The Grand Alliance (156 page)

A second batch of five hundred and fifty will follow on
their heels. I now understand there are legal difficulties.

I hope, Mr. President, that these are not serious, as it
would be very disappointing to us and would offset our
arrangements if there were now to be delay. General
Arnold’s offer was an unexpected and very welcome
addition to our training facilities. Such ready-made
capacity of aircraft, airfields, and instructors all in
balance we could not obtain to the same extent and in
the same time by any other means. It will greatly
accelerate our effort in the air.

Prime Minister to General

11.V.41.

Arnold

I am much obliged for the information reported by
your observer in Egypt. The Air Ministry tell me that we
have recently sent out to Takoradi the best officers we
can find, but they are necessarily less familiar with
American than with British types of aircraft and engines
and welcome your offer of American experts. Details of
numbers and grades desired will be sent to you by the
Air Ministry as soon as possible.

2. In the climate of tropical West Africa no man can
work as hard or as long as at home. We should like to
work three shifts, and are planning to use ships for
additional living quarters.

3. We are sending to Africa one of our most energetic and competent senior technical officers, who will be
responsible to Commander-in-Chief for repair and
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maintenance in Egypt and for general control of Takoradi reinforcement route, sole responsibility for which lies
with Air Ministry. Some decentralisation of local control
is necessary on a route which begins in British or
American factories and ends in Egypt.

4. Criticism of technical inexperience of certain
drafts to Takoradi is justified, but there is now great
dilution throughout R.A.F. We are now sending picked
men. We gratefully accept your offer of loan of experts,
and M.A.P. is being pressed to provide tools and
equipment.

5. We agree about importance of B.P.C. inspection,
and I am passing your criticism to the M.A.P.

6. I am much obliged for the help already given and
for your offer of skilled men. Assembly of aircraft is not
sole bottleneck of deliveries from Takoradi. Any acceleration must be matched by corresponding increase in
transport aircraft for ferry pilots. Can your promised
deliveries of American transport aircraft to Africa be
accelerated? Thank you so much for cabling direct to
me.

(Action this day.) Prime

14.V.41.

Minister to First Lord and

First Sea Lord

Further to my “Tiger” Number 2, one would hope
that it could be fitted in during the moonless period after
about the middle of June. In order to give greater
security it might be well to send Victorious right
through, and thus give the C.-in-C. Mediterranean what
he longs for, namely, two armoured aircraft-carriers. For
this purpose however it is most desirable that
Victorious, and if possible the other aircraft-carriers who
would be accompanying her, should have a proportion
of the best and fastest fighters which can be thrown off
a float. What happened to those American Martlett
aircraft? I have not heard of them for some months, yet
we were told they were so promising on account of their
high speed. How is the unloading of “Tiger” going on?

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Prime Minister to General

16.V.41.

Ismay

What is the situation at Martinique? Are the fifty
million pounds of gold still there? What French forces
are there? What French vessels are in harbour? I have
it in mind that the United States might take over Martinique to safeguard it from being used as a base for U-boats in view of Vichy collaboration.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

16.V.41.

Your minute of May 15. You tell me that the total
number of cruiser tanks in a brigade of the 7th Armoured Division is 210 (including 20 per cent reserves),
and that of the “I” Tank Brigade 200 “I” tanks – say, 400

heavy tanks in the 7th Armoured Division. We must try
to compare like with like. I am told that the German
principle is two light tanks to every heavy; thus there
would be in a German armoured division about 135

heavy tanks. In other words, it would have fewer heavy
tanks than one of our tank brigades. What is the
additional outfit of our armoured brigades in light tanks
or armoured cars? Surely they have an adequate outfit
of these ancillaries. It would be enormously helpful and
simplify our work if you would kindly let me have in two
columns the standard outfit of the 7th Armoured
Division on the basis you indicate, and the outfit of a
German full armoured division, and add a third column
for a German colonial division.

Have you noticed the reports from various sources
that the Germans are using only one brigade in their
divisions identified by contact?

Prime Minister to First Lord

I7.V.4I.

and First Sea Lord

At the end of February the Admiralty seem to have
had forty ships of ten thousand tons and over employed
as armed merchant cruisers, since when I believe
about three have been sunk. We are so short of troop-carriers now that I must ask for some of these ships to
be surrendered. I suggest you hand over any you have
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left in excess of thirty – i.e., about seven – leaving them
with their armaments, but with reduced naval crews,
and choosing those which will carry the largest number
of troops. They will thus be able to defend themselves
and the convoy of which they form a part.

