The Secret Sentry (48 page)

These anecdotal conclusions were confirmed by a 2006 report by Major General Barbara Fast, the former commandant of the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, in Arizona, which found that army intelligence specialists were spending more than
one year out of every two deployed overseas, and that as a result, reenlistment rates among these specialists, including SIGINT
collectors, were falling fast. Many units returning from Iraq were reporting that in addition to being exhausted and short
of personnel, they had had to leave behind their equipment, which meant that they had nothing to train with once they got
back to the United States. Fast’s conclusion was that the intense operations tempo associated with trying to fight three wars
simultaneously was “consuming the MI [military intelligence] force.”
⁷⁸

Searching for a Cure

Today, NSA’s modernization programs are, to varying degrees, well over bud -get and years behind schedule. Recent revelations
in the press show that yet another of the agency’s hugely expensive modernization programs, Turbulence, has also experienced
significant delays and cost overruns, raising doubts within the U.S. intelligence community as to whether it will ever work
the way it was originally envisioned. The serious problems being experienced by NSA in bringing this program to fruition prompted
intense criticism from members of the Senate intelligence committee during a rare public hearing in March 2007, where they
forcefully made clear their concern about where NSA’s transformation efforts were headed, writing, “NSA’s transformation program,
Trailblazer, has been terminated because of severe management problems, and its successor, Turbulence, is experiencing the
same management deficiencies that have plagued the NSA since at least the end of the Cold War.”
⁷⁹

But these problems may, in fact, be the tip of the iceberg. As strange as it may sound, one of the most urgent problems facing
NSA is a severe shortage of electrical power, which threatens to derail the agency’s efforts at Fort Meade unless fixed. It
will come as no surprise that NSA is a massive consumer of electricity, which, as every American consumer knows, is an increasingly
expensive commodity. As of 2000, NSA’s annual electricity bill from Baltimore Gas and Electric amounted to twenty-one million
dollars. But higher gasoline prices and the continued deterioration of the national electricity grid resulted in NSA’s annual
bill rising to almost thirty million dollars by 2007.
⁸⁰
However, the rising cost of electricity is not what is currently strangling NSA. Rather, during the 1990s and post 9/11 era,
the agency neglected to build new power generators needed to run the ever-growing number of computers and other high-tech
systems that the agency has been buying en masse since 9/11. The situation has become so grave that in many NSA offices at
Fort Meade the installation of new computers and data processing systems has been put on hold because there is not enough
electricity to run them, and NSA’s power grid has become so overtaxed that there have been occasional brownouts of key operational
offices for as much as half a day. However, press reports indicate some resistance within the Office of Management and Budget
to giving NSA additional funds because the agency has once again failed to provide a detailed accounting of why the money
is needed or how it will be spent.
⁸¹

As a result, much of the groundswell of support that NSA once enjoyed inside Congress and the U.S. intelligence community
after 9/11 has slowly slipped away as it has become clear that the agency’s modernization and reform efforts are not being
effectively managed. A former NSA official quoted in a press report said, “Right after Sept. 11 and the ensuing period, I
think NSA could have gotten anything they wanted. They lost the support because they didn’t handle it properly.”
⁸²

So one of the top items on General Alexander’s to-do list today is to try to right the ship and put NSA’s internal reforms
and modernization efforts back on track, while at the same time increasing the agency’s productivity and maintaining its reputation
within the U.S. intelligence community. Fixing all of these problems at once will not be easy or cheap. In January 2007, NSA
asked Congress for an additional one billion dollars in supplemental funding, and another one billion for 2008. All this was
on top of NSA’s huge eight-billion-dollar annual budget already approved by Congress.
⁸³

And yet, despite all the money, resources, and high-level attention being lavished on NSA, there are signs that the agency’s
“golden days” may be almost over. Agency insiders interviewed for this book understand that following the Bush administration,
a greater degree of fiscal austerity and stricter oversight controls will almost certainly return. A now-retired senior NSA
official said it best: “I guess we are going to have to go back to the ‘bad old days’ of doing more with less. It was a great
ride while it lasted.”
⁸⁴

Acknowledgments

For the past year the National Security Archive in downtown Washington, D.C., has been my home away from home. Without the
generous and unstinting support of the archive’s director, Tom Blanton, and his staff of dedicated professionals I would not
have been able to complete this work. Special thanks go to the archive’s general counsel, Meredith Fuchs, and longtime friend
Dr. William Burr, both of whom kept me on track and helped me avoid pitfalls in the road.

