The Irish Revolution, 1916-1923 (21 page)

On 7 April 1919, Ned Broy smuggled Collins into the headquarters of the DMP's G Division in Great Brunswick (now Pearse) Street, allowing him access to the division's files and giving him a valuable insight into the workings of the enemy's intelligence network that he subsequently proceeded to replicate with the formation of his own Squad from mid-1919 (Foy, 2006: 21–5). Recruited from the IRA's Dublin Brigade and containing some of Collins's most trusted lieutenants – including Liam Tobin, Frank Thornton and Tom Cullen – the Sqaud became central to Collins's efforts to win the intelligence war against British agents in Dublin City. Rising in strength to 12 in 1920 and 21 at the height of the war in 1921, it operated on a full-time basis from September 1920 and carried out a number of cold-blooded assassinations often in broad daylight, such as that of Alan Bell (Foy, 2006: 53–4, 63).

While the Squad had some major coups, including Bloody Sunday, it was not an unqualified success. One of its early targets was the Lord Lieutenant, Lord French, but the failed ambush of his car at the Ashtown Gate of the Phoenix Park in December 1920 only resulted in the death of a Dublin volunteer, Martin Savage (Foy, 2006: 32–3). Personality clashes and intra- Squad rivalry created tensions within the unit that were exacerbated by the tedium and frustration of much waiting around for opportunities for action to present themselves (Foy, 2006: 60). Having received no formal training they were expected to execute the enemy at close range and be prepared for their own deaths if an operation went wrong, all of which exacted a psychological toll (Dolan, 2006: 808).

Even Bloody Sunday was not without its down sides. Collins had initially hoped to eliminate up to 60 agents. The deaths of Dick McKee and Peadar Clancy were a serious loss to the Dublin Brigade. Crucially, it left the British under no illusions about what they were dealing with and British policy towards Ireland changed putting greater pressure on the IRA. This was especially noticeable in Dublin City during 1921 as the Squad and the Dublin Brigade came under increasing pressure from constant raids that resulted in a significantly higher number of arrests (Foy, 2006: 175–7, 218–9).

Other parts of Collins's intelligence system had also fallen apart by the time of the truce. The removal of G Division from Brunswick Street to the safer confines of Dublin Castle negated much of the usefulness of his spies, who in any case were coming under suspicion by 1921. Joe Kavanagh died in September 1920, James McNamara went on the run to avoid being discovered and Broy was arrested in February 1921 and interned until after the truce, although the authorities were unable to find sufficient evidence to prosecute him (Foy, 2006: 188–91).

The Dublin-based intelligence organisation was complemented by a regional IRA one with each brigade having its own intelligence officers who were trained by and kept in constant contact with the GHQ Intelligence Directorate. The intelligence officer of the Longford Brigade, Michael Heslin, was brought to Dublin for instruction from Collins and Gearóid O’Sullivan on how to set up a secret service network. He cultivated sympathetic clerical staff in the local post offices and railway stations, who along with Cumann na mBan members, formed a vital part of his communications network. Collins provided the key to decoding British cyphers. Intercepting postal communications in this manner led to the unmasking of at least one local spy. Heslin also used his brother's friendship with a local RIC sergeant to glean useful information from the unsuspecting policeman. All of the information was gathered from Heslin's own agents and he never succeeded in recruiting a spy from the British side (
http://www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/reels/bmh/BMH.WS0662.pdf#page=1
).

GENDER IN THE IRISH REVOLUTION

The War of Independence allowed Cumann na mBan to undertake military activities, although they were not involved in actual combat. Their military activities usually concerned the acquisition and movement of arms and ammunition. Cumann na mBan members attached to the country brigades, such as Brigid Lyons in Longford, often travelled to Dublin to obtain ammunition from IRA GHQ and carry it back home for use by local units. Within brigade areas the task of transporting arms and ammunition, from magazines to the sites of ambushes or to safe locations to avoid detection, often fell to women. These tasks were allocated to women because they were less likely to come under suspicion. The social mores of the time also resulted in the crown forces being less willing to search women, although by the end of the conflict they were becoming more aware of these surreptitious actions and female searchers were drafted in. Cumann na mBan also played a role in acquiring arms, including plying British soldiers with alcohol and offering to buy their guns.

