Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (41 page)

"Peak," "Polo," and "Sachs" are of value because of their official positions
but have not yet made use of their capabilities. While studying them, it is essential to orient the sources toward doing everything they can to strengthen
their positions in the department, especially since "Peak" in the past has already been somewhat compromised as a `Red."50

Early in 1942, Moscow referred to this group as "`Informator's'
[Minton's] group" and listed Silvermaster as one of his agents. But
Moscow Center had decided on taking a different direction. The memo
directed the KGB New York station toward "`gradually deepening our
work with individual members of the group"' and ordered that to "`protect the covert work and eliminate the complexity of the whole system,
the group should be broken down into separate teams."' Golos would become the chief intermediary with Silvermaster's group and, consequently,
Minton was to be

"completely excluded from this group and is switched over for use as a talent
spotter and background checker, while letting him continue to prepare candidates he has identified for contracting. This needs to be done tactfully, with
the explanation made to him that he has done important and valuable work,
but the situation requires a reorganization. In order for this transition not to
be painful for "Informator" [Minton], one or two of "Sound's" [Golos's] connections should be transferred to him, and he should be used to study journalistic circles and acquire new agents. For example, communications with "Cautious" [Julius Joseph] and his wife can be transferred to "Informator" so that
he can further study them."

(The KGB New York station, however, did not shift Joseph and his wife
to Minton. They remained linked to the KGB through Golos via Elizabeth Bentley. )51

Minton did have successes as a talent spotter. Shortly after Maurice
Halperin, a secret Communist, arrived in Washington in 1941 to take a
senior analytic position with the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI; predecessor to the Office of Strategic Services-see below),
he contacted Minton and asked how he could be reconnected to the
CPUSA. Realizing the sensitivity and intelligence potential of Halperin's
position, Minton consulted Golos, and he arranged for Halperin to
meet Bentley and begin a career as one of the KGB's most productive
sources.52

Still, the KGB's decision to remove him as liaison with Silvermaster's
apparatus was reinforced by an August 1942 report that Minton was
"widely known in W [Washington] as a fellowcountlyman [Communist],
works in the open, and is considered the chief mouthpiece of the fellowcountrymen," not a reputation the KGB wanted for a courier to its espionage sources. Additionally, in mid-1943 Golos, the KGB's chief conduit
to the CPUSA, wanted to break his ties with Minton, upset by some unspecified act. In December 1943, Moscow ordered the New York station
to "`deactivate agents without future prospects,"' and specified several,
one of whom was Minton. With that, he disappeared from further mention in Vassiliev's notebooks.53

Along with his wife, the humorist and short-story writer Ruth McKinney, Bruce Minton moved to Hollywood in 1944 to work as a
scriptwriter. Both were expelled from the Communist Party in 1946, accused of a left-wing ideological deviation. They moved to Europe during
the Hollywood blacklist era. He committed suicide in London in 1955.

Even as it exploited a host of journalists with Communist ties to provide
information, entree, and cover, the KGB was anxious to learn what more
mainstream and establishment journalists knew. The most prominent,
and one of its major targets, was Walter Lippmann. One of the doyens of
American establishment journalism, Lippmann had evolved from a preWorld War I young, socialist-leaning intellectual to a consummate insider
and highly respected commentator on the world of Washington and high
government policy. His extensive contacts within the government provided him with copious background information, much of it off-the record and too sensitive to publish, knowing that while it would assist
him to write his opinion columns, it would not appear directly in his newspaper writings. By the early 194os Lippmann was a man of firm liberal
but non-radical views, and while not hostile to the USSR, neither was he
particularly sympathetic. Later in the Cold War he came to urge respect
for a Soviet sphere of influence but on the basis of a calculated realism
rather than any sentimentality about Soviet goals. There was no chance
that the KGB could recruit Walter Lippmann as a source. Nonetheless,
anxious to gain access to the information that came to his attention, the
KGB set out to develop sources close to him, and in 1941 Golos found
one-Lippmann's secretary.

