The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (64 page)

people have the resources to mobilize, and because people seize the political

opportunity. These three answers parallel theoretical approaches that have

successively occupied the field. It started with grievance theories such as relative deprivation theory, which basically hypothesized that discontent generates protest. But it was too obvious that many people who are aggrieved never engage in

protest. Indeed, protagonists of resource mobilization theory began to argue that grievances are ubiquitous and that the real question to answer is not so much

what makes people aggrieved but what makes aggrieved people participate in

social movements. Their answer to that question has been the availability of

resources. But soon social movement scholars, some of whom had a background

in political sciences, questioned whether the availability of resources was sufficient. They proposed that political opportunities that present themselves to

aggrieved groups make the difference.

Because People are Aggrieved

In a society there are all kinds of social and cultural cleavages. Some of those cleavages may become manifest and generate a social movement, others remain

latent. Several attempts have been made to distinguish cleavages. The first that come to mind are the four classic cleavages distinguished by Lipset and Rokkan

(1967a): center versus periphery, which concerns the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the

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271

peripheries; church versus government, which concerns conflicts between the

centralizing and mobilizing nation-state and the historically established privileges of the church; urban versus rural, which concerns the conflict between the

landed interest and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs; and class conflict, which concerns the conflict between owners and employers on the one side and

tenants, laborers, and workers on the other (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967a, p. 14).

Kriesi et al. (1995) distinguish thesè`traditional'' cleavages, as they depict them, from so-called ``new'' cleavages, such as gender, generation, peace and war, and ecology. Finally, Sisk (1995), in his discussion of politics in divided societies, distinguished between three types of cleavages: ascriptive cleavages, such as race, caste, and ethnicity; attitudinal cleavages, such as ideological orientation; and behavioral cleavages, such as membership of an organization or voting behavior.

(Obviously, ascriptive cleavages, as defined by Sisk, are akin to Lipset and

Rokkan's cleavages, but also to Kriesi et al.'s gender and generational cleavages.

Kriesi et al.'s peace, war, and ecology cleavages, on the other hand, are akin to Sisk's attitudinal cleavages.)

The key question is, of course, how do cleavages turn into grievances? Relative

deprivation was the answer given by grievance theory (Gurr, 1970). The theory

pointed to the discrepancy between expectations and outcomes to explain why

cleavages generate grievances. Rising expectations and outcomes that are lagging behind was the basic principle these authors proposed. Social psychologists

would undoubtedly wonder if and how individuals are actually aware of the

discrepancy. All too often such discrepancies are not observed simply because

people do not make the relevant comparisons. Moreover, even if they are aware

of the discrepancy they need not necessarily define it as illegitimate. The social psychology of relative deprivation or injustice has pointed to these two processes of comparison and legitimization as crucial for the generation of grievances

(Tyler and Smith, 1998).

Grievance theory in the social movement domain initially had very little to say

about the process of grievance interpretation. It took until the 1980s for social movement literature to show awareness of the problem. Klandermans (1984)

coined the term consensus mobilization, Snow and his colleagues introduced the

process of framing in the social movement domain (Snow et al., 1986), and with

the appearance of the concept of collective action frame (see Gamson, 1992b;

Klandermans, 1997, for synthetic treatments), grievance theory had become

much more sophisticated, not only because the collective action frame was a

far more elaborated conceptualization of grievances as determinants of social

movement activity than relative deprivation, but also because processes such as

consensus mobilization and framing added a dynamic component to the theory.

Today's general consensus in the social movement literature is that grievances are socially constructed.

Collective action frames arè`sets of beliefs that serve to create a state of mind in which participation in collective action appears meaningful'' (Klandermans,

1997, p. 17). Collective action frames are conceived of as consisting of three

components: injustice, identity, and agency (Gamson, 1992b). Injustice specifies a sense of injustice, moral indignation, and outrage about the way authorities are 272

Bert Klandermans

treating a social problem. Identity specifies à`we'' ± that is to say a group or social category that feels deprived and angry ± and à`they'' ± that is to say

authorities that are held responsible for the adverse situation. Agency concerns perceived opportunities, the belief that collective action may succeed in changing the situation. Thus a collective action frame specifies some authority that is

doing injustice to a group or category people identify with, plus the belief that it is possible to take action as a group.

The transformation of social and cultural cleavages into collective action

frames does not occur by itself. It is a process in which social and political

actors, media, and citizens jointly interpret, define, and redefine states of affairs.

A variety of conceptualizations have been proposed to account for the process. In an attempt to systematize (Klandermans, 1992, 1997), I proposed to distinguishes three different processes: (a) public discourse, i.e. the interface of

media discourse and interpersonal interaction; (b) persuasive communication

during mobilization campaigns by movement organizations, their opponents,

and countermovement organizations; and (c) consciousness-raising during epis-

odes of collective action. Public discourse in principle involves everyone in a

society or a particular sector within a society. Persuasive communication affects only those individuals who are targets of persuasion attempts; and consciousness-raising during episodes of collective action concerns primarily participants in the collective action, although bystanders can be affected as well. In each

setting the processes of forming and transforming collective beliefs take place in different ways: in the first setting, through the diffuse networks of meaning

construction; in the second setting, through deliberate attempts by social actors to persuade; and in the third setting, through discussions among participants in and bystanders at collective actions who are trying to make sense of the events of the struggle.

