The Grand Alliance (79 page)

to the Polish Government the Foreign Secretary stated our view:

On the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-Polish Agreement of today I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provisions of the agreement for mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th of August, 1939, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertaking towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which affects the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty’s Government do not

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recognise any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August, 1939.

Mr. Eden quoted this Note in the House of Commons on the same day, and added:

It is stated in paragraph 1 of the Soviet-Polish Agreement that the Soviet Government recognise the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 concerning territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. The attitude of His Majesty’s Government in these matters was stated in general terms by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on September 5, 1940, when he said that His Majesty’s Government did not propose to recognise any territorial changes which took place without the free consent and good-will of the parties concerned. This holds good with the territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August, 1939, and I informed the Polish Government accordingly in my official Note.

And in reply to a question Mr. Eden concluded: “The exchange of Notes which I have just read to the House does not involve any guarantee of frontiers by His Majesty’s Government.”

There the matter rested, and during the autumn the Poles were occupied in the grim task of collecting those of their nationals who had survived captivity in the prison camps of the Soviet Union.

The entry of Russia into the war was welcome but not immediately helpful to us. The German armies were so strong that it seemed that for many months they could maintain the invasion threat against England while at the same time plunging into Russia. Almost all responsible military opinion held that the Russian armies would soon be The Grand Alliance

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defeated and largely destroyed. The fact that the Soviet Air Force was allowed by its Government to be surprised on its landing grounds and that the Russian military preparations were far from being complete gave them a bad start.

Frightful injuries were sustained by the Russian armies. In spite of heroic resistance, competent despotic war direction, total disregard of human life, and the opening of a ruthless guerrilla warfare in the rear of the German advance, a general retirement took place on the whole twelve-hundred-mile Russian front south of Leningrad for about four or five hundred miles. The strength of the Soviet Government, the fortitude of the Russian people, their immeasurable reserves of man-power, the vast size of their country, the rigours of the Russian winter, were the factors which ultimately ruined Hitler’s armies. But none of these made themselves apparent in 1941. President Roosevelt was considered very bold when he proclaimed in September, 1941, that the Russian front would hold and that Moscow would not be taken. The glorious strength and patriotism of the Russian people vindicated this opinion.

Even in August, 1942, after my visit to Moscow and the conferences there, General Brooke, who had accompanied me, adhered to the opinion that the Caucasus Mountains would be traversed and the basin of the Caspian dominated by German forces, and we prepared accordingly on the largest possible scale for a defensive campaign in Syria and Persia. Throughout I took a more sanguine view than my military advisers of the Russian powers of resistance. I rested with confidence upon Premier Stalin’s assurance, given to me at Moscow, that he would hold the line of the Caucasus and that the Germans would not reach the Caspian in any strength. But we were vouchsafed so little information about Soviet resources and intentions that all opinions either way were hardly more than guesses.

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It is true that the Russian entry into the war diverted the German air attack from Great Britain, and diminished the threat of invasion. It gave us important relief in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it imposed upon us most heavy sacrifices and drains. At last we were beginning to be well equipped. At last our munitions factories were pouring out their supplies of every kind. Our armies in Egypt and Libya were in heavy action and clamouring for the latest weapons, above all tanks and aeroplanes. The British armies at home were eagerly awaiting the long-promised modern equipment which in all its ever-widening complications was flowing at last towards them. At this moment we were compelled to make very large diversions of our weapons and vital supplies of all kinds, including rubber and oil. On us fell the burden of organising the convoys of British and still more of United States supplies and carrying them to Murmansk and Archangel through all the dangers and rigours of this Arctic passage. All the American supplies were a deduction from what had in fact been, or was to be, successfully ferried across the Atlantic for ourselves. In order to make this immense diversion and to forgo the growing flood of American aid without crippling our campaign in the Western Desert, we had to cramp all preparations which prudence urged for the defence of the Malay Peninsula and our Eastern Empire and possessions against the ever-growing menace of Japan.

Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which History will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty nation in the battle with us, and we all felt The Grand Alliance

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that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains, Russia would still exert an immense and, if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.