Prime Minister to First Lord

17.V.41.

This chart of the immense work of the Salvage
Department makes me anxious that you should convey
to those in charge of that branch a very high and
express measure of commendation. Perhaps you will
let me see a draft of what you propose.

Prime Minister to General

26.V.41.

Ismay

It is interesting to see how very much exaggerated
were the estimates formed by our Intelligence Service
of the coastal defences of the various Italian ports that
have now come into our hands. I have long suspected
that the Italians, and probably the French also, like to
have it thought that their seaward defences are on a
very heavy scale. We were told, for instance, that
Massawa was defended by four eight-inch, ten large
calibre, and sixteen six-inch, total thirty high-powered
guns. Not one existed. In the light of this exposure the
Intelligence branches of the different departments
should carefully re-examine their scale of foreign
coastal fortifications, which otherwise may prove to be
a deterrent upon action.
12

Prime Minister to General

27.V.41

Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

This is a sad story [about parachute troops and
gliders], and I feel myself greatly to blame for allowing
myself to be overborne by the resistances which were
offered. One can see how wrongly based these resistances were when we read the Air Staff paper in the
light of what is happening in Crete, and may soon be
happening in Cyprus and in Syria.

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2. See also my minute on gliders of September 1,
1940.
13
This is exactly what has happened. The
gliders have been produced on the smallest possible
scale, and so we have practically now neither the
parachutists nor the gliders, except these 500.

3. Thus we are always found behindhand by the
enemy. We ought to have five thousand parachutists
and an airborne division on the German model, with
any improvements which might suggest themselves
from experience. We ought also to have a number of
carrier aircraft [i.e., transport aircraft]. These will all be
necessary in the Mediterranean fighting of 1942, or
earlier if possible. We shall have to try to retake some
of these islands which are being so easily occupied by
the enemy. We may be forced to fight in the wide
countries of the East, in Persia or Northern Iraq. A
whole year has been lost, and I now invite the Chiefs of
Staff to make proposals for trying, so far as is possible,
to repair the misfortune.

The whole file is to be brought before the Chiefs of
Staff this evening.

Prime Minister to General

27.V.41.

Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

I am in general agreement with the appreciation of C.

I.G.S.; but it is clear that priority and emphasis of the
operations must be prescribed from here.

I should be glad if the Chiefs of Staff would consider
forthwith the following proposed directive:
In view of General Wavell’s latest messages, he
should be ordered to evacuate Crete forthwith, saving
as many men as possible without regard to material,
and taking whatever measures, whether by reinforcement or otherwise, are best.

2. With the capture of Suda Bay or Kastelli on the
south side the enemy will be most eager to land a
seaborne force. The Navy must not open their sea
guard yet, and should try, in any case, to take the
heaviest toll, thus getting some of our own back.

3. The defence of Egypt from the west and from the
north under the increased weight of the air attack from
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Crete presents the standard military problem of a
central force resisting two attacks from opposite quarters. In this case the choice seems clearly dictated by
the facts.

4. The attack through Turkey and/or through Syria
cannot develop in great strength for a good many
weeks, during which events may make it impossible.

5. In the Western Desert alone the opportunity for a
decisive military success presents itself. Here the object
must not be the pushing-back of the enemy to any
particular line or region, but the destruction of his
armed force, or the bulk of it, in a decisive battle fought
with our whole strength. It should be possible in the
next fortnight to inflict a crushing defeat upon the
Germans in Cyrenaica. General Wavell has upwards of
four hundred heavy tanks, against one hundred and
thirty enemy heavy tanks, plus their nine-tonners, as
well as light armoured forces upon both sides. He has a
large plurality of other arms, particularly artillery. He has
sure communications, ample supplies, and much help
from the sea. He should therefore strike with the utmost
strength in the Western Desert against an enemy
already in great difficulties for supplies and ammunition.

Here is the only chance of producing a major military
success, and nothing should stand in its way.

6. There is no objection meanwhile to the advance
he proposes with the forces specified into Syria, and he
may get the aerodromes there before the Germans
have recovered from the immense drain upon their air
power which the unexpectedly vigorous resistance of
Freyberg’s army has produced.

7. Forces should not be frittered away on Cyprus at
this juncture. We cannot attempt to hold Cyprus unless
we have the aerodromes in Syria. When we have
these, and if we have gained a decisive victory in
Cyrenaica, an advance under adequate air cover into
Cyprus may become possible. We must not repeat in
Cyprus the hard conditions of our fight in Crete.