The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (79 page)

than did political support centrality on both organizational reputations and

political activities, while the Japanese pattern was just the reverse (Knoke et

al., 1996, p. 120). Detailed analyses of specific legislative decisions showed that most national labor policy fights were conducted by relatively small `àction

sets,'' defined as coalitions of organizations that: hold the same preferred event outcome (passage or failure of a bill); communicate directly or indirectly with

one another about policy affairs; and consciously coordinate their policy influ-

ence activities (pp. 21±2). Labor unions and business associations were the

primary coalition leaders in all three nations, frequently taking opposing posi-

tions on legislative bills and almost never collaborating in the same action set even on those rare occasions when they preferred the same policy outcome. Only

minorities of the 117 core US labor policy domain organizations expressed

interest in the outcomes of each of the 25 congressional bills examined. On

average fewer than 37 organizations advocated either the passage or failure of a bill (p. 140). Slightly more than half participated in action sets, which averaged fewer than ten members (however, two legislative events produced no action

sets, and nine others just one action set favoring the bill's passage).

Most often, action sets are constructed as short-term coalitions to fight

collectively over a specific policy event, then to disband after political authorities render a decision. Subsequently, new action sets coalesce, composed of different participants lured by the particular substantive interests at stake in a new policy proposal. These changing alliances are not random assemblages of political

organizations. Policy domains are routinized political arenas comprising a

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337

limited range of potential participants, problems, and procedures for putting

proposals onto the national agenda. Consequently, many coalitions are

assembled and led by an enduring core group of organizations, primarily the

peak or encompassing organizations possessing broad mandates to defend and

advance the policy interests of sizable domain segments.

Intraorganizational Networks and Social Capital

The macro-level economic and political forces that reshaped interorganizational

relations also produced a new employment contract between workers and their

employers (Cappelli et al., 1997). The more daring or desperate corporations

implemented flexible, high performance work practices. Rigid bureaucratic

hierarchies yielded to experiments in cross-functional teams that devolved

increasing volumes of information, technical skills, and managerial responsibil-

ity down to the front-line workers' level. Employees were prodded to contribute

to restructured decision-making through quality circles, cross-training and job

rotation, team work, and total quality management programs. Total quality

management (TQM) principles emphasized the never-ending collaboration

between management and workers for continuous learning and quality improve-

ments, assessment of customer requirements, scientific monitoring of task per-

formance, and process-management to enhance team effectiveness. New human

resource management practices emphasized rewarding individual and group

performances through incentive-based compensation schemes (profit- and

gain-sharing, bonuses, and employee stock ownership plans). These diverse

high performance innovations were all intended to lower supervisory costs and

increase employees' work-life morale, thereby raising corporate productivity,

quality, and profitability. By flattening managerial hierarchies and outsourcing formerly internalized staff functions, firms shortened or eliminated many

traditional internal labor markets that had provided career ladders for regular

promotions to ever-higher levels of responsibility, prestige, and pay. Instead,

jobs evolved from fixed positions into flexible bundles of tasks that were

subjected to periodic restructuring to grapple with organizational contingencies in turbulent world economic markets. Jobs mutated into project-based

appointments through which multiply skilled employees passed in short-term

assignments on their way to the next project inside the firm or with another

employer.

From these gales of creative destruction a new corporate form emerged ± the

network organization, whose external alliances were discussed above. Its distin-

guishing internal features are multiplex exchange ties among the firm's loosely

coupled divisions, departments, and work groups, and among managers and

employees. It breaks down hierarchical and functional barriers, replacing them

with task-specific units connected through communication, advice, and inter-

personal trust networks. The networked organization ``creates autonomous

units, but it increases the volume, speed, and frequency of both vertical and

horizontal communication within the organization to promote collaboration. . . .

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David Knoke

Network management is, in the end, management by empowerment'' (Limerick

and Cunnington, 1993, p. 61).

N-form organizations provide structural opportunities to develop social capi-

tal relations for constructing employee careers under the new employment con-

tract. Workers have always used networking activity as an important strategy for getting ahead in their companies. All organizations exhibit informal structures, at every level from the executive suite to the loading dock, which exist autonomously from formal structures stipulated by corporate policies, procedure man-

uals, and organization charts. Thus, any organization's actual internal structure combines formal authority and communication channels with informal networks for exchanging information, advice, and trust that simultaneously facil-

itate and constrain individual and group behavior. To succeed in obtaining

power resources and better career opportunities, employees must learn to use

informal network ties to extend beyond narrowly constrained formal role

positions.

The new employment contract compels workers to survive and prosper by

learning how to form and manipulate egocentric relations that yield competitive

advantages in the contest for jobs, project assignments, promotions, recognition, and rewards. An employee's interpersonal ties comprise crucial social capital

investments which may prove as beneficial for her career development as her

human capital assets of knowledge, skills, and experience. A capacity ``to net-

work,'' in the everyday sense of contacting people who can help you, takes on

great significance inside networked organizations, where formal positions are ill-defined and constantly changing. Social capital consists of manifest and latent

social relationships that a person can mobilize, ``making possible the achieve-

ment of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence'' (Coleman,

1990, p. 302). Embedded in pre-existing multiplex network ties, social capital is

``created when the relations among persons change in ways that facilitate action''

(p. 304). By proactively forging large volumes of contacts with numerous,

diverse, and well endowed alters, an ego gains potential access to the assets

controlled by others. ``Social capital is at once the resources contacts hold and the structure of contacts in a network. The first term describes whom you reach.

