The General's Son: Journey of an Israeli in Palestine (7 page)

My father’s next major assignment was commander of the Jerusalem Brigade, which secured and protected West Jerusalem’s precarious border with Jordanian-controlled
East Jerusalem. Jerusalem was not just another region. Jews, Christians, and Muslims had a deep regard for the city, which meant that my father had dealings with diplomats and religious leaders from all around the world. It was a highly sensitive diplomatic post as well as a difficult military one.

Commander of Jerusalem Brigade with Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.

In the early 1960s, he served as special advisor on armaments to the deputy minister of defense, who at the time was Shimon Peres. This was the period when, under Peres’s supervision, Israel began developing its nuclear weapons program. It was one role about which my father never spoke, and about which I could find no information, presumably because of its highly classified nature.

In 1964, when I was three years old, my father was promoted to major general
(aluf
in Hebrew) as chief of logistics of the Israeli army. This is the highest rank in the Israeli army with the exception of one person, the army chief of staff. His responsibilities included armaments, technology, logistics, the medical corps, weapons and other purchases, and overseeing an enormous budget. The job he wanted was head of army intelligence, and since he was the only general who spoke Arabic at the time, it would have been a logical choice. But chief of logistics was an important position that carried a great deal of responsibility, and the state of logistics in the army was in dire need of reform. So army Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin nominated him to that position, and he remained in it for four years.

He felt that war was imminent and that the logistical operation needed modernization, and so in the first one hundred days of his command he planned a
complete overhaul of the system. A book on the IDF logistics command that was published years later by the IDF, described his reform:

“In a fashion that is uncharacteristic of the army the discussions he led were short and efficient and within six months of him taking command the reforms were approved by Chief of Staff Rabin. Within three months after that the reforms were implemented.”

The description ends by stating that,

Only an officer with a broad vision, an understanding of the needs of the military and an extraordinary determination in implementation (as general Matti Peled possessed) is capable of executing an overhaul of such dimensions.
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My father served as chief of logistics of the Israeli army. His rank was Major General, the highest rank in the Israeli army with the exception of one person, the army chief of staff.

On Fridays, my father would come home from work early, and after dinner he would sit in the living room and turn on our beautiful, large wooden radio. I was no more than four or five years old, but I remember it like it was yesterday. He would sit there, still in uniform, and listen to speeches in Arabic given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and other Arab leaders of the time. My father spoke Arabic fluently by then. I remember hearing the massive applause the speakers received and thinking that they sounded like a lot of chess pieces being tossed around in a box. Even though I could not understand a word, I would sit in complete silence as he listened for hours to these speeches. He was absorbed in what he was doing and did not acknowledge me or anyone else that may have been there. Still, I felt as though I was witnessing something very important.

Soon war was on the horizon again. In the late spring of 1967, Egypt’s President Nasser expelled the United Nations peacekeeping forces that had been monitoring
the ceasefire between the two countries from the Sinai Peninsula. He sent Egyptian troops across the Suez Canal and into the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula, and he threatened to blockade the straits of Tiran and not permit Israeli ships to proceed toward the Israeli port city of Eilat. These were acts that blatantly violated the terms of the ceasefire that was signed between Egypt and Israel. The army was calling it a plausible
casus belli
, or justification for war.

According to documents I found in the IDF archives and other sources, the Soviet government fed misinformation to the Egyptians, claiming that Israel was planning a surprise attack against Syria. The Soviets claimed that Israel had amassed troops on the border with Syria. Syria and Egypt had a mutual security pact, and President Nasser had to act in defense of his Syrian allies. As the Israeli cabinet was considering its options, on May 26, 1967, the Russian prime minister sent the Israeli prime minister, Levi Eshkol, a letter through the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv, calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. When the Russian ambassador presented Prime Minister Eshkol with the letter, Eshkol invited the ambassador to see with his own eyes that the claim had no merit and that Israeli troops were not amassed at the Syrian border.

The army was recommending that Israel initiate a preemptive strike against Egypt. The cabinet was hesitant and wanted time to explore other options before committing to a full-scale war. Things came to a head in a stormy meeting of the IDF General Staff and the Israeli cabinet that took place on June 2,
1967.
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After opening remarks, my father told the cabinet in no uncertain terms that the Egyptians needed a year and a half to two years in order to be ready for a full-scale war. The other generals agreed that the Israeli army was prepared and that this was the time to strike another devastating blow.

