The Circle (63 page)

A
. That is true, Lieutenant.

Q
. Second, you were located in flag plot. That is a space within the skin of the ship?

A
. Yes.

Q
. Could you see
RYAN?

A
. No.

Q
. Were you maintaining a radar plot of the formation?

A
. No. We were in radar silence.

Q
. Yes, sir, that slipped my mind. Let us now turn to your message of the day before, the order you sent to screen units over your signature. Do you recall that order?

A
. The directive to expedite maneuvering.
TALBOT
and
GARCIA
had been imprecise and sluggish occasionally. I wanted that tightened up. That was the intent of the message.

Q
. We have heard testimony to the effect that message was the driving force behind Commander Packer's using a risky maneuver in preference to a safe one to reach his plane guard station. Would you respond to that?

A
. That's [expletive deleted]. U.S. Navy destroyers are built for fast maneuvering. We're trained for it. It's a combat necessity and we're out there preparing for combat. You don't do that by creeping up on station like a bunch of maiden aunts. I have served in ships like
RYAN
and such a maneuver was well within her capability, if the bridge team was properly trained and alert.

Q
. You were knowledgeable, were you not, of
RYAN
's material condition?

A
. Yes, that she had sustained some damage during her operations in the Gap, but the report Packer sent me when she joined said she was C-1 in maneuvering—fully capable, no degradation worth mentioning. I took him at his word and expected RYAN to perform like the other units of my screen.

Cross-examined by counsel for Lieutenant Evlin.

Q
. Admiral, let us talk for a moment about your decision to ram
RYAN.
I may have to have some of the background on this explained to me.

Witness asked whether Mr. Barrett was cleared to the proper level. He was assured that such was the case.

Q
. How much experience have you had with nuclear weapons, sir?

A
. I went to school on them.

Q
. When? How long ago?

A
. I don't recall the exact year. When I was a lieutenant commander.

Q
. Have they not been upgraded to be much more resistant to fire and shock than they used to be?

A
. I think so. But they'll still cook off eventually in the middle of a conflagration.

Q
. Are you certain of that?

A
. [Witness paused.] Pretty sure.

Q
. How long had the fire been going when you sent
RYAN
to the bottom?

A
. I don't know. Ten or twelve minutes.

Q
. How long does a Mark Five warhead take to cook off in a JP-5 fire?

A
. You'd have to get an expert to answer that one for you.

Q
. What is being done about these weapons now?

A
. The ones on
RYAN?

Q
. Yes.

A
. Well, I'm out of the picture on that. Water depth where she went down is over 1,000 fathoms. It would be hard to get to them, if that's what you mean. If we can't, I don't think anyone else will be able to.

Q
. What was your state of mind when you ordered Captain Javits to ram
RYAN?

A
. Upset, of course—reluctant—it wasn't an easy decision. But as I said, I still think it was the right one. I've forwarded my report on it. There hasn't been any response yet.

Q
. Let us return to Lieutenant Hauck's question about your hurry-up message. Was your task group engaged in combat at the time?

A
. Of course not. We were simulating such operations.

Q
. Do you feel, Admiral, that in peacetime we need to take exactly the same risks we would in war?

A
. You're trying to trap me into giving a yes or no answer. I will reiterate that the only way to prepare for war is to train realistically, and if we don't, we aren't doing our jobs right. Obviously, I was not ordering people to take foolish chances. I was asking them to do things the way they're supposed to be done.

Q
. If you were sent out again to command a task force, would you reissue that same order? Specifically, sir, would you order them to maneuver at high speed, in the dark, without radar, “even at the expense of an occasional mistake”?—As your original message put it?

A
. [Witness did not answer.]

THE COURT
: Please respond to that, Admiral Hoelscher.

A
. I was going to. I would say that I would, if my ships were moseying around and going too slow.

Q
. Then you have learned nothing from this incident?

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: Mr. Barrett, I must caution you—

THE WITNESS
[interrupting]: No, I will respond to that. Sir, I have drawn no conclusions that would reduce what I expect from a Navy destroyer skipper.

Neither counsel for the Court, the Court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The Court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything he thought should be a matter of record that had not been brought out by previous questioning.

WITNESS
: I would like to say that I did not mean to imply, as I may have seemed to, that occasional accidents like this are inevitable. I don't think anything's inevitable. But I don't think the solution lies in reducing what we expect from our commanding officers. I hope we can find out what happened to
RYAN
and find some way of fixing it. It's hard to see a ship go down and go back to sea as if nothing had happened.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

He was duly warned and withdrew.

*   *   *

AT this point the Court sat with open doors. The survivors reentered.

Captain Roland Javits, U.S. Navy, a party, was called as a witness, and was sworn. He was reminded of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and advised that any testimony given by him might be used as evidence against him in any subsequent trial by court-martial.

Examined by the counsel for the Court.

Q
. State your name, rank, branch of service, and present duty station.

A
. Captain Roland J. Javits, USN. I am captain of USS
KENNEDY,
CV-67.

Q
. Will you please briefly describe your naval and aviation experience?

A
. I graduated from the Naval Academy and served in the Air Force for a time before requesting transfer back to the Navy. I did the standard things Navy fliers do, including a spell flying F-9s in combat. I was CO of VF-114. Then I attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. After that I served with the Chief of Naval Operations staff. Following that, I was commanding officer of
DENEBOLA.
Following that, I put
KENNEDY
in commission.

