The Grand Alliance (125 page)

The story of this attack has often been vividly related. It is sufficient here to state the salient facts and to note the ruthless efficiency of the Japanese airmen. By 8.25 A.M. the first waves of torpedo and dive-bombers had struck their blow. By 10 A.M. the battle was over and the enemy withdrew. Behind them lay a shattered fleet hidden in a pall

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of fire and smoke, and the vengeance of the United States.

The battleship
Arizona
had blown up, the
Oklahoma
had capsised, the
West Virginia
and
California
had sunk at their moorings, and every other battle-ship, except the
Pennsylvania,
which was in dry dock, had been heavily damaged. Over two thousand Americans had lost their lives, and nearly two thousand others were wounded. The mastery of the Pacific had passed into Japanese hands, and the strategic balance of the world was for the time being fundamentally changed.

Our American Allies had yet another set of misfortunes.

In the Philippines, where General MacArthur commanded, a warning indicating a grave turn in diplomatic relations had been received on November 20. Admiral Hart, commanding the modest United States Asiatic Fleet, had already been in consultation with the adjacent British and Dutch naval authorities, and, in accordance with his war plan, had begun to disperse his forces to the southward, where he intended to assemble a striking force in Dutch waters in conjunction with his prospective allies. He had at his disposal only one heavy and two light cruisers, besides a dozen old destroyers and various auxiliary vessels. His strength lay almost entirely in his submarines, of which he had twenty-eight. At 3 A.M. on December 8 Admiral Hart intercepted a message giving the staggering news of the attack on Pearl Harbour. He at once warned all concerned that hostilities had begun, without waiting for confirmation from Washington. At dawn the Japanese dive-bombers struck, and throughout the ensuing days the air attacks continued on an ever-increasing scale. On the 10th the naval base at Cavite was completely destroyed by fire, and

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on the same day the Japanese made their first landing in the north of Luzon. Disasters mounted swiftly. Most of the American air forces were destroyed in battle or on the ground, and by December 20 the remnants had been withdrawn to Port Darwin in Australia. Admiral Hart’s ships had begun their southward dispersal some days before, and only the submarines remained to dispute the sea with the enemy. On December 21 the main Japanese invasion force landed in Lingayen Gulf, threatening Manila itself, and thereafter the march of events was not unlike that which was already in progress in Malaya; but the defence was more prolonged.

Thus the long-nurtured plans of Japan exploded in a blaze of triumph. But this was not the end.

The dispatch of the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin tells of his visit to Ribbentrop.

The day after Pearl Harbour at one o’clock I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at General Headquarters [in East Prussia], discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out properly.

Both Hitler and his Staff were astonished. Jodl tells at his trial how Hitler “came in the middle of the night to my chart room in order to transmit this news to Field-Marshal Keitel

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and myself. He was completely surprised.” On the morning of December 8 however he gave the German Navy orders to attack American ships wherever found. This was three days before the official declaration of war by Germany on the United States.

I convened a meeting, mostly Admiralty, in the Cabinet War Room at ten o’clock on the night of the 9th to review the naval position. We were about a dozen. We tried to measure the consequences of this fundamental change in our war position against Japan. We had lost the command of every ocean except the Atlantic. Australia and New Zealand and all the vital islands in their sphere were open to attack. We had only one key weapon in our hands. The
Prince of Wales
and the
Repulse
had arrived at Singapore.

They had been sent to these waters to exercise that kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality whose whereabouts is unknown can impose upon all hostile naval calculations. How should we use them now?

Obviously they must go to sea and vanish among the innumerable islands. There was general agreement on that.

I thought myself they should go across the Pacific to join what was left of the American Fleet. It would be a proud gesture at this moment, and would knit the English-speaking world together. We had already cordially agreed to the American Navy Department withdrawing their capital ships from the Atlantic. Thus in a few months there might be a fleet in being on the west coast of America capable of fighting a decisive sea battle if need be. The existence of such a fleet and of such a fact would be the best possible shield to our brothers in Australasia. We were all much attracted by this line of thought. But as the hour was late we

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decided to sleep on it, and settle the next morning what to do with the
Prince of Wales
and the
Repulse.

Within a couple of hours they were at the bottom of the sea.

The tragedy of these ships, in which Chance played so fatal a part, must now be told.

