The Irish Revolution, 1916-1923 (24 page)

The Irish delegation was headed by Griffith and also included a reluctant Collins, Eamonn Duggan, Robert Barton and George Gavan Duffy, with Erskine Childers as secretary. The most glaring omission was de Valera, who felt that Griffith and Collins provided good leadership without him and preferred to remain in reserve at home, providing an opportunity for the delegation to demur in agreeing to anything in haste without consulting him first. The decision was strongly opposed by Collins and Griffith who felt that it was a mistake to leave their most skilled negotiator behind. De Valera's absence from the treaty negotiations remains a polarising issue in Irish history, with his detractors arguing that he deliberately absented himself in the knowledge that Lloyd George would never concede a republic and thereby de Valera could avoid the taint of compromise, a view held at the time by Collins (Hopkinson, 1988: 25). There was also a possibility that the negotiations would fail and if de Valera was not part of them he could not be blamed for such an eventuality (Ferriter, 2007: 82–7; Pakenham, 1972: 83–4).

The opposing delegation was headed by Lloyd George, and included the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead (who, as F. E. Smith, had been a prominent supporter of the UVF in 1913), Austen Chamberlain (Conservative Party leader), Winston Churchill (Secretary of State for the Colonies), Sir Laming Worthington Evans (Secretary of State for War), Sir Hamar Greenwood (Irish Chief Secretary) and Gordon Hewart (Attorney General) (
http://www.treaty.nationalarchives.ie/the-delegates
).

The negotiations took place in London between 11 October and 6 December 1921. Sinn Féin's main aim was to achieve the greatest level of sovereignty possible. While a republic was the ideal goal, in reality the delegation knew that it was an unlikely outcome; instead they would seek as much independence as possible, preferably avoiding any reference to the King in the government of Ireland. Partition was not a major concern for the delegation. It had become a reality in June 1921 and there was little likelihood of any change in the status of Northern Ireland in the foreseeable future. They hoped for some indication of the British Government's commitment to eventual Irish unity. Sir James Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, had been invited to attend the negotiations but refused. Partition was important to the delegation as a popular issue on which to break off the negotiations if they were not going well.

The constitutional position of the 26-county state and its relationship to Britain was the most important issue in the negotiations. The outcome was the creation of the Irish Free State, which would have the status of a dominion of the Commonwealth, similar to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. While the state would be largely independent, enjoying a much greater level of self-government than Northern Ireland under home rule – including its own army, coinage, postage, central bank etc. – it was
not a fully sovereign republic and the controversial trappings of the monarchy remained. The King was still head of state and members of the Free State Parliament had to take an oath of fealty to him and his successors. This clause, often mistakenly referred to as the oath of allegiance to the King (it was an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the Free State and an oath of fealty to the King), would prove to be one of the core issues in the split that subsequently emerged
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.

Partition figured in the debates in regard to the exact geographical boundary of the new Free State. On 12 November Griffith scuppered the Irish delegation's strategy of using Ulster as a convenient excuse to break off unsuccessful negotiations by agreeing to Lloyd George's suggestion that a
Boundary Commission
be established to delineate the border between the Free State and Northern Ireland (Hopkinson, 1988: 29). Lloyd George was also successful in convincing Collins that the Commission would grant the Free State ‘large territories’ and ‘that Ulster, reduced to an uneconomic unit, would probably be “forced in” [to the Free State] before long’ (Pakenham, 1972: 222). This appears to have been a decisive factor in convincing Collins to sign the treaty.

Boundary Commission
: Commission established under the Anglo-Irish Treaty to delineate the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. Its 1925 report was suppressed and the border left unchanged.

