The Battle of Britain (2 page)

A
t 0445hrs on September 1, 1939, the first shots of World War II were fired when the Luftwaffe attacked Poland. An hour later German ground forces crossed the Polish frontier. A new style of warfare devised by Germany had been unleashed:
der Blitzkrieg
, the lightning war, synchronising simultaneous massive assaults by dive bombers and tanks.

Why was the German invasion of Poland of consequence to France and Britain? Because on April 1, 1939, Britain and France had guaranteed to defend Poland against any threat by Germany.

On August 24, 1939, Germany had signed a non-aggression pact with Russia. The British General Staff was sceptical about this, knowing that Nazism was the avowed enemy of Communism and expecting Hitler to turn on his new ally as soon as he felt strong enough. The British made two appreciations of the situation. One was that, as Hitler had no strategic need to enter Poland, he would, faced with the certainty of British and French intervention, attack the Ukraine as a first step towards the conquest of Russia. The other was that Hitler would take on Poland, France and Britain, that the first two would quickly succumb, that Britain was his main objective and he would immediately order the Luftwaffe to obliterate London and its docks, then send his Army to invade England.

In fact, Hitler did not expect to have to fight the British at all. Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had been Ambassador in London before becoming Foreign Minister in 1938, had constantly assured him that the British were effete and would not go to war. Hitler himself thought that Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, had made an empty promise to Poland merely to frighten Germany. The British Government had been pusillanimous and appeasing throughout Hitler's time as Chancellor and dictator. He had easily deceived Chamberlain at their meetings in Munich in September 1938. All this made him certain that once again the British Cabinet would prove too cowardly to face war with Germany.

Immediately on the invasion of Poland, the British and French Governments demanded German withdrawal. Hitler ignored them. The next day there were frantic talks in Paris and London. As usual, Chamberlain and his Ministers took a passive line. The French Government showed no more courage or sense of honour than the British. But the British Parliament felt differently and prevailed on the Government to give Germany an ultimatum. France followed suit. At 1100hrs on September 3, 1939, Britain declared war, and France did so at 1700hrs. Thus, while the Germans were conquering Poland, a British Expeditionary Force and units of the RAF were establishing themselves in France.

In anticipating the German conquest of Poland, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, to whom Hitler had given responsibility for the campaign, summarised his objective as ‘To anticipate an orderly mobilisation and concentration of the Polish Army and to destroy the main bulk of it west of the Vistula-Narev line by concentric attacks from Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia'. The plan was intended to squeeze most of the Army in a pincer-grip and prevent it from escaping over the Vistula. This meant that the Luftwaffe must first establish air superiority. On a vast scale, never attempted before, bombers would disrupt road and rail traffic deep in Poland; and, the more significant tactic, bombers and fighters would maintain constant bombing and strafing of ground troops.

The latter is invariably described as a total innovation. It was nothing of the sort. Britain's Royal Flying Corps introduced it on the Somme in 1916 with terrifying effect described by a German infantryman, who wrote home: ‘One can hardly calculate how much additional loss of life
and strain on the nerves this cost us.' By 1918 it was standard practice on both sides, for which purpose-designed aircraft were built. What the Germans did do, with their traditional thoroughness, was to develop air-to-ground attack to its ultimate potential.

The resolution of these and all the other associated problems, by preliminary theory and by practical experience in Poland, was the rehearsal for what was to follow eight months later in Belgium, Holland and France; and would have been inflicted on the British if RAF Fighter Command had not won the Battle of Britain. The first purpose, to destroy the Polish Air Force, if possible on the ground, also foreshadowed Goering's design in July, August, September and October 1940.

The Polish General Staff was old-fashioned, the Army was inadequately equipped and poorly deployed to defend the 1,750 miles (2,815km) of frontier adjoining East Prussia and Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia. No defences had been built, the armoured force was small, and the cavalry was the Army's pride. The Poles, with their traditional dash, relied on the efficacy of counter-attacks. When the German tanks rolled across the Polish plains they were met by cavalry charges.

The Germans sent in two Army Groups: one comprising the Third and Fourth Armies, the other the Eighth, Tenth and Fourteenth.

