War and the Nation-State
(Clarendon Press, 1978), 14.

32
. “Government Cleared in 1993 Branch Davidian Deaths,”
Houston Chronicle
, September 21, 2000, A17.

33
. Sanford Levinson, “The Embarrassing Second Amendment,”
Yale Law Journal
99 (1989): 637.

34
. Here again, the fundamental difference between the American idea of popular sovereignty and the European idea surfaces. Whereas Europeans and Americans can agree that “a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence lies with the state, whose forces can only use violence on the authorization of responsible political leaders,” the American view holds that the right to delegate this monopoly to the State lies with the people, who, as they have done in the Second Amendment, may take a residual interest, as it were, in the monopoly. The European view assumes that the State, being sovereign, has been fully delegated the sovereignty of the people and thus has the monopoly so long as it can keep it. These fundamental differences are discussed in Philip Bobbitt,
Three Dogmas of Sovereignty
(unpublished manuscript).