The Fall of Carthage (9 page)
The discipline of the Roman army in this period was often very tight, citizens losing most of the protection offered by the law to civilians. Even at this early date, Roman armies generated large amounts of bureaucracy and had a rigid daily routine. This was emphasized by the marching camp, the highly organized, neatly laid out structure built every night by an army on the march. Always built to recognizably the same pattern, a camp had four gateways and two main roads running at 90 degrees to each other and meeting in front of the main concentration of command tents. Everything was regulated, from the positioning of each unit's tents and baggage to the duties carried out by various contingents, so that for instance the
triarii
always provided guards for the horse lines. The responsibility of various officers to supervise the sentries and pickets around the camp and to transmit orders for the next day's march were all clearly allocated.
triarii
always provided guards for the horse lines. The responsibility of various officers to supervise the sentries and pickets around the camp and to transmit orders for the next day's march were all clearly allocated.
In most years the Roman Republic fielded four legions. Each consul was given an army of two legions and two
alae.
In battle the legions formed the centre of the line with one
ala
on either flank. For this reason the
alae
were often known as the Left and Right
ala.
Legions were usually numbered, one consul commanding the First and Third Legions, the other the Second and Fourth. It appears that all the legions in existence were renumbered every year so few of these units developed a lasting sense of esprit de corps or identity. It was rare before 264 for a praetor to be given a military command, but during the Punic Wars this was to become common. A Praetorian army usually consisted of only one legion and
ala.
Each year the consuls were first allocated the most important and largest scale operations, and then praetors were put in charge of smaller campaigns. Usually a Roman legion mustered 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry on formation, but this was not a fixed size, rigidly imposed. According to the Senate's judgement of the strength of the opposition, the size of the legion could be increased to 5,000, 5,200, or even 6,000. This was done by enlarging the maniples of the
hastati
and
principes
and increasing the number of
velites.
This did not require any significant change in the legion's organization or tactical system. In exactly the same way the size of the
ala
could be increased, which may in part explain the variation in the recorded size of Latin cohorts. In times of extreme crisis, each consul might be given four instead of two legions.
30
The Roman army of this period operated most efficiently at the level of the consular army of two legions and two
alae.
This force of at least 20,000 men was well balanced, perhaps ten per cent of the total consisting of cavalry, and had a clear command structure leading up to the unchallenged authority of the consul. It was sufficient for most tasks, but there was no clear mechanism for providing the command structure of an army composed of the forces of more than one consul. The temporary office of dictator, whose authority superseded that of all other magistrates, was exceedingly rare. When two consuls joined forces then each man held command on alternate days. The system was not ideal and was used by later authors to explain some of the early disasters of the Second Punic War. However, earlier in the third century both consuls had occasionally joined forces and seem to have operated without major problems. Both consular armies also participated in the victory at Telamon in 225; but in this case the actions of the two armies were not concerted but the result of a happy chance, since both consuls had been unaware of the other's presence before the battle. The system of shared command was not ideal, but it may have taken a commander of Hannibal's great ability to exploit the opportunities it offered to an opponent.
31
alae.
This force of at least 20,000 men was well balanced, perhaps ten per cent of the total consisting of cavalry, and had a clear command structure leading up to the unchallenged authority of the consul. It was sufficient for most tasks, but there was no clear mechanism for providing the command structure of an army composed of the forces of more than one consul. The temporary office of dictator, whose authority superseded that of all other magistrates, was exceedingly rare. When two consuls joined forces then each man held command on alternate days. The system was not ideal and was used by later authors to explain some of the early disasters of the Second Punic War. However, earlier in the third century both consuls had occasionally joined forces and seem to have operated without major problems. Both consular armies also participated in the victory at Telamon in 225; but in this case the actions of the two armies were not concerted but the result of a happy chance, since both consuls had been unaware of the other's presence before the battle. The system of shared command was not ideal, but it may have taken a commander of Hannibal's great ability to exploit the opportunities it offered to an opponent.
31
It took time to form a Roman army and then train and drill it to a reasonable standard. Throughout their history, the Romans' concept of the ideal commander was always a man who carefully trained and prepared his army before risking them in battle. The longer legions and
alae
remained in service the more opportunity they had to drill and the more experience they gained, so that steadily their efficiency increased. The armies which served for much of the Second Punic War were eventually indistinguishable from professional soldiers. The weakness of the Roman system was that every time the legions were discharged and a new army raised, the whole process had to start again from scratch. Most levies of citizens included men with prior service, but although this aided the process of making an army battle-worthy it did not render it unnecessary. Such men would not have served together in the same units and under the same officers. There is a little evidence from the second century
BC
for a class of semi-professional junior officers and centurions who viewed the army as a career. It is unclear how numerous these were and we have no idea whether or not such men existed in the third century.
32
alae
remained in service the more opportunity they had to drill and the more experience they gained, so that steadily their efficiency increased. The armies which served for much of the Second Punic War were eventually indistinguishable from professional soldiers. The weakness of the Roman system was that every time the legions were discharged and a new army raised, the whole process had to start again from scratch. Most levies of citizens included men with prior service, but although this aided the process of making an army battle-worthy it did not render it unnecessary. Such men would not have served together in the same units and under the same officers. There is a little evidence from the second century
BC
for a class of semi-professional junior officers and centurions who viewed the army as a career. It is unclear how numerous these were and we have no idea whether or not such men existed in the third century.