Q
. And you are still her commanding officer?

A
. So far.

Q
. Will you state to the court your recollection of the events leading up to the collision of
KENNEDY
with USS
REYNOLDS RYAN,
DD-768?

A
. Yes. I have made some notes here and I will refer to those.

Q
. Would you like to submit that as a narrative?

A
. No, they're rough. I haven't had time to … I'll just make remarks, if that's all right.

Q
. Go ahead.

A
. On December 24 I was the OTC of a carrier strike formation off the Irish coast. Exercise WESTERN VIGIL was in progress. I had assumed tactical command, since CTG 21.1 was engaged with the developing threat picture. At 2000, in accordance with the operation order, all ships were darkened. The weather conditions were favorable for night flying operations. It was clear, extremely dark, middle overcast around 8,000 feet; visibility 10 miles, wind west southwest, fourteen to fifteen knots; sea smooth, wave height 4 feet, period 6 seconds, direction 270 degrees. There was no visible horizon, and from the height of
KENNEDY
's bridge the hulls of the escorts merged with the water. Due to the tactical conditions, all our orders were sent by short-range tactical radio rather than signal light.

About 2230, the admiral ordered me to launch our first strike on the RED fleet. I'd anticipated this, and at 2245 I put out a signal to stand by for a simultaneous left turn to launch course and designated
RYAN
plane guard. All units acknowledged. Meanwhile lead fighters were being placed on the catapults and pilots briefed. I executed the signal at 2250. We steadied up on two-six-zero, the screen steadied up, and
RYAN
reported in position. I then manned and launched ten F-4Bs with drop tanks on a vector of one-nine-zero toward the simulated enemy forces.

The purpose of this exercise was to familiarize the pilots with night launches and strikes under dimmed conditions and radar silence; second, to exercise the deck crew, flight crews, and small boys in night carrier operations.

At 2316, with the last plane off the deck, I signaled a new course and came right to zero-one-zero true, the course Admiral Hoelscher had directed. All ships rogered and
RYAN
returned to her position in the screen.

We had some electronic intercepts around 2400, but the enemy attack we expected didn't materialize. At midnight, we conducted a radio check with all the screen ships, and comms were satisfactory, though
RYAN
's response was weak. At 0055, the strike leader reported “attack complete” and that the force was returning.

In accordance with my instructions, preparations for night recovery commenced at 0157. This included a voice radio message giving my course and speed intentions. All ships receipted for this signal.
RYAN
again came through weak and asked about plane guard. My OOD, Lieutenant Commander Garner, had neglected to do this, and I spoke to him about it. At 0221, we commenced a simultaneous turn to the right, first to one-zero-zero, then on around to two-six-zero. I also increased speed to twenty-seven knots. At the beginning of this maneuver
RYAN
was on our starboard quarter, bearing two-four-five, range 3,000 yards. His new position for night recovery was to be 1,000 yards off our port quarter.

As we neared recovery course, I noticed that
RYAN
's lights were slightly to the right of my bow, but that the relative bearing was changing slowly to the left. I noticed that the actual wind was slightly to port of the anticipated wind, and so I directed a course modification to steady at two-five-zero vice two-six-zero. This message went out and was receipted for.

The next time I looked out,
RYAN
's lights had suddenly become much brighter and closer. I immediately ordered all back emergency.
RYAN
's lights closed rapidly. She passed under my bow so close she disappeared from sight under the overhang of the flight deck. The bow and forward stack reappeared on my starboard side. I thought for a moment he had cleared us. However, almost immediately
KENNEDY
struck
RYAN
midships on her starboard side. I stopped all engines as soon as it was evident we had hit.

Practically simultaneous with the collision, I ordered “light ship” and sounded collision quarters. I had already passed “man overboard” and called away fire and rescue parties when Admiral Hoelscher got to my bridge.

We then had a short conversation while
KENNEDY
coasted forward in the water. Meanwhile I was receiving damage reports. We were basically unhurt, but a JP-5 line under the starboard forward sponson had ruptured and leaked about 50 tons of fuel before it was secured.
RYAN
lay astern of us and was beginning to burn. The admiral made an observation, which had escaped me, about the special weapons she carried. I had not thought of this, but he had a point. Following his orders, when I was sure we had sound props, I gave ahead full and hard right rudder. We came around and I personally conned the ship through the burning portion of the destroyer.

After this, since the F-4s were reporting dry tanks, we got up to speed again and recovered them on a westerly course. When they were aboard I scrambled our ready rescue choppers after survivors.

Q
. Now, will you continue your narrative and describe the search-and-rescue operation?

A
. There is one thing I would like to put in before I do. I have prepared here a chart on which I and my officers reconstructed the tracks of
RYAN
and
KENNEDY
from the point at which we came right from zero-one-zero to the point where the collision occurred. It includes the proper maneuver
RYAN
should have followed and the track she did in fact follow.

Counsel for the Court requested that the reporter mark the chart Exhibit E. There being no objection, it was so marked and entered.

Q
. I note that you have included ranges at various points between the two ships. Is this an estimate?

A
. No, those are radar ranges.

Q
. How is that possible? I understood that all ships were ordered to maintain radar silence.

A
. That is so, and our ship's radars were shut down. However, on my own initiative, I had used some discretionary funds to install a small Raytheon piloting radar. These are common on merchants. They don't give you away as being a warship. It was a safety measure I liked to have.