The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (37 page)

TB was good at the crime meeting, closed it really well, drew in the centre of gravity of the comments. He felt DB was too emotional about it, saw it too much in personal terms. We had good ideas but we needed to know we had the systems and people to put them into practice. [Sir John] Stevens was pleased and did clips with DB that went fine. TB was raving about the crime meeting, felt it had been a really useful exchange and that if we listened to the cops more, we could get more done. On the hunting vote, Hilary [Armstrong] called and said TB was in some bother on this. TB wanted to push on and was in real ‘fuck off’ mode. All a bit grim at the moment.

TB/GB relations getting worse. Then an extraordinary thing later when George Pascoe-Watson [
Sun
] read to me the opening sentences of the draft of TB’s [planned education] speech, accurately. It had gone to the Treasury and DfES [Department for Education and Skills] private offices earlier. Ian Austin, Ed Miliband and others denied it was them, claiming it must have been Education. All very odd. After Cabinet, TB had a meeting with GB, Margaret Hodge re student finance. GB was arguing strongly for a graduate tax, TB for top-up fees and it all ended a bit ugly when TB seemed to put his foot down, said eventually we have to make a decision and this is the decision we are making. GB said nothing after that and walked out as soon as it was convenient.

Our immediate problem for the day was [Labour MP] Alun Michael’s hunting statement. TB was in a rage at not having followed his instincts, having voted for when he hadn’t really wanted to. Deep down, he wished he had never let this thing on the agenda. Alun’s draft was long, rambling, a bit unclear. But when he came in to discuss it at 9 and we went through it, the more you pressed for clarity, the more obvious it was the only way to get it was to come down on the side of the ban. The solution was a new bill. TB didn’t really want that. He wanted more delay, more consultation and was in a foul mood on it. [Margaret] Beckett and [Alun] Michael were perfectly calm but getting a little bit exasperated. Before the statement, Gerald Kaufman [veteran Labour MP and chairman of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee] called me to say he would never see himself as a loyal TB supporter again if we backtracked on this. I said I never realised he was so passionate about it and he said he was, adding ‘If the Tony who stood up to Milosevic and Bin Laden can’t stand up to the Countryside Alliance, I can’t support him.’

The mood with GB was poisonous. At the start of Cabinet, when TB read out the absences, he said in a perfectly friendly way ‘It says here you’re in Monterey, Gordon.’ GB didn’t even look up, let alone smile. TB said later he found his behaviour at times weird. I said we just had to accept there was a counter-strategy. Cabinet was largely foreign affairs, a bit on CSR/Budget. Milburn was good, emphasising the need for a more collegiate approach. TB saw Clare earlier and told her to watch this stuff about her being offside on Iraq. He said she had been very disarming, saying she had been done in on it and would not be a problem, but then at Cabinet whacked Geoff on Afghanistan. Then to Northolt and the flight up to Manchester with Tessa. TB wasn’t sure what to push in the speech but we worked up
education still the number one priority, tough on truancy. We visited the Commonwealth Games stadium which looked great, fantastic atmosphere, then to Bolton Arena, where he did an OK Q&A. There was a group of councillors from Burnley lobbying me to be their MP.

Overnight at the Lowry hotel in Manchester. Another discussion re strategy over dinner. He had had dinner with Clinton last night who had suggested I pick his brains on how to deal with this changed media mood. He had said the danger was doing the wrong thing instead of the right thing. Keep listening to your instincts that got you there in the first place, not the press who want you out. Keep getting out with people. TB and I were still disagreeing about the extent to which this was a reality or communications problem. What I did agree was that we needed more imagination in our communications. TB said there was a danger he, TB, was just becoming boring because people were so familiar with him. Bill’s great appeal, or part of it, was his celebrity. He felt we had become too defensive about TB the phenomenon. He said this isn’t your fault because everyone says you’re the best in the world at what you do but we need new thinking, new ideas. I said it was about reality, lack of texture and enrichment. It’s about you, drawing on real interests, real passion, real experience. I said we could do all manner of new interview ideas, pictures, talking points, but in the end it was about how he spoke about what he really felt. It became quite a tough exchange but we both felt better after it. After the others left, he filled me in on his earlier conversation with GB. He said Gordon’s view has always been that when the going gets tough, I [TB] should disappear in a puff of smoke and he’ll come in. He doesn’t really get me. I do this job better than he thinks.