Three longtime friends and colleagues deserve special thanks for the incredible support they provided me. For the past twenty-five
years, Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson has been a veritable fount of knowledge and wisdom about the U.S. intelligence community,
generously providing me with thousands of pages of documents from his collection and pointing me to where more could be found.
He is a walking encyclopedia about the U.S. intelligence community. My friend and coauthor Dr. Cees Wiebes did more to push
me along than just about anyone else, even if I did not want to go. Every author needs someone like him to keep them honest
and their eyes on the prize. And last but not least, I owe a debt of gratitude to my friend and colleague of many years Rosemary
Lark, without whom this project would never have been completed.

Over the past twenty-five years, hundreds of individuals freely provided me with documents, leads, and advice. I wish to particularly
acknowledge to assistance of the following individuals: Dr. Richard J. Aldrich, Dr. David Alvarez, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.,
Dr. Dwayne A. Day, Ralph Erskine, Angela Gendron, Nicky Hager, Seymour M. Hersh, Dr. Robert S. Hopkins, Alf R. Jacobsen, Dr.
David Kahn, Miriam A. Kleiman, Dr. Edwin E. Moïse, Dr. Olav Riste, Bill Robinson, Dr. Martin Rudner, Susan Strange, Dr. Athan
Theoharis, and Dr. Wesley Wark. Any omissions are purely the fault of the author.

During the past twenty-five years, it has been my pleasure to sit down for lengthy and candid conversations with dozens of
former and current officials of the NSA and other agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, many of whom have sadly passed
away since I began my research. These men and women helped me sketch out the history of an agency that remains to this day
largely invisible, even to those who hold a Top Secret Codeword security clearance. Almost all did so with the understanding
that I would not name them, and I have respected their wishes, despite the fact that a number of these individuals have since
passed away. Without their help I never would have been able to even begin to understand what NSA does or how important it
is.

My heartfelt thanks go to Colonel William J. Williams, USAF (ret.), and his staff at the National Security Agency’s Center
for Cryptologic History (CCH). The work of the CCH historians runs throughout this history. It is fair to say that this book
would not have been possible without them.

And finally, I would also like to extend his most heartfelt thanks to the staff of the National Archives at College Park,
Mary land, for helping me conduct my research over the past two decades. I will always remain deeply indebted to the late
John E. Taylor, the doyen of military archivists at the National Archives, whose encyclopedic knowledge of the records based
on his fifty years at the archives was unparalleled anywhere. His passing in September 2008 at the age of eighty-seven marks
the end of an era. The staff of the NARA Library at College Park, especially its amiable head Jeff Hartley, helped me work
the CIA’s CREST database of declassified documents through many trials and tribulations, and stoically processed the vast
amount of declassified documents that I brought to their desks day after day without complaint. They are wonderful people.

My deepest gratitude goes to Peter Ginna, my publisher at Bloomsbury Press, who to his eternal credit took a risk and agreed
to publish this book. Michael O’Connor and Pete Beatty did the heavy lifting at Bloomsbury getting this opus ready for publication.
Special thanks go to my editor James O. Wade, who performed a Herculean effort to get this manuscript into final form. And
last but not least, my agent, Rick Broadhead, worked tirelessly on this project, believing implicitly in the importance of
what I was trying to accomplish.