32
Roman generals were amateurs in a modern sense, in that they received no formal training for command. The twelve-month political cycle ensured that very few ever enjoyed the long periods of command common with their Punic opponents. In the event, only Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal were to show themselves to be markedly more skilled than their Roman opponents. During the later stages of the First Punic War, the Roman electorate seems to have favoured re-electing experienced men, something that became even more common in the Second War, when the Senate also made extensive use of its power to prorogue the
imperium
of a magistrate for an additional year or years. In this way many able leaders were retained, some commanding the same army for years on end. However, as with success in elections, whether or not a man's command was extended sometimes had more to do with his political influence than his ability. The Roman system produced some incompetents who led their armies to disaster, but it also produced men of exceptional talent, most notably Scipio Africanus. The average Roman commander appears to have been at least as good as his average Punic counterpart. He was certainly likely to be far more aggressive and, whilst this carried the risk of rashness, it produced more spectacular victories. It used to be claimed that the Roman army won its victories in spite of the shortcomings of its amateur officers, whose inexperience was compensated for by the skill of more junior men, especially the centurions. Yet Roman commanders needed to make many important decisions before a battle, and were highly active during the fighting, paying attention to the small detail of the action. It was a style of command which demanded considerable skill. Although they received no formal training, we should not forget that most Roman senior officers did have extensive military experience before they achieved high rank. They were also the products of a class which valued military glory above all else and had clear ideas about how its members should face the danger of battle. A senator was expected to embody the characteristics implied by the Latin word
virtus,
which embraced not only physical courage, but also technical and tactical ability.
33
imperium
of a magistrate for an additional year or years. In this way many able leaders were retained, some commanding the same army for years on end. However, as with success in elections, whether or not a man's command was extended sometimes had more to do with his political influence than his ability. The Roman system produced some incompetents who led their armies to disaster, but it also produced men of exceptional talent, most notably Scipio Africanus. The average Roman commander appears to have been at least as good as his average Punic counterpart. He was certainly likely to be far more aggressive and, whilst this carried the risk of rashness, it produced more spectacular victories. It used to be claimed that the Roman army won its victories in spite of the shortcomings of its amateur officers, whose inexperience was compensated for by the skill of more junior men, especially the centurions. Yet Roman commanders needed to make many important decisions before a battle, and were highly active during the fighting, paying attention to the small detail of the action. It was a style of command which demanded considerable skill. Although they received no formal training, we should not forget that most Roman senior officers did have extensive military experience before they achieved high rank. They were also the products of a class which valued military glory above all else and had clear ideas about how its members should face the danger of battle. A senator was expected to embody the characteristics implied by the Latin word
virtus,
which embraced not only physical courage, but also technical and tactical ability.
33
The standard Roman battle formation was the
triplex acies,
based around the three lines of legionary heavy infantry. The maniples of the
has
tati
deployed perhaps six to eight ranks deep, with an interval equivalent to the frontage of the unit between each maniple. The formation of the
principes was
the same, but the maniples were stationed behind the gaps in the line of
hastati.
In the same way the smaller maniples of
triarii
covered the gaps between the units of the second line. This created a checkerboard of maniples, like the
quincunx
or number five on a gaming dice. Polybius tells us that each Roman legionary occupied a frontage and depth of 6 feet (1.8 m), although a later source makes it more likely that the frontage was in fact only 3 feet (90 cm) and the depth 6-7 feet,
(c. 2
m). The distance between the ranks was necessary to allow the legionaries to throw their
pil
a.
Assuming a frontage of a yard (90 cm) per man and a depth of six ranks for the unit, then a maniple of
hastati
or
principes
would have occupied a frontage of 20 yards
(c.
18 m) and a depth of just over 12 yards (11m). The entire legion would have formed up on a front of around 400 yards
(c.
365 m), allowing for the intervals between the maniples, and the infantry of a consular army occupied something like a mile, assuming, as seems probable, that the
alae
deployed in a similar formation. We have no direct evidence for the distance between the three lines, and the above calculations must remain to a great extent conjectural, but do provide a rough idea of scale.
34
triplex acies,
based around the three lines of legionary heavy infantry. The maniples of the
has
tati
deployed perhaps six to eight ranks deep, with an interval equivalent to the frontage of the unit between each maniple. The formation of the
principes was
the same, but the maniples were stationed behind the gaps in the line of
hastati.
In the same way the smaller maniples of
triarii
covered the gaps between the units of the second line. This created a checkerboard of maniples, like the
quincunx
or number five on a gaming dice. Polybius tells us that each Roman legionary occupied a frontage and depth of 6 feet (1.8 m), although a later source makes it more likely that the frontage was in fact only 3 feet (90 cm) and the depth 6-7 feet,
(c. 2
m). The distance between the ranks was necessary to allow the legionaries to throw their
pil
a.
