The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (78 page)

While Haldeman doubted that I had recorded the conversation, he incorrectly told the president, “He must have been talking from notes, I mean, it sure looked liked it, I mean, sounded like it.” “It made quite an orderly report, he’d put together,” Nixon observed, and he asked Haldeman to go over the Hunt demand part again. When Haldeman finished he prompted, “You’re smoking him out on what he thinks the alternatives are. You’re pumping him.” As the conversation progressed, the president returned to his incriminating instruction to me to pay Hunt’s demand. “What I’m really setting up there,” Nixon explained, “putting the best light on a bad situation, is basically, I’m saying, ‘Well, get the money, but we should try to cut it off,’ and so forth, ‘but how do you do it?’” Haldeman reminded him, “You’re being blackmailed, here on this specific question of the national security point. Because what Hunt was holding you up on was not on the Watergate. But on the other, the seamy work for Ehrlichman. All the other defendants were also involved in this.”

Nixon briefly changed the subject to report that Kleindienst had been over earlier and given him a copy of a memorandum Justice felt they had to send to the judge handling the Ellsberg criminal trial. The president instructed, “Show Ehrlichman that memorandum from Kleindienst and say we had no choice under the circumstances.” As he explained, “Dean, see, informed them on the Ellsberg break-in.” Realzing it was going to have Watergate repercussions, he said, “It’ll break in the paper,” and he thought it might “clear Ellsberg.” The press would write that the “Watergate buggers tried to do this or that and the other thing. Know what I mean?” Nixon wanted Haldeman to tell Ehrlichman he had had no choice when Kleindienst asked him about doing it.

This discussion ended on the March 21 conversation, when Nixon said, “Let me say, it’s got to be, you, Ehrlichman and I have got to put the wagons up around the president on this particular conversation. I just wonder if the son of a bitch had a recorder on him. I didn’t notice any, but I wasn’t looking.” Haldeman thought, “It’s almost inconceivable that the guy would try that, because—” Nixon interrupted, acknowledging, “He was really coming in, in fact, to warn me.” Haldeman agreed and observed, “He had no thought that you were going to say anything like this. All he was coming in to tell you was that there was a problem. He wasn’t expecting you to solve it that way. I think you probably surprised him enormously by even raising this point.” Nixon’s mind had drifted, and after asking, “What, what?” Haldeman recast his point: “Of, you know, well, we could get the money. I think that’s the last thing he expected you to say.” Nixon asked, “What did he expect me to say, we can’t do it?” Haldeman dodged the question, and Steve Bull entered the office to tell Nixon that Henry Petersen had arrived at his Oval Office.

The president had Petersen brought over to his EOB office, where the poor audio quality of the tape suggests that both seated themselves facing away from the hidden desk microphones for this conversation.
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Pressed by Nixon for information, Petersen reported that his friend William Hundley would represent John Mitchell and that Sam Dash had informed the Justice Department that the Senate Watergate committee was going to seek immunity for a number of witnesses during their hearings. Petersen was going to try to talk them out of it, but he was not hopeful. Nixon asked how negotiations were going with Magruder’s attorney, and mine, and Petersen said no agreements had been reached. With the deeply incriminating March 21 tape fresh
in his mind, the president said he thought that that conversation was “probably” my trump card, so he proceeded to spin it for Petersen into an innocuous passing inquiry by him as to how much money the Watergate defendants might want: “I said, ‘How much is this going to take?’ I mean, ‘How about maybe a million dollars.’ I said, ‘Well, we could get a million dollars, but how the hell are you going to get it to them?’ I said, ‘It’s wrong. You can’t go that way.’” Nixon warned Petersen that if I ever tried to testify about the contents of that conversation, I was not to be believed. “But that is the conversation, period. I remember telling Ehrlichman and Haldeman about that conversation,” he added, suggesting that his position could be corroborated.

