The Road to Berlin (151 page)

Kiryukhin, S.P.,
43-ya Armiya v Vitebskoi operatsii
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1961), 143 pp.,
passim
. Detailed monograph on 43rd Army operations (1st Baltic Front), Vitebsk operations.

Krylov, N.I., Alekseyev, N.I., Dragan, I.G.,
Navstrechu pobede. Boevoi put 5-i armii
(Moscow: Nauka 1970), ch. 8, ‘Za svobodnuyu Belorussiyu’, pp. 205–35, 5th Army operations (3rd Belorussian Front).

Kuznetsov, Lt.-Gen. P.G.,
General Chernyakhovskii
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1969). Biography: see under ‘Komanduyushchii frontom’, pp. 143–86, Chernyakhovskii’s operations as commander, 3rd Belorussian Front, June 1944.

Lyudnikov, Col.-Gen. I.I.,
Pod Vitebskom
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1962), 112 pp.,
passim
. General Lyudnikov’s own analysis of 39th Army operations (3rd Belorussian Front), Vitebsk operations.

Malinin, General M., ‘O deistriyakh voisk 1-go Belorusskovo fronta v Belorusskoi nastupatel’noi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1959 (7), pp. 18–32.

Panov, Maj.-Gen. B., ‘Okruzhenie i unichtozhenie krupnykh gruppirovok protivnika v Belorusskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1974 (6), pp. 18–26. Analysis of Soviet encirclement operations, Belorussia.

Rudenko, Air Marshal S., ‘Osobennosti boevykh deistvii aviatsii v Belorusskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1971 (2), pp. 22–31. Air operations, Belorussian offensive; tabulation of sorties flown by air armies, p. 30.

Shimanskii, Colonel A., ‘Organizatsiya operativno-strategicheskovo vzaimodeistviya v Belorusskoi operatsii 1944 goda’,
VIZ
, 1973 (6), pp. 13–22. An important detailed analysis of planning for and implementation of ‘co-ordination/inter-action’ of four Fronts, plus aviation, air defence (PVO), partisans, Dnieper Flotilla in Operation
Bagration
, June–July.

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Belorusskaya strategicheskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1969 (10), pp. 63–71. With 3 BF 24 June, text of report to Stalin 24 June (pp. 63–4) with proposal over timing of committing 5th Guards Tank Army, report to Stalin 26 June on 1st Baltic Front operations (pp. 65–6), composite report on 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Front operations 1300 hours 27 June (pp. 67–8), liquidation of enemy forces encircled at Vitebsk, Chernyakhovskii outflanks Orsha during night 26–27 June, interrogation of captured German generals.

Vasilevskii, A.M.,
Delo vsei zhizni
(2nd edn). See ‘Za zemlyu Belorusskuyu’, pp. 456–64: further account of
Bagration
, operational reports to Stalin not included, problem of committing 5 th Guards Tank Army and Rotmistrov’s lack of enthusiasm at assignment to 3rd Belorussian Front, 5th Guards Tank performed worse than hitherto’, Stalin’s disquiet and dissatisfaction, demanded 28 June decisiveness in 5th Guards Tank operations, Chernyakhovskii promoted full general on Vasilevskii’s recommendation, problems of rail movement and supply, signal to Stalin 27 June on requirements for effective rail traffic, continued concern over
low tempo
of 5th Guards Tank Army advance, orders to Rotmistrov to close on Minsk, considerations relating to further development of Soviet offensive.

Vasilevskii, A.M. For further version, see also ‘Vospominaniya o Belorusskoi operatsii’ in
Osvobozhdenie Belorussii
(ed. A.M. Samsonov), pp. 69–83. This account includes Vasilevskii’s daily reports to Stalin on 3rd Belorussian Front operations dated 24 June (pp. 69–70), report 25 June (pp. 73–5), report 26 June (pp. 75–6), report for 27 June (pp. 78–9), signal on rail traffic 27 June (pp. 80–1), disquiet on slow progress of 5th Guards Tank Army, Stalin’s directive (No. 220124) 28 June further orders for 3rd Belorussian Front, also insistence on decisiveness from 5th Guards Tank.

Zagorul’ko, M.M. and Yudenkov, A.F.,
Krakh plana ‘Ol’denburg’
(Moscow: Ekonomika 1980), ch. 6, under ‘Rel’sovaya voina’, pp. 252–65, Soviet partisan operations against German rail communications, detailed tabulations by type of operation (mining) and geographical area, extensive use of archival records. (A detailed monograph on the disruption of German plans for economic exploitation, also some military aspects.)