IDS had done a local paper interview in which he said TB ruthlessly exploited his children. I filled in TB who said IDS would regret this. If he had any sense he would apologise, but probably he wouldn’t. Yelland called and, bizarrely, IDS had called him to say he didn’t recall using those exact words, he felt really bad and he wouldn’t do it again. I said to David that that was more about the desire to stop the papers whacking him and if he meant it he should call TB. Off to Abraham Moss High School. Good speech but limited coverage.
²⁴
We flew back, and I met up with Fiona and the kids on the M4 and headed for Devon.

We were staying in an area where the mobiles didn’t work, so I had limited contact with the office to a couple of calls a day, and did very little work. When I bothered collecting any papers, the theme of TB in trouble was developing pretty fast. I felt we had a clear difference in how to deal with it, which meant I felt I wasn’t really offering solutions at the moment. He had been clear he didn’t see the current situation as my fault, but I found his obsessive belief that it was about communications rather than policy or overall positioning a bit odd. We were staying in a house near Totnes and the local pub was run by a couple of party members who were generally OK about things, though there was nevertheless a sense that we weren’t on top of things like we used to be. We went back to Tavistock a couple of times including a visit to the
Tavistock Times
office.
²⁵
As often happened when we were away, usual suspects and others were lining up to whack us on various policy areas – Iraq, Post Office, tax and spend, TB’s relations with Berlusconi. We got into a routine fairly quickly. There were some great hills around and I ran every day as well as playing tennis with Calum and swimming. We had a couple of days on the beach. The kids were an absolute joy at the moment.

Jeremy [Heywood] called to tell me, in total confidence, that the Queen Mother had died. Although she had been frail, the actual death came as a surprise. The Queen was there [Windsor] now and they were trying to tell Charles who was in Klosters [ski resort]. They hoped to announce it soon. They were aiming for around 6. TB came on the line and we went over what to do. Unlike with Diana’s death, there were well-laid plans which swung into action pretty quickly. But it was evident from the call I took from Robin Janvrin early evening that they were a bit worried, unsure that there would be crowds to justify three days’ lying in state, or that there would be the level of interest necessary to fill nine days of news. I felt that it would develop a strong momentum of its own and that they were worrying unduly, though I could see why. TB, Jeremy and I agreed that we should go
for a recall of Parliament before people started to call for it, and got Hilary Armstrong on the case.

TB worked on his words and as soon as it was announced formally, we got a crew to Chequers. He spoke well, and all the better for it being all his own words. The atmosphere was very different to Diana’s death. It was not a Diana moment. TB felt there would be quite an outpouring of grief but I felt more that it would become one of those moments where people simply reviewed the past. Cherie was out in the States on her holiday and we had to make a decision about whether she came back or not. She clearly didn’t want to. TB spoke to the Queen around 7 and told me afterwards she was ‘very sad but dignified’. I spoke to Janvrin again, who agreed we should go to the US as planned and Jeremy H successfully pushed them for a Tuesday funeral so we could get to the US and back. I spoke to JP, who agreed to do the media on the Queen Mum tomorrow. Jeremy was doing a fantastic job with the Palace.

TB called re the fact that cameras were still hanging around. He was volunteering to do more extended interviews today but we took the judgement it would look like he was muscling. Maybe another time. We did a couple of conference calls to agree what we should be saying about the visit to the US going ahead, recall of Parliament, receiving the body to Westminster Hall. TB, Jeremy and I went through the draft guidance on national mourning and took out a reference to businesses closing down on the day of the funeral, instead putting in the idea that schools do something to respect it, also give guidance on how practically people went to see the body. Our input was fairly minimal compared to Diana’s death, but there was nonetheless a steady traffic between us and the Palace. I felt Charles should do something public fairly soon, the Queen maybe later in the week. JP did fine on the lunchtimes. Once all the amendments were put into the guidance, and some of the more antiquated language was taken out, we put it out. There were the beginnings of chat about the Royals coming under more scrutiny, how long would the Queen stay, would she abdicate kind of thing, but it was still pretty low-key.