Because women did not fall under suspicion as easily they were also trusted with some vital intelligence work. Cumann na mBan members were among the most important channels of communication between IRA brigades and between local units and GHQ. Written and verbal communications could largely be transported safely in this manner, with women often hiding messages in their underclothes to avoid detection. Simple intelligence-gathering, such as reporting on the movements of crown forces, was another way in which women assisted the campaign. One particular category of women who
played a crucial role in IRA intelligence-gathering were postmistresses, many of whom were members of Cumann na mBan, and through whose post offices important crown force communications were relayed. Sympathetic postmistresses often copied these for the local IRA intelligence officer using Cumann na mBan couriers to transport them.

Cumann na mBan also supported both the military and political campaigns in a number of other ways. With the formation of flying columns and IRA men on the run, women played an important role in providing food, laundry and shelter. Volunteers who had not evaded capture were visited in prison and brought meals and news from their families. The emphasis on first aid paid off when trained Cumann na mBan members, some of whom were professional nurses, travelled with IRA ambush parties and provided essential first aid to wounded volunteers. Women often deputised for men attending ceremonies, including republican funerals and pilgrimages to Wolfe Tone's grave in Bodenstown (Coleman, 2003: 186–9; McCarthy, 2007: 123–54).

On the political side of the campaign, Cumann na mBan members were engaged in distributing republican propaganda. Prominent republican women were among the most important propagandists during the war. Following the controversial and high-profile death of Terence MacSwiney in October 1920, his sister and widow, Mary and Muriel, travelled to the USA in December 1920 to give evidence to the sympathetic American Commission on Conditions in Ireland. Mary remained until August 1921 undertaking a very successful lecture tour during which she addressed over 300 meetings in 58 cities (Mooney Eichacker, 2003: 92–137). Highlighting the plight of Ireland abroad, especially in the USA, resulted in success in raising funds to provide relief for the civilian population who were badly affected economically by the war, either through the loss of a bread-winner or destruction to property. Charitable activities such as raising and distributing these funds, through the mechanism of the Irish White Cross, also occupied the time of many Cumann na mBan women during the War of Independence (McCarthy, 2007: 151–3; Matthews, 2010: 255–60).

It is very difficult to estimate how many women took part in the revolution. In 1921 Cumann na mBan reported that it had 702 branches, over half of which (375) were in Munster. Leinster had the next highest concentration (188), whereas the organisation was relatively weak in Connacht (93) and Ulster (46) (McCarthy, 2007: 159). These figures show that Cumann na mBan was strongest where the IRA was also strongest. Local studies indicate that branches of Cumann na mBan tended to be formed in the same areas as IRA units (Coleman, 2003: 182). The strong links between the IRA and Cumann na mBan were also forged through republican families. Prominent Cumann na mBan women were often the relatives of senior Sinn Féin and IRA leaders. The women who undertook lecture tours of the USA were close relatives of
republican martyrs. Brigid Lyons was a niece of the Sinn Féin TD Joseph McGuinness. Four of the six women elected unopposed to the Second Dáil in 1921 (Margaret Pearse, Mary MacSwiney, Kate O’Callaghan and Kathleen Clarke) were the mother, sister and widows respectively of men who had either been executed, died in prison or killed by crown forces.

The similarities between the IRA and Cumann na mBan extended to social backgrounds, which is not very surprising given the family ties between them. Similarly to the IRA, many of the most active members of Cumann na mBan were young, single women. Those who had previously been active and who married during the course of the conflict tended to fade very fast. Active women who were married and had families tended to have independent means or important domestic support to allow them to continue their activities; Constance Markievicz had family wealth and sevenyear- old Owen Sheehy-Skeffington stayed in the homes of Irish-American political supporters while his widowed mother toured the USA (Mooney Eichacker, 2003: 65–70).

Violence against women during the revolution was physical, psychological and to a lesser extent sexual. There were very few deliberate killings of women. In Cork the IRA executed Mrs Mary Lindsay for informing on the volunteers responsible for the Dripsey ambush, and in Monaghan the intellectually challenged
poitín
maker, Kitty Carroll, was similarly dispatched on a convenient charge of spying. Incidental fatal attacks on women included the deaths in Galway of the pregnant Ellen Quinn in a drive-by shooting by police on 1 November 1920, and Lily Blake, the wife of an RIC district inspector whose vehicle was ambushed by the IRA in May 1921 (Leeson, 2011: 51, 62).