‘Freies Deutschland’: 20 July bomb plot

Irving, David,
Hitler’s War
, pp. 657–77. See ‘ “Do you recognize my voice?” ’, on the bomb plot and attempted assassination of Hitler, with its consequences.

Soviet War News
, TASS report: ‘Rebellion against Hitler’, 24 July 1944, No. 917 (on the bomb plot).

On
Freies Deutschland
, see documents/facsimiles,
Zur Gesch. der deutschen Antifaschistischen Widerstandsbewegung
, and on Paulus in summer 1944, see Willy Wolff in Soviet translation,
Na storone Krasnoi Armii
, pp. 128–38 (orig. German,
An der Seite der Roten Armee)
.

For Soviet evaluation of German resistance to Hitler, see V.I. Israelyan,
Diplomaticheskaya istoriya VOV
, ch. IV(5), ‘Razlozhenie germanskovo tyla’, pp. 215–19; see also
Sovinformbyuro
, VII, p. 151, for 9 September 1944, secret German document captured from 28th Corps (doc. no. 40/44 for 4 August) explaining events of 20 July and great distrust now of German officer corps, also new role for Nazi Party—with instruction ‘Burn after reading’.

Lvov–Sandomierz operation:
Rokossovskii’s left-flank drive pp.
231
–
247

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo–German War
, pp. 444–54, Koniev’s 1st Ukrainian Front offensive, Soviet drive to the Vistula and approaches to Warsaw.

GMD

FHO
(I), Stellungnahme zur Beurteilung der Lage der Hgr. Nordukraine v. 17.6.44. T-78/R466, 6446349.

Obkdo. Heeresgr. Nordukraine
, Ia, Nr 0823/44 g. Kdos. chefs. 8.6.44
Feindbeurteilung
. Estimate of Soviet intentions: see also map, Kräftebild/German and Soviet forces, deployment, strength. T-78/R466, 6446386–89.

Obkdo. Heeresgr. Nordukraine Abt. Ic/AO
, Garde-Panzer-Korps. Rpt Nr 21282/44 geh. Dated 30.6.44, Soviet order of battle—Guards tank/mech. corps, cavalry, artillery, anti-tank brigades, AA divisions: composition, deployment as of 20.6.44. T-78/ R486, 6470724–766.

Soviet materials

IVMV
, 9, pt 1, pp. 81–92, encirclement of German forces at Brody, Soviet advance into SE Poland.
(Note:
figures for 1st Guards Tank Army strength 14 August (p. 92): 184 tanks/
SP
guns; strength on 12 July, beginning of operation, 416 tanks/
SP
guns.)

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 210–23, Brody encirclement, fall of Lvov, drive to Vistula, Sandomierz bridgehead, push to Drohobych. (Also p. 224: armed suppression of ‘bourgeois nationalist bands’, NKVD units—one cavalry, two motorcycle regiments—brought in for rear security duties, ‘accounting for’ 36 bands, 4,315 individuals.)

Babadzhanyan, A.Kh.,
et al., Lyuki otkryli v Berline, op. cit
., (Combat history of 1st Guards Tank Army). 1st Guards Tank operations ‘from the Bug to the San’, 13 July–28 July, 1st Ukrainian Front, pp. 185–97.

Batov, General P.I.,
Vpokhodakh i boyakh
. (Moscow: Voenizdat (VM), 3rd edn 1974). See ‘K granitsam Pol’shi’, 65th Army drive to W Bug, stormy relations with Zhukov (p. 420), pp. 416–32.

Collective authorship,
V srazheniyakh za pobedu
. Boevoi put 38-i armii … (Moscow: Nauka 1974), pp. 368–99, 38th Army operations, Lvov offensive, operational narrative.

Chuikov, Marshal SU V.I.,
Ot Stalingrada do Berlina
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1980). (A composite version of previous memoir compilations, all heavily ghosted.) Pt 3, pp. 455–77, 8th Guards Army assigned to 1st Belorussian Front, drive to the Berezina, offensive on Lublin, liberation of Maidanek concentration camp.

Galitskii, General K.N.,
Gody surovykh ispytanii 1941–1944
. Zapiski komandarma (Moskow: Nauka 1973). Ch. 16, ‘Razgrom gruppy armii “Tsentr” ’, 11th Guards Army operations, Belorussian offensive, drive on Orsha, advance to the Berezina, Borisov–Minsk, advance on Molodechno, movement to line west of Minsk–Molodechno, pp. 512–45. Ch. 17, drive to the Niemen, 3 BF directive 3 July to advance to Vilno/Lida, 11th Guards to operate at centre reaching Neimen at Alitus, 16th Guards Rifle Corps closes on river line dawn 13 July, pp. 546–53.