The second term describes how you reach'' (Burt, 1992, p. 12).

Mixtures of competitive and cooperative modes characterize many multiplex

intraorganizational networks. Sometimes actors activate their social capital

connections to gain personal advantages over their adversaries, while under

other circumstances they participate in collective actions for mutual benefit.

For example, corporate employees engage in self-serving career moves, seeking

out individual mentors or networking with superiors to get a leg up the promo-

tion ladder. In contrast, high performance work practices, such as self-managed

teams stressing group responsibility for production, encourage workers to pool

their skills and social capital to increase group performance. Both networking

styles also occur at a firm's strategy level, where top executives decide and

implement plans to achieve global corporate objectives. Firms operating in the

same industry generally form exclusive supplier relations and compete for

customer loyalties, yet, as noted above, they also frequently collaborate in

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339

strategic alliances and joint ventures with expectations of mutual gains. An

important challenge for network analysts is to explain which conditions encour-

age zero-sum or positive-sum behavior.

Ronald Burt's (1992) structural hole theory proposed a social capital explana-

tion of competition at both inter-and intraorganizational levels of analysis. To succeed in a highly competitive arena, workers should invest in social contacts

providing timely access to people controlling organizational resources vital for performing tasks and achieving objectives. An employee's ``profit'' is the rate of return on these social capital investments generated from using network alters,

such as promotion recommendations and job referrals. Hence, a crucial net-

working skill is learning how to spot and develop ties to specific alters who can provide optimal information benefits, such as access, timing, and connections

(Burt, 1992, pp. 13±15). A high-volume strategy, forming a large number of

connections with many alters, is not sufficient. More crucially, a worker should enlarge her social capital by adding network alters who exhibit diverse qualities.

That is, time and energy should be poured into cultivating relations with persons not otherwise connected to one another: `À structural hole is a relationship of

nonredundancy between two contacts'' (Burt, 1992, p. 18). Besides tapping into

unique information sources, an employee who fills a structural hole thereby

gains some control benefits through exploiting network gaps between non-

redundant contacts. Ego becomes a valuable corporate player by occupying a

unique informal position that connects vital constituencies, serving as a network broker or go-between who negotiates deals and extracts a commission. Structural holes thus provide employees with entrepreneurial opportunities for play-

ing one party against another to reap a personal benefit.

Burt's (1992, pp. 115±80) analysis of 284 upper-level managers of a computer

firm demonstrated that structural holes in egocentric networks contribute to

early promotion and rapid rise to higher ranks. Different career paths ensued

from two network forms: (a) an entrepreneurial form with network contacts

outside a manager's immediate work group, which spanned corporate structural

holes, led to early promotion and subsequent quick advancement to higher

ranks; (b) a hierarchical or boss-centered form, centered on a manager's immedi-

ate work-group supervisor, also led to early promotion but subsequent pro-

longed stagnation in rank (p. 153). The gender gap in competitive networking

was sharp: ``The worst network for women and entry-rank men is the one best

for high-ranking men. Women and entry-rank men with entrepreneurial, oppor-

tunity-oriented networks were promoted late to their current rank'' (p. 159).

Although women gained initially through using a boss-centered strategy, they

faced subsequent barriers to career advancement. Lacking network contacts

outside their immediate work group to vouch for a candidate's credentials,

women mangers' mobility into top leadership positions was thwarted.

Herminia Ibarra's (1992, 1993a, b) research on ego-network dynamics

revealed how men and women employees differentially converted their social

capital into career advantages. She observed different homophily patterns (ten-

dencies toward same-sex ties) among the 80 male and female employees in a

New England advertising and public relations firm. Men formed multiplex

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David Knoke

network contacts mostly with other men (communication, advice-seeking, sup-

port, friendship, and influence relationships). Women employees differentiated

their network contents, forming social support and friendship connections with

female coworkers and instrumental ties with higher-status men. Hence, expres-

sive and instrumental networks were reinforced for men, but were inversely

correlated for women. Consequently, men seemed to receive higher career

returns than women on their social capital investments, in the form of greater

network centrality. Similar gender-differentiated network propensities occurred

among 63 managers of four large corporations (Ibarra, 1993a). Men formed

more weak-tie same-sex networks but women forged strong expressive bonds

with other women. The impact of managers' ego-net strategies on potential for

promotion also differed by gender. Both high-potential men and low-potential

women concentrated on instrumental ties, while high-potential women and low-

potential men emphasized expressive networks, such as trust and reciprocity.

Ibarra concurred with Burt that women's preferred social capital strategies

disadvantaged them getting ahead in the corporate game: ``The èntrepreneurial'

network pattern characteristic of successful male managers is less effective for females who many require stronger network ties to achieve the same level of