Israeli generals preparing for battle. Generals Rabin, Bar-Lev, Peled.

During this meeting, my father said to the prime minister: “Nasser is advancing an ill-prepared army because he is counting on the cabinet being hesitant. He is convinced that we will not strike. Your hesitation is working in his advantage.” In his reply to my father, the prime minister said: “The cabinet must also think of the mothers who are likely to become bereaved.”

The generals were getting more and more frustrated and tensions ran high. Rabin, who was a heavy smoker, was said to have suffered nicotine poisoning and a nervous breakdown. They all knew what my father knew, which was that victory was imminent. In his role as chief of logistics, my father also warned that a prolonged mobilization of reservists, who had already been called up by then and comprised a significant percentage of Israel’s workforce, would cripple the country’s economy, perhaps even cause it to collapse, unless the cabinet acted decisively. “The army morale is high, and we will be victorious whether we strike today or in three weeks. But the Israeli economy cannot hold for very long. We are not prepared nor are we meant to hold through an extended period of waiting,” my father said. General Ezer Weizmann, a lifelong friend of his, threatened to resign his post as deputy chief of staff. General Ariel Sharon, who many years later would be prime minister, said that Israel must engage in a preemptive strike against the Egyptian army “and destroy it entirely without delay.”

According to all accounts I had heard over the years by people who were present at this meeting, my father’s words to the prime minister were particularly scathing. He demanded an explanation: “Why must this army which had never lost in battle endure such an insult by the cabinet?” This exchange between the two power centers was later known as the “General’s Coup.”

Many years later, when the issue came up in public debate, I asked my father: “What do you say to the claim that this was a coup?”

“Nonsense!” he retorted in his typically dismissive way. He did not like to have his commitment to the state of Israel questioned, and when it was, he made his displeasure known. But he believed firmly in the superiority of the civilian government and in the rule of law. He defended his actions in speeches and articles many times. His exact words were, “The army leadership had an obligation to advise the cabinet and to make their point clear. Just as the other arms of government had obligations to advise in matters of state or economics, so were we obliged as military experts to give our expert opinion.” In an article he published in
Ma’ariv
on June 15, 1973, he mentioned this again: “I can testify that there was not a single senior officer in the army who questioned the government’s undeniable authority to decide or the army’s duty to obey.”

Still, as one reads the transcript of that meeting it is obvious my father spoke to the prime minister in a harsher tone than would otherwise be acceptable in a civilian democracy.

I heard the story of this meeting more than once related by Ezer Weizman (who we fondly called Eyzer) himself when he visited us: “You should have seen your father,” he recalled with great enthusiasm. “He knew how to pound on the table and get the job done.” The whole thing visibly pleased Eyzer to no end.

Well, the generals made no progress and the members of the cabinet chose to wait. They preferred to see the impasses resolved through diplomatic means, and a tug-of-war of unimaginable proportions ensued. This was more than a difference of opinion on how to resolve the crisis. A generational difference factored in as well. The Israeli army generals were in their early to mid-forties, and most of them volunteered in their youth to serve in the Palmach. All but five were Israeli-born, and they were zealous in their belief that Israel must always be decisive and forceful. The members of the cabinet, on the other hand, were mostly in their sixties. Most were from my grandfather’s generation, had immigrated to Israel from Eastern Europe, and had fresh recollections of Jews being persecuted and killed. After all, this was taking place only thirty years after the Holocaust.

The army decided to announce that: “The delay in attack is due to diplomatic considerations, but the existential threat remains imminent.” Israeli citizens were led to believe that the Arab armies were coming to rape and murder them, as the Nazis had done less than three decades earlier.

The government was pressured by public demands on the one hand and by the generals on the other to act decisively. Eshkol, who acted as defense secretary in addition to his capacity as prime minister, something that is quite common in Israeli administrations, was pressured to give up his role as defense secretary. This was a personal insult for him as well as a major political setback. He called the highly admired former army chief of staff and Ben-Gurion protégé, General Moshe Dayan, into the cabinet as minister of defense. Eshkol then called the opposition parties into a national unity government, which authorized a preemptive strike against Egypt. Once again, the militant approach gained the upper hand.