Strongman (17 page)

I interviewed Saakashvili a year or so later, when his pro-Western policies were already raising hackles in Moscow, and reminded him of his predecessor’s famous phrase about the ‘sun
rising in the north’. Was he not afraid of provoking the Russian bear, I asked? ‘Don’t worry,’ he told me. ‘I also know where the sun rises. We want the best relations
with the West
and
with our great neighbour to the north.’
³

In fact, Saakashvili’s first moves as president were uncannily like Putin’s at the start of his rule. He immediately pushed through constitutional amendments that increased his
presidential powers, while drastically reducing the role of parliament. He replaced regional governors and began to impose state control over television stations.
⁴
In a crackdown on corruption he had former ministers and businessmen arrested, and (unlike in Russia) carried out a radical overhaul of the police which dramatically reduced
bribe-taking. He and his prime minister, Zurab Zhvania, transformed the economy by, among other things, slashing taxes and attracting major foreign investments.

Like Russia, Georgia also faced the threat of separatism. After the country gained independence from the USSR in 1991, the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia both broke away and after brief
civil wars enjoyed
de facto
independence – with Russian support. A third ‘autonomous republic’, Ajaria, did not declare independence but was ruled like a personal fiefdom
by its autocratic president, Aslan Abashidze. Regaining control over Georgia’s lost provinces was as much of an obsession for Saakashvili as retaking Chechnya was for Putin. On the eve of his
inauguration as president on 24 January 2004 Saakashvili solemnly swore on the grave of Georgia’s twelfth-century King David the Builder that, ‘Georgia will be united and strong, will
restore its wholeness and become a united, strong state.’

It was that resolve, that determination to reintegrate Georgia’s minority nationalities, that four years later would bring his country to war with Russia.

Saakashvili also flaunted his love affair with the West like a reckless divorcee, thumbing her nose at the bullying ex-husband. The US secretary of state, Colin Powell, was guest of honour at
Saakashvili’s inauguration ceremony. He recalls: ‘We all stood up when the national anthem was played. And when it was over I was about to sit down again when another anthem started up
– it was “Ode to Joy” and the European Union flag was being raised. I thought: oh boy, I bet Igor [Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister] isn’t enjoying this part of the
performance.’
⁵

Igor certainly would not have enjoyed what followed. Saakashvili invited Powell to come with him into the City Hall, which was decorated with dozens of Georgian and American flags, side by side.
‘Then we went into the chamber where the city legislature meets,’ Powell remembers, ‘and we sat behind a table in front of all these people ... and we had a town hall meeting with
the whole population, televised throughout Georgia. Just President Saakashvili and the American secretary of state, while all the other guests and senior people from around the world, including
those from the Russian Federation, were outside wondering what’s going on.’

Saakashvili did have the prudence to head north, not west, though, for his first presidential visit abroad. And remarkably, his trip to Moscow on 10–11 February 2004 was a great success.
Igor Ivanov was present when the two presidents met in the Kremlin, and recalls that – considering the hatred the men would later develop for one another – the mood was very positive:
‘Saakashvili greeted Putin very emotionally, very joyfully, and said that he greatly respected him as a politician and had always dreamed of being like him. He said he would do everything in
his power to develop good relations between our countries, and that the previous leadership of Georgia had made many mistakes which he would try to put right.’

Saakashvili’s own foreign minister, Tedo Japaridze, confirmed that the Georgian president emerged from the meeting almost bewitched by Putin: ‘He came out of it very much excited and
thrilled with that encounter and with the man himself: “He’s a real leader, a resolute and strong man who controls everything – Duma, the mass media and so forth.” These
were his first words when we were driving back to the airport.’
⁶