The Luftwaffe Order of Battle for this campaign numbered 648 bombers, 219 dive bombers, 210 single- and twin-engine fighters, 30 ground attack aircraft and 474 reconnaissance and transport types.

The Polish Air Force was organised in regiments, wings and squadrons. The strength on September 1, 1939, was 159 PZL P7 and PZL P11 single-seat fighters, all three to seven years old, 154 PZL 37 and PZL 23B bombers and light bomber/recce aircraft capable of offensive operations, and 84 observation aircraft.

German intelligence mistakenly estimated the Polish Air Force frontline strength as more than 900, including 150 bombers, 315 fighters, 325 reconnaissance, 100 liaison and 50 naval aircraft.

The Polish combat aircraft were nowhere near as capable as those of the Luftwaffe. From the Luftwaffe strength given above and the specification of its aircraft given in a later chapter, it is clear that the Polish Air Force was at a huge disadvantage in numbers and in aircraft performance and armament.

The Polish War Plan and General Directive for Air Operations, issued on July 28, 1939, laid down that fighter squadrons were to be used as an
integral part of the Armies, with the exception of the Pursuit Brigade, consisting of five squadrons, which was to be under the control of the Supreme Commander of the Polish Forces. The tasks for the Army fighter squadrons (known as the Army Air Force) were: interception of enemy aircraft over the Army sector, air cover of Polish aircraft operating over the Army sector, and in critical situations, air attacks on enemy ground forces. The task of the Pursuit Brigade was air defence of the country.

The eight squadrons operating with the four Armies covered large sectors but had no radio, and therefore no co-operation with, or information from, the ground when airborne. Enemy activity was so intense, however, that most take-offs were followed by combat. The rapid advance of the German Army and the Luftwaffe's attacks on airfields necessitated frequent changes of base. Heavy losses of aircrew and aircraft were suffered on the ground and in the air.

After 12 days the Army Air Force ceased to operate effectively and was withdrawn to join the remnants of the Pursuit Brigade. There was one exception: the Poznan Army Wing, commanded by Major M. Mumler, fought until September 16, 1939. It shot down 31 enemy aircraft, lost two pilots killed, four wounded and six missing, and lost all but one of its aircraft. This last, flown by the commanding officer, landed in Romania on September 18 – all that remained of an initial strength of 22.

The Pursuit Brigade was based on airfields near Warsaw to defend the capital and its environs. Eight radio stations provided a means of communication and control, although the radio range was only 9 to 12 miles (15 to 20km). The Warsaw surveillance centre provided information on the enemy. On September 7 the Brigade, with 16 serviceable aircraft, was moved to the Lublin area, to be joined later by the surviving pilots and aircraft of the Army squadrons. The combined fighter force, short of fuel and deprived of adequate communication, shot down only five enemy aircraft between September 7 and 17, after which the Polish Air Force ceased to operate. The Polish Army fought on until October 3.

It is customary to dismiss the performance of the Polish Air Force with the statement that it was wiped out on the ground before it could put up a fight. As the foregoing proves, this is wildly inaccurate and a calumny on brave men who died disproving it, and on those who survived to fight on in the RAF.

The Luftwaffe suffered 285 aircraft destroyed and 279 severely damaged; 189 Luftwaffe aircrew were killed, 224 missing and 126 wounded.

Out of 435 aircraft engaged, the Polish Air Force lost 327 from all causes, of which 264 were by direct enemy action, destroyed in combat or on the ground; at least 33 were shot down by their own anti-aircraft gun fire and 116 escaped to Romania. Aircrew killed and missing numbered at least 234.

The experience of 18 days' hard air fighting contributed nothing to help the RAF in the Battle of Britain. The German aircraft destroyed and aircrew killed or disabled were more than replaced by then. The disparity between the quality and quantity of the Polish and British fighters was obvious: the Polish PZL P7s and P11s had been at a crippling disadvantage, but if Germany had attacked Britain then, Hurricanes and Spitfires would have mauled the Luftwaffe.

Although scores of Polish fighter pilots managed to reach France and Britain and were interrogated by French and British intelligence officers, no conclusions were drawn from the fact that the Luftwaffe fighter formation based on loose pairs was obviously more effective than the conventional threes of the Polish and French Air Forces, and the RAF. Nothing was deduced about how defending fighters should deal with formations of 50 to 100 bombers accompanied by an equally large fighter escort, or the best technique for shooting down dive bombers.