The
Prince of Wales
and
Repulse
had reached Singapore on December 2. On December 5 Admiral Tom Phillips arrived in Manila by air to discuss possible joint action with General MacArthur and Admiral Hart. Admiral Hart agreed that four American destroyers should join Phillips’s flag.

Both Admirals felt that neither Singapore nor Manila could at the moment be a suitable base for an Allied Fleet. Next day news came that a large Japanese seaborne expedition had entered the Gulf of Siam. It was clear that decisive events were at hand. Phillips got back to Singapore on the morning of the 7th. Soon after midnight on the 8th it was reported that a landing was actually in progress at Kota Bharu, and later that other landings were being made near Singora and also at Patani. A major invasion of Malaya had begun.

Admiral Phillips judged it his duty to strike at the enemy while they were disembarking. At a meeting of his senior officers all agreed that it was impossible for the Navy to stand out of the battle at this critical stage. He reported his intentions to the Admiralty. He requested the Singapore Air Command to move fighters to our northern airfields, and requested the utmost help from our meagre air force –

namely, reconnaissance a hundred miles north of his squadron on December 9, reconnaissance off Singora from daylight on December 10, and fighter protection over The Grand Alliance

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Singora on the morning of December 10. This last all-important aid could not be given, first, because of the expected attack on Singapore, and secondly, because the northern airfields were already untenable. The Admiral had sailed at 5.35 P.M. on the 8th with the
Prince of Wales
and
Repulse
and the destroyers
Electra, Express, Vampire,
and
Tenedos
when news of the landing reached him. It added the warning that large Japanese bomber forces were based in Southern Indo-China. As the frequent rain squalls and low clouds were unfavourable for air action, Phillips resolved to press on. On the evening of the 9th the weather cleared, and he soon had reason to believe that he was being shadowed by enemy aircraft. The hope of surprise was gone, and heavy air attacks must be expected the next morning near Singora. At this Admiral Phillips reluctantly abandoned his daring enterprise, and after dark turned homeward. He had certainly done his best, and all might have yet been well. About midnight however by a hard mischance another enemy landing was reported at Kuantan, more than a hundred and fifty miles south of Kota Bharu. Admiral Phillips thought it unlikely that his force, last sighted by the enemy on a northerly course, would be expected so far south by daylight on the 10th. After all, he might achieve surprise. He accepted the risk and turned his ships towards Kuantan.

Japanese records make no claim to have sighted the British squadron from the air on the 9th, but a submarine reported them steering north at 2 P.M. The Japanese 22d Air Flotilla, based near Saigon, was loading bombs for an attack on Singapore. They immediately exchanged bombs for torpedoes and decided to make a night attack on the British ships. They found nothing, and returned to their base by midnight. Before dawn on the 10th another Japanese submarine reported that the British were steering south, The Grand Alliance

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and at 6 A.M. a searching force of nine Japanese aircraft set forth, followed an hour later by a powerful striking force of eighty-four bombers and torpedo bombers, organised in waves of about nine aircraft each.

The report of the landing at Kuantan proved false, but as no amending message had been sent from Singapore the Admiral remained expectant, until soon after daylight the destroyer
Express
reached the harbour and found no sign of the enemy. Before resuming their southerly course the squadron spent some time in searching for a tug and other small craft which had been sighted earlier. But now the crisis came and fortune was hard. The Japanese air fleet had ranged as far south as Singapore without sighting anything. It was returning home on a northerly course, which by chance led them straight to their quarry.

At 10.20 A.M. a shadowing aircraft was sighted by the
Prince of Wales,
and soon after 11 A.M. the first wave of bombers appeared. The enemy attacked in successive waves. In the first the
Repulse
received one hit from a bomb which caused a fire, but this was soon under control and the ship’s speed was not impaired. In the second the
Prince of Wales
was struck simultaneously by what seemed to be two torpedoes close together, which caused very severe damage and flooding. Both port propellers were put out of action, and the ship was never again under complete control. The
Repulse
was not hit in this attack. A few minutes later another wave closed in on the
Repulse,
and again she escaped damage. The ships by now had become somewhat separated, and Captain Tennant, having made an emergency signal to Singapore, “Enemy aircraft bombing,” turned the
Repulse
towards the Admiral.