Saakashvili himself described in an interview what happened when the presidents left their foreign ministers and retreated to a separate room for private talks. Having proposed that they take
off their jackets and ties, Putin apparently launched into a tirade about the subject that worried him most – Georgia falling into the all too warm embrace of the United States. It was not
just American involvement in supporting – or, as the Russians firmly believed, planning – the Rose Revolution that concerned Putin. The US had also had a small military presence in
Georgia for two years. Ironically the American troops had been invited in by the previous president, Shevardnadze, to help him deal with a problem that was spoiling his relations with
Russia
. After Putin had launched the second Chechen war at the end of 1999, thousands of Chechens, including armed militants (and foreign Islamist fighters), had moved over the mountains
from Chechnya into Georgia and settled there in the Pankisi Gorge. Russia claimed the gorge was being used as a terrorist base and threatened to bomb it. Alarmed at the prospect of Russia attacking
Georgia, Washington offered instead to help the Georgians themselves clear terrorists from the Pankisi Gorge by training their armed forces. Launched in May 2002, the Georgia Train and Equip
Programme involved only a couple of hundred American soldiers at first, but it gave the US its first foothold in the Caucasus. Attending Saakashvili’s inauguration two years later, Colin
Powell remarked upon the marching styles on show in the military parade: ‘I was just fascinated to sit there and watch some Georgian troops march by, marching like Soviet troops, the way they
had been trained, and then the next contingent go by marching like American soldiers – 120 steps per minute just the way we teach our soldiers. And I said, times they are a
changing.’

So it was not surprising that Putin’s toughest message for the new Georgian president was to cool it on the American front. According to Saakashvili, Putin stressed on the one
hand that Russia was a friend of America and developing relations with it, but on the other hand claimed that Eastern European countries had become ‘slaves to America’, doing whatever
‘some second secretary’ at the US embassy told them to do. ‘Basically, it was all about America, a 20–25 minute tirade, until I finally politely stopped him and said,
“Look, it’s very good you’re telling me about your relations with America, but I’m not here to talk about America.” I said, “Do you really believe that what
happened in Georgia is an American plot? Do you really believe that our government is paid by Americans, or George Soros or, you know, that we are directed by them?” And he said, “No,
no. Not you for sure. But some people in your government might be in that position, to be closely working with the Americans.” ’
⁷

(In fact, Putin was almost certainly aware that Saakashvili’s senior adviser was an American, Daniel Kunin, who previously worked for the National Democratic Institute and was paid not by
the Georgian government but by the American, through the US Agency for International Development. Kunin was the first port of call for Washington officials trying to contact – and influence
– the Georgian leader.
⁸
)

Saakashvili says he proposed they should start from a clean sheet – that as a small country Georgia would do whatever it could to accommodate Russia’s interests, in exchange for some
understanding of its own, much smaller interests. He says Putin seemed very receptive. ‘Actually I liked him. I cannot blame George Bush for looking into his soul because my first impression
was that I liked him. I thought, well, yeah, he comes from this KGB kind of background, he is very different from what I come from and what I believe in, but this seems to be a pragmatic guy. He
likes his own country, and maybe he would act on behalf of his county in a very pragmatic way and we can find some understanding. And you know, he was basically also trying to show, by the end of
our conversation, that he could go a long way to solving some issues.’

The good rapport led to regular telephone calls and genuine efforts on both sides to mend fences. But it was never going to be easy for Saakashvili to balance his desire for good relations with
Moscow with his two major obsessions – restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia (ending the
de facto
independence of three provinces with close ties to Russia) and tethering his
country to the West’s great alliances, NATO and the European Union.

On 25 February 2004 Saakashvili made his first trip as president to the United States, and immediately raised the issue of Georgian membership of NATO. He announced a new five-year deal under
which US army instructors would train thousands more Georgian troops.

The honeymoon with Moscow lasted until May 2004, when Putin did what he called his ‘last favour’ for Saakashvili. The new Georgian government was close to civil war with the province
of Ajaria – under its maverick Soviet-era leader, Aslan Abashidze. Saakashvili did what his predecessor Shevardnadze had done: he called Putin for help. And once again, Putin dispatched Igor
Ivanov – now no longer foreign minister but secretary of the National Security Council – to the scene. Ivanov flew first to the Ajarian capital, Batumi, planning to negotiate with
Abashidze and then fly on to Tbilisi. But as they had dinner that evening of 5 May, Ivanov recalls, news came of a Georgian armoured column heading for Batumi. Despite his call to the Georgian
prime minister, requesting him to stop the advance, a fierce fire-fight soon broke out, right on the outskirts of the city. ‘It was so intensive we felt the smell of powder in the
palace.’ According to Ivanov, Abashidze told him he had sufficient military power of his own to confront the Georgian troops and force them out of the region, but Ivanov replied: ‘I
have a plane at the airport. If you are prepared to leave with me to Moscow, you are welcome to take this opportunity.’ Abashidze seized the chance of political asylum in Russia, and fled,
taking his son, who was the mayor of Batumi, with him.

