The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (18 page)

doctrine can be summarized as follows: behavior is self-centered and rational;

the desire for goods is dominant (that is, people value commodities above all

else); and wants, needs, and utilities are equivalent. Sometimes this is refash-

ioned in political rhetoric as ``choice'' and even ``democracy.'' Most sociologists probably agree that social agents have more choice in contemporary life than

previously, but ``choice'' in sociology has usually meant voluntarism rather than utility, or the singular pursuit of self-interest. I intend to advance a conception of choice as it is lodged in codependent relations, not individuals. Risks and responsibilities are, thereby, considered to be collectivized by groups, commu-

nities, social movements, and organizations.

I can point out two paradoxes that motivate my arguments. One is that social

and cultural processes are promoting egalitarian social relations, through

empathy and mutual regard, while simultaneously market forces give rise to

increasing economic inequalities. Another is that heterogeneous publics and,

also, post-national formations (composed of fundamentalist ethnic, racial and

religious groups) are emerging despite an acceleration of homogenizing eco-

nomic processes. To clarify these paradoxes, I suggest that economic processes,

which have engulfed communities, societies, and regions, are driven by a logic

that makes too-strong assumptions about individual utilities.

These globalizing economic processes encounter tenacious community solidar-

ities, and local social diversities are stubborn roadblocks against homogenizing work and production routines. Some of these solidarities take the form of post-national formations (Appadurai, 1996), as nations and groups respond to pro-

tect their own identity in terms of ethnic or religious fundamentalism, but also in reaction to materialism and the threat that marketization poses to their social

foundations. Others draw from liberation models and maintain fairly extensive

ties throughout the world in their struggle for self-determination. Still others pose alternatives to marketization in ways that are not as dramatic, but are

innovative and help to promote economic advance. These include collectiviza-

tion of production, reappropriation of markets and suppliers, and the creation of demand for their own products, such as organic coffee, fish, hardwoods, crafts,

or herbs and other natural products for medicine. Just as cultural entrepreneurs in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere hybridize popular music and cast it back to the international community (Hannerz, 1991), economic entrepreneurs are

beginning to hybridize products to reinsert them into international markets

(Lutz, 1999; Oliver and Grant, chapter 12 in this volume). In other words,

resistance against monopolies of global markets takes various forms, but the

common theme is that capitalism poses threats to codependent relations around

which groups and collectivities define themselves.

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Judith R. Blau

Critical Perspectives on the Theory of Utility

According to Sen (1987; also see Osmani, chapter 11 in this volume), real

difficulties with the assumption of utility are the following: (a) in diverse communities each person's utilitarian preference may not in fact maximize his or her own outcome and may impair the outcomes of others; (b) monist conceptions of

economic models ignore the fact that people are responsible and that there are

pluralities of goods; and (c) individuals have complex needs and wants, many of

which, like responsibility, are interpersonal and intergroup in nature. For these reasons, outcomes ought to be evaluated in terms of their distributional consequences ± in terms of the equalities and inequalities they produce ± and also as they affect interpersonal and intergroup relations.

Sen's emphasis on the inherently relational aspects underlying individual and

group well-being ± which cannot be understood simply in the singular terms of

utility, use-value, or rationality ± challenges sociologists in important ways.

Specifically, it suggests that we view individual rationality as a component of

intention and wants, which are inseparable from individuals' group member-

ships. It also follows that owing to their inseparabilities, people admit ethical considerations into their actions and decisions. These assumptions verge on a

rejection of an essentialist conception of the individual and instead suggest that social, economic, and civic institutions are built around relatively fluid, but

irreducible, reciprocal relations.

These considerations help to unravel one paradox. Choice ± through co-

dependence ± involves others, and to the extent that contemporary life offers

more choices than ever before, choice promotes more reciprocal relations. With-

out strong institutional holds on choice, individuals are likely to err on the side of generosity or, at least, civility. In contrast, relations governed by utilitarian principles are not so constrained, and they, thereby, produce highly inflated and artificial inequalities. To further elaborate, I discuss aspects of economic globalization and its correlate, global communications, and then review evidence for

increasingly decentralized political processes, and I argue that racism might be compared with post-national and ethno-national formations. Finally, I return to

how emerging codependence and diversity go against the tide of economic

homogenization.

Economic Globalization

Globalization

The penetration of market capitalism and commodified products into virtually

every community in the world has transformed daily practices, social relation-

ships, and people's consciousness in ways that we do not quite understand.

While capitalism is not new, transforming Europe and regions that had been

colonized over a period of several centuries, its global reach and societal depth was made possible by the collapse of the world order in the late 1980s. Foreign

ownership, intense commodification, and staggering financial debts are part of

Bringing in Codependence

61

the price incurred by developing nations. One cost to nations with competitive

economies ± notably the United States, but also Canada, the UK, and other

European countries ± has been a retrenchment in welfare and social services,

increasing privatization of public goods, and the concentration of wealth.

Another cost is the great and growing obligations that rich nations have to

poor nations, incurred as the consequences of military incursions, social engin-

eering, environmental degradation, and other forms of exploitation.