Mary Price was a North Carolina native, born in 19og, who had graduated from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in 1930. She
went to work at the New York Herald Tribune in 1939 and was assigned
to work as Lippmann's secretary and stenographer. She was also a secret
Communist, having joined the party sometime in the 1930s. Golos recruited her for covert work in 1941 and assigned Elizabeth Bentley to
serve as her contact and courier. For two years in both New York and
Washington Price rifled her boss's files, stole copies of his correspondence, and prepared summaries of his conversations and telephone calls,
all of which she turned over to Bentley. 54

A November 1941 report from Price dealt with a matter of KGB interest: Lippmann's relationship with William Donovan, then chief of the
Office of the Coordinator of Information, a hurriedly established agency
from which would grow America's World War II intelligence agency, the
Office of Strategic Services, and its war propaganda arm, the Office of
War Information (OWI). In addition to sending a copy of a stolen Lippmann-Donovan letter, the KGB New York station said:

(We are sending "Dir's" [Price's] reports on Lippmann. We are starting a file
on him called "Hub.") "Lately Lippmann has significantly cut back on his
newspaper work. He has spent a lot of time on correspondence, phone conversations, and personal discussions with certain political figures, obviously putting his main emphasis on participation in the behind-the-scenes activities of
various Amer. circles. In addition, he is studying issues involving the presentation of other propaganda broadcasts on the radio.... He was allocated a special short-wave radio for listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Obviously, one
of the areas of his cooperation with Donovan is precisely this type of activity."

A report on KGB operations in the United States prepared in 1941 noted
that Price had provided information on secret talks between the British government and agents of Henri Petain's Vichy regime in France, while
a 1942 report cited information on American Far Eastern policy.5

Price continued to spy on her boss on behalf of the KGB throughout
1942, although she considered resigning. Moscow Center commented:
"`You write that you are `holding her back' through "Sound" [Gobs] from
quitting her job. Since she attributes quitting her job to getting married,
it seems problematical to us that you would be able to `hold her back' for
long. Is it possible to give her an opportunity to get married quickly and
still keep her in her current job.' '156

Price did not get married, but her romantic interests found another
outlet that eventually complicated KGB activities. Her sister, Mildred,
was also a CPUSA member who worked for the China Aid Council. At
the end of 1941, a young, well-connected New York lawyer who was secretly a member of the Communist Party, Duncan Lee, became legal adviser to Russian War Relief. At the same time, he was on the executive
board of the China Aid Council. Mary Price met Lee through her sister
and informed Golos in 1942 that he would be joining his law firm's former boss, William Donovan, at the newly organized Office of Strategic
Services. Golos asked her to develop him as a source. A biography of Lee,
prepared by Golos, noted: "`A while ago, we had instructed "Dir" [Price]
to find someone new, and when "Koch" [Lee] was transferred to Wash.,
her sister told her about him. Mildred gave him a good reference. She
gave him "Dir's" address, and when he arrived in Wash. he came to see
her and stayed at her apartment for two days while looking for an apartment for himself. "Dir" discussed "Koch" with her sister, who assured
her that he was a reliable person. "K." wants to work with us and provide
us with any info. he can get."'57

Initially Price met with Lee regularly to pick up material. But late in
1943 Price asked Bentley to take over the duty of meeting with Lee, and
she did so. It was not until months later that Bentley learned what had
motivated the request. Washington station chief Gorsky reported:

Dir [Price] met K. ["Koch"/Lee] through her sister, Mildred, in the spring of
1942 and recruited him for secret work, ostensibly for the fellowcountryman
organization. At the same time, D. ["Dir''/Price] began an intimate relationship with K., which she did not tell us about until very recently. Dir held meetings with K. in one of two locations-at her place, or at his apartment; moreover, the meetings took place in the presence of K's wife, who knew about her
husband's secret work. In the fall of 1943, D. refused to work with K. As it
later turned out, the reason for this was that K's wife had found out about K
and D's intimate relationship and had had fits of jealousy in front of the latter. Although D. broke off her connection with K. on our line, she continues to
have a personal relationship with him. When he comes to NY, K. occasionally
stays at D's apartment. According to D, she is in love with K. and has not lost
hope that she will marry him when the latter divorces his wife. K. has not said
anything to Myrna [Bentley] about his intimate relationship with D, which is
characteristic of him.

