The Road to Berlin (149 page)

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Belorusskaya strategicheskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1969 (9), pp. 47–58. First stage of planning/co-ordination Belorussian offensive, 4-Front operation including Dnieper flotilla, partisan operations, decision
(GKO)
on splitting Western front, 20 May Antonov presents General Staff plan to Stalin for Belorussian offensive, confirmed by Stalin 30 May, decision on reinforcements, reports to Stalin 14 June (p. 55), final reports to Stalin on attack preparations.

Yeremenko, A.I.,
Gody vozmezdiya
, pp. 180–205, Independent Coastal Army operations, Kerch peninsula, 16 April Independent Coastal Army assigned to 4th Ukrainian Front as Germans fell back on Sevastopol, Yeremenko recalled to Moscow, succeeded by Lt.-Gen. K.S. Melnik; pp. 145–50, transmission of information to Soviet command on revised timings for
Overlord
, Soviet suspicion that May (1944) date agreed in Teheran part of deception plan by Western powers directed against USSR.

The Second Front, Karelian offensive,
planning/preparation
‘Bagration’
pp.
199
–
215

Diplomatic correspondence

Perepiska
… vol. 1, Churchill to Stalin, 5 June (1944), no. 271, pp. 265–66; Churchill to Stalin, 6 June, no. 273, p. 268; Stalin to Churchill, 6 June, no. 274, p. 267; Stalin to Churchill, 9 June, no. 276, p. 269.

GMD

FHO
(I)
Feindliches Kräftebild vor der Finnland–Front
(24.4.44). T-78/R466, 6446408.

FHO
(I)
Beurteitlung im Grossen
, 30.3.1944. See maps, projected Soviet operations against Finnish Front, also detailed map ‘Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen über sow.-russ. Operationsabsichten’. T-78/R497, 6485597–98 (for maps; otherwise 6485573–602).

Hgr. Nord
(Army Group North). Tätigkeitsbericht. Ic/AO Teil 1. Feindlage. 1 Ausfertigung vom 16.5–20.6.44. (Intelligence, Army Group North, daily reports 16th, 18th Army, Army Group Narwa.) T-311/R90, 7117702–8070.

FHO
(I)
Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung
… abgefassten Beurteilungen (4.42–12.44). ‘Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen …’, Stalin’s command conference (with attendance of head of Polish resistance), discussion of two offensive designs (dated 3.5.44). T-78/R498, 6485829–35.

FHO
(I)
Notiz
(Soviet battalions deployed against Army Group Centre and N Ukraine, 28.4.44). Against N Ukraine: frontage 500 km, 420 Soviet battalions deployed; against Army Group Centre: frontage 1,200 km, 448 Soviet battalions deployed. T-78/T466, 6446403.

FHO
(IIc)
Panzerlage vor deutscher Ostfront
(for 1 June 1944). Total,
deployed
Soviet tank/mechanized forces: 38 corps, plus 106 independent brigades, 8,073 tanks. T-78/R493, 6480814.

FHO
(IIc) Booklet:
Truppen–Übersicht und Kriegsgliederungen der Roten Armee
Stand August 1944. Soviet divisions/regiments, place of origin, appearance on Soviet–German Front, current deployments. T-78/R459, 6437543–38066.

Planning/preparation, Soviet offensive, Karelia

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 133–45, planning, execution of Soviet offensive Karelian isthmus.

IVMV
, 9, pt 1, pp. 26–32, Soviet offensive Karelian isthmus, capture of Vyborg, preparations to drive on Petrozavodsk.

Inozemtsev, I.G.,
Pod krylorn–Leningrad
, pp. 208–26, 13th Air Army operations, Soviet offensive Karelian isthmus, to capture of Vyborg.

Mironov, Lt.-Gen. N., ‘Proryv ukreplennovo raiona na Karel’skom peresheike’,
VIZ
, 1974 (6), pp. 10–17. 21st Army operations, Karelia. Total Soviet strength committed to Vyborg operation—260,000 men, 7,500 guns/mortars (including naval guns), 628 tanks and
SP
guns, 1,000 aircraft (220 from Baltic Fleet naval air force).