Philip [Gould] gave a hilarious account of TB’s behaviour last week at the various strategy meetings, that whenever he was challenged or under attack he just curled up into a foetal position. He said he was wearing the most extraordinary collection of brightly coloured
shirts and ties whilst GB was always in a plain white shirt and red tie. ‘It was a classic style meets substance moment.’ He said GB hadn’t really engaged. TB finished his note and as I had told him we were at Philip’s, he sent it through there. The fax ran out of ink after page three, which ended ‘Here is what we should do.’ There then came through seven blank pieces of paper. When I finally got it, it was fine, but the kind of note I had seen so many times and we never really fully delivered on them.

Chequers. I was working on a response to TB’s notes. He asked me what I thought of his note when we got there. I said good in parts. He said I really had to read it carefully, because it meant a lot of change from him, and he was serious about making that change. We both felt we needed new blood around the place. I said he could only get new blood if he got rid of the old blood and if he was looking for volunteers, I’d be happy enough to go. He asked if I actually wanted to go. I said I’d stay if he really wanted me to but I wasn’t enjoying it and therefore wasn’t doing it as well as I could, or possibly vice versa. I felt I was stuck in my own tram lines and so were others. He asked who could replace me and said he couldn’t just take a chance. At one point we thought of Adam Boulton [Sky political editor] but coincidentally today we had the TV political editors in for lunch at Chequers and he thought Adam lacked judgement. I said people may emerge if they knew there was a vacancy. Most of the hacks would be amazed we were having this discussion. He said so was he, that I was too important to the operation and gave it strength which would be impossible to replace. I said all I was saying was that if he was looking for space for new blood he should feel free to look for a replacement. Later we were talking about Manchester United. He said that I was his [Roy] Keane
²⁶
and he was very loath to lose me.

On Iraq, the meeting started at 10 up in the Long Gallery. It was a repeat of the smaller meeting we’d had on Afghanistan. Boyce was looking very tanned and smartly dressed and mainly set out why it was hard to do anything. He even talked up the Middle East peace process as a problem, as if TB had never thought of that. TB wanted to be in a position to give GWB a strategy and influence it. He believed Bush was in the same position as him, that it would be great to get rid of Saddam and could it be done without terrible unforeseen
circumstances. We were given an account of the state of Iraqi forces, OK if not brilliant, the opposition – hopeless – and Saddam’s ways – truly dreadful. CDS appeared to be trying to shape the meeting towards inaction, constantly pointing out the problems, the nature of the administration, only Rumsfeld and a few others knew what was being planned, TB may speak to Bush or Condi but did they really know what was going on? TB said in the end Bush would take the decisions. CDS said so far he had followed the Rumsfeld (he always pronounced it Rumsfield) advice. He said apart from Rumsfeld, there were only four or five people who were really on the inside track.

There was also a different understanding on UNSCRs, the US thinking they have existing cover, us believing we need a new one for foolproof legal cover. Both C and John Scarlett kept saying co-operation was better, e.g. on intelligence, but CDS would keep coming back to the problems. I recalled his dire warnings about the Taliban skinning people alive. Now he was saying this would not be as easy as the Taliban. General Tony Pigott did an OK presentation which went through the problems realistically but concluded that a full-scale invasion would be possible, ending up with fighting in Baghdad. But it would be bloody, could take a long time. Also, it was not impossible that Saddam would keep all his forces back. He said post-conflict had to be part of conflict preparation. The Americans believed we could replicate Afghanistan but it was very, very different. There was a guy there called [Lieutenant General] Cedric [Delves], our military man based in Tampa, working with the US inside CENTCOM. He was sunburned, wearing American lace-up boots, and said Tommy Franks was difficult to read because he believed they were planning something for later in the year, maybe New Year. He basically believed in air power plus special forces. CDS said if they want us to be involved in providing force, we have to be involved in all the planning, which seemed fair enough. TB said it was the usual conundrum – do I support totally in public and help deliver our strategy, or do I put distance between us and lose influence? We discussed whether the central aim was WMD or regime change. Pigott’s view was that it was WMD. TB felt it was regime change in part because of WMD but more broadly because of the threat to the region and the world. On WMD, people will say that we have known about WMD for a long time. He said what was sure was that this would not be a popular war, and in the States, fighting an unpopular war and losing is not an option.