The Nuremberg Interviews (28 page)

Kaltenbrunner seemed inclined to give me a lecture on the structure and variability of the Reich Security Main Office.

“It was a very changeable organization and it was on a ministerial level from 1933 to 1945. If you don’t understand the political situation in Germany, it is difficult to comprehend this structure. I entered Hitler’s service in 1938. Do you realize that I learned most about what went on — the atrocities, the concentration camps, the mass murders, the gas chambers, the terrorization of the partisans, and the terrible methods of the police itself against the German people — I learned most about it here, because I only worked in Berlin as chief of the RSHA since 1943?

“In order to make you understand, I have to go from the time of the rise of power of Hitler in 1933. Let us deal only with the Gestapo at the beginning of 1933. Just as in any other state, there were original police organizations, and these policemen had enlisted and were civil servants.

“There were the Criminal Police and the Political Police in the Reich. They were called the Security Police, and these came together as one organization in 1936. Therefore, you must understand that the Security Police consisted of the Criminal Police and the Political Police.

“The second big body of police — but separate from the first party — was the Ordinary Police. This consisted of three parts:

“First, the Gendarmes, which were in every state and which also served the function of criminal police in the rural areas. If there was a robbing or shooting, we didn’t send the Criminal Police from Berlin, but the Gendarmes took care of it.

“Second, the uniformed police in the big cities, who directed traffic, trade, et cetera.

“Third, the Fire Brigade Police, who were used in the city officially and who were a volunteer organization in the country and rural districts.

“After 1933 all the Criminal Police, officially all over the Reich, were put together in the Reich Criminal Police Office.
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“The Political Police, which existed before 1933, were put in the Geheime Staatspolizeiamt [Secret State Police Office]. Those words stand for the Gestapo. This abbreviation was used by the enemies of Germany and was patterned after the GPU in Russia. In Germany it was called, for short, ‘the Stapo.’ Now just to make this very clear to you in case there is as much doubt in your mind as in the tribunal’s because of that ridiculous chart the tribunal had pasted on the wall of the courtroom, understand: the Criminal Police and Gestapo were not uniformed, the Ordinary Police were uniformed.

“Later on more and more Criminal Police and Gestapo people wore SS uniforms as they entered the SS from the ranks of the other police organizations. This was from 1935 onward.

“Before National Socialism came to power in 1933, people in the Political Police were opposed to Nazi ideas and naturally held stubborn beliefs in the old regime.

“The police, as in any other trade, had among their numbers a certain percentage of voters. So did the tailors or the bricklayers or any other group. For example, in 1928, five percent of the police voted for National Socialism; in 1929, ten percent; in 1930, thirty percent; in 1931, fifty percent; in 1932, seventy percent; and in 1933, eighty percent. In other words, it was the same with the police as with other groups. The police, as a whole, voted for National Socialism. And do you know, it is interesting that the percentage of National Socialist votes among the police even later than 1933 was slightly less than among the general population. For example, in the years after 1933 when there were elections, only seventy percent of the police voted for National Socialism, whereas a higher percentage of the general population voted for it. Partly this was because of their own beliefs and because of a fear of reprisal without outward pressure. Just like your own de-Nazification program but less oppressive. This program existed when a new party came to power. After the Weimar Republic was overthrown, laws had to be created to do away with it and to find a legal way to put out of power those who were politically democratic. After the Russian Revolution, Russia did away with everyone who was not a Communist. They did it much more openly by shooting any- and everyone.”

Do you really believe this story of what seems to me fascist influence, which so many of your defendants are using as a basis for an excuse for your own defense — do you really believe that the Russians went around
shooting ‘any- and everybody’? “Well, in 1933 when the Nazis came to power, there was very little shooting by the police or anyone. In 1933, policemen were replaced in Bavaria; twenty-one percent were replaced in Berlin. It was a very mild action. You cannot speak of a Christian persecution.”

I don’t understand exactly what you mean about this exchange of policemen. “Well, what I mean is that some police people were replaced by Nazi policemen in Bavaria in 1933 and that in Berlin twenty-one percent of the old police department had to be replaced by Nazis, and that is why I say it was such a mild action.
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Altogether perhaps in Bavaria there were forty policemen discharged. Can you call that an extermination of your opponent? And that is in cases where policemen had behaved badly, or had spoken insulting words or in an insulting manner against National Socialist ministers.

“In 1934 Heydrich arrived. It will be interesting for the prosecution — but they don’t seem to care, and without knowing these details one can’t get an adequate picture. You have to know the personal characteristics and aims of Heydrich. He was a terribly ambitious man with a great craving for power. This desire for power was measureless, and he was extraordinarily clever and cunning.”

I asked Kaltenbrunner whether he knew Heydrich personally and he replied: “Yes. You see, Himmler at that time was still the leader of the SS, which was a party organization. I played a very subordinate part all that time. Because the SS consisted of the General SS, which was more than ninety percent of the total SS, together with the regiments of SS troops which carried arms — the Bodyguard, the General Service troops, the Death’s Heads. The General Service troops were at the personal disposal of the Führer. The Bodyguard was a regiment of this latter organization; there were other regiments, called, for example, the Deutschland, et cetera. The Death’s Heads consisted of three or four battalions. Himmler at that time was in charge of the SS when Heydrich came to power. In other words, the SS was a ridiculously small organization at that time.

“The army at that time opposed SS regiments carrying arms because the army felt that it should be the only defense of Germany. It also opposed the air force, and it is only thanks to Goering and his close connections with Hitler that the air force developed alongside the army.”