Platonov, S.P.,
Bitva za Leningrad 1941–1944
, pt 2, ch. 7, ‘Razgrom vraga na Karel’skom peresheike’, 1944, pp. 418–74. Govorov’s operational directive (Leningrad Front) 3 May 1944, offensive against Karelian isthmus with 21st, 23rd Army and 13th Air Army, Baltic Fleet operational planning, fire support directive 23 May, organization artillery/engineer/air support, opening of Soviet offensive 10–12 June, operations D.N. Gusev’s 21st Army, breaching main Finnish defences 14–17 June, operations 21st and 23rd Army, advance on Vyborg, capture of Vyborg 18–20 June,
Stavka
orders to continue Soviet advance 21 June, Govorov’s plan for two-stage operation. (Extensive use of Soviet military archival material.)

Shtemenko, S.M., ‘Na severnom flange sovetsko-germanskovo fronta letom i osenyu 1944 goda’,
VIZ
, 1972 (6), pp. 59–66. Planning for offensive on northern flank, Stalin’s concern over which force to hit first (German or Finnish), detailed planning for Karelian offensive, Stalin’s instruction not to waste Soviet resources in order to preserve enough force to encounter German troops in the north.

Terekhov, P.V.,
Boevye deistviya tankov na severo-zapade v 1944 g
., (Moscow: Voenizdat 1965), pp. 10–74, planning of Karelian attack, use of armour in offensive on Vyborg, use of tanks and
SP
guns with 21st Army, 379 tanks and 164
SP
guns used in first stage of offensive, increased to 464 tanks and 182
SP
guns in second stage, armoured support for 23rd Army operations, approach to third line of defences 17 June, rifle corps commanders employing tank-mounted infantry and
SP
guns as ‘forward detachments’. (Extremely detailed monograph.)

Tributs, Admiral V.F.,
Baltiitsy nastupayut
(Kalingrad, Kalinin: Knizh. Izd. 1968), pp. 77–99. Tributs summoned to
Stavka
, naval support (Baltic Fleet, Ladoga Flotilla) planning, Baltic Fleet to support seaward flank 21st Army, problem posed by extensive mining in Gulf of Finland, Ladoga Flotilla to cover flank of 23rd Army, coordination of naval/ground forces command (co-location of artillery/fleet gunnery commanders), sinking of U-250, extracts from Tributs’s diary (12–19 June, pp. 99–102).

Zubakov, Colonel V., ‘21-ya armiya v Vyborgskoi nastupatel’noi operatsii (10–20 iyunya 1944 g.)’,
VIZ
, 1971 (6), pp. 23–33. 21st Army offensive, capture of Vyborg.

Planning/preparation ‘Bagration’

Gaskenholz, Hermann, ‘The Collapse of Army Group Centre in 1944’ in
Decisive Battles of World War II: the German View
(eds H-A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer) (London: Deutsch 1965), here p. 361, OKH conference, 14 June, warnings from Army Group Centre, but conviction of Soviet offensive in Galicia, operations against Army Group Centre would be of secondary nature.

Soviet materials

IVMV
, 9, pt 1, pp. 40–47, planning, preparation for Soviet offensive, Belorussia.

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 152–68, planning, preparation of
Bagration
.

Bagramyan, I.Kh.,
Kak shli my k pobede
, pp. 287–306, planning for
Bagration
(note his comment that Stalin had special feeling for Rokossovskii, whom he compared to Dzerzhinskii—
osobaya simpatiya
, pp. 300–1), acceptance of Bagramyan’s modification to initial attack plan, operational assignments to Front armies.

Chernyaev, Maj.-Gen. V., ‘Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v Belorusskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1974 (8), pp. 11–21. Soviet camouflage/deception measures, Operation
Bagration;
extract from instructions for camouflage.

