The Circle (69 page)

He limped out into the corridor, guarding his arm, and stood in line for the bubbler. He was still too confused to feel much. He expected a buzz of speculation, but the witnesses and counsels stood about smoking silently. Bryce came out, lighting a Camel before he was out of the courtroom. The others glanced at him, glanced away. His eyes passed over Dan's, over those of the others. He bent a bland, mysterious smile toward the flame of his Zippo.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: Sir, it was my assignment as counsel for the Court to elicit evidence on every circumstance having to do with the
RYAN
incident. I feel that I have fully and impartially performed that duty. The Court is now in possession of all the facts that can be ascertained surrounding the collision and subsequent events of interest.

COURT
: The Court is now ready to proceed with the closing arguments.

Captain Roland Javits, a party, made the following closing oral argument.

*   *   *

“IN beginning my remarks, I want first to reemphasize the status of USS
Kennedy
during the maneuver in question.

“It is common knowledge in the fleet that the carrier, a much larger ship than the rest, is restricted in her maneuverability and is therefore to be regarded with caution and to some degree even suspicion. This is heightened by her frequent turns to seek the wind for launching and recovering aircraft.

“In addition, doctrine and maneuvering instructions explicitly direct that while engaged in flight operations, as
Kennedy
was, all ships are to stay clear and not embarrass her in any way. It is not too much to say that when so engaged, a carrier can do no wrong.

“None of my testimony on this point has been challenged by any of the counsels.

“I now refer to Exhibit E, the track of the two ships before collision. Subsequent testimony has not challenged its validity and it must be regarded as a true record of the courses followed.

“It is in evidence that shortly before my turn to flight course,
Ryan
's OOD prepared a conservative solution to take her safely to station. However, her CO preferred a high-speed turn, a high-speed transit across my bow, and a second high-speed, split-second turn into station. Even if it was ‘good practice,' any error in execution would result in his ending up out of position, if not in mortal danger.

“Perhaps what we are seeing here is an example of a man being seduced by his own seamanship into a gamble that failed.

“The signals leading up to the maneuver were standard, easily understood, straight from the book. Also, there is no question but that they were received and understood.

“It has been brought out in testimony that the night, though overcast, was clear. Visibility was good. Though my lights were dimmed,
Ryan
's JOD has testified they could be clearly seen. The course and station change could have been executed without haste, misunderstanding, or risk.

“The fact that my OOD had to be reminded to assign
Ryan
her plane guard station is minor. The fact that they called back to ask about it shows that they had anticipated that order and were prepared for it.

“Regarding my adjustment of course to two-five-zero, there seems to be some question that
Ryan
even heard it. Whether or not they did, I have shown it would have made little difference, as it was a matter only of a few degrees.

“On remarking the dangerous proximity of the destroyer, I immediately backed emergency and ordered ‘light ship.' I did not sound whistle signals because they would have been confusing. To reconcile the ensign's testimony with that, it is possible that my boatswain gave a squeak on the horn in excitement, but if so it was not long enough to register with anyone on the bridge. It is also possible that one of the flight-deck crew, driving a plane-handling vehicle, saw
Ryan
ahead and sounded his horn as a warning to the bridge.

“In any event these are side issues. The single initiating and immediate cause of the accident was Commander Packer's fatal left-rudder order. This is true regardless of any extenuating circumstances. The collision was not caused by any action or lack of action by
Kennedy,
and there was no action anyone on her bridge could have taken to avert it.

“It has been theorized by Captain Piasecki that some momentary confusion in Packer's mind as to his relative position caused him to conclude that his only hope lay in a turn to the left. However, on cross-examination, he agreed that first, there were other actions Commander Packer could have taken to clear up the confusion, and second, that confused or not, he was still accountable. Confusion is not a forgivable attribute of men commanding U.S. Navy ships.

“However, in view of the sea experience of Commander Packer, and the uniformly excellent opinion of him brought out in this inquiry, it seems to me there is a more logical explanation then ‘confusion' for such a horrendous mistake.

“It has been clearly brought out that prior to going to his sea cabin, Packer described his intention to pass me close aboard and then turn left sharply to reach station.

“I believe that the argument in regard to his maneuver firmly fixed in his mind that fact of a final left turn. It fixed it there subconsciously rather than consciously.

“Once he had begun the maneuver, and realized he was standing into danger, his conscious mind was so occupied with that danger that at the critical moment he subconsciously reverted to his original plan, and said ‘left rudder' when at a cooler moment he would have said ‘right'—which was the proper order.

“After he came to zero-nine-zero, almost the reciprocal of my course, the closing speed of the ships was over sixty miles an hour. Warnings from his OOD and JOD led to a rapid realization that he was dead ahead of me at a short and rapidly closing range. If he had ordered right rudder then, he would have ended up roughly where he wanted to be—on my port quarter.

“Unfortunately, though he sensed the proper moment to turn, it must have been at that point that his intense concentration, blunted as it may have been, reverted to the original plan fixed in his mind by the argument. Instead of ‘right rudder,' what came out of his mouth was ‘left rudder.'

“The subconscious plays that trick on all of us occasionally. In this very hearing, experienced witnesses have said
Kennedy
when they meant
Ryan
or two-three-zero when they meant three-two-zero. The slip is easily corrected here.

“It was not so on
Ryan.
Even if after a second or two he realized his error, the die was cast. If he tried to shift his rudder back, he would meet me head-on. He had to bend on every bit of speed he had to get across my bow before I hit him.

“It may be that it is difficult to tell which way a carrier is heading. If that's so, it seems to me to be an additional reason to be cautious. However, it's hard to believe that any commanding officer could start out crossing a carrier's bow and not pay the most intense attention to it.