Petersen next reported, “The United States attorney for the Southern District of New York wants Dean to testify in the Vesco thing.” Nixon was surprised (as was I), but Petersen assured him that he had been holding them off, trying to make a deal with me. Petersen incorrectly reported that I had made “a couple of calls to the SEC” for Mitchell on Vesco’s behalf to get a subpoena quashed. He quickly moved on to report that he had learned the contents of the documents Gray had destroyed (from me via my attorney, for when Gray denied having the documents, I took a lie-detector test and challenged Gray to do likewise, since I had become tired of Gray’s calling me a liar publicly, and now privately, to prosecutors). Petersen explained that the documents included “concocted” State Department cables suggesting that, when Kennedy was president, he was actively involved in the murder of South Vietnam president Diem. Nixon, who said nothing, was aware of this undertaking by Colson and Hunt and merely asked why Gray had destroyed the material. Petersen still relied on Gray’s account that I had given him the documents to destroy them.

Petersen reported that, based on information “from a very reliable source, a newspaper man” who had interviewed Donald Segretti, they were developing a criminal case against Segretti under the Corrupt Practices Act, and Petersen added that they would probably immunize two people to get an indictment against him. Not surprisingly Nixon continued to bring the conversation back to his own involvement, with him and Petersen repeating that they were not going to allow me to blackmail them, Haldeman, Ehrlichman or Kleindienst. What Nixon ultimately took from this conversation can be gleaned from his subsequent discussions with Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Nixon tried unsuccessfully to call Ehrlichman first, and failing to reach
him, spoke with Haldeman, who was at home when the president reached him shortly before 7:00
P.M.
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“I had a good talk with Petersen and told him that, you know, about the need to expedite the grand jury,” Nixon reported. “Second, I told him I wanted a paper from him with regard to you and John. He said he’d have it by Friday afternoon.” The president gave Haldeman more background on the memorandum from Silbert regarding the Ellsberg case, which Nixon characterized as basically “a little blackmail” by Dean.
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Nixon expected that this would make the news, but Haldeman was not sure that was all bad, explaining, “Well, it adds confusion to the whole thing.” “Yeah,” Nixon responded, “the Watergate buggers tried to knock over Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.”

The president asked if Haldeman had given Ehrlichman the memorandum from Kleindienst yet. He had not but said, “I covered it with him.”

“I leveled with Petersen on the conversation that we had,” Nixon reported, regarding their review of the March 21 recording. “And I said, now I want you to know this, and I said, we’ll not be blackmailed on it, we didn’t do anything about it, but that’s when I started my investigation. And that’s our line there, I think,” noting, “incidentally, I think that should just be between you and me.” Haldeman agreed; they would not tell Ehrlichman. “Did it bother Petersen?” Haldeman asked. “Oh, well, everything bothers him,” Nixon quickly answered, and Haldeman could not resist laughing.

Nixon talked about the problem of handling me “in such a way that he doesn’t become a totally implacable enemy.” He reminded Haldeman, “At least, I have treated him decently. In fact, more decently than he deserves. On the other hand, he may become totally intractable. If he does, you’re going to have one hell of a pissing contest.” “If you do, you just got to win it,” Haldeman replied, leading Nixon to wonder, “What else can you do? And when you think of this, all this kind of thing, you know, I was just thinking a little bit more about the impeachment thing, that I don’t see the Senate or any senators starting an impeachment of the president based on the word of John Dean.” Haldeman agreed,
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and Nixon continued, “That’s all it is. I mean, John Dean says that, this, and that and the other thing happened.” “And there’s no way he can support it,” Haldeman added. “I mean, there’s no way to make a case.” Nixon cautioned, “Well, except it could be he recorded
his conversation, made a memorandum, told his lawyers immediately thereafter, and so forth and so on. But even there, I mean, here is—”

“Still his word, unless he’s got a tape recording. And even with the tape recording, I think you could make the case the other way,” Haldeman argued. The president remained silent a while, then thoughtfully added, “I don’t know [about] a tape recording. I can’t believe that he could have walked in there with a tape recorder that day, because that day, I mean, I’m not trying to be wishful thinking, that particular day he wasn’t really out to get the president, I don’t think.” “That’s right, no sir, he wasn’t,” Haldeman agreed. “He was going just the other way.” Nixon noted, “Trying to help?” Although Haldeman agreed, and said he could not conceive that I would have recorded Nixon, they continued to speculate about where and how I might have hidden a recorder. The conversation ended with the president encouraging Haldeman to make a trip to Mississippi with him on Friday and reminding him to fill Ehrlichman in on the Ellsberg matter.

