The Other Side of the Night (38 page)

In 1992, the British government’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), under pressure from Harrison, who was capitalizing on the recent discovery of the wreck of the
Titanic
by loudly claiming that it offered proof that the
Californian
was even father from the Titanic than earlier claimed, opened what it termed the “Reappraisal of Evidence Relating to the SS
Californian
.” Despite the fact that the Board seemed favorably inclined toward Lord when it convened, the conclusions of the report were a devastating blow to Harrison and Lord’s supporters. The only area of contention within the report was when the two leading investigators disagreed over the distance which separated the
Californian
and the
Titanic
. Deputy Chief Inspector James De Coverly believed the two ships were 17 to 20 miles apart, while Master Mariner Thomas Barnett, whose professional qualifications were superior to De Coverly’s, maintained that only 5 to 7 miles separated the Titanic from the Californian. For political reasons, De Coverly’s figure was used in the final report.

Most critically, however, the Board concluded unanimously that the
Titanic
’s rockets were seen from the
Californian
, that they should have been interpreted as distress signals, and that further action should have been taken by the
Californian
’s officers as soon as multiple rockets had been sighted. While a certain emphasis was placed on Second Officer Stone’s actions and inactions, the report strongly emphasized the point that the ship’s master bore the ultimate responsibility for what happened aboard his vessel, and that Lord had failed to fulfill his obligations as the
Californian
’s captain. Eighty years after both the American and British inquiries had come to the same conclusion, an inquest constituted for the sole purpose of exonerating Stanley Lord had condemned him anew.

The thirty-five years Lord spent in retirement were far from uncomfortable, his family’s finances and his own investments providing well for him during those years. Lord appears to have put the sea well behind him when he retired; there is no record of him ever again seeking a berth after he left Lawther Latta. Perhaps not surprisingly, during the Second World War, when Great Britain’s shortage of qualified merchant marine officers and masters was approaching critical proportions, and despite the fact that many of his contemporaries answered the call to the colors and voluntarily came out of retirement to serve, Stanley Lord remained safely ashore. He died of kidney disease in 1962 at the age of eighty-five, at last safely beyond the reach of his critics as well as the solace of his supporters.

Of all the incredible events of that incredible night, April 14–15, 1912, the most startling must be the contrast in conduct between Captains Rostron and Lord, found in their reactions the moment each of them was informed that a ship nearby was signaling distress. When told of the
Titanic
’s distress call, Rostron acted immediately and decisively. Even though he knew he might be taking his ship into peril, he believed that he did not have the luxury of remaining in relative safety and security while hundreds or even thousands of others might be in danger of losing their lives. In short, he was the best possible kind of man to have in command of the
Carpathia
in the early morning hours of April 15, 1912.

Stanley Lord’s reaction upon being informed of a ship nearby firing white rockets, on the other hand, suddenly revealed the sociopath that had long been lurking beneath his apparently urbane and civilized exterior, as he manipulated the ambiguities of the circumstances to allow him to avoid taking any decisive action until such a time as the danger to himself was minimal. Lord was indeed the worst possible sort of individual to be the master of the
Californian
at precisely the time when that person would be faced with the greatest moral and professional challenge of his life.

For when all is said and done, at issue when deciding the question of Stanley Lord’s responsibility—and whether or not he abandoned that responsibility—in the early morning of April 15, 1912, is not whether Lord refused to go to the aid of the stricken
Titanic
, but rather why did he refuse to go to the aid of people who were so clearly in distress? It was in exactly these terms that Lord himself would define the debate over his conduct: to his dying day he maintained that he was innocent of abandoning the passengers and crew of the
Titanic
to their fate, for his ship was too far away to even see the sinking liner, let alone reach her in time to be of any help. And yet that carefully crafted position never acknowledged—and indeed seemed to dodge as effectively as Lord did the decision to wake Cyril Evans in the crucial hours of April 15, 1912—that there was an even deeper, more fundamental moral and legal obligation which Lord abandoned: the obligation to go to the assistance of
whomever
was signalling distress. Stanley Lord consciously, callously chose to let people die rather than run even the slightest risk to his ship and himself.

No amount of manipulation of ships’ positions, questions of visibility, curvature of the earth, “hyper-refraction,” numbers of rockets fired, navigational errors, “mystery ships,” nor any tricks of verbal legerdemain or legalistic obscurantism, can alter that one simple fact.
Stanley Lord chose to do nothing.
Precisely why has been a riddle for more than nine decades; only now can the underlying flaw in his character, the defect of his personality, be fully explained, even if it can never be fully understood.

It was the great tragedy of his life that Stanley Lord was the man on the bridge of the
Californian
on April 15, 1912. In contrast, it was literally salvation for those hundreds of people in a score of lifeboats bobbing about on an open sea that Arthur Rostron stood on the bridge of the
Carpathia
during those same hours. Ultimately the final story of the “night to remember,” is the story of “the other side of the night,” the story of these two men, one who refused to hesitate in answering the call for help, and the other who pretended he never heard it.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

April 17, 1912

Resolved, That the Committee on Commerce, or a subcommittee thereof, is hereby authorized and directed to investigate the causes leading to the wreck of the White Star liner Titanic, with its attendant loss of life so shocking to the civilized world.

