The 900 Days (93 page)

What were the chargés in the Leningrad Affair? They may be deduced from the nature of the suppressions. The chargés turned the heroism of Leningrad inside out, presenting tht Council for the Defense of Leningrad as part of a plot to deliver the city to the Germans. The Leningrad leadership was chargéd with planning to blow up the city and scuttle the Baltic Fleet. Treachery was alleged at many levels. In some way even the valiant stand of the Izhorsk workers at Kolpino became involved. It may have been contended that Zhdanov and the Leningrad group deliberately sought to involve Russia in war, hoping to procure her defeat and to set up a new non-Communist regime with the aid of the Nazis. At the end of the war, the conspirators were alleged to have taken steps looking to the seizure of power, the transfer of the capital from Moscow to Leningrad and the setting up of a new regime with the aid of foreign powers, specifically, in all probability, with British assistance.
¹¹

The fact that there was not one word of truth in the bizarre allegations made no difference. The chargés were used to exterminate all Zhdanov’s lieutenants and thousands of minor officials. They were shot or sent to prison camps.

Nothing in the chamber of Stalin’s horrors equaled the Leningrad blockade and its epilogue, the Leningrad Affair. The blockade may have cost the lives of a million and a half people. The “affair” destroyed thousands of people who survived the most terrible days any modern city had ever known.

A quarter of a century later the great city on the Neva had not recovered from the wounds of war. The scars, physical and spiritual, could still be found. The deadly sequence of Stalinist events, beginning with the murder of Kirov, December i, 1934, through the savage purges of the 1930’s, the outbreak of war, the nine hundred days, the Leningrad Affair, left a mark nothing could erase. The dreams of a new gateway to Europe were not realized. Leningrad was the last great Russian city to be restored after World War II, far behind Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk and, of course, Stalingrad.

The passage of time did not diminish the political struggle over the Leningrad events. A volume of Leningrad memoirs, including some reminiscences originally set down in wartime and the years before 1948, was turned over to the printer in the summer of 1965. It was not cleared by the censorship for three years and when it finally reached the bookstores late in 1968 bore painful evidences of omission, revision and occasional falsification.
¹²
The time had not yet come when the people of Leningrad could freely tell their story in Russia.

But one thing was finally achieved. The blue and white signs reappeared on the Nevsky Prospekt in 1957. Once again the pedestrian was warned: “Citizens: In case of shelling this side of the street is the most dangerous.” The signs are carefully touched up each spring. The Leningraders are very fond of them, very fond of their memories. They have etched on the wall beside the eternal flame at Piskarevsky the words of Olga Berggolts:

Stalin is dead. So are Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, Popkov, Govorov. So are Akhmatova, Zoshchenko, Shvarts, Chukovsky. A new generation has been born which does not know the names of Malenkov, Kulik, Mekhlis.

But the memory of the nine hundred days will always live.

¹
In 1946 the exhibition was transformed into a permanent Museum of the Defense of Leningrad under Director Major L. Rakov. Here were collected thousands of personal archives and trophies of the blockade—pictures, maps, models, photographs, panoramas outlining each stage of the siege, letters, diaries, personal materials on the commanders, the ordinary civilians, the soldiers and the political leaders who participated in the epic. One painting depicted the Izhorsk workers halting German tanks almost singlehanded at Kolpino. There was a list of twenty-two different dishes prepared in the winter of 1941–1942 out of pig skin. More than 150,000 visitors, including Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin, visited the museum in its first three months.

²
The volume presented comparisons of Leningrad with Washington and Paris and said that in planning the new city center of Leningrad the architects had incorporated the best features of the two capitals. The existing Leningrad center (Palace Square) was “far too small” in the opinion of the architects for the new role of the future city. (Baranov
et al., Leningrad
, Leningrad-Moscow, 1943.)

³
Completed in 1950. (Karasev,
Istoriya SSSR
, No. 3, 1961, p. 126.)

⁴
Susloparov had been the Soviet military attaché in Paris at the outbreak of war and had sent many intelligence reports back to Moscow in the spring of 1941 warning of Nazi preparations for attack.