Three minutes after the president ended the call with Haldeman, the operator had Ehrlichman on the line, and they spoke briefly.
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The president explained that he had given Haldeman information to share with Ehrlichman following his talk with Petersen. “And the only thing that is particularly relevant is that piece of paper which they brought in here, which I talked to Petersen about, and he said that he felt very strongly, as did Kleindienst, and Dean’s people were trying to blackmail them with that. And that they, therefore, felt it was very important that they get that conveyed to the prosecution. Dean’s lawyer having told them this, they feel that it’s important that the prosecution know it. That the judge knows it. Now that’s what they’ve done.”

“They passed it on to Matt Byrne?” a mildly mortified Ehrlichman asked. “Passed it on to the judge,” Nixon affirmed, and added, “And what is likely to happen is that, well, I don’t know. Might call Dean. And then Dean will have to say what it was. So the Watergate buggers are involved in the psychiatrist’s office.” He added, “Let me say, though, on that point, I think it was information all those prosecutors over there already [had],” referring to the Watergate prosecutors, and “it’s going to come out anyway, John.” Ehrlichman said he would speak to Haldeman.

Nixon knew that this information being released to Judge Byrne had upset Ehrlichman, so he decided to shield his aide as best he could. At 7:22
P.M.
he called Kleindienst and instructed him to warn the prosecutors and
the judge “that this was a national security investigation of very great sensitivity.”
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Kleindienst thought this was a “good suggestion” and agreed to pass it along. As soon as Nixon completed this call to Kleindienst, he called Ehrlichman to report what he had done.
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“Great,” he told the president, and Nixon proceeded to give him a few highlights of his meeting with Petersen. Ehrlichman confided to Nixon, “I tell you, I made a mistake in joining with Bob in retaining counsel.” The president agreed and suggested, “You better change pretty fast.” Ehrlichman noted, “If I could, if I can figure out some way of getting a little separation, I think it’s wise to do.”
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During this conversation Nixon ascertained who was involved in the Ellsberg break-in. When he told Ehrlichman that I might be called as a witness in the Ellsberg case on this matter, he said, “He’ll probably say he was doing it under Ehrlichman’s direction, right? Is that what he’ll say?” Ehrlichman answered, “I don’t think Dean can say that. They would have to get some other witness, they would have to get Liddy or Hunt or somebody. Dean was not directly involved.” “He wasn’t?” a surprised Nixon asked. “Then how the hell does he know about this? This is hearsay.” Ehrlichman did not recall how I had learned of it, so he said, “Snooping over the fence.” “Oh, I see. Oh, I see. He wasn’t an actor in this?” Nixon asked, despite having accused me to both Kleindienst and Petersen. “No, sir,” Ehrlichman assured him. I had not been involved.

When the president asked Ehrlichman what he would say about the matter, Ehrlichman provided a bit more information than he had in his previous denials: “Well, I’d say what is the fact, that my connection with it was that I authorized their travel, and I authorized them to go out and investigate Ellsberg, and among the things that were to be investigated out there was an examination of his medical records, if that were possible. Now they chose a method that I—” Nixon interrupted and injected, “You did not approve.” Ehrlichman agreed, “I did not approve. When I heard about it afterward I disapproved of it. And my shortcoming, my failing, was in not bringing them to account on it and not just having them arrested on discovery. Since it was a—” Nixon interrupted with the response he wanted again: “Highly sensitive thing.” But Ehrlichman continued using his own words, “A military area, why, ah—” The president interrupted again to remind Ehrlichman that the FBI was not being helpful, which Ehrlichman acknowledged might be part of the problem. “But here again, I think I’ll talk to Wilson about this in the morning, so that he’s forewarned. And he can do some briefing on it.” But
based on Ehrlichman’s claiming that he had not approved anything, the president began arguing that it was not illegal, that he had done nothing wrong. Ehrlichman, however, was giving the president a less than full account.

This conversation ended with Nixon relating to Ehrlichman that Petersen had told him that my attorneys (actually, it was only Shaffer) had made a serious error: “[Petersen] says, ‘I think Dean’s attorneys made a terrible mistake in putting this out to us,’” regarding Ellsberg. “Because they were trying to test us, they were trying to see if we got this information, they didn’t think we’d use it. And they thought they would hold that over our heads.” (I have not been able to verify Petersen’s making this statement to Nixon in their earlier conversation.
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