The Battle of Britain (3 page)

Fighter control was handicapped by poor radio equipment. Aircraft sets needed frequent retuning in the air. Their air-to-ground range was 93 miles (150km) at heights above 3,280ft (1,000m), and air-to-air 31 miles (50km)

This small Regular air force and inchoate Reserve, with its scanty supply of modern fighters and enduring hard living conditions, nevertheless entered the war with high morale.

The entire nation felt secure behind the Maginot Line, the most impressive fortification ever built, consisting of three lines of reinforced concrete outposts, blockhouses and forts with underground arsenals, living quarters and hospitals. Defended by enormous artillery pieces and tens of thousands of infantry, it stretched along the German frontier from Belgium to Switzerland. The French believed it was impregnable.

The first units of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), under the command of Field Marshal Lord Gort, began to land in France on September 10, 1939, Two RAF formations had preceded them. The Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) was commanded by Air Vice Marshal P. H. L. Playfair, CB, CVO, MC, who had joined the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 from the Royal Artillery and won his Military Cross in France during World War I. His headquarters was near Reims, around which his squadrons were based. Their task was to work with the French
Army along the German frontier. The Air Component of the BEF, under Air Vice Marshal C. H. B. Blount, CB, OBE, MC, with his headquarters near Arras, was based in the Pas de Calais. Its function was to operate with the BEF, which went into the line along the Belgian frontier, and to patrol Channel convoys. Blount, who transferred from the Surreys to the RFC in 1913, had also won his gallantry decoration in the Great War, when commanding No. 34 Squadron in France and Italy.

The Advanced Air Striking Force consisted of 10 bomber and two fighter squadrons. Nos. 12, 15, 40, 88, 103, 105, 142, 150, 218 and 226 flew the Fairey Battle. This was an obsolescent three-seater type with a single 1,030hp Rolls-Royce Merlin engine and armed with one fixed .303in Browning gun forward and one .303in Vickers K aft. Its maximum speed was 241 mph (388km/h) at 13,000ft (3,960m) and its ceiling 23,500ft (7,160m). The bombload was 1,000lb (453kg). Nos. 85 and 87 had Hurricanes, whose specification is given elsewhere. The Battles landed in France on September 1 and the Hurricanes on the 7th.

The Air Component, whose records were almost totally destroyed during the hasty retreat of the British forces in June 1940, comprised the following: Four corps squadrons, whose function was army cooperation: Nos. 2, 4, 13 and 26, flying Lysanders. These were two-seater, single-engined, high-wing monoplanes with 890hp Bristol Mercury XII engines and armed with two fixed .303in Brownings firing forward and one .303in Vickers or Lewis in the rear cockpit firing aft; maximum speed 219mph (352km/h) at 10,000ft (3,050m); ceiling 26,000ft (7,925m).

Four army squadrons. Nos. 18, 53, 57, 59, flying Blenheims, whose specification is given elsewhere.

Six fighter squadrons. Those equipped with Hurricanes were Nos. 1, 17, 85 and 87. Those with Gladiators were 607 (County of Durham) and 615 (County of Surrey), both of the Auxiliary Air Force.

None of the 12 airfields designated for the Air Component was in the area allotted to the British Army, which was supposed to supply them with rations, tents, fuel, pay, works, postal service, furniture, billets, etc. The French Army proved helpful and supplied rations, wine and petrol. All these airfields were covered in clover, not grass, and would become soggy and non-operational in wet weather. None had hangars or had been provided with any other resources. The RAF did not know this before-hand, because Britain had made a gentlemen's agreement with France not to do any intelligence studies there.

The British Army came to the rescue of the Air Component in the person of an officer on Gort's staff. He was Brigadier Appleyard of the Territorial Army, who was chief engineer of a major road-construction company and undertook to provide 20 proper airfields by the spring. He returned to England and visited the managing directors of his own employers and four other leading road contractors. With their wholehearted cooperation he raised five companies for the Royal Engineers, each bearing the name of the firm that it represented and by which it was provided with all the necessary equipment needed for earth moving, road construction and the building of accommodation. Having been vested with virtual omnipotence in achieving his objective, he obtained commissions in the rank of major for company directors and captain for managers. Foremen became instant sergeants and charge hands were enlisted as corporals. Uniforms were supplied immediately. Swiftly they were in France, putting up huts for themselves and sowing grass seed on the ploughland that had been selected for conversion (it is appropriate to confirm here that by the spring they had indeed rolled the new grass and laid down concrete runways on nearly all their 20 sites.)