⁵
Zoshchenko was much impressed by the partisans of the Leningrad area. He wrote a cycle of thirty-two stories about their wartime achievements. The first ten were published by
Novy Mir
under the title “Never Let Us Forget.” Their publication was suspended as a result of the Zhdanov attack, and the full cycle was not published until 1962. The topic of partisans was politically extremely sensitive because of behind-the-scenes quarrels between Beria and other Politburo members, including Zhdanov, over the direction of underground activities behind the Nazi lines. This may have been a factor in the suppression of the Zoshchenko stories.
(Istoriya Russkoi Sovetskoi Literatury
, Vol. II, Moscow, 1967, pp. 378–379.)

⁶
Lozovsky vanished almost immediately after offering this opinion. He probably was arrested in late 1948 and was executed August 12, 1952, along with a number of Jewish intellectuals, presumably on the concocted chargé that they were planning to set up a separate Jewish republic in the Crimea and detach it from the Soviet Union. The Crimea had been virtually cleansed of population by Stalin at the end of the war. He deported all the Crimean Tatars to Siberia on grounds that they collaborated with the Nazis. Whether the “affair” in which Lozovsky was caught up was connected with the others put forward in Stalin’s last years, such as the Leningrad Affair and the so-called Doctors’ Plot, is not known.

⁷
The blame actually lay with Stalin himself and with his police chief, Beria. It is probable that Beria and Malenkov persuaded Stalin that the fault lay with Zhdanov.

⁸
The possibility that Zhdanov was poisoned or died of medical malpractice cannot be excluded. This chargé was made in the so-called “Doctors’ Plot” of January 13, 1953. Other supposed victims included his brother-in-law, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, who died in 1945, and General Govorov, the Leningrad commander, who was then still alive. There is reason to believe that in certain other cases where medical “murder” was chargéd by Stalin (specifically in the death of Maxim Gorky and Gorky’s son) the deaths actually were criminally caused, but the instigator was not necessarily the person named in Stalin’s indictment. Thus it cannot be excluded that a combination of Stalin, Malenkov and Beria or all three had a hand in Zhdanov’s death. Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, points out that Zhdanov was known to be suffering from a bad heart condition. However, Stalin’s
chef de cabinet
, Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, confirmed before his death that “we” (presumably meaning Stalin) did in fact employ poison in purges after 1940.

⁹
After Stalin’s death Major Rakov was released from concentration camp and began a new career as a playwright. He collaborated with I. Alem in writing a comedy called
The Most Dangerous Enemy
. (Shtein,
Znamya
, No. 4, April, 1964, p. 68.) Some manuscripts taken from the museum in 1949 were deposited in the archives of the Ministry of Defense, where presumably they repose as classified materials. But many items have never been found. (Karasev,
op. cit
., p. 15.)

¹⁰
Asked why no Soviet historian prior to himself had mentioned the existence of the Leningrad Council of Defense, D. V. Pavlov replied that “very few persons were aware of the facts.” (Pavlov, personal communication, April 30, 1968.)

¹¹
There have long been vague rumors that part of the “plot” involved a project to conduct an international exposition or World Trade Fair at Leningrad.

¹²
The volume contains a self-serving memoir by General Popov, the Leningrad commander at the outbreak of war, in which he obscures the fact that he did not return to Leningrad in time to participate in the initial military decisions. He reveals, however, that a prompt start on fortifications was hindered because no one would take responsibility for the politically sensitive action of mobilizing the civilian population. Only after a “painful” telephone conversation between Zhdanov and Stalin were the necessary orders issued. Popov’s memoir makes clear that the Malenkov-Molotov mission to Leningrad in August-September, 1941, was in direct consequence of Zhdanov’s setting up the ill-fated Council for the Defense of Leningrad (V. M. Kovalchuk, editor,
Oborona Leningrada
, Leningrad, 1968, p. 29).