Assuming a frontage of a yard (90 cm) per man and a depth of six ranks for the unit, then a maniple of
hastati
or
principes
would have occupied a frontage of 20 yards
(c.
18 m) and a depth of just over 12 yards (11m). The entire legion would have formed up on a front of around 400 yards
(c.
365 m), allowing for the intervals between the maniples, and the infantry of a consular army occupied something like a mile, assuming, as seems probable, that the
alae
deployed in a similar formation. We have no direct evidence for the distance between the three lines, and the above calculations must remain to a great extent conjectural, but do provide a rough idea of scale.
34
Our sources clearly state that the legion deployed for battle with wide intervals between the maniples in each line. The advantages of such an open formation for moving across country are obvious, since it allowed the sections of a line to flow around any obstacles without losing their order, in a way that would have been impossible for a solid formation. However, the vast majority of scholars have refused to believe that the legion would actually have fought with gaps in the line, since surely this would have allowed a charging enemy to stream through the intervals in the Roman line, surrounding and overwhelming each separate maniple. They have therefore proposed various schemes allowing the legion to alter its formation and create a solid, unbroken line before it made contact with the enemy. Connected with this problem is the question of how the three lines of the
triplex acies
interacted with each other. Clearly the Roman tactical system was based upon the principle that the lines ought to be able to support each other. The
principes
and
triarii
were able to join the combat in some way, and it is claimed that they might even advance and replace the troops in the front line, but it is not easy to understand how this was achieved. The problem is particularly complex if it is accepted that when in contact with the enemy the maniples were packed together in a solid line. In fact, it is far more likely that they were not and that the gaps in the line remained during combat, but in order to understand the Roman tactical system we must first look at the nature of warfare and battle in this period.
triplex acies
interacted with each other. Clearly the Roman tactical system was based upon the principle that the lines ought to be able to support each other. The
principes
and
triarii
were able to join the combat in some way, and it is claimed that they might even advance and replace the troops in the front line, but it is not easy to understand how this was achieved. The problem is particularly complex if it is accepted that when in contact with the enemy the maniples were packed together in a solid line. In fact, it is far more likely that they were not and that the gaps in the line remained during combat, but in order to understand the Roman tactical system we must first look at the nature of warfare and battle in this period.
Warfare in the Third Century
BC
BC
The main developments in military theory and practice before the Punic Wars had all occurred in the Greek world. Greek city states had first developed the hoplite phalanx, a dense mass of heavily armoured infantrymen which advanced and fought their way through anything in their path. On level ground such Greek spearmen had proved superior to any other type of soldier down to the earlier fourth century. It was a system of fighting ideally suited to the Greek soldier-farmers, who wished to resolve a campaign quickly so that they could return to working their farms. It required little technical skill or training, for which Greek citizens apart from the Spartans had little time, but needed considerable courage and group solidarity, things which the hoplites of the city states possessed in abundance. Tactics were simple, especially when two similar phalanxes confronted each other in a war between rival cities, and such subtleties as reserves were virtually unknown. Many wars lasted a matter of weeks and were resolved by a single day's clash on one of the few level plains in the Greek Peninsula. Greek warfare developed as society changed and in the late fifth and fourth centuries professional soldiers appeared in increasing numbers, campaigns tended to last much longer and not be so closely tied to the agricultural year, whilst generalship and tactics grew in importance. Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedon led well-trained and drilled professional soldiers, forming armies that included heavy and light cavalry, and light infantry as well as the heavy infantry of the phalanx, who were now armed with two-handed pikes instead of the spears. It was with such an army that Alexander swept across the Near East and on into India in little more than a decade. The Hellenistic military system had proved itself superior to anything else in the world at that time, but after Alexander's death and the break-up of his empire into a number of bickering Successor Kingdoms Macedonian style armies most often found themselves facing another similar force. Where both sides employed the same tactical system and equipment, a decisive victory was much harder to achieve. As a result armies began to experiment with all sorts of unusual weapons, such as scythed chariots, war elephants and heavily armoured cataphract cavalry, in an effort to gain some advantage over the enemy. More emphasis was also placed on the role of the commander, who tried to force a battle on terms most favourable to his own army and avoid contact if the odds were against him.
Neither the Romans nor the Carthaginians possessed a modern army based on the Hellenistic model, but the campaigns between them were to be fought largely in the manner of contemporary Hellenistic warfare. The most important and decisive element in warfare remained the pitched battle, although raiding and sieges now played a far more significant role than had ever been the case with hoplite warfare. A clear victory in a massed battle was the best way of putting pressure on the enemy, but there was always the possibility of defeat and a battle was not something to be risked lightly. Heavy casualties were difficult to replace quickly, since both Carthaginian mercenaries and Roman levies needed time to be turned into a battle-worthy force. Even if the majority of a defeated army survived an engagement, their morale was severely reduced and made it unlikely that they could face the same enemy again with any prospect of success until some time had passed. Battles were rarely if ever fought for any strategic purpose greater than destroying the enemy field army. Therefore a good commander sought battle when he felt that there was a good chance of victory and avoided a confrontation if there was not.
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