The war began with a period of comparative inactivity that was, in comparison with the eventual Blitzkrieg that came in 1940, retrospectively known as the Sitzkrieg. The French refer to it as
La Drôle de Guerre
– The Joke War. The Allied land and air forces stagnated. Their armies patrolled in front of the Maginot Line and fought occasional skirmishes. Their air forces were forbidden to bomb Germany for fear of reprisals. The Luftwaffe was under the same restrictions over Britain and France. The BEF's artillery did gunnery practice for which the Air Component's Lysanders spotted as they used to on Salisbury Plain. They also did some close reconnaissance and photography. The Blenheims were interestingly employed on photographic reconnaissance over Germany.

The only sector of the Franco-German frontier across which the Allies or the Germans could attack was the 90 miles (146km) between the Rhine and the Moselle. Well within her own territory, Germany had built strong defences, the Siegfried Line or West Wall. The Blenheims photographed the whole of it, as well as more distant objectives. Nos. 1 and 73 Squadrons filled their time with convoy patrols and the normal practice flying.

The RAF squadrons based at home had meanwhile been more active than those in France. On the night of September 3, Whitley bombers flew the first of many leaflet raids – codenamed Nickel – and dropped six
million copies of an exhortation to Germany to abandon the war. Not only was the penalty for reading them severe, which ensured that few would be picked up, but also this was psychologically an absurd time at which to spread propaganda. German morale was at its height with the invasion of Poland going so much in Germany's favour. The time to spread propaganda is when one has the upper hand and the enemy's resolve is wilting. Casualties among the crews who flew these sorties were, like those of the crews who carried bombs across the North Sea or made daylight sorties in Battles and Blenheims from France, particularly sad in their wastefulness. All three activities were futile. At Air Ministry and in Bomber Command HQ was a theory that casualties on leaflet raids could have been heavier, because the enemy hesitated to betray the siting of his flak and searchlights when he knew that neither bombing nor photography was their purpose. This was not shared by the men who actually did the job. What was true was that the elementary radar was of scant help in controlling night fighters which were therefore less lethal than they might have been.

On September 1 President Roosevelt of the USA had appealed to the German and Polish Governments to limit bombing to legitimate military objectives. On the same date Hitler said in the Reichstag: ‘I will not war against women and children. I have ordered my air force to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives.' On that very day, the Luftwaffe bombed 60 towns and villages in Poland. On September 3 Hitler replied to Roosevelt: ‘It is a precept of humanity in all circumstances to avoid bombing non-military objectives, which corresponds entirely with my own attitude and has always been advocated by me.' On September 13 he attempted to justify his savage bombing of Polish civilians by claiming that it was legitimate because the Polish Government had incited its citizens to fight the Germans as
franc-tireurs
.

Although bombing the German mainland was forbidden and German bombers were under orders not to attack mainland Britain or France, shipping in port was a permitted target. Flying Officer A. MacPherson of No. 139 (Blenheim) Squadron flew a reconnaissance off Wilhelmshaven on September 3 but his wireless report was too distorted by atmospherics to read. On September 4 he took off again at 0835hrs to repeat the sortie. Despite low cloud and rain squalls he obtained photographs of ships in Brunsbüttel, Wilhelmshaven and the Schilling Roads, including the pocket battleship
Admiral Scheer
and training cruiser
Emden
. Once more
his message was unreadable. After he reported verbally on landing, 15 Blenheims of Nos. 109, 110 and 139 Squadrons set out to bomb Wilhelmshaven and 14 Wellingtons from Nos. 9 and 149 Squadrons to bomb two battleships in Brunsbüttel.

With cloud base at 500ft (150m), only three Blenheims of 110 were able to attack. One hit the
Admiral Scheer
but the 500lb (227kg) bombs were too light for the task and the 11-second fuse did not detonate it until after the bomb had bounced off the warship's deck. Another Blenheim crashed on the
Emden
, fatally for the crew. Only one Blenheim of No. 107 Squadron returned and there is no record of any hits. No. 139 Squadron could not find its target in the adverse weather and returned unscathed without having bombed anything. None of the Wellingtons claimed hits. Most failed to find the target or turned back early because of bad weather. Two did not return. All aircraft met accurate and heavy flak and the Wellingtons were attacked by Bf 109s.