The Lees reconciled, however, and there was no divorce.58

The stress of covert work, illness, and her affair with Duncan Lee had
taken its toll on Price. The New York station reported that she had symptoms of tuberculosis and that Lippmann was increasingly unhappy with her
work. She resigned in April 1943 and left to recuperate in Mexico. Once
she returned to the United States, Soviet intelligence fully expected Price
to resume her intelligence work. She applied for jobs in the State Department and OSS. The KGB New York station told Moscow: "We think that
with the assistance of "Imperialist" [Lippmann], who has shown an interest in setting "Dir" [Price] up at the above institutions, she will succeed in
getting a job there. "Dir's" past activity in the progressive labor-union movement, however, may be an obstacle. D. is currently undergoing a background check, the results of which will be known in a few weeks." 59

Meanwhile, Golos continued to use Price as a recruiter. The KGB
New York station and Golos had had their eye on Michael Greenberg, a
China specialist and assistant to presidential aide Lauchlin Currie, then
the deputy administrator and day-to-day head of the Foreign Economic
Administration (FEA):

"'Re "Yank" [Greenberg]. We have reported to you about him several times as
valuable contact. As "Page's" [Curries] secretary he can provide interesting
information. With this mail we are sending materials Nos. 2414 and 2485,
which contain valuable facts about the political situation in China...... Dir"
[Price], who has returned from the "Countryside" [Mexico], came to "Yank"
on "Sound's" [Golos's] recommendation (they are good acquaintances) and on
behalf of the fellowcountrymen [Communist Party] asked him to supply her
with information. "Yank" agreed."'

British-born, Greenberg had become a secret Communist while a student at Cambridge University in the 1930s. He immigrated to the United
States in 1939 and became editor of Pacific Affairs, a journal published
by the Institute of Pacific Relations. His tenure caused one trustee to
complain that Greenberg had imposed a pro-Communist slant on the
journal. In 1942 he became a China specialist for the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW; later merged into the Foreign Economic Administration). Elizabeth Bentley identified him as a source; she said she never
met directly with Greenberg but received his information via Mary and
Mildred Price. (Greenberg became a naturalized American citizen during this period, so his cover name, "Yank," represents a bit of KGB
humor.) At the end of World War II, Greenberg succeeded in transferring to a position in the Department of State, but resigned abruptly in
1946, an act likely triggered by Bentley's defection. Questioned by the
FBI in 1947, he admitted knowing the Price sisters but denied ever turning over any information. Shortly afterwards, he returned permanently to
England.00

As for Mary Price, she did not get a new job at the State Department
or the OSS and pressed for release from her covert work. Bentley supported her and resisted KGB efforts to take direct control of her troubled
agent. Earl Browder also wanted to withdraw Price from espionage and
use her for party work. Eventually, the KGB agreed, and Price became
director of the Legislative and Educational Department of the Communist-dominated United Office and Professional Workers of America, a
small Congress of Industrial Relations (CIO) union, in 1945. In 1946 she
moved to North Carolina to serve as secretary-treasurer of the North Carolina Committee of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare and
ran for governor on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948 .61

Having lost its covert entree to Walter Lippmann in 1943, the KGB
took steps to recover some part of it. It used Vladimir Pravdin, whose cover
job as a TASS correspondent concealed his role as deputy chief of the
KGB New York station in early 1944. Pravdin met with numerous journalists, and the New York station reported, "`Contrary to all expectations,
the person with whom `Sergey' [Pravdin] succeeded in achieving the
biggest results in the task of establishing a good relationship"' was Lippmann. He attributed this to Lippmann's desire "`to have connections with
responsible representatives of our circles in the Country [USA]. He views
the acquaintance with "Sergey" [Pravdin] precisely in this light, and naturally he is attempting to use the acquaintance with him to determine our
viewpoint on various issues of international politics. He is doing this, of
course, very subtly, with the utmost tact. It should be recognized that, by
attempting to draw "Sergey" into making candid comments, "Imperialist"
[Lippmann] is sharing his own information with him."' What Lippmann
was not aware of was that the man with whom he was trading confidences
was not a senior journalistic colleague but an experienced intelligence officer. Pravdin saw the relationship as an opportunity to elicit indiscreet re marks about sensitive American matters to which Lippmann's privileged
relationship with senior government officials gave him access.62