Notes Glossary

AIA      Air Intelligence Agency

ASA      Army Security Agency

CALL     Center for Army Lessons Learned

CCH      Center for Cryptologic History, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

CNSG    Crane Naval Security Group Archives

DCI      Director of Central Intelligence

DDEL     Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

DDRS     Declassified Document Retrieval Service

DOCID     Document Identification number

DOD     Department of Defense

FBI     Federal Bureau of Investigations

FOIA     Obtained by Freedom of Information Act request

GPO     Government Printing Office

HCC     Historic Cryptologic Collection, contained in Record Group 457 at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland

HSTL     Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

INR     State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INSCOM     U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

JCS     Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFKL     John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

LBJL     Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

NA, CP       National Archives, College Park, Maryland

NARA        National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

NIO IIM     National Intelligence Officer Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

NSA OH     NSA Oral History, held by the NSA’s Center for Cryptologic History, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and obtained through
FOIA

PRO     Public Records Office, now National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, England

RG-    Record Group

RUMRA     NSA internal designation for the Russian communications target: “RU” = Russia; “M” = Army; “RA” = mainline Morse code
circuit

SSA     Signal Security Agency

Notes

Prologue

1. Background and character of Clarke from U.S. Army biographical data sheet, Brigadier General Carter Weldon Clarke, USA
(Ret.); interviews with W. Preston Corderman, Frank B. Rowlett, Morton A. Rubin; NSA, oral history,
Interview with Carter W. Clarke
, May 3, 1983; NSA OH-01-74 to NSA OH-14-81, oral history,
Interview with Frank B. Rowlett
, 1976, p. 33, NSA FOIA. See also memorandum, Ohly to McNarney,
Your Proposals with Respect to the Handling of Communications
Intelligence and Communications Security
, May 12, 1949, p. 1, RG-330, entry 199, box 97, file: CD 22-1-23, NA, CP; Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee,
Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement
(New York: Crown, 1992), p. 24.

2. NSA OH-01-74 to NSA OH-14-81, oral history
, Interview with Frank B. Rowlett
, June 26, 1974, p. 76, NSA FOIA.

3. For the genesis of the SIGINT effort against the USSR in 1943, see Robert Louis Benson and Cecil Phillips,
History of VENONA
(Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), vol. 1, p. 12, NSA FOIA; Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds.,
VENONA: Soviet Espionage
and the American Response, 1939–1957
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996), p. xiii. For the intense secrecy surrounding the Russian code-breaking
effort, see memorandum, Corderman to Taylor,
Draft of “Priorities Schedule,”
March 6, 1943, and memorandum, Taylor to Corderman,
SPSIS 311.5—General—Draft of “Priorities Schedule
,” March 8, 1943, both in RG-457, HCC, box 1432, file: SSS Intercept Priorities, NA, CP; Benson and Phillips,
History of
VENONA
, vol. 1, p. 16 and fn27. For the U.S. Navy’s parallel SIGINT effort against the Soviet Union, see Naval Communications Activity,
Russian Language Section: July 1943–January 1948
, NSA FOIA via Dr. David Alvarez; Dr. Thomas R. Johnson,
American Cryptology During the Cold
War, 1945–1989
(Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), bk. 1,
The Struggle for
Centralization, 1945–1960
, p. 159, NSA FOIA. For the problematic cooperation between the army and navy on the Russian problem, see Thomas L. Burns,
The Origins of the National Security
Agency: 1940–1952
(Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1990), p. 25, NSA FOIA.

4. SRH-364,
History of the Signal Security Agency, 1939–1945
, vol. 1, p. 139ff, RG-457, entry 9002 Special Research Histories, NA, CP; “Hot Weather Policy,”
NSA Newsletter
, June 1956, p. 23; Debbie DuBois, “Those Good Old Days,”
NSA Newsletter
, December 1979, p. 7; Jack Gurin, “Dear Old Arlington Hall,”
NSA Newsletter
, February 1981, p. 14, all NSA FOIA; “From Coeds to Codewords: How a Girls College Became the Nerve Center for USASA’s Global
Operations,”
Hallmark
, September 1970, p. 8, INSCOM FOIA; “Forty One and Strong: Arlington Hall Station,”
INSCOM Journal
, June 1983, pp. 7–12, INSCOM FOIA; U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command,
INSCOM and Its Heritage
(Arlington, VA: INSCOM History Office, 1985), Special Historical Series, pp. 137–38, INSCOM FOIA.