Within hours Saakashvili’s troops entered the city, and Ajaria was reclaimed as part of Georgia. The next day, Saakashvili himself made a triumphant appearance in Batumi and addressed a
jubilant crowd in the city square: ‘You are heroic people,’ he told them. ‘You have achieved your Georgia. We have shown the world we are a great people. Only we could have staged
two bloodless revolutions in six months.’ Surrounded by jubilant supporters chanting ‘Misha! Misha!’, he walked to the Black Sea beach – out of bounds to Georgia’s
leaders for many years – and splashed seawater on his face. And he uttered the promise, or threat, that the restoration of central control over Ajaria was only the start of his mission:
‘We must start negotiations, serious and peaceful negotiations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, about reuniting the country and settling problems which are not settled. We have proved in
Ajaria that it is possible to act peacefully but resolutely. This means that Georgia will be strong and we will definitely get to Sukhumi [the capital of Abkhazia]. Exactly when? We shall
see.’

Aware of Moscow’s crucial role in defusing the crisis and getting rid of Abashidze, Saakashvili telephoned Putin to thank him. According to the Georgian, Putin gave a tart reply:
‘OK, Mikheil Mikheilovich, we helped you on this one, but remember very well, there will be no more free gifts offered to you, on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.’ Russia had much deeper
interests in Georgia’s two breakaway territories than in Ajaria. Abkhazia is a republic of some 200,000 people (the figure is disputed) – less than half its pre-1992 population, since
almost all the Georgians fled in the civil war. Its Black Sea coastal towns – Sukhumi, Gagra, Pitsunda – used to be principal holiday resorts for Russians during the Soviet period.
South Ossetia is much smaller – less than 100,000 in Soviet days (roughly two-thirds Ossetian, and one-third Georgian), and only some 70,000 following the civil war of the early 1990s. The
majority Ossetians had close links to their kinsfolk living in North Ossetia (a republic inside the Russian Federation). Both the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians looked to Russia for protection
against the Georgians, and received large subsidies and other support. Since most of them did not have, and did not want to have, Georgian citizenship, Putin introduced a policy of
‘passportisation’ – issuing residents of the two provinces with Russian passports, which then allowed the Kremlin to claim the right to protect its citizens. In both republics
ethnic Russians held important jobs, and in South Ossetia former KGB officers were brought in to staff key government posts.

If Putin’s words about ‘no more favours’ were meant as a warning – and they certainly were – Saakashvili paid little heed. Perhaps he even misunderstood a hint that
Putin is said to have given during their first meeting in the Kremlin, to the effect that he was prepared to do a deal over South Ossetia that would see it restored to Georgian sovereignty. In May,
Giorgi Khaindrava, a film director whom Saakashvili appointed as his conflict resolution minister, saw maps hanging in the deputy security minister’s office showing plans for a military
attack on South Ossetia. As he told the Caucasus expert Thomas de Waal, ‘All the days were mapped out – they wanted to do an exact copy of what they had done in
Ajaria.’
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On 26 May 2004, Georgia’s Independence Day, Saakashvili held a huge military parade in Tbilisi at which he addressed the Abkhaz and
South Ossetians in their own languages, urging reintegration with Georgia. The South Ossetian president, Eduard Kokoity, a onetime wrestler and businessman with strong links to Russia, recalled in
an interview that Saakashvili’s call for reintegration sent an unambiguous message: ‘I want to emphasise that he did it in front of a column of tanks moving down Rustaveli Avenue. It
was not a call but a threat for Ossetians. And everyone in Ossetia regarded this call as a threat.’
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