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2

An African Pause: Tobruk

General Auchinleck Takes Command, July
2
—

Need for an Offensive in the Western Desert —

My Telegram of July
6
— Auchinleck’s Prohibitive
Requirement — “British” Divisions — Four and a
Half Months’ Delay — Unjustified Concern for the
Northern Flank — The Chiefs of Staff Telegram of
July
19
— My Telegram of the Same Date —

Auchinleck’s Stiff Reply, July
23 —
His Visit to
London — I Am Not Convinced, but Agree — The
German View of Rommel’s Situation and the
Prospects in North Africa — Mr. Menzies’ Return
Home — Our Divergence on the Structure of the
War Cabinet — Fall of Mr. Menzies — My Telegram to Him — Relations with Mr. Fadden’s
Government — Demand for the Withdrawal of the
Australian Division from Tobruk — Relief of One
Australian Brigade — Australian Insistence on Full
Relief — My Telegram to General Auchinleck of
September
17
— He Threatens Resignation —

Further Appeals to Mr. Fadden — Refusals —

Defeat of Mr. Fadden’s Government — Mr.

Curlin’s Labour Party Assumes Power — New
Appeal Concerning Tobruk — Further Refusals —

We Comply with Australian Demands — Appreciable Losses in the Relief — Work of the Royal
Navy in the Defence of Tobruk.

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G
ENERAL AUCHINLECK assumed effective command of the Middle East on July 2, and formally on July 5. I started my relations with our new Commander-in-Chief in high hopes.

Prime

Minister

to

1 July 41

General Auchinleck

You take up your great command at a period of
crisis. After all the facts have been laid before you it will
be for you to decide whether to renew the offensive in
the Western Desert, and if so when. You should have
regard especially to the situation at Tobruk, the process
of enemy reinforcement of Libya, and the temporary
German preoccupation in their invasion of Russia. You
should also consider the vexatious dangers of the
operations in Syria flagging and the need for a decision
on one or both of these fronts. You will decide whether
and how these operations can be fitted in together. The
urgency of these issues will naturally impress itself
upon you. We shall be glad to hear from you at your
earliest convenience.

And again on the following day:

Prime

Minister

to

2 July 41

General Auchinleck

Once Syria is cleared up we hope you will consider
Wilson for the Western Desert, but of course that
decision rests with you.

It is much to be regretted that this advice, subsequently repeated, was not taken.

On July 4 General Auchinleck replied to my first message.

He agreed that as soon as Syria had been secured, and with it our position in Iraq re-established, the offensive in the Western Desert could be contemplated. Adequate armoured forces were however essential to success. He The Grand Alliance

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reckoned that two and probably three armoured divisions, together with a motor division, would be required. The advance, which aimed at driving the enemy from North Africa, would for administrative reasons have to be conducted by stages. The first objective would be the reoccupation, also by stages, of Cyrenaica. The General stated in conclusion that a simultaneous action in the Western Desert and Syria would “invite failure on both fronts.”

I thought it wise to set out the position as we saw it fully:
Prime

Minister

to

6 July 41

General Auchinleck

I agree about finishing off Syria, and here we have
always thought that holding Syria is the necessary
foundation for holding or re taking Cyprus. One hopes
that Syria may not be long now and that you will not be
forestalled in Cyprus. The priority of both these operations over offensive action in Western Desert after what
has happened is fully recognised.

2. Nevertheless, Western Desert remains decisive
theatre this autumn for defense of Nile Valley. Only by
reconquering the lost airfields of Eastern Cyrenaica can
Fleet and Air Force resume effective action against
enemy seaborne supplies.

3. In General Wavell’s message of April 18 he stated
that he had six regiments of trained armoured
personnel awaiting tanks. This was a main element in
decision to send “Tiger.” Besides this, personnel for
three additional tank regiments are now approaching
round the Cape. Your need for armoured vehicles is
therefore fully realised, in spite of the stress which
Wavell and you both lay upon further training for these
already-trained armoured units. We make out that you
should have by end of July five hundred cruiser, infantry, and American cruiser tanks, if your workshops
arc properly organised, besides a large number of
miscellaneous light tanks and armoured cars.