I asked Kaltenbrunner whether he thought that this was a good thing. He replied: “I am not a military man and I don’t know if it is more advisable
to create a separate air force or make it a part of the army and navy. Experts all over the world were of varying opinions. The Japanese divided their air force between the army and navy, whereas in America, your air force was a new branch of the army. The education of the people will bring that with it. I believe there is a different feeling of comradeship in the air force as opposed to the infantry. For example, just think of the close comradeship of an air corps crew.

“I believe that because Himmler saw he could not form another branch equal to the army, he tried to develop or gain power through the police. And Heydrich, who was a clever organizer, brought together the Criminal and Political Police in the Security Police and later put it into the RSHA. And a third branch came into the RSHA when the SD was formed, which was not a police formation but only an information service.”

At this point Kaltenbrunner took out a pencil and paper and charted the structure of the RSHA for me. He said that the chart used in the courtroom gave an inaccurate picture of the RSHA.
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“Every year things changed. There was Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, me, and others. It was a very confusing situation. The various offices were given different numbers. One can only describe how it appeared in a certain year. For example, let us take a man by the name of Meyer. He was in charge of anti-Communist activity in the Frankfurt branch. He must have a personal file, and there is also a personal file on him in Frankfurt. From the personnel division of the State Police Office in Frankfurt — it is their responsibility that Meyer should be promoted after four or five years in rank. Let us say he is to be promoted from administrative adviser to chief administrative adviser. Now Meyer’s chief in Frankfurt will ask his personnel chief that an application be made for Meyer’s promotion. This would be forwarded to Berlin. That is Office IV — the Gestapo. The personnel division chief of Office IV, if he has no objection to it, will approve it and give it to Heinrich Mueller, chief of Office IV, in order that Meyer be promoted.
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“Twice a year one could turn in names for promotion. Each time Mueller took eighty cases in file and went to Himmler with it. But, aside from that, a personnel division in the RSHA which was above the personnel division of Office IV existed. The RSHA personnel division was there to take care of general questions, such as finances, furloughs for all employees, et cetera. This personnel section in the RSHA was Office I—for
personnel and organization. The chief of Office I had no police functions.

“Now let us turn to Office II, which was administration. This can be seen as one big thing with a financial division for negotiations with the finance office and with the finance officer of the party, with the Reich’s treasurer, et cetera, which was necessary because in the RSHA there were two categories of employees: one, state officials; and, two, party officials. The party officials worked in the SD. The state officials also worked in the Criminal Police and State Police. There were certain exceptions — like Offices I and II, which employed both categories of employees, such as accountants.

“That’s only of importance as to who paid them — the party or the state. You will only understand it when I tell you the character of the SD, which consisted completely of party employees. When the party first came into power, it found a complete police organization and retained this organization. You have to think of the feelings and ideology of the party in those years. The party leaders thought that something was missing in the state, since they took theaters, press, cinema, et cetera, and steered them into their own way of thinking. There was no means of criticism and what was lacking was a way of obtaining a picture of the feeling of the cross section of the population, because the only information they received came from the district and local administrators, none of whom would say anything against the party, to which they were answerable. From a philosophical standpoint that is the weak part of every authoritarian state. This possibility of criticism is one point that I recognize and which I compliment in a democracy. Because after a period of years every authoritarian state will be informed in a one-sided manner if there is no freedom of criticism.

“And now Heydrich and Himmler got an idea which was, in my opinion, the cause of the beginning of the final downfall. By downfall I don’t mean the catastrophe at the end but the destruction of the inner basis of confidence.

“This tribunal makes the SS one organization, and that is all false. If you talk to some officers who are interned in the SS camps, you will find that there are people who had about ten weeks of training and who were active in the front lines and never had anything to do with concentration camps or with Himmler.

“The Russians who fought against the armed SS must admit that the
armed SS consisted of soldiers, and of course, there were bad ones among them just as in any army.

“To return to the SD. The party looked for an instrument which might bring information — aside from information through party channels. It had no police functions. The thought was correct from the standpoint of a single party within the Reich — but Himmler and Heydrich recognized they would thereby gain valuable leverage against the party itself.

“Now they had the opportunity to do bad things. There are bad people in any regime. You only have to check the statistics in 1918, 1928, and 1938 as to how many murders, et cetera, were committed. Now they [the SD] had the opportunity to observe the party and were the first to learn of any misstep by any district or local administrator. It didn’t have to be a crime — for example, if the party district administrator had drunk too much. If any party district administrator had looked for material advantages, the SD would have reported it.”

I asked Kaltenbrunner whether any examples of this had occurred. He said: “The Nazi Party consisted of sixty percent workers, ten percent farmers, and the rest, intellectuals and bourgeoisie. Through all those elections, a common workman could become a party district administrator, just like Fritz Sauckel, who was a common seaman, or August Eigruber in Austria, who used to be a mechanic. As a matter of fact, sixty percent of the party district administrators used to be laborers.
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“You can imagine what happened to a little laborer who suddenly finds himself a leader, builds himself a big estate, possesses not one car but perhaps four — and in a certain sense Hitler required that the party district administrators live up to their positions, with pictures in their homes, nice furnishings, et cetera. But Hitler did not want a great many nouveau riche developments.

“And now begins something interesting — Himmler and Heydrich had the opportunity of observing these weaknesses of the party district administrators and other officials through the SD. Himmler and Heydrich used to carry tales to Hitler and say, ‘See what happened in your party’ — and would use it as blackmail in the party. Heydrich played a still more devilish role. He would go to Bormann and the latter would say that he would take the matter up with Hitler. Bormann said, ‘Give it to me.’ And Himmler was told nothing. When Heydrich wanted something, he asked Bormann for a favor. Thereby Heydrich accumulated greater power — too great for Himmler.”