5. For keeping the SIGINT effort against the Soviets a secret from the British, see Benson and Phillips,
History of VENONA
, vol. 1, p. 16 and fn27. For details of the British code-breaking effort against the USSR during World War II, including
the fact that this operation was kept secret from the United States, see Benson and Phillips,
History of VENONA
, vol. 1, pp. 30–31; Burns,
Origins of the National Security Agency
, p. 25; NSA OH-01-79, oral history,
Interview with
Brigadier John H. Tiltman (ret.)
, January 30, 1979, p. 1, NSA FOIA; NSA OH-20-93, oral history,
Interview with Oliver R. Kirby
, June 11, 1993, pp. 10–11, NSA FOIA; handwritten notes labeled “CDR Dunderdale,” undated, in OP-20-G organizational file,
NSA FOIA.

6. Hallock was one of the first men to excavate the old capital of the Achaemenid civilization at Perse-polis in Iran. Recruited
into the Signal Security Agency in 1942 because of his linguistic skills, Hallock initially worked on solving Vichy French
and German Enigma machine cipher systems before being transferred to the Special Problems Section in 1943. Hallock background
from Robert L. Benson,
Introductory History of VENONA
(Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History), p. 2; SRH-361,
History of the Signal Security Agency,
vol. 2,
The General Cryptanalytic Problems
, pp. 114, 118, 129, 236, 238, 253, RG-457, entry 9002 Special Research Histories, NA, CP. Hallock was also the author of
a number of scholarly books, including
The Chicago Syllabary and the Louvre
Syllabary
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940) and
Persepolis Fortification Tablets
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). For details of Hallock’s breakthrough, see
Weekly Report for
Section B III b9 for Week Ending 1 October 1943
, p. 1;
Weekly Report for Section B III b9 for Week Ending
8 October 1945
, p. 2;
Weekly Report for Section B III b9 for Week Ending 19 November 1945
, p. 1, all in RG-457, HCC, box 1114, file SSA BIII Weekly Reports, NA, CP.

7. David A. Hatch, “Venona: An Overview,”
American Intelligence Journal
, vol. 17, nos. 1–2 (1996): p. 72.

8. For change in priorities and expansion of SIGINT effort against neutrals and friendly nations, see memorandum, McCormack
to Clarke,
S.S.B. Priorities
, January 26, 1943, RG-457, HCC, box 1432, file: SSS Intercept Priorities, NA, CP; memorandum, Taylor to Clarke and McCormack,
S.S.B. Priorities
, February 3, 1943, RG-457, HCC, box 1432, file: SSS Intercept Priorities, NA, CP; memorandum, Strong to Chief Signal Officer,
March 8, 1943, RG-457, HCC, box 1025, file: C/A Solutions, Intercept Evaluations, 1943–44, NA, CP. For not wanting to be bullied
after the end of the war, see Lietuenant ( j.g.) J. V. Connorton,
The Status of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence
After World War II
, December 17, 1943, p. 9, RG-457, HCC, box 1008, file: Post War Planning Files, NA, CP.

9. For putting distance between the U.S. and British SIGINT efforts, see memorandum, Taylor to Clarke,
Cooperation Between United States Signal Intelligence Service and British Y Service
, April 5, 1943, RG-457, HCC, box 1417, file: Army and Navy COMINT Regulations and Papers, NA, CP. For secrecy of the SIGINT
effort against the USSR, see memorandum, Corderman to Taylor,
Draft of “Priorities Schedule,”
March 6, 1943, and memorandum, Taylor to Corderman,
SPSIS
311.5—General—Draft of “Priorities Schedule,”
March 8, 1943, both in RG-457, HCC, box 1432, file: SSS Intercept Priorities, NA, CP.