The best sources for the Leningrad epic are the men and women who lived through the nine hundred days. The author began collecting accounts from the people of Leningrad on his first visit there, a few days after the blockade was lifted, January 27, 1944, when the events were vivid in the minds of all survivors. He has continued to collect them over the years. Especially since the death of Stalin an increasing flow of memoirs and literary treatments of the blockade has been published. The most valuable are those of Olga Berggolts, whose
Dnevnye Zvezdy (Day Stars)
has been heavily drawn upon; Vera Inber, a sensitive diarist; Vsevolod Vishnevsky, an insensitive diarist whose record is nonetheless fascinating; Pavel Luknitsky, a newspaperman and excellent reporter; Valerian Bogdanov-Berezovsky, musicologist, diarist and historian; Aleksei I. Panteleyev, who has an outstanding eye for detail; Vera Ketlinskaya, whose novel
The Blockade
despite Stalinist bowdlerizing presents a revealing picture of the siege; Vissarion Sayanov, a poet who spent the whole blockade in Leningrad; and Vsevolod Kochetov, a blundering, often unreliable newspaper correspondent whose recollections convey more than he is aware. Not all the diarists and writers remained in the Soviet Union. Among those now in the United States whose stories are memorable are Yelena Skryabina, Dmitri Konstan-tinov and Anatoly Darov.

One of the most painstaking accounts of life in Leningrad is that of the Hermitage Museum and its director, Iosif Orbeli, written by S. Varshavsky and B. Rest. These men have dedicated their lives to the Hermitage. They spent the whole siege in Leningrad. No single book conveys more of the suffering and heroism of the time than their
Podvig Ermitazha (Triumph of the Hermitage)
. They, like many other writers, historians and ordinary Leningraders, have been tireless in assisting the author in the collection and verification of facts.

There are five major official works on the Leningrad siege. The first and most important book is that of Dmitri V. Pavlov, who was sent to Leningrad in September, 1941, to handle the city’s food supplies. His book,
Leningrad v Blokade (Leningrad in Blockade)
, published in 1958 and reissued in second and third editions, each containing additional information, is the classic source on the starvation winter. Many details of the Leningrad epic are still to be found only in Pavlov, and every Soviet writer on the subject since 1958 has based his work on Pavlov’s. Almost equally useful is A. V. Kara-sev’s
Leningradtsy v Gody Blokady (Leningraders in the Years of the Blockade)
. Karasev is a painstaking professional historian who has searched the archives tirelessly. Many facts not available to Karasev when he published his book in 1959 are provided in
Na Zashchite Nevskoi Tverdyni (Defending the Neva Bastion)
, a collective work produced under the auspices of the Leningrad Party organization in 1965. A fourth source is a collection of reports, decrees and official documents published under the title of
poo Geroicheskikh Dnei (poo Heroic Days)
in 1967. The fifth major source is
Leningrad v Velikoi Ote-chestvennoi Voine (Leningrad in the Great Fatherland War)
, published in 1967 by the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences as the fifth volume of a
History of Leningrad
.

On the military side there are five basic works:

Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941–1945 {History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945)
, a. six-volume general history of the war, issued in 1961, giving a detailed account of all military operations and an excellent summary of the state of preparedness—and unpreparedness—in 1941 on the eve of war; a shorter one-volume version by the same editors called
Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina Sovetskogo Soyuza (The Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union)
, which, interestingly enough, provides detail on Stalin’s lapses and misevaluation of intelligence on the eve of war not included in the six-volume version;
Bitva Za Leningrad (The Battle for Leningrad)
, a collective work by I. P. Barbashin and others, which is illuminating when collated closely with the Leningrad section of the six-volume general history; a work of the same title,
Bitva Za Leningrad (Battle for Leningrad)
, by V. P. Sviridov and two others, an earlier and inferior history which is useful only for occasional details; and
Borba Za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku V Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine 1941–1945 (The Struggle for the Soviet Baltic in the Great Fatherland War 1941–1945)
, which reveals the disasters which overwhelmed Soviet forces in Leningrad’s Baltic littoral in the first days of the war.

None of these histories is complete, and each seeks to suppress or overemphasize certain aspects of the Leningrad events. But by close comparison the general course of what happened can be established. A far more revealing source is the memoirs of the military participants, particularly those of Colonel (now General) B. V. Bychevsky, Chief of Army Engineers in Leningrad; Admiral V. A. Panteleyev, Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet; Major General Mikhail Dukhanov, Commander of the Sixty-seventh Army; Marshal Kirill A. Meretskov, one of the principal Leningrad commanders; General Ivan I. Fedyuninsky, another Leningrad commander; Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, Naval Commissar. To these should be added the scores of individual memoirs and unit histories which pour in a steady stream from the presses of the Military Publishing House in Moscow.