Resolved further, That said committee or a subcommittee thereof is hereby empowered to summon witnesses, send for persons and papers, to administer oaths, and to take such testimony as may be necessary to determine the responsibility therefor, with a view to such legislation as may be necessary to prevent, as far as possible, any repetition of such a disaster.

Resolved further, That the committee shall inquire particularly into the number of lifeboats, rafts, and life preservers, and other equipment for the protection of the passengers and crew; the number of persons aboard the Titanic, whether passenger or crew, and whether adequate inspections were made of such vessel, in view of the large number of American passengers travelling over a route commonly regarded as dangerous from icebergs; and whether it is feasible for Congress to take steps looking to an international agreement to secure the protection of sea traffic, including regulation of the size of ships and designation of routes.

Resolved further, That in the report of said committee it shall recommend such legislation as it shall deem expedient; and the expenses incurred by this investigation shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers to be approved by the chairman of said committee.

Attest: CHARLES C. BENNETT,

Secretary.

By: H. M. ROSE,

Assistant Secretary.

ORDER FOR FORMAL INVESTIGATION.

Whereas, on or about the 14th day of April, 1912, the British Steamship ‘Titanic’, of Liverpool, Official Number 131,482, struck ice in or near latitude 41° 46’ N., longitude 50° 14’ W., North Atlantic Ocean, and on the following day foundered, and loss of life thereby ensued or occurred. And whereas a shipping casualty has occurred, and the Board of Trade have requested a Wreck Commissioner appointed under this Act to hold a Formal Investigation into the said shipping casualty, and he has consented to do so.

Now the Board of Trade, in pursuance of the powers vested in them by Section 466 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, do hereby direct that the Formal Investigation shall be held into the said shipping casualty in the Scottish Hall, Buckingham Gate, London, S.W.

Annexed hereto is a Statement of the Case upon which the said Formal Investigation has been ordered.

Dated this 30th day of April, 1912.

Walter J. Howell.

An Assistant Secretary to the Board of Trade.

The British Steamship “Titanic,” of the port of Liverpool, Official Number 131, 428.

STATEMENT OF CASE.

The following is a Statement of the Case on which a Formal Investigation is ordered:

The above named ship left Queenstown for New York on or about the 11
^th
day of April, 1912, with a crew of about 892 hands all told, and about 1,316 passengers.

On the night of Sunday the 14th day of April, 1912, the vessel struck ice in or near latitude 41° 46’ N., longitude 50° 14’ W., North Atlantic Ocean, and at about 2 a.m. on the following day foundered in about the same locality, and loss of life thereby ensued or occurred.

Dated this 30
^th
day of April, 1912.

Walter J. Howell

An Assistant Secretary to the Board of Trade.

S. S. “TITANIC.”

1. When the “Titanic” left Queenstown on or about 11th April last: -

(
a.
) What was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board her, and what were their respective ratings?

(
b.
) What was the total number of her passengers, distinguishing sexes and classes, and discriminating between adults and children?

2. Before leaving Queenstown on or about 11th April last did the “Titanic” comply with the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894-1906, and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of passenger steamers and emigrant ships.

3. In the actual design and construction of the “Titanic” what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties?

4. Was the “Titanic” sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned? Were the watches of the officers usual and proper? Was the Titanic supplied with proper charts?

5. What was the number of boats of any kind on board the “Titanic”? Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the “Titanic” in case of emergency proper and sufficient? Had a boat drill been held on board, and, if so, when? What was the carrying capacity of the respective boats?

6. What installations for receiving and transmitting messages by wireless telegraphy were on board the “Titanic”? How many operators were employed on working such installations? Were the installations in good and effective working order, and were the number of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day and night?

7. At or prior to the sailing of the “Titanic” what, if any, instructions as to navigation were given to the Master or known by him to apply to her voyage? Were such instructions, if any, safe, proper and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers likely to be encountered during the voyage?

8. What was in fact the track taken by the “Titanic” in crossing the Atlantic Ocean? Did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on voyages from the United Kingdom to New York in the month of April? Are such tracks safe tracks at that time of year? Had the Master any, and, if so, what discretion as regards the track to be taken?

9. After leaving Queenstown on or about the 11
^th
April last, did information reach the “Titanic” by wireless messages or otherwise by signals, of the existence of ice in certain latitudes? If so, what were such messages or signals and when were they received, and in what position or positions was the ice reported to be, and was the ice reported in or near the track actually being followed by the “Titanic”? Was her course altered in consequence of receiving such information, and, if so, in what way? What replies to such messages or signals did the “Titanic” send and at what times?

10. If at the times referred to in the last preceding question or later the “Titanic” was warned of or had reason to suppose she would encounter ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to encounter it? Was a good and proper look-out for ice kept on board? Were any, and, if so, what directions given to vary the speed - if so, were they carried out?

11. Were binoculars provided for and used by the look-out men? Is the use of them necessary or usual in such circumstances? Had the “Titanic” the means of throwing searchlights around her? If so, did she make use of them to discover ice? Should searchlights have been provided and used?