1: Roller-Coaster Ride

1. Included in the thirty-seven thousand personnel were approximately seventeen thousand assigned to dozens of tactical COMINT
collection units stationed overseas. SRH-277, “A Lecture on Communications Intelligence by RADM E.E. Stone, DIRAFSA,” p. 12,
RG-457, entry 9002 Special Research Histories, NA, CP. For the number of codes and ciphers being exploited in June 1945, see
SSA General Cryptanalytic Branch Orga nization Chart, June 1, 1945, p. B-2, RG-457, HCC, box 1004, file SSA Organization Charts,
NA, CP. For 88,747 diplomatic messages, see “The General Cryptanalytic Branch,” in SSA, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1945,
General Cryptanalysis
Branch (B-3): July 1944–July 1945
, RG-457, HCC, box 1380, file General Cryptanalysis Branch Annual Report 1945, NA, CP.

2. Memorandum, Adjutant General to Commanding Generals,
Establishment of the Army Security
Agency
, September 6, 1945; memorandum, Adjutant General to Chief, Military Intelligence Service,
Establishment of the Army Security Agency
, September 19, 1945; memorandum, Adjutant General to Commanding General, Army Service Forces,
Transfer of Signal Security Agency
to Army Security Agency
, September 21, 1945; memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 to Commanding Generals,
Establishment of the Army Security Agency
, November 7, 1945; memo for record,
General Provisions of the Army Security Agency
, May 17, 1946, all in RG-165, entry 421 ABC files, box 269, file: ABC 350.05 (8 Dec 43), sec. 1, NA, CP.

3. SRMN-084,
The Evolution of the Navy’s Cryptologic Organization
, p. 9, RG-457, NA, CP.

4. Elliott E. Okins,
To Spy or Not to Spy
(Chula Vista, CA: Pateo Publishing Co., 1985), pp. 150–51; SRH-039,
Unit History, 2nd Army Air Force Radio Squadron, Mobile, April 1945–June 1946
, p. 9, RG-457, entry 9002 Special Research Histories, NA, CP.

5. Oral history,
Interview with Pat M. Holt #1: Years in Journalism
, September 9, 1980, p. 13, U.S.

6. SRH-364,
History of SSA
, p. 237, RG-457, entry 9002 Special Research Histories, NA, CP; National Cryptologic School,
On Watch: Profiles from the National Security Agency’s Past 40 Years
(Fort Meade, MD: NSA/CSS, 1986), pp. 14–16, NSA FOIA; NSA, oral history,
Interview with
Frank B. Rowlett
, 1976, p. 357, NSA FOIA.

7. The overall strength of the combined army and navy COMINT organizations went from 37,000 on duty on VJ Day to only 7,500
men and women at the end of December 1945. The army COMINT organization’s command strength went from 10,600 men and women
on VJ Day plus 17,000 personnel assigned to tactical intercept units to only 5,000 by the end of December 1945. The navy COMINT
organization’s staff levels went from 10,051 men and women on duty on VJ Day to only 2,500 personnel on the organization’s
rolls at the end of December 1945. For the impact of army personnel losses, see ASA,
Summary Annual Report of the Army
Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1946
, July 31, 1947, p. 7, INSCOM FOIA; memorandum, Johnston to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Report of Signal Security Agency and Second Signal Service Battalion
Personnel Strength
, December 4, 1945, RG-319, entry 47B Army G-2 Decimal File 1941– 1948, box 568, file 320.2 5/1/45–12/31/45 (31 Dec 44), NA,
CP; ASA, “Minutes of 38th Staff Meeting Held 4 December 1945 at 1300,” in SRMA-011,
SSS/SSA/ASA Staff Meeting Minutes:
25 November 1942–17 February 1948
, pp. 271, RG-457, NA, CP. For the impact of navy personnel losses, see memorandum, Wenger to OP-20,
Report of Progress in OP-20-G During Absence of
CNC
, December 5, 1945, Enclosure 1, p. 1, RG-38, CNSG Library, box 114, file 5750/220 OP-20 Memos Covering Various Subjects 1942–45,
part 4 of 5, NA, CP; Op-20-A-vb (5 Jan 1946), Serial: 1002P20, memorandum, Chief of Naval Communications to Chief of Naval
Operations,
Assistant Chief of Naval Communications for Communications Intelligence—Recommendation for
Promotion to the Rank of Commodore, U.S. Navy
, January 7, 1946, p. 1, RG-38, CNSG Library, box 81, file 5420/36 Dyer Board 1945, NA, CP.