Where possible, inquiries and questions have been put to individuals who played a role in the Leningrad epic, notably to Dmitri V. Pavlov. Interesting information on the events of June 21–22, 1941, was provided personally by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. The rare bound files of
Leningradskaya Pravda
for 1941–42, preserved in the archives of that newspaper, were examined in the offices
of Leningradskaya Pravda
, but so hastily that only general impressions could be gleaned.

The story of the breaking of the Leningrad blockade in January, 1944, was recounted to the author by many of the commanders who participated on the spot at that time. The plans for Leningrad’s postwar Renaissance were outlined similarly at that time by Mayor Peter S. Popkov, later shot in the so-called Leningrad Affair in 1949, and by the city’s chief architect, N. V. Baranov.

Detail for the description of Leningrad on June 21, 1941, was provided by many Leningrad residents, including S. Varshavsky, Dmitri Konstantinov, Vsevolod Kochetov, Aleksandr Kron, Aleksandr Shtein, Aleksandr Rozen, Olga Berggolts, Ivan Krutikov, Valerian Bogdanov-Berezovsky, Pavel Luknitsky, Olga lordan, Vissarion Sayanov and Vera Ketlinskaya. The account of Orbeli comes from
Podvig Ermitazha
by Varshavsky and B. Rest. The Party plenum at Smolny June 21 is described in
Na Zashchite Nevskoi Tverdyni, Bitva Za Leningrad
(Sviridov
et al
.) and in
V Ognennom Koltse
.

The description of General Kirill A. Meretskov is provided in his own
Nekolebimo, Kak Rossiya
. The story of Yuri Stasov is told in M. Ye. Sonkin,
Eto Bylo Na Baltike
. Other sources: Admiral A. G. Golovko,
Vmeste s Flotom;
M. P. Pavlovskii,
Na Ostro-vakh;
I. I. Fedyuninsky,
Fodnyatye Po Trevoge
. Panteleyev describes Tributs’ activities in
Morskoi Front
. The account of Kuznetsov is drawn from his numerous versions, which often differ in detail.

Naval Commissar Kuznetsov’s description is provided by himself. The story of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, June 21–22, is given by Valentin Berezhkov,
S Diplomaticheskoi Missiyei v Berlin;
I. F. Filippov,
Zapiski o Tretiyem Reikhe;
and Raymond James Sontag,
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941
, p. 353. Maisky’s story is in his memoirs and in a bit more detail in
Novy Mir
, No. 12, December, 1965. The account of the Molotov-Schulen-burg meeting is based on Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer,
The Incompatible Allies
, with detail added from
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941
. General I. V. Tyulenev’s story is drawn from his
Cherez Tri Voiny
. The decision to set up the Moscow fighter command is from M. Gallai,
Novy Mir
, No. 9, September, 1966.

Naval Commissar Kuznetsov and Admiral Panteleyev are the principal sources for this chapter, with detail from V. Achkasov and B. Veiner’s work on the Baltic Fleet. The story of events at Sevastopol comes from I. I. Azarov,
Osazhdennaya Odessa;
Captain N. G. Rybalko,
Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 6, June, 1963; N. P. Vyunenko,
Chernomorskii Flot v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine
. Marshal Voronov describes the
night of June 21–22 in
Na Sluzhbe Voyennoi
. General Tyulenev is the source of Stalin’s skepticism regarding Zhukov’s reports of German bombing.

The description of the military situation in Leningrad is drawn from General B. V.
Bychevsky’s
Gorod-Front
and
Na Zashchite Nevskoi Tverdyni
. Some detail is provided by
Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza
and General Mikhail
Dukhanov,
V Serdtse i v Pamyati
. The description of the Baltic Military District is provided by
Borba Za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku
, with additions from Voronov. The description of General Sobennikov’s Eighth Army comes from
Borba Za Sovetskuyu Pribaltiku
and
Bitva Za Leningrad
(Barbashin
et al.)
. The description of events in the German Embassy in Moscow is based on Hilger, personal accounts by Dr. Gebhardt von Walther, then a secretary of the embassy and in 1967 German Ambassador to Moscow, and
Nazi-Soviet Relations;
that of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, largely from Berezhkov’s published work, amplified in personal correspondence.