On September 29, 12 Hampdens of Nos. 61 and 144 Squadrons took off for Heligoland and the Frisian Islands. One turned back. Six saw two destroyers, which three attacked unsuccessfully and three could not get in position to attack. Five were attacked by Bf 109s and all were shot down.

These heavy losses did not shake the sacred Bomber Command axiom that a section of three bombers in close formation in broad daylight had the combined defensive fire power to drive off any number of heavily armed attacking fighters.

In France, by mid-September two Blenheim squadrons, Nos. 114 and 139, had joined the AASF. From the outset both the Allies and Gemany had been making several daily photo reconnaissance sorties. While the Germans evaded anti-aircraft fire and fighters, the Battles and Blenheims constantly suffered casualties from both. Flak over Germany was heavy and accurate. The information gained was not worth the loss of one or two Blenheims day by day, so daylight sorties stopped and night reconaissaissance began. Taking off by the light of six blue glim lamps at 200-yard (183m) intervals was inherently hazardous. Over Germany not only were German searchlight crews highly efficient but, in order to take photographs, flares were used which attracted flak and night fighters. Heavy losses continued.

It was No. 1 Squadron that scored the first British success, on October 30, a sunny day with no low cloud. Flying Officer P. W. ‘Boy' Mould, who had joined as a Halton apprentice in 1934 and been selected for Cranwell
in 1937, had barely refuelled after a patrol when a Dornier 17 flew high over the airfield. He took off without awaiting orders, caught up with the Dornier at 18,000ft (5,485m) and attacked from astern. It caught fire and spun vertically until it crashed into the ground.

On October 31 a member of 73 Squadron who was destined to become the best-known pilot in the Battle of France destroyed his first enemy aircraft, Flying Officer Edgar James Kain, known as Cobber, was a New Zealander who had come to England in 1936 to join the RAF. He gave an acrobatic display at the Empire Air Day show in 1938.

On patrol in a Hurricane he saw anti-aircraft shells bursting and headed towards them. At 27,000ft (8,230m) he intercepted a Do 17 and fired at it. Its port engine began to smoke and its rear gunner returned his fire while its pilot took evasive action. Kain gave the Dornier a long burst with the remainder of his 14.8 seconds'-worth of ammunition and it fell into a vertical dive. His Hurricane could not keep up with it and he pulled out at 400mph (643km/h). The Dornier crashed in a village street. This combat set an altitude record for air fighting. On November 23 Kain shot down another Do 17.

On November 7 Germany's assault on the Low Countries was postponed on account of the weather. It was put off 13 times more and the last definite date Hitler chose was January 16, 1940.

The best day of 1939 for the RAF fighters was November 23, when several enemy aircraft were plotted on the map in the Operations Rooms of Nos. 1 and 73 Squadrons, and Hurricanes were scrambled. Sqn Ldr ‘Bull' Halahan and Flying Officer ‘Hilly' Brown, a Canadian, intercepted a Do 17 and shot it down in flames. A section led by Flt Lt ‘Johnny' Walker caught an He 111, which they set on fire. While it was going down out of control a formation of Moranes came dashing in, one of which collided with Sgt ‘Darky' Clowes's Hurricane and tore off an elevator and half the rudder. The French pilot's aeroplane was even more badly damaged and he baled out. Clowes landed at 120mph (193km/h), overshot and nosed in, but was unhurt. Another section of No. 1 Squadron, led by Flt Lt ‘Pussy' Palmer, attacked a Do 17, set it alight and saw the rear gunner and navigator bale out. Palmer flew alongside to ensure that the pilot was dead. He found out that the German was not when the bomber swerved onto his tail and riddled his Hurricane with 43 bullets. His engine stopped with coolant smoke issuing from it but he made a force-landing, while FO Kilmartin and Soper resumed
shooting at the Dornier, which in turn force-landed with both engines on fire. The German pilot waved at them as they circled the wreckage. No. 73 Squadron destroyed three Do 17s, one of which fell to Cobber Kain.

The first Czech pilots arrived in France after long circuitous journeys and were distributed among the Morane groupes. They were soon followed by Poles, who were given their own groupe, No 1/45, under the command of Major Kepinski and equipped with Moranes.