“No, Packer knew where he was. He might not have been able to tell the exact angle, but he knew he was in mortal danger and had to act instantly. I believe he simply said the wrong thing. He realized it only when he noticed his bow swinging toward me instead of away. He made the instant decision not to reverse his rudder and plow into me bow-on, but acted decisively in an attempt to tighten his turn and get by fast. The evidence? The moment he saw his bow swing in the wrong direction, he gave the proper orders in rapid succession—‘left full, hard left, all ahead emergency flank.' He did all he could to retrieve the slip of the tongue. I profoundly wish he had made it, and for a second there that night, I thought he had. But it was not enough.”

*   *   *

REAR Admiral Leonard A. Hoelscher, USN, then made the following oral argument.

*   *   *

“ADMIRAL Ausura, Admiral Dennison, Admiral Morehead; counsels and parties; witnesses. The collision of
Kennedy
and
Ryan
while under my tactical command has been exhaustively examined. The points in contention are many, including some internal to
Ryan,
but as Captain Javits has just pointed out, the most important fact is not at issue: that her commander made an error that sank his ship and killed one hundred and seventy-eight of his crew and officers, including himself. The facts surrounding this are about as clear as they can be.

“I am a party to these investigations due to my position as CTG 21.1. Now, let us note that no allegations have been made by any person questioning my handling of the formation. The maneuvers ordered under my authority were clear, standard, and in accordance with regulations. Finally, there have been no criticisms of events subsequent to the collision: my action to extinguish the fire aboard
Ryan,
for reasons discussed in closed session, the hardest decision I have ever had to make; the entire process of search and rescue, which succeeded in saving over sixty men.

“Let us go on to the only issue of possible culpability that has been raised against me, first by Ensign Lenson, later by counsels for the deceased officers. That is the issue of my stationkeeping instruction.

“Prima facie, its import is rather innocuous. It's the kind of combination pat on the back and kick in the pants I imagine has been used since the first man commanded another. From time to time, even with subordinates who know their stuff, it's necessary to rake them over the coals a bit. In fact, that's one of the prime things a skipper, a commodore, or even the Chief of Naval Operations is there for.

“In the last few days, though, we've heard the entire blame for the collision traced, as though by magic, to that message. That it caused Commander Packer to throw his good sense and training overboard and stake his ship in a reckless gamble to save a few seconds.

“Now, I'm not worried that the civilian counsel, Mr. Barrett, and the counsel for Commander Packer, Lieutenant Hauck, are going to succeed in convincing men with years at sea that because of a message like that one man should be relieved of responsibility for an accident while his senior bears the blame. If that was so, if error or excess in a subordinate was to condemn the senior, no officer could escape the wrath of the law.

“I, too, like Captain Javits, believe that there may be some single clear explanation for Packer's mistake. But we may wander in the murk of supposition as long as we will, and never know for sure. Like him, I wish fervently that it hadn't happened, or that
Ryan
's captain had been able to ramrod her past
Kennedy
's bow.

“The question remains, how do we prevent this from happening again? At this moment in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, destroyers are maneuvering as the Navy guards the distant stations of the world. There have been suggestions made here as to how to prevent a duplication of this disaster. I will dedicate from now on in my career a portion of my time and influence toward getting them adopted. If we can learn from what I've already heard called ‘the
Ryan
Incident,' her men will not have died in vain.”

*   *   *

THE Court then, at 1215, took a recess until 1400, at which time it reconvened.

Counsel representing Commander Packer, a party, then made the following oral argument.

*   *   *

“THE narrative of the collision that follows, and its attribution of the responsibility of that collision, hinges on three facts. One: The signal that the
Kennedy
was on course two-five-zero true was erroneous and misleading. Two: That it was received aboard
Ryan
in time for action by her commanding officer. Three: That it, and other errors and omissions by the captain of the
Kennedy,
exacerbated by mistakes in judgment by Rear Admiral Hoelscher, in charge of the task force, constitute the true causes of the collision, and not errors or omissions by the commanding officer of USS
Reynolds Ryan.

“First, let's look at the fatal ‘mike corpen' signal, transmitted, as
Kennedy
's signal book shows, approximately one minute and forty seconds before her bow split
Ryan
in two.

“The fact that it was entered in the signal book shows that aside from Captain Javits, who directed it, and Lieutenant Commander Garner, who transmitted it, others in
Kennedy
's CIC heard it go out. I have made message inquiries of the other ships in formation and have received replies from
Talbot
and
Dewey
corroborating this.

“It has also been established in cross-examination by Mr. Barrett that confusion existed in Captain Javits's mind as to the proper meaning of the signal ‘mike corpen,' and that this confusion persisted right up till he was confronted with the signal book on the stand.

“Conclusion: that an erroneous and misleading signal was sent less than two minutes before the collision.

“Second, we ask, was the signal received by
Ryan?
For if it was not, we face a different set of deductions, though also tending to show that the responsibility for the collision was not Commander Packer's.

“Captain Javits has told us he tested his comms at midnight, and that all ships answered the check, though
Ryan
came back weak. Apparently no one bothered to tell her this, so no action could be taken to correct it. However, it is proof that two hours before collision, the circuit was functioning.

“In addition, only minutes before the fatal signal,
Ryan
and
Kennedy
communicated about whether
Ryan
was to resume her plane guard station. Again, the circuit was functioning.

“Now, the JOD of
Ryan,
Lenson, has stated that the pritac speaker was either malfunctioning or turned down to reduce the noise on the bridge. The receiver was located on the starboard side of the pilothouse. The pilothouse on
Gearing
-class destroyers is only twenty feet wide. Let's look at the positions of the officers approximately two minutes before the collision, as given by Mr. Lenson.