The British delegation was concerned about the implications of Irish independence for British defence and demanded that a British naval presence be retained at three Irish ports – Berehaven and Cobh in County Cork and Lough Swilly in County Donegal. This was a further reminder that the Free State was not fully sovereign. The ports were eventually returned in 1938 enabling éire to remain neutral during the Second World War. The fourth major issue at stake in the negotiations was the Free State's responsibility for a portion of British public debt, including war pensions and compensation to civil and public servants and policemen who were not retained by the new government or chose to resign rather than serve in the new state or seek a transfer to Northern Ireland. This was subsequently estimated to amount to between £6.25 million and £8.25 million annually, but much of this was waived by the British Government in 1925 following the conclusion of the Boundary Commission (Laffan, 1983: 104–5).

On 30 November Lloyd George produced a draft treaty that the Irish delegation brought back to Dublin for consultation with the Dáil Cabinet. The confused and acrimonious debate which ensued foreshadowed much of what would emerge in the subsequent Dáil debate on the treaty, with republican hardliners such as Austin Stack and Cathal Brugha criticising the content of the document and tactics of the Irish negotiators. The delegation returned to London with vague instructions about seeking re-wording of the oath and no written instructions about strategy or whether they needed to refer an amended treaty back again before signing it. After the British delegation made concessions on the oath and other minor issues, Lloyd
George dramatically demanded that the Irish delegates sign the modified treaty immediately without referring it back to Dublin, or risk an immediate resumption of war. He was undoubtedly calling the Irish delegates’ bluff, but knew that any hesitation would allow the republican opponents of the agreement to prolong or possibly even destroy the negotiations at the eleventh hour. The
Anglo-Irish Treaty
was subsequently signed in 10 Downing Street in the early hours of Tuesday, 6 December 1921.

Anglo-Irish Treaty
: Treaty signed in December 1921 between Britain and Southern Ireland that created the Irish Free State as a dominion of the Commonwealth.

There are a number of reasons why the Irish delegation agreed to sign the treaty. Griffith was the most moderate member of the delegation and therefore always likely to sign a document that conferred a considerable level of sovereignty, if not full independence. His agreement to a boundary commission also made it impossible for him to refuse. Lloyd George had been a most skilful negotiator. At an early stage he identified the fault-lines within the Irish camp, recognising that Collins and Griffith could be worked around while seeking to exclude the more recalcitrant Duffy and Duggan from some of the deliberations. He also used the Conservative majority in his government to his advantage, arguing that his hands were tied because of it, especially on the question of Ulster. Throughout the negotiations he raised the prospect that if the negotiations failed, his government would fall to be replaced by a Conservative government, possibly led by the Unionist stalwart Bonar Law, that would not be prepared to offer the Irish such a generous settlement.

Lloyd George's success in convincing Collins of the potential of the Boundary Commission to destroy Northern Ireland was significant in his decision to sign. Collins had also gained the support of the IRB supreme council for an amended oath, and by early December was aware that this was the best deal possible. As the only military man in the delegation he knew that the IRA had lost much of its valued anonymity during the truce and would be unable to resort to the successful covert guerrilla tactics it had practised prior to July 1921. With the two principal negotiators having decided to sign, the others followed reluctantly, aware of the divisive reaction that would ensue back in Ireland (Hopkinson, 1988: 31–3).

THE TREATY SPLIT

The first group to express an opinion on the Treaty was the Dáil Cabinet, which included three of the signatories (Griffith, Collins and Barton), in addition to de Valera, Brugha, Austin Stack and W. T. Cosgrave. The cabinet divided four to three, with the more republican-minded de Valera, Stack and Brugha voting against it. Robert Barton would subsequently recant his support but at this early stage the Treaty had passed its first hurdle. Its fate would now
be decided in the Dáil debate, which took place between 14 December 1921 and 7 January 1922, with a break for Christmas.

The Dáil treaty debate was one of the most acrimonious ever to take place in the Irish Parliament
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. Much of the early debate centred on whether the delegates had acted outside their powers in signing the treaty, most likely a deliberate strategy by the treaty's opponents ‘to personalize the debate, to put the delegation – Collins and Griffith, in particular – on the defensive’ (Knirck, 2006: 118–19). Personal animosities that had been simmering throughout the War of Independence rose to the surface. Cathal Brugha, who, as Minister for Defence, had tried to bring the IRA under Dáil control in spite of opposition from Collins and the IRB, took exception to a comment that Collins ‘was the man who won the war’, pointing out that he was ‘merely a subordinate in the Department of Defence’, whose image as a romantic hero was manufactured by the press. Griffith, who was the target of many personalised attacks from anti-treatyites, reacted furiously to their verbal attack on him, referring cuttingly on one occasion to Erskine Childers as a ‘damned Englishman’.