Although grievance theory over the past few decades has become far more

sophisticated, it has never provided a satisfactory answer to the question of why at a specific point in time and space a specific grievance becomes the focal point of a social movement. Grievance theory explains thè`demand side'' of social

movement activity but has very little to say about thè`supply side.'' It helps to understand why people are aggrieved, but not how aggrieved people mobilize

into social movements. Resource mobilization theory took this assessment as its

point of departure and argued that it is the availability of resources that makes the difference.

Because People Have the Resources to Mobilize

Resource mobilization theory distanced itself from grievance-based conceptions

of social movements. Grievances are seen as ubiquitous and thus the key ques-

tion is whether aggrieved groups have the resources to mobilize. Such resources

include money, time, technical infrastructure, expertise, and so on, including the structures and organizations to mobilize and deploy those resources. Indeed,

organizations and mobilizing structures are crucial according to resource mo-

bilization theory. McCarthy and Zald (1976), who are generally seen as the

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273

founding fathers of the approach, deliberately used organizational theory and

introduced concepts such as social movement sector and industry, and move-

ment entrepreneurs in their attempt to theorize about resource mobilization by

social movements. In a way, resource mobilization by movement organizations

creates a vicious circle. You need resources to maintain the structures needed to mobilize those resources. Obviously, movement organizations do not only mobilize resources, they also make use of the acquired resources. In fact, an important aspect of organizational management and therefore internal conflicts relates to

the deployment of resources. Decisions must be made about which part of the

resources will be used for organizational maintenance, which part for inter-

actions with opponents and countermovements, and which part for the mobiliza-

tion of resources.

Movement organizations play a central role in thè`supply'' of social move-

ment activities to aggrieved people. They organize activities, they stage protest events, they collect fees, they ask for time and effort from their members to

maintain the organization, and so on. Most movement scholars see organization

as a structural necessity to step up from loosely related protest events to sus-

tained collective action, one of the distinguishing features of social movements.

Movement organizations may be crucial in mobilizing resources but they are not

the only mobilizing structures. Any kind of societal organization or structure can become involved in mobilization campaigns: friendship and neighborhood networks, but also formal organizations such as churches, unions, and professional

associations. Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of resource

mobilization scholars has been overwhelming evidence that social movement

participant are not marginalized. On the contrary, precisely because any societal structure can be employed to mobilize, people who are involved in such structures run a better chance of being targeted by mobilization attempts (Marwell

and Oliver, 1993).

If, then, the availability of resources is making the difference, a question of

strategic importance becomes: is the emergence of a movement dependent on the

availability of internal, indigenous resources; that is, resources that are available to the aggrieved population? Or are external resources needed from conscience

constituencies who feel solidarity with the aggrieved population? Originally,

McCarthy and Zald (1976) believed that external resources are needed, as

aggrieved populations by definition tend to lack resources. Morris (1984), how-

ever, demonstrated that in the case of the civil rights movement indigenous

resources were more important than external resources. Jenkins and Eckert

(1986) concluded that a movement first needs indigenous resources to gain

some visibility and success. It is only then that external resources are made

available. Crucially or not for their emergence, social movements do receive

external support as movement organizations are embedded in multiorganiza-

tional fields.

Multiorganizational fields consist of the organizations with which a move-

ment organization might establish specific links (Klandermans, 1997). From the

point of view of a movement organization, a multiorganizational field is com-

posed of supportive, antagonistic, and indifferent sectors. Supportive sectors can 274

Bert Klandermans

be described as the movement organization's alliance system, consisting of

groups and organizations that support the organization; antagonistic sectors

can be described as the organization's conflict system, consisting of representatives and allies of the challenged social or political system and including countermovements; indifferent sectors consist of organizations that are not (yet)

involved in the controversy. The boundaries between these sectors remain fluid

and may change in the course of events. Specific organizations that try to keep

aloof from the controversy may be forced to take sides. Coalitions can fall apart, and former allies can become part of the conflict system. Mobilization takes

place within the boundaries of a multiorganizational field. Accordingly, the

impact of mobilization attempts is influenced by the dynamics of that field.

Finally, the composition of a movement organization's multiorganizational

field is also determined by the original social or cultural cleavage the movement emerges from. If we take a specific social or cultural cleavage in mind, let us say ethnicity, we can for some organizations, though not all of course, predict on

what side they will end if that cleavage generates a conflict.

Resource mobilization's emphasis on resources, be they indigenous or exter-

nal, meant a concentration on the movement's internal life. To be sure, move-

ment organizations were defined as open systems in interaction with their

environment to either acquire or employ resources, but little was said about

the environment itself. Questions such as what impact characteristics the polit-

ical environment has on social movements or to what extent movements impact