Getman, A.L.,
Tanki idut na Berlin
, pp. 202–27, operations 11th Guards Tank Corps (1st Guards Tank Army), Corps not fully manned in July (1944)—only 38 per cent T-34s, 60–70 per cent
SP
guns—17 July moved up to new start line, attacked in two-echelon formation, forcing of W Bug, fighting for bridgehead 17–19 July, 1st Guards Tank Army now ordered to move westwards and on to river San, 24 July 11th Guards Tank Corps deepened San bridgehead, entire force across river by July 25, drive on Przemysl, captured July 27.

Katukov, M.E.,
Na ostrie glavnovo udara
, pp. 314–22, operations with 1st Ukrainian Front (843,000 men, 19,300 guns and mortars, 2,200 tanks/
SP
guns, 3,000 aircraft): orders for 1st Guards Tank Army—on 2nd day of operations to enter breakthrough at junction of 3rd Guards and 13th Army, then drive for W Bug, on 4th day to capture Rava–Russkaya; July 19 Germans encircled at Brody, eliminated July 22, 1st Guards Tank driving for river San, crossing into Polish territory, threat to German rear, July 24 Koniev orders 1st Guards to assist 3rd Guards Tank Army assaulting Przemysl, Katukov duly detached Gusakovskii’s 11th Guards Tank Corps.

Kazakov, Artillery Marshal K.P.,
Vsegda s pekhotoi, vsegda s tankami
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1969), ch. 5, Soviet artillery operations, Lublin–Brest offensive, left-flank formations 1st Belorussian Front.

Koniev, I.S., ‘Zavershenie osvobozhdeniya sovetskoi Ukrainy i vykhod na Vislu’,
VIZ
, 1964 (7), pp. 3–21 (Koniev’s earlier personal account). Discussions with army/ divisional commanders, summons to
Stavka
early June, Koniev’s decision to mount two main blows (Rava–Russkaya/Lvov), Koniev and Krainyukov in Moscow with Stalin, Stalin’s objections to Koniev’s plan, Koniev in this version pays fulsome tribute to Khrushchev and his assistance, Koniev presents his own view of the battle for Lvov, impossibility of taking Lvov off the march, urgency of having Rybalko (3rd Guards Tank Army) break off fruitless action for Lvov, Koniev’s request to the
Stavka
end July to set up independent field administration for forces driving on Carpathians, this assigned to I.E. Petrov with command of 1st Guards and 18th Army (forming 4th Ukrainian Front on 5 August 1944).

Koniev, I.S.,
Zapiski komanduyushchevo frontom 1943–1944
, ch. 6, ‘Lvovsko–Sandomirskaya operatsiya’, pp. 223–64:
Stavka
fixed mid-July as date for 1st Ukrainian Front offensive, preparatory work Front/army commands, assessment of previous Front operations, Koniev’s discussions with commanders (down to division), Moskalenko kept record of these discussions (see pp. 227–9), conversation with Stalin early June, operational aim to eliminate Army Group North Ukraine, initial plan for two blows on two axes, composition of assault forces (shock groups), mid-June conference with Stalin, Stalin’s objections to two blows, cited experience of other fronts, Stalin finally yielded but told Koniev that he must assume responsibility; Front operational plan developed 7 July, submitted to
Stavka
, confirmed almost intact, two-echelon deployment for armies, Front deployed 7 tank and 3 mechanized corps, 4 independent tank brigades, 18 tank regiments, 24
SP
-gun regiments, 90 per cent tank/
SP
gun strength committed on main attacks (to Lvov and Rava–Russkaya), air support from 2nd Air Army, German intelligence knew of direction of Soviet attacks also Soviet deployments, Koniev personally supervised preparations of Rybalko’s
3 Guards Tank Army
, all forces ready by July 12; 1st Ukrainian Front operations—begun 12–13 July, 3rd Guards and 13th Army on Rava–Russkaya axis, forces W Bug and enters Polish territory 17 July, Lvov attack more difficult, 3rd Guards Tank Army committed 16 July, encirclement of 8 German divisions at Brody, advance continued on Koniev’s right flank, Katukov’s 1st Guards Tank Army ordered to swing SW, force river San and cut German escape route to west, evening July 18 Koniev’s special orders to 3rd Guards Tank and 4th Tank Army to outflank and capture Lvov (p. 255), Rybalko drives into peat-bogs, impossible to seize Lvov off the march with only one tank army, heavy fighting for Lvov 24–26 July, finally cleared 27 July. Army Group North Ukraine now split in two,
Stavka
orders to seize bridgehead south of Warsaw, operations to be co-ordinated with 1st Belorussian Front.