All six women TDs (Countess Markievicz, Ada English, Mary MacSwiney, Margaret Pearse, Kate O’Callaghan and Kathleen Clarke) opposed the treaty, with the last four invoking the republicanism of their male relatives who had died since 1916. In the longest speech of the debate, lasting over two-anda- half hours, Mary MacSwiney delivered one of the most ardent republican arguments against any compromise short of complete sovereignty. The debate appears to have had little outcome on the result of the vote and was more of an opportunity for TDs to record their opinions and vent their frustration at former colleagues who had now become political enemies. Most TDs seem to have made their decisions well before the vote was taken, though the Christmas break might have been significant in some making their minds up as a result of pressure from their constituents, especially influential figures such as the largely pro-treaty Roman Catholic clergy.

The most influential opponent of the treaty was the Dáil's president, de Valera, who argued that it was incompatible with Sinn Féin's stated ambition of achieving a republic. As an alternative de Valera introduced
Document No. 2
, which outlined his idea of external association, an idea that was mooted during the treaty negotiations but did not receive any serious consideration at the time
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. External association envisaged a relationship between the Free State and the Commonwealth whereby the Irish Free State would be associated with the Commonwealth for matters relating to foreign affairs, war and defence and would recognise the King as head of the Commonwealth, though not as Irish head of state. It was a complicated and sophisticated arrangement that he would later put into operation under the External Relations Act in 1936, but was still too convoluted for the circumstances of 1922, as Irish independence was in its fledgling stages and the relations between the dominions and Britain had yet to evolve in the way they did after the Statute of Westminster in 1929 that gave greater autonomy to the dominions. De Valera subsequently withdrew Document No. 2 before the Dáil had an opportunity to vote on it as an alternative to the treaty.

Document No. 2
: De Valera's alternative to the treaty that envisaged an external association relationship between the Free State and Britain, under which the King would not be recognised as Irish head of state.

The treaty was put to a vote in the Dáil on 7 January 1922 where it was accepted by a slim margin of seven votes – 64 to 57 – a mere four votes could have swung the balance in the other direction. De Valera resigned as president of the Dáil and was replaced by Griffith. Critics of de Valera often see this as one of his greatest political mistakes, arguing that by rejecting the democratic decision of the Dáil he precipitated a split in the republican movement that spread from the Dáil to Sinn Féin and the IRA, eventually leading to civil war six months later. De Valera's defence was that as he considered the Irish delegates to have acted outside their authority in signing the treaty, he was not bound by the Dáil's decision. There were also a number of dedicated republicans within the IRA, such as Liam Lynch and Rory O’Connor, who would have rejected the treaty regardless of de Valera's position.

In the aftermath of the Dáil Cabinet, the Dáil, the IRB, Sinn Féin and Cumann na mBan (which voted 419 to 63 against the treaty), the final and most significant body to split was the IRA (Laffan, 1999: 365). The majority of the army was opposed to the settlement. Very few senior officers, apart from Seán MacEoin in Longford and Michael Brennan in Clare, and some prominent members of GHQ including Mulcahy, Collins and J. J. O’Connell, took the pro-treaty side. The rank-and-file members tended to follow the lead given by their officers. The division within the IRA was exacerbated by the hasty withdrawal of the crown forces from Ireland in early 1922. Dublin Castle was handed over on 16 January, the disbandment of the RIC was put in place and most barracks were evacuated of troops by the end of March. Empty barracks were then taken over by the local IRA, regardless of whether they were pro- or anti-treaty. As a result a large number of vacated barracks were under the control of those opposed to the treaty settlement.