Global capitalism, or hyper-capitalism, has accelerating adverse effects on

poor nations because both the rules and scope of capital circulation and invest-

ment have changed over the past decades. The flow of raw capital is virtually

unregulated; unfixed currencies introduced high instabilities for nations that are import dependent; and trade liberalization after the 1980s eliminated many

export subsidies. This has led to deepening poverty, soaring rates of unemploy-

ment, and widespread capital flight. It also has created increasing economic

inequalities within and between nations. Galbraith (1999) examines the period

of 1972±95, and finds that global economic inequalities increased steadily from

1972 to 1989, and then dramatically so between 1989 and 1995, particularly in

Korea, China, Africa, the Middle East, Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin

America. What is responsible for `èconomic havoc,'' he concludes, is ``weak

government, deregulation, privatization, and free global flows of capital'' (p.

186). The dilemma for individual nations is that policies to protect the integrity of civil society by reducing poverty ± fiscal discipline, tough regulations, and social benefits ± frighten away foreign investors.

Neither have populations in industrialized nations especially benefited during

the past decades of global expansion. In the USA, for example, over the past

three decades, real earnings have declined and the distribution of income has

become more unequal. In a close examination of possible reasons for increasing

economic inequalities in the USA, Morris and Western (1999) report that the

following play a role: the growth of low-paying service-sector jobs and stagna-

tion in other sectors; a growing gap between the earnings of college graduates

and those without a college degree; and the decline of union strength. They find little evidence that immigration and the changing demographic characteristics of the labor market play much of a role in contributing to economic inequalities.

Similarly, in their analysis of developed nations, Gustafsson and Johansson

(1999) find that inequalities have increased over recent decades, but this increase is less in countries with high union strength, and in those in which social welfare programs continue to be relatively strong.

It is useful to put this into a somewhat longer historical perspective, and

although I refer particularly to the USA here, there are close parallels in other Western nations. Between 1945 and 1973 there was a growth in productivity

and wages, and, in general terms, the well-being of adults and children improved quite dramatically, and the very poor were partially buffered by social welfare

and health care plans. However, the growth of real family income had begun to

fall by the early 1970s. The overall trend since then has been a decline in real earnings, a concentration of wealth, growing racial economic inequalities, and

an increase in poverty rates of single-women with children (Bernstein and Adler, 62

Judith R. Blau

1994; Wilson, 1996; Plotnick et al., 1998). To give one specific example, the

percentage of children who live in poverty increased from 1960 to 1997, and

now stands at over 20 percent (Hernandez, 1995, p. 289; Cornia and Danziger,

1997). To give a contrasting example, the richest person in America has a net

worth of $100 billion, which is equal to the combined wealth of the bottom 40

percent of the American population (Thurow, 1999).

Another aspect of globalization has been the growth of already large firms and

their growing prominence in global production (Harrison, 1994). A central

feature of these firms is their ability to downsize, namely to eliminate workers and to replace bureaucratic hierarchies with networked coordination. While in

the conventional view, market uncertainty is best dealt with by hierarchical

bureaucratic structures, in which transaction costs associated with market

exchanges are internalized (Williamson, 1975), global firms now operate in

quite different ways. They are not hierarchical, entrepreneurial, or purely com-

petitive in nature, but instead are knit together through networks (Powell, 1990; see Knoke, chapter 23 in this volume), increasingly possible owing to international communications, flexible production, and just-in-time technologies.

Headquartered in a place with maximum tax shelters, firms use cherry picking

strategies to decide where to locate their various production operations.

The picture that is emerging of the world's labor market is that it is organized in terms of four segments: (a) a transnational capitalist elite (Reich, 1991), or what Barnet and Cavanagh (1996) called thè`casino masters''; (b) local markets

that respond to competitive pressures and are increasingly based on services; (c) public sector employees; and, (d) a marginal labor market that includes informal economies, the self-employed, and low-wage workers.

Globalization

Globalization and Knowledge

Thus, it appears that there is more than a grain of empirical truth in Marx's

prediction that capitalists would fatten themselves off the resources of the globe, while governments would initially wink, then wither away. In this section and

the next, I develop arguments that suggest that there are countervailing forces

that stem the effects of capitalist expansion. I briefly indicate that an important one is the phenomenal growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that

work with communities on local projects. In this way, schools and clinics are

built ± village . . . by village . . . by village. NGOs tend to favor community

empowerment over the classic ``top down'' development model, and when com-

munities are empowered to come up with their own approaches, there are

positive externalities and multiplier effects. That is, successful communities

pass on leadership, know how, and strategies for other communities.

One of the most notable changes in the past decades is the increase in literacy, school enrollments, and access to information. UNESCO (1998) reports fairly

dramatic gains in school enrollments since 1970. However, adult illiteracy rates in many nations are alarming high ± over 60 percent in Benin, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone,

Bringing in Codependence

63

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. Yet many of these countries with

high adult illiteracy also have high school enrollment rates, so that the next

generation will have higher levels of skills and resources. But an important

caveat is that overall favorable rates of school enrollments often disguise

huge gender gaps between boys and girls, sometimes close to double, in favor

of boys.

Dramatically different motives drive educational expansion. Writing as the

Chair of UNESCO's International Commission on Education for the Twenty-