Patyka, Colonel F., ‘Tylovoe obespechenie frontov v operatsii ‘Bagration’ ‘,
VIZ
, 1974 (8), pp. 22–9. Logistics/supply problems, rail movements, tonnages, fuel/ammunition
boekomplekty
(fills), medical services, Rear Services organization.

Rokossovskii, K.K., ‘Dva glavnykh udara’,
VIZ
, 1964 (6), pp. 13–18. Rokossovskii’s own account of his insistence on a ‘double blow’ from his right flank (a version much disputed by Zhukov), attempts by Malenkov and Molotov to dissuade him from pressing the point with Stalin, plan finally accepted on its third submission.

Shtemenko, S., ‘Pered udarom v Belorussi’,
VIZ
, 1965 (9), pp. 43–59.
Stavka
and General Staff planning, logistical problems, Stalin’s refusal to contemplate total if temporary shift to defensive operations—
podumaem eshchë
—17–19 April NW and W axes allowed to take up defensive, submissions 11 May, Stalin himself proposes codename
Bagration
, full
Stavka
session with Front and arms commanders (except Chernyakhovskii, absent through illness, and Petrov) 22–23 May, Bagramyan’s proposal for modification of 1st Baltic Front plan accepted, agreement to time other fronts to transition gradually to defensive,
Stavka
directive issued only 1–7 May, first drafts of General Staff plan submitted to
Stavka
end April, importance of disinformation/camouflage
(maskirovka)
, Plan
Bagration
and operational assignments, 1st Belorussian Front offensive for 15–20 June, Chernyakhovskii finally arrives in Moscow, assigned 5 th Guards Tank Army and heavy artillery, further planning for Leningrad and 1st Ukrainian Front operations.

Shtemenko, S. ‘Pered udarom v Belorussii’,
VIZ
, 1966 (2), pp. 58–71. Mekhlis denounces Petrov as unsuitable to command 2nd Belorussian Front, Stalin replaces Petrov by G.F. Zakharov, Shtemenko sent to support Zakharov who then tried to effect alterations in
Stavka
plan, work of
Stavka
representatives with Front commands, Vasilevskii report to
Stavka
on operational plans 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, 5th Guards Tank Army now subordinated directly to
Stavka
, 10 June Zhukov asks for air force commanders to define air tasks in person, reconnaissance of German positions begins, organization of command/control systems and procedures, great delays with rail movements, Stalin’s categorical instructions to Kaganovich.

Note:
Tabulation of work schedules/assignments
of Stavka
representatives Zhukov and Vasilevskii (for period 4.6–24.6.44)
VIZ
, 1966 (2), pp. 72–82 (follows Shtemenko article).

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Belorusskaya strategicheskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1969 (9), pp. 47–58. Planning of
Bagration, Stavka
assignments to Fronts (1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian Fronts), relations with Antonov (Chief of General Staff), visits to Front/army commands early June as
Stavka
representative, 9 June report to Stalin on planning work, serious delays with rail movements, 14 June Stalin postpones offensive to 23 June, 17 June Antonov discusses Leningrad Front operations with Stalin, 21 June Vasilevskii report to Stalin (quoted p. 57), report on final readiness.

Vasilevskii, A.M.,
Delo vsei zhizni
, pp. 432–55, under ‘Pered Belorusskoi operatsii’,
Stavka
planning for
Bagration
, operational concepts, Zhukov-Vasilevskii consultations with Stalin, 20 May General Staff plan presented to Stalin, 30 May
Stavka
approves final version of offensive plan, Stalin assigns Zhukov and Vasilevskii to Front commands as
Stavka
representatives (30 May), Front decisions, 9 June Vasilevskii to Stalin on completion of 1st Baltic Front preparations, Stalin signal on enforced postponement of offensive, report to Stalin 16 June, return to Moscow and review of Leningrad Front operations, deployment of Long-Range Aviation (ADD), summary of Stalin’s role in preparation of
Bagration
.