The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (59 page)

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “We would expect that, yes, Senator.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

A review of CIA records on this topic identified no records to indicate that al-Qa’ida had conducted “broadly-based” interrogation resistance training. The CIA repeatedly represented that Abu Zubaydah “wrote al Qaeda’s manual on resistance techniques.”
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This representation is also not supported by CIA records. When asked about interrogation resistance training, Abu Zubaydah stated:

“ . . . both Khaldan camp and Faruq [terrorist training] camp at least periodically included instruction in how to manage captivity. He explained that in one instance, Khaldan had an Egyptian who had collected and studied information from a variety of sources (including manuals and people who had been in ‘different armies’). This Egyptian ‘talked to the brothers about being strong’ and ‘not talking.’ Abu Zubaydah’s response to this was to take him aside—out of the view of the brothers—and explain to him that it was more important to have a ‘super plan—not expect a superman.’ ”
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Abu Zubaydah explained that he informed trainees at the training camp that ‘“no brother’ should be expected to hold out for an extended time,” and that captured individuals will provide information in detention. For that reason, the captured individuals, he explained, should “expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured.”
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CIA TESTIMONY

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “All those involved in the questioning of detainees have been
carefully chosen and carefully screened
.
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The average age of our officers interrogating detainees is 43. Once they are selected, they must complete more than 250 hours of specialized training for this program before they are allowed to come face-to-face with a terrorist. And we require additional field work under the direct supervision of an experienced officer before a new interrogator can direct an interrogation.”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “The Army field manual was also written to guide the conduct of a much larger, much younger force that trains primarily to detain large numbers of enemy prisoners of war. That’s not what the CIA program is.”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “[The Army Field Manual has] got to be done by hundreds and hundreds of teenagers in battlefield tactical situations.”

SENATOR JOHN WARNER: “Without the benefit of a tenth of the training of your professionals.”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Exactly.”
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SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This CIA testimony is incongruent with internal CIA records and the operational history of the program.

• On November █, 2002, after the completion of the first formal interrogation training class, ███CTC Legal, ██████, asked CTC attorney █████ to “[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled in, observing or teaching—or otherwise associated with—the class.”
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  The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating: “I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House.”
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  Contrary to CIA Director Hayden’s comments and Statement for the Record that “[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,” CIA records suggest that the vetting sought by ████ did not take place. The Committee reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.
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• Director Hayden’s testimony on the required hours of training for CIA interrogators is inconsistent with the early operational history of the program. Records indicate that CIA officers and contractors who conducted CIA interrogations in 2002 did not undergo any interrogation training. The first interrogator training course, held in November 2002, required approximately 65 hours of classroom and operational instruction.
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  The initial training was designed and conducted by ████, who had been sanctioned for using abusive interrogation techniques in the 1980s, and
  █████
  , who had never been trained in, or conducted interrogations. In April 2003, █████ [CIA OFFICER 1] was certified as an interrogator after only a week of classroom training.
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  In 2003, interrogator certification required only two weeks of classroom training (a maximum of 80 hours) and 20 additional hours of operational training and/or actual interrogations.
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CIA TESTIMONY

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “All interrogation sessions in which one of these lawful procedures is authorized for use has to be
observed by nonparticipants
to ensure the procedures are applied appropriately and safely.
Any observer can call ‘knock it off’ at any time.
They are authorized to terminate an interrogation immediately should they believe anything unauthorized is occurring.”

SENATOR SNOWE: “So you also mentioned that there are non-participants who are observing the interrogation process. Who are these non-participants?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “They could be other interrogators, medical personnel, chief of base, debriefers, analysts.”

SENATOR SNOWE: “Do they ever raise concerns during this process, during these interrogations?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Everybody watching has—every individual has an absolute right to stop the procedure just by saying ‘stop.’ ”

SENATOR SNOWE: “Did it happen? It’s never happened?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “No, we’re not aware. I’m sorry. John [Rizzo] and [
██████
] point out it’s just not the ability to stop it; it is an obligation to stop it if they believe something is happening that is unauthorized.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records, for example:

• During the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN objected to the continued use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, stating that it was “highly unlikely” Abu Zubaydah possessed the threat information CIA Headquarters was seeking.
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  When the interrogation team made this assessment, they stated that the pressures being applied to Abu Zubaydah approached “the legal limit.”
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  CIA Headquarters directed the interrogation team to continue to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and instructed the team to refrain from using “speculative language as to the legality of given activities” in CIA cables.
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• During the KSM interrogation sessions, the CIA chief of Base directed that the medical officer at the detention site not directly contact CIA Headquarters via the CIA’s classified internal email system, to avoid establishing “grounds for further legal action.” Instead, the chief of Base stated that any information on KSM’s interrogations would be first reviewed by the chief of Base before being released to CIA Headquarters.”
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  Prior to KSM’s third waterboard session of March 13, 2003, the on-site medical officer raised concerns that the session would exceed the limits of draft OMS guidelines for the waterboard.
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  The waterboard session was conducted after an approval email from a CTC attorney at CIA Headquarters.
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  The medical officer would later write that “[t]hings are slowly evolving form [
  sic
  ] [medical officers] being viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keeping everyone’s butt out of trouble.”
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• As was the case with several other CIA detainees, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was repeatedly subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques at the direction of CIA Headquarters, despite opposition from CIA interrogators.
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• The CIA Inspector General Special Review states that CIA “psychologists objected to the use of on-site psychologists as interrogators and raised conflict of interest and ethical concerns.” According to the Special Review, this was “based on a concern that the on-site psychologists who were administering the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques] participated in the evaluations, assessing the effectiveness and impact of the [CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques] on the detainees.
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  In January 2003, CIA Headquarters requested that at least one other psychologist be present who was not physically participating in the administration of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. According to ████OMS, however, the problem still existed because “psychologist/interrogators continue to perform both functions.”
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CIA TESTIMONY

SENATOR SNOWE: “Did any CIA personnel express reservations about being engaged in the interrogation or these techniques that were used?”

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “I’m not aware of any. These guys are more experienced. No.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This statement is incongruent with CIA records. For example, from August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. The non-stop use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was disturbing to CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN. These CIA personnel objected to the continued use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but were instructed by CIA Headquarters to continue using the techniques. The interrogation using the CIA’s enhanced techniques continued more than two weeks after CIA personnel on site questioned the legality “of escalating or even maintaining the pressure” on Abu Zubaydah. CIA records include the following reactions of CIA personnel expressing “reservations about being engaged in the interrogations” and the use of the techniques:

• August 5, 2002: “want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a place he’s ever been before in his medical career . . . It is visually and psychologically very uncomfortable.”
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• August 8, 2002: “Today’s first session . . . had a profound effect on all staff members present . . . it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much further . . . everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue . . . we cannot guarantee how much longer.”
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• August 8, 2002: “Several on the team profoundly affected . . . some to the point of tears and choking up.”
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• August 9, 2002: “two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer” away from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the enhanced interrogation techniques.
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• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video “has produced strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the pressure.” With respect to viewing the interrogation tapes, “prepare for something not seen previously.”
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The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez—via email—instructed the CIA interrogation team to not use “speculative language as to the legality of given activities” in CIA cable traffic.
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Shortly thereafter, circa December 2002, the CIA general counsel had a “real concern” about the lack of details in cables of what was taking place at CIA detention sites, noting that “cable traffic reporting was becoming thinner,” and that “the agency cannot monitor the situation if it is not documented in cable traffic.”
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The CIA’s chief of interrogations—who provided training to CIA interrogators—expressed his view that there was “excess information” in the Abu Zubaydah interrogation cables.”
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CIA TESTIMONY

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: “Any
deviations from approved procedures and practices that are seen are to he immediately reported and immediate corrective action taken
, including referring to the CIA Office of Inspector General and to the Department of Justice, as appropriate.”

SAMPLING OF INFORMATION IN CIA RECORDS

This testimony is not supported by CIA records, for example:

• Multiple individuals involved in the interrogation of CIA detainee ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri failed to report inappropriate activity. With regard to the unauthorized use of a handgun and power drill to threaten al-Nashiri, one CIA interrogator stated he did not report the incidents because he believed they fell below the reporting threshold for the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, while noting he did not receive guidance on reporting requirements. The chief of Base stated he did not report the incidents because he assumed the interrogator had CIA Headquarters’ approval and because two senior CIA officials had instructed him to scale back on reporting from the detention site to CIA Headquarters. The inappropriate activity was discovered during a chance exchange between recently arrived CIA Headquarters officials and security officers.
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• There were significant quantitative and qualitative differences between the waterboarding of KSM, as applied, and the description of the technique provided to the Department of Justice. Neither CIA interrogators nor CIA attorneys reported these deviations to the inspector general or the Department of Justice at the time.
  
• Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques for which they were not approved.
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