The Luftwaffe, on the contrary, benefited from a tremendous boost to its morale, the satisfaction of knowing that it had made devastatingly effective use of what it had learned in the Spanish Civil War, and the combat knowledge gained by its pilots and crews.

At the time of France's declaration of war against Germany, her air force was poorly equipped to conduct either a defensive or an offensive campaign. Despite the warnings of General Vuillemin, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and Captain Stehlin, the Air Attaché in Berlin, the French High Command had refused in the 1930s to recognise Germany's aerial rearmament. No pressure was put on indigenous aircraft manufacturers to design and build fighters or bombers that would meet realistic modern requirements. Little air-to-air firing was done; gunnery training was almost totally limited to camera gun practice. Fighter pilots were trained to make beam attacks ending with a full deflection firing pass at 820ft (250m). These were to prove mostly abortive against the Luftwaffe because the French aircraft lacked sufficient performance.

The total fighter strength of aircraft considered to have a performance capable of taking on the Messerschmitt 109 was 250 Morane 405/406 and 120 Curtiss H75 (US-supplied Curtiss P-36). The bomber and reconnaissance strength consisted of 120 Bloch 151/152, 85 Potez 630 and 205 Potez 631.

Regular officer pilots were trained at l'Ecole de l'Air and NCOs at l'Ecole d'Istres. Pilots and observers on the Reserve were trained during their compulsory military service. Pilot candidates aged 18 could, on passing an examination, be trained initially as civilians at a civil flying school. They would then sign on for three years and complete their training at Istres, after which they joined a squadron. At the end of the contract period they were put on the Reserve, in which there were two classes. Class A reservists were assigned to a squadron, with which they did about 10 hours' flying a year. Class B did no continuation flying and were sent on a refresher course in the event of mobilisation.

The Organisation of France's Air Force, l'Armée de l'Air, in 1939 was: groupements comprising several groupes; escadres comprising two groupes (until May 1939, when some were increased to three); groupes comprising two escadrilles (squadrons); escadrilles comprising three patronilles (patrols) of three aircraft in each.

In addition, there was one unit similar to a British Auxiliary Air Force squadron: l'Escadrille de Paris, based at Villacoublay.

The normal aircraft establishment for a groupe was 25, but for those flying the Curtiss it was 30. The pilot establishment for all groupes was 30.

On August 28, 1939, fighters were based as follows: at Etampes: 1st Escadre, comprising two groupes of obsolescent Dewoitine 510; Escadrille 1/13, night fighter, equipped with Potez 631. At Chartres: 2nd Escadre, three groupes of Morane 406; 6th Escadre, two groupes of Morane 406. At Dijon: 3rd Escadre, three groupes of Morane 406; 7th Escadre, two groupes of Morane 406. At Reims: 4th Escadre, two groupes of Curtiss H75; 5th Escadre, two groupes of Curtiss H75; Escadrille 2/13, night fighter equipped with Potez 631. At Marignane: 8th Escadre, comprising two groupes, one with Dewoitine 510, the other with Potez 631.

By August 1939, these were dispersed on active service aerodromes that were mostly bare fields among woods or forests far from a town. The aircraft were kept in the open air. The pilots were often billeted with civilians if a village were near enough. The ground troops lived in barns and slept on straw.

The standard fighter formation was three aircraft, with the leader in the centre and his wing men laterally separated by 220 yards (200m) from him, one 55 yards (50m) below him, the up-sun aircraft taking the higher position.

The control and reporting system was, by British standards, ramshackle. Warning of hostile aircraft was based on the Système de Guet, the Look-Out System, similar to the Observer Corps in Britain but less reliably served by the telephone lines on which it depended. This was weakly supported by a radio method of detection,
détection électromagnétique
or D.E.M., consisting of a chain of alternate transmitters and receivers. These gave a rough plan position of aircraft by observations on the bearing produced between the direct wave from the transmitter to the receiver and the reflected wave from the aircraft. It had a range of approximately 50km and did not give satisfactory results on more than one aircraft.