8. ASA,
Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency: Fiscal Year 1946
, July 31, 1947, pp. 21–22, INSCOM FOIA; SRMA-011,
SSS/SSA/ASA Staff Meeting Minutes
, p. 265, RG-457, NA, CP; memorandum, OP-23 to OP-02,
Future Status of U.S. Naval Communications Intelligence
Activities—Comments On
, January 16, 1946; memorandum, Redman to OP-02,
Future Status of
U.S. Naval Communications Intelligence Activities
, January 23, 1946; memorandum, Inglis to OP-02,
Future Status of U.S. Naval Communications Intelligence Activities
, January 25, 1946, all in RG-80, SecNav/CNO Top Secret Decimal File 1944–1947, box 42, file 1946 A8, NA, CP.

9. SSA, “Minutes of 25th Staff Meeting Held 14 August 1945 at 1300,” in SRMA-011,
SSS/SSA/ASA
Staff Meeting Minutes: 25 November 1942–17 February 1948
, p. 216, RG-457, NA, CP; “Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Army-Navy Cryptanalytic Research and Development Committee,”
August 22, 1945, p. 6, RG-38, CNSG Library, box 92, file 5420/169 ANCIB (2 of 2), NA, CP; ASA,
Summary Annual Report of the Army Security Agency: Fiscal Year 1946
, July 31, 1947, p. 24, INSCOM FOIA; NSA OH-15-82, oral history,
Interview with Ann Z. Caracristi
, July 16, 1982, p. 29, NSA FOIA.

10. Copies of these decrypts can be found in the collection of T-series messages in RG-457, HCC, box 521, file Decrypted Diplomatic
Traffic: T3101–T3200, NA, CP.

11. Andrew and Leslie Cockburn,
Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), pp. 36–37; NSA-OH-11-82, oral history,
Interview with Captain Wesley A. Wright, USN
, May 24, 1982, p. 66, NSA FOIA.

12. For ASA military targets, see ASA
Descriptive Dictionary of Cryptologic Terms
(Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1997), pp. 4, 11, 21, 23, 36, 62, 65, 95, 111, 113, 143, 150. For OP-20-G’s successes
with foreign naval ciphers, see
War Diary Report OP-20-G-4A: 1 September to 1 October 1945
, October 1, 1945, p. 5, RG-38, CNSG Library, file 5750/160, NA, CP; “Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Army-Navy Cryptanalytic
Research and Development Committee,” October 17, 1945, p. 11, RG-38, CNSG Library, box 92, file 5420/169 ANCIB (2 of 2), NA,
CP;
G4A War Diary
Summary for November 1945
, December 4, 1945, p. 1, RG-38, CNSG Library, file 5750/160, NA, CP;
G4A War Diary Summary for May 1946
, June 6, 1946, p. 1, RG-38, CNSG Library, file 5750/160, NA, CP; memorandum, OP-20-3-GY-A to OP-20-3,
Status of Work Report on Spanish,
Portuguese, Dutch and French Language Systems
, January 16, 1946, RG-38, CNSG Library, box 22, file 3222/85: Non-Japanese Crypto-Systems Processed— Apr 43–Aug 45 (3 of
3), NA, CP.

13. Memorandum, OP-23 to OP-02,
Future Status of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence
Activities— Comments on
, January 16, 1946, RG-38, CNSG Library, box 114, file 5750/220 OP-20 Memos Covering Various Subjects, 1942–1945 (4 of 5),
NA, CP; memorandum, Redman to OP-02,
Future Status of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence Activities
, January 23, 1946, and memorandum, Inglis to OP-02,
Future Status of U.S. Naval Communications Intelligence Activities
, January 25, 1946, both in RG-80, SecNav/CNO TS, box 42, file 1946 A8, NA, CP.