The Nuremberg Interviews (33 page)

“I didn’t know any of the Nazis — none of them. I was absolutely not pro-Nazi on account of the methods they used in the election campaigning. Hindenburg died in August 1934. At that time one and a half years had passed, and Hindenburg had followed my advice in foreign policy. In interior policy I had nothing to do. It was only foreign policy. He followed my counsel, especially the peace line of the policy, as every German did against the paragraphs of the Versailles Treaty. I was in Geneva a month, at the League of Nations and the Disarmament Commission. As is known, it was without any effect. All our proposals were rejected at that time. Hitler was prepared to disarm totally if others disarmed, but the French especially refused. In 1935, I found the influence of some party members against my policy more and more. Ribbentrop was in the background as private counselor of Hitler.

“The first incident between Hitler and me was in 1935. I was against the nomination of Ribbentrop as ambassador at large in London. I had made Ribbentrop’s acquaintance and said he was not the man to go to London. Ribbentrop was preceded by Leopold von Hoesch, an old colleague of mine. He died. More and more I was attacked by the party. But until 1937, with great difficulty, I could stand firm and Hitler followed. But in August 1937, he certainly turned and decided to follow his power politics. Until I objected that that would be foolish, we would have had war in January 1938. I asked him to relieve me of my office. I left office on February 4, 1938, and he nominated me secret state councillor — only a title. I had nothing to back me up, and he even refused to let me have any information anymore. Only a title. From March 1938 I left Berlin and stayed at home in my country estate near Stuttgart — a farm. In September
1938 one of my colleagues, Finance Minister Lutz Count Schwerin von Krosigk, called and told me Hitler intended to make war in Czechoslovakia. I should go to Berlin and try to stop him. The result was the Munich Conference.
³

“At the conference, I assisted as observer — because I knew Mussolini, Daladier, and Chamberlain at the conference. Goering took me in his car to Munich. During the conference I acted as mediator. Next day I went to my home. Then I was without information, except what was in the newspaper and radio — which was little. I had also an apartment in Berlin, and from time to time went there on private matters. I stayed in Berlin at the beginning of March 1939 without any information beforehand. I saw that Czechoslovakian president Dr. Emil Hácha had come to Berlin and asked Hitler to take over the protection of his country. The next day, Hans Heinrich Lammers telegraphed me in the name of Hitler to come immediately to Vienna.
⁴
I flew there. To my great surprise, Hitler asked me to take over the post of protector of Bohemia and Moravia. I had told him in Vienna that I could not understand this — have you done this in agreement with France, England, and Italy? He said it was not necessary because Hácha had asked for Germany’s protection. I myself was very upset. I was convinced that such a step must have been a great shock to England and France especially. I was further convinced that nothing must be done unless there was an acute danger of war. I refused therefore to accept. But Hitler insisted. He said it would be a great service to my country and I was needed because I was known as a moderate man and he would show them my name. He had nothing further to say. I told him that it was a difficult task, and it would be hard to prevent Sudeten Germans from taking revenge. He said he would proceed anyway. What power could prevent that? I was sixty-six years old already. I finally grudgingly accepted. I said I would try it — a patriotic duty.

“But the power Hitler gave to me was power against the Czechs. He gave me no power against Himmler and his cohorts. I complained sometimes to Hitler; sometimes he agreed. But it became worse and worse. Especially after he nominated a very bad man to become my secretary of state, my subordinate, Karl Frank. He was a representative of Himmler, and in powers of the police Himmler had executive power. I had nothing to say. All he did I only found out about afterward — either through Czech or private information. It was like being in a prison there.
After the war broke out in 1939, I asked Hitler to let me go. But he refused. Things were worse and worse. In September 1941, Hitler called me to the headquarters and told me I was too mild against the Czechs. And he had decided to take strong measures and to send Heydrich, and I said I would never agree. I would say good-bye. I knew Heydrich by name; he was called “Bloodhound.” I refused to go back to Prague. I dissolved my household and decided I would never go back. That was September 1941. He did not give me my official dismissal until 1943. But I stayed at home. Heydrich arrived in Prague two hours after I left Prague by auto. He began his persecution of the Czechs.”

Franz von Papen
1879–1969

Franz von Papen was German chancellor in 1932, vice chancellor in 1933–1934, and appointed ambassador to Austria in 1936. Tried by the Nuremberg tribunal and found not guilty, in early 1947 he was reclassified as a major offender by a German de-Nazification court and sentenced to eight years in labor camp. He was released two years later, following appeal.

Interview (with Gilbert present) with Franz von Papen. This gray-haired, somewhat deaf, but very alert, smiling man is polite, exerts a definite personality and “charm” of the “old school.” Or what is associated with polite parlor behavior in my mind. He clears a place for us on his bed, offers his chair, a bit of matchbox for an ashtray. He gratefully and gracefully accepts and smokes the proffered cigarette.

Today was the Hess case to-do in court. The session had lasted until 5:45 p.m., which was half an hour later than usual. The defendants were most interested, and it was clear that to most of them the facts produced by the British prosecutor were as interesting as to the spectators. Hess alone of the defendants seemed unimpressed and untouched. He had maintained his usual frozen, apathetic face except for occasional glances toward the gallery, and once or twice smiling and whispering to Goering next to him, in what seemed a rather inappropriate manner. Also at times he leaned forward and seemed to be intent on what was being said, an evincing of interest beyond the usual as far as he is concerned.

Papen said that he believed the case against Hess was clear as far as his being one of the party founders and leaders, but that regarding conspiracy
for war, it was Papen’s opinion that the case was not strong. Papen himself said that Hess was a peaceful type of man, although he stated, too, that he knew him none too well as he had no contact with him aside from occasional cabinet meetings.

