The Israel-Arab Reader (102 page)

We call on you to take a true Arab stand of pride that is in line with the history of this glorious Arab nation, its capabilities, and the sacrifices of its steadfast peoples in protection of their holy shrines, land, and future. I would like to thank all our brothers and friends in the world who support our just struggle and cause. I would also like to thank them for their help at all levels.

I conclude my speech by conveying the message of my people to you, the Arab leaders, calling on you to disregard all differences and reach inter-Arab reconciliation which will put the corner stone for a new Arab era that is in line with the status of our nation and the greatness of our pan-Arab goals. This also requires us all to end the siege imposed on the Iraqi people and make way for real and comprehensive Arab reconciliation and openness within our single Arab nation. For the sake of the children of Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and the rest of the Arab nation, we call on you to entrench unity and integration. . . .

The
intifada
is a decision of the Palestinian people—not
Fatah
. Everything happens first on the ground. [We do not] determine what people do. . . . If tens of thousands of people have mobilized, it is on nobody's orders. The Israelis have made me the
intifada
's leader because I am seen in the media. President Yasir Arafat remains the nation's leader; he takes the political decisions. And he support us. Without his support, the
intifada
could not continue. But he does not deal with the day-to-day details. People follow me only because I express what they expect. We have set up local coordinating committees of the movement. Some 30 parties are represented on them, from the Communists to the Islamists. Those committees determine the
intifada
's progress from day to day. . . . The decisions are collective, but
Fatah
holds the majority on them. . . .

Perhaps some people believed at the outset that this movement would stop quickly, but nobody can stop it. Perhaps some people among us still believe that the message sent by the
intifada
to Israel and the international community is now sufficient. But that is not my opinion. The movement will continue and must continue. . . .

What would be the point of a return to calm? We were calm for seven years in order to give a chance to the negotiations, of which I have been a keen supporter.

But the Israelis used that time in order to negotiate interim agreements which were never implemented and to continue their policy of a fait accompli on the ground: The new settlements, the expropriations, the confiscation of land, the keeping of prisoners in the jails. Why should calm now be restored? So that they can resume the same policy? We have the right to self-determination, like all the peoples of the world.

Some people believe: If Marwan al-Barghuthi gives the order to stop everything, everything will stop. That is wrong. People do not support me because I give orders but because I support them. They will stay with me as long as I express their opinion. If I no longer do so, they will be against me. . . .

A withdrawal from the territories conquered by Israel in 1967 is our demand. And ending the occupation is the real reason for the current
intifada.
The
intifada
will last as long as the occupation lasts. After seven years, we have experience of the Israelis; we have had hundreds of meetings with them: They never let go of anything without being obliged to do so by force. I have nothing against the negotiations—on the contrary. But the rules of the game must now be changed. In the first place, they should agree to negotiate during the confrontations. Second, the monopoly exercised by the Americans must be broken, because the United States is not an honest mediator. The United Nations, the Europeans, and Russia should also be directly involved. . . .

The Islamists—Hamas and Jihad—are in the local committees' coordinating body called the “Committee of National and Islamic Political Forces.” Sometimes they have their own activities, as we do, but, on the whole, we cooperate well; we are very united.
Fatah
is leading the movement not because it is afraid of being outflanked by the Islamists but because it is its duty. . . .

The Islamists sometimes shout slogans taken from the Koran referring to the Jews, but not “death to the Jews.” That is absolutely not in the tradition of Islam. Listen: I was first imprisoned at the age of 17. Between 1978 and 1988 I served six and a half years in prison for political activities, plus six months' house arrest. I was expelled in 1987 by an order signed by Mr. Barak. I stayed in exile for seven years, until my return in 1994. What kind of life have I had? I was a keen supporter of Oslo. I want reconciliation with the Israelis. We are not extremists. The vast majority of the Palestinians still want peace and coexistence with Israel, which is and will remain our neighbor forever. But I do not want my children to experience what I have experienced.

They will live in a free, unoccupied country. The Israelis want everything: Peace, security, stability, the settlements, and a Palestinian state without Jerusalem and without real sovereignty. That is impossible. They must leave the territories, and there will be no more confrontations. . . .

There will never again be either a 1948 or a 1967; they will not be able to expel us
en masse
. The Israelis will eventually realize that the occupation also works against them. I am very optimistic.

TERRITORY:

Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90 percents, between 94-96 percent of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State. The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3 percent in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage. The parties also should consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs. . . . The parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:

-80 percent of settlers in blocks;

-Contiguity;

-Minimize the annexed areas;

-Minimize the number of Palestinians affected.

SECURITY:

The key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides. . . .

My best judgment is that the Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threat to Israel.

On early warning stations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review every 10 years with any changes in the status to be mutually agreed.

Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you will still have to develop a map of the relevant areas and routes. . . . I propose the following definition:

Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel's national security of a military nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency.

Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such determination.

On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that the two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a “demilitarized state” while the Palestinian side proposes “a state with limited arms.” As a compromise, I suggest calling it a “non-militarized state.” This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrent purposes. . . .

JERUSALEM:

The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.

Regarding the Haram Temple Mount, I believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to symbolic issues of sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.

I know you have been discussing a number of formulations. . . . I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over the Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish people. Regarding either one of those two formulations will be international monitoring to provide mutual confidence.

Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over a) the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part or b) the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part. There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.

Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation could take place.

REFUGEES:

I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level. I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem. . . .

The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning the principle.

The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel's sovereign policies and admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.

Any solution must address both needs. The solution will have to be consistent with the two state approach. . . . the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian state should be the focal point for the Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.

I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return that will make clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

I propose two alternatives:

The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list the five possible homes for the refugees:

In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip and area acquired in the land swap would be right to all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries.

Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel sovereign decision.

I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon. The parties would agree that this implements Resolution 194.

THE END OF CONFLICT:

I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Council Resolution that notes that resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release for Palestinian prisoners.

The Palestinian leaders are starting to get on people's nerves. These leaders, who negotiate while shooting their six-guns, are getting things that they never even dreamed of getting. Yet they incite their public to attack us, while they never stop whining and complaining. Purposely overlooking what they have already obtained or what is already within their grasp, they are never satisfied. They just want us to keep on trying and making concessions—otherwise, they threaten, they'll refuse to sign a peace treaty with us. They remind many people of the legendary Hershel of Ostropol who threatened that, if he were not given a free meal, he would have to do what his father used to do—namely, go to bed hungry. Israel is a strong nation that has emerged victorious from every war it has ever fought. Furthermore, Israel can live with the status quo for many years and with much less trouble than the Palestinians. They need our approval if they want to set up an independent state and they need us as partners in every possible sphere. Who knows, one day they might find themselves needing our military umbrella to protect them from their own Arab brothers and sisters. In our generation, more Arabs have been killed by other Arabs than by Jews.

In the Oslo agreement and in the White House lawn parties, it was Israel that resurrected a Yasser Arafat who had become a pariah among the leaders of the Arab world for his support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and it was Israel that freed him from the status of persona non grata. The Oslo agreement, which returned Arafat to his homeland from his life of exile and ceaseless wandering, was designed to bring about conciliation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.