The Kremlin military meeting is described by S. A. Kalinin,
Razmyshlyaya o Minuvshem;
M. I. Kazakov,
Nad Kartoi Bylikh Srazhenii;
A. I. Yeremenko,
V Nachale Voiny
(Yeremenko’s version is sharply challenged by V. Ivanov and K. Cheremukhin in
Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 11, November, 1966); and Marshal Ivan Bagramyan,
Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 1, January, 1967. One of the richest sources for data on Soviet intelligence concerning Nazi war preparations is the anonymous article,
“Sovetskiye Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti v Gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny,” Voprosy Istorii
, No. 5, May, 1965. Presumably this article was prepared by a high Soviet intelligence source. Others are: P. A. Zhilin,
Kak Fashistskaya Germaniya Gotovila Napadeniye na Sovetsky Soyuz;
Army General V. Ivanov,
Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 6, June, 1965; Admiral Kuznetsov,
Nakanune;
Marshal A. Grechko,
Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 6, June, 1966; Berezhkov; numerous Soviet works on Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy; A. M. Nekrich,
1941 22 luniya;
Hilger; and
lstoriya Velikoi Otechest-vennoi Voiny SS. 1941–1945
, Vol. I.

Ilya Ehrenburg described his dealings with Stalin in his memoirs and added some details in personal conversation before his death. Zhilin is another source on the Kremlin. Sources on troop transfers include Kazakov, Bagramyan; A. M. Samsonov,
Velikaya Bitva pod Moskvoi
. Analyses of Stalin’s conduct are provided by Nekrich, A. Zonin in
Prosolennye Gody
, and Admiral Kuznetsov. The Malenkov intervention of June 3 is reported in
Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina Sovetskogo Soyuza
, p. 58, and by G. Kravchenko,
Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 4, April, 1965. Maisky and Berezhkov describe the situation in London and Berlin. The Western frontier is described by Aleksandr Rozen in his historical novel,
Posledniye Dve Nedeli;
Bagramyan; L. M. Sandalov,
Trudniye Rubezhi
, and V. A. Grekov,
Bug v Ogne
. The reports on last-minute intelligence come from the
Voprosy Istorii
, May, 1965, study of state intelligence organs;
lstoriya Velikoi Otechestvennii Voiny S.S. 1941–1945
, Vol. I; and Admiral Kuznetsov. The movement of Nazi and Soviet troops to the frontier is assessed by P. Korodinov,
Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 10, October, 1965; and Marshal Sergei Shtemenko in
Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal
, No. 6, June, 1966. The air force incident is reported by A. Yakovlev,
Tsel Zhizni
. Nekrich and Voronov describe Stalin on the eve of war. The rumors of a Russo-German deal were reported by Grigore Gafencu; von Hassell; Filippov; Gerhard L. Weinberg in
Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–41;
Haider; and Angelo Rossi,
The Russo-German Alliance
. Stalin’s suspiciousness and lack of plans are dealt with by Kuznetsov, Voronov, Tyulenev, Bagramyan and Nikita Khrushchev in his so-called “secret speech” of February, 1956, and on other occasions. Stalin’s breakdown is described by Khrushchev, Maisky, Nekrich and others.

Trofimov’s story is contained in A. Dymshits,
Podvig Leningrada;
Glazunov in
Doroga k Tebe;
Gankevich in
Konets Gruppy ‘Nord’;
Skryabina in
V Blokade;
Kanashin,
Poka Stuchit Serdtse;
Krutikov,
V Prifrontovykh Lesakh;
Konstantinov,
Ya Srazhalsya v Krasnoi Armii;
that of the Hermitage in Varshavsky and Rest,
Podvig Ermitazha;
the station scene in Ortenberg,
Na Ognennikh Rubezhakh;
Larin in Sozonkov,
Geroi Zemli Sovetskoi;
Kronstadt in Rudny,
Deistvuyushchii Flot;
Petrova’s story in Konstantinov,
Zhenshchiny Goroda Lenina;
Sayanov in his
Leningradskii Dnevnik;
the story of Lebedev from the account of his wife, Vera Petrovna,
Zvezda
, No. 5, May, 1965; and Kochetov in
Oktyabr
, No. 1, January, 1964.