But Papen held his hand to his head and practically moaned at the stupidity of the Foreign Office’s and Hess’s ignorance of things outside Germany, which was illustrated by Hess’s statements in England after his flight. Particularly his peace “offer,” when he said the German government would not negotiate with the present English government (meaning Churchill) but would have to have some other government which was acceptable. Papen made disparaging remarks about Ribbentrop, and referred caustically to the latter’s stupidity, blind following of Hitler, and his being a “whiskey salesman.” He remarked about Hitler’s saying that whenever he wanted to take a step forward, his advisers let him down, saying it was too dangerous, and that only one or two supported him, including Ribbentrop. And how Hitler had said that Ribbentrop was therefore a greater statesman than Bismarck.

“I have always stood for principles,” said Papen, and that is why Himmler and the party kept watch on him all the time he was ambassador to Vienna and to Turkey. He told of his being summoned by Hitler in the middle of the night to go to Vienna on the evening after Engelbert Dollfuss was killed. Two SS men came up to the house he was staying at, late one night, in Silesia. His son and he thought the SS were coming to get them (as had been attempted once before, he said). His son said the SS were probably there for the purpose of killing them. They each took a pistol and approached the door. There were two SS men there. They said, “We have come to tell you Hitler wants you to telephone him at once.” But Papen and his son were fearful of moving, lest they be shot. Finally Papen went to the phone and telephoned Hitler, who was in Bayreuth. “You must go to Vienna at once,” said Hitler (Papen related), “after what has happened today.” Papen said he replied that he had no idea of what had happened. Then Hitler told him that Dollfuss had been murdered in Vienna that day and things were in a turmoil in Vienna. “Well,” said Papen, “I’ll have to think it over.” “I will send a plane for you in the morning,” answered Hitler. In the morning, Hitler’s plane arrived and took Papen to Bayreuth, where he saw Hitler, who told him that he needed someone who knew Austria and could handle the situation in Vienna at once. Papen left for Vienna immediately.

In Vienna, Papen was watched constantly by Himmler’s agents of the Gestapo, he said, because he was not trusted on account of his friendliness with the Catholic Church. He remained in Vienna until sometime in February 1938, a few weeks before the annexation. Suddenly he was recalled to Germany. In March the annexation came. Of course, he had no idea there would be any annexation at that time, though he did favor, as did all Germans, he said, a union with Austria. Hitler did not want him in Vienna at the time of the annexation because he had gone to Austria only after extracting a promise from Hitler, when he saw him at Bayreuth, that there would be no “armed entry into Austria and no spilling of blood.” He implied that he was removed from Austria because Hitler was about to break his “promise” to Papen. (At this point, Gilbert asked him, “I suppose you still believed in the word of Hitler then?” and Papen blandly sighed, and said, “Yes.”)

His next assignment was to Turkey. Well, if you opposed Hitler, were followed by Gestapo, disapproved of his regime and treatment of Catholics (he mentioned nothing about Jews), why did you continue in Hitler’s service? “It was because I felt that it was in the interest of peace,” said Papen, “for me to go to Turkey and prevent the ring of encirclement being established around Germany.”

Well, I said, that is puzzling, as it might have been better for the interest of peace if Germany had been encircled, would it not?

“Ah,” sighed Papen, “you are looking at it from the viewpoint of history and what has happened. But at the time, it seemed to me that if Turkey joined the Allied ring around Germany, then Hitler would perhaps feel forced to strike out in some direction and war would ensue.”

In Turkey he was not watched by the Gestapo as far as he knew, he said, “because I had made it a condition of my accepting the Turkish assignment that Himmler’s men not follow me as they did in Vienna.” Himmler had replied at that time, during an interview preceding Papen’s going to Turkey, that Papen must agree to be less interested and friendly toward the Catholic Church. “At this I laughed,” said Papen, “because as I said to Himmler, you must be quite unaware of the fact that Turkey is a country of Muslim religion, and there are practically no Catholics there.” The situation in Turkey was “ticklish,” said Papen. If he ever tried to even talk to another diplomat, let us say a Swedish or Swiss one, or any neutral, the result of this conversation, which “might come from the bottom of my heart,” regarding his “desire for peace,” would be
picked up by the decoding experts on the cables, or overheard and reported to the Nazi government. He was under order on pain of death not to discuss peace with anyone.

When he was finally recalled from Turkey in 1944 he saw Hitler, who was a different man. It was after the
Attentat
of July 20, 1944, and Hitler shook all over, seemed to have lost his capacity for clear thinking. Did he ever really think clearly? I said. “Well,” said Papen, “he was a most interesting man. You could talk to him about so many things. He was interested in art, architecture, politics, the military, music. He could have a thousand interests. Quite a remarkable man. But after the
Attentat
he was changed.”

Tonight, Papen was as usual in a receptive mood and eager to express his opinions. He asked me whether there was anything in particular I wanted to know, and I said that it was immaterial, and I would merely have an interview with him so that I could continue my acquaintance with him and further my attempt to understand his personality.

He began to talk about the history of Germany, and its pros and cons. “It is my opinion that the formation of federal states in Germany was a good one. There were centers of great cultural value. Each state had its court, which included a retinue of all sorts of people, including men of science. This gave Germany many cultural influences. Of all the variety of systems, federal states are as good as any. From another standpoint federal states that were not unified were bad, because there was no unity of foreign policy. For example, Bavaria, Baden, Prussia, in particular, had varying viewpoints. In 1871 Bismarck founded the Reich, and he overcame these differences of viewpoints by a magnificent conception. He made the prime minister of Prussia act as the chancellor of Germany so that the same policy in general would hold throughout Germany.