There is ample evidence attesting to assaults on women by the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries. Frequently this took the form of cutting off their hair. In September 1920 five members of Cumann na mBan in Galway were subjected to this unofficial punishment in reprisal for a similar attack carried out by the IRA on a woman who had given evidence to a military court. This incident indicates that the IRA was equally culpable for such attacks and there are likewise many instances of women who were friendly with the police or who worked for them being subjected to similar degradation (Coleman, 2003: 120; Leeson, 2011: 46, 176–8). Black and Tans and Auxiliaries also earned a reputation for rough treatment and threats against women, as evidenced by the report of the British Labour Commission
[Doc. 21]
.

Women were also subjected to the psychological terror of seeing their male relatives assaulted or killed. Tomás MacCurtain's wife was restrained by her husband's assassins and suffered a miscarriage soon after his death. The mother and sisters of Richard and Abraham Pearson were in attendance
when they were executed by the IRA at Coolacrease in County Offaly on 30 June 1921. The fatal shooting of William Frederick Newberry by the Squad on Bloody Sunday was witnessed by a female companion, probably his wife (Leonard, 2012: 108; Stanley, 2005: 21). In March 1921 the serving Mayor of Limerick, George Clancy, and his predecessor, Michael O’Callaghan, were shot dead in their homes in the presence of their wives by suspected Black and Tans (McCoole, 2003: 71).

Evidence of sexual assaults on women is more difficult to find, which is not to say it did not take place. The British Labour Commission explained that it was ‘difficult to obtain direct evidence of incidents affecting females, for the women of Ireland are reticent on such subjects’, but clearly suspected a sexual assault had taken place in a case where ‘A young woman who was sleeping alone in premises which were raided by the crown forces was compelled to get out of bed and her nightdress was ripped open from top to bottom’
[Doc. 21]
. The
Irish Bulletin
carried two reports by a Mrs Healy and a Miss Nellie O’Mahony who claimed to have been raped and sexually assaulted respectively by members of the crown forces; the veracity of these reports is difficult to judge given the propaganda nature of the
Irish Bulletin
and lack of any other evidence (Ryan, 2000: 89).

SECTARIANISM

The most controversial topic in the historiography of the Irish revolution at present is the extent to which it was a sectarian conflict. Outside of the sectarian violence in Ulster between 1920 and 1922, there is some evidence of a sectarian element to the war in the south. The issue was highlighted by the Canadian historian, Peter Hart, in the late 1990s with the publication of his book
The IRA and Its Enemies
and an article on ‘The Protestant experience of revolution in southern Ireland’. The former highlighted incidents such as ‘the Bandon Valley massacre’ of 18 Protestants on the nights of 27, 28 and 29 April 1922, while the latter produced revealing statistics about the disproportionate number of assaults on Protestants in Cork between 1920 and 1922; 36 per cent of civilians deliberately shot by the IRA were Protestants, five times the proportion of Protestants in the population, while only 15 per cent of the houses burned by republicans were owned by Catholics (Hart, 1998: 273–6; Hart, 2003: 234). Sectarian attacks by the IRA also took place in County Monaghan, although historians have found little or no evidence of a determined sectarian attitude in the IRA in other areas, including Longford and Limerick (Coleman, 2003: 156–7; Dooley, 2000: 43–50; O’Callaghan, 2010: 203). As with the regional variations in violence, sectarianism in the War of Independence appears to have been a response to local circumstances.

Hart believed that the intensity of sectarian attacks between 1920 and 1922 was the principal reason for the substantial decline of 34 per cent (from 248,635 to 164,215) in the Protestant population of the 26 counties that now make up the Republic of Ireland between 1911 and 1926 (Hart, 2003: 223). It is difficult to ascertain exactly when these people left because the political upheaval prevented a census of population being taken in the intervening years. The Protestant exodus is also explicable by a number of other reasons. The removal of the British state from Ireland, including civil and military personnel, accounted for some of the decline. The desire to remain under British rule either in Britain itself or in Northern Ireland also explains some of the movement, especially in border areas. The continuation of land purchase resulting in the final sale of entire estates, combat deaths during the First World War, the influence of Catholic teaching on legislation in the early years of the Free State (including a prohibition on introducing divorce and strict censorship of publications and films) and the effect of the Roman Catholic Church's
Ne Temere
decree of 1908, which required the children of a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Catholic to be raised as Catholics, all undoubtedly contributed to this significant change in the religious demography of the Irish Free State (Bowen, 1983: 20–46).