Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (34 page)

Zorin's analysis was largely accurate. The American Venona project had
deciphered KGB cables from 1944 and 1945 that pointed to Fuchs as a
Soviet source. The FBI in 1949 had turned the information over to the
British Security Service, which then confronted Fuchs. Zorin did not
identify the four American agents the KGB was attempting to get out of
the United States, but two of the obvious candidates were David Greenglass and Julius Rosenberg.165

Zorin's correct identification of deciphered cables as the culprits in
Fuchs's arrest did not prevent Soviet internal politics from causing reconsideration later. In June 1953 Lavrenty Beria lost the struggle to succeed Stalin and was arrested and accused of being a British spy. A draft
report to be sent by the head of KGB foreign intelligence to the Council
of Ministers asserted "`the reasons for Fuchs's failure have not been precisely identified to this day"' and noted the central role Beria and his
longtime associates such as Vsevolod Merkulov had played in atomic intelligence. The draft suggested: "`In view of the uncovering of a criminal
link between the traitor Beria and foreign intelligence services, it would
be desirable to question Beria and his accomplices additionally as to
which information regarding the most valuable scientific-technical intelligence agents and materials obtained from them on atomic energy, jet
aviation and radar, etc. was passed to foreign intelligence services."' However, other officers thought the evidence too thin, and the report was not
sent. Beria, Merkulov, and other Beria cronies were, in any case, executed. Nonetheless, some KGB officers refused to give up on the notion
that Harry Gold had betrayed Fuchs. For example, Alexander Feklisov
throughout his life believed that Gold, not the KGB cables deciphered by
Venona, had led the FBI to Fuchs.166

As the extent of the disaster unfolded, with Fuchs's arrest leading to
Gold's arrest, and Gold's arrest leading to the arrest of David Greenglass,
and his arrest leading to the arrest of Julius Rosenberg and the uncovering of his extensive espionage apparatus, the KGB's anger at Fuchs grew.
A disgusted London station reported in December 1950 that it had learned that Fuchs had asked to be allowed to keep his British citizenship,
that there had been little solid evidence against him, and, consequently,
that he had confessed of his own accord and not under serious pressure
of prosecution. Leonid Kvasnikov, then a senior KGB officer at Moscow
Center, fumed and wrote on the London report that Fuchs "has undergone total degeneration ."167

Based solely on his confession, Fuchs's trial went swiftly, and he was
sentenced to fourteen years in prison and loss of his British citizenship.
Released in 1959 after serving nine years of his sentence, he was allowed
to emigrate to Communist East Germany. After reaffirming his loyalty to
communism, Fuchs became one of the German Democratic Republic's
leading atomic physicists, served as deputy director of its Institute for
Nuclear Research, and was awarded membership on the central committee of the SED, East Germany's ruling Communist Party.

Eventually Soviet anger at Fuchs cooled as it better appreciated the
value of his work for the Soviet Union and the difficulties of his position
in 1950. In 1960 the KGB arranged an invitation for him to visit the Soviet Union to meet with Soviet nuclear scientists. During his visit he was
kept under close surveillance. After determining that he appeared to be
sincerely pro-Soviet, Kvasnikov and another KGB officer met with him at
Moscow's Peking Restaurant, then one of the city's premier eating spots.
Kvasnikov reported: "`We began the conversation by expressing our gratitude to B. ["Bras"/Fucks] for the great help he had rendered to the Sov.
Union during a difficult time."' In the conversation that followed, Fuchs
explained why he had confessed: "`According to B., this action had been
prompted by serious polit. ambivalence and by doubts as to the correctness of Soviet policies, which he had begun feeling under the influence
of bourgeois propaganda and his detachment from sources of truthful information. Specifically, this ambivalence and doubt manifested themselves in the fact that at that time, B. came to the conclusion that the Sov.
Union had violated the principles of democracy and was treating the People's Democracies unjustly. The consequence of these mistaken views
was his opinion that his collaboration with us was a mistake."' Fuchs went
on to say he later realized that he had made ideological errors in losing
his faith, and thus his decision to emigrate to East Germany when he was
released. He told Kvasnikov that "`our positive assessment of his past
work had given him greater satisfaction than `any decoration,' as he put
it."' For the KGB's part, Kvasnikov wrote: "`As we parted ways, we
thanked B. once more for helping us in the past, wished him success in his future life and work, and told him that in the future he can turn to us
for friendly support if he ever has any problems."' 168

The KGB kept a friendly eye on Fuchs and in 1965 tried, unsuccessfully, to get the Soviet Academy of Sciences to make him an honorary
member. (Alexander Feklisov, then deputy chief of the KGB's training
institute, initiated the action. Soviet scientists opposed honoring Fuchs,
fearing it would reduce the importance of their role in building the Soviet bomb.) Fuchs died in 1988, and in 1989 the KGB successfully petitioned the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union to posthumously award him the "Order of Friendship among Nations . " 169

As part of its revival of old networks in March 1948 Moscow Center instructed the KGB New York station to meet with Julius Rosenberg and
obtain a report on the status of his agent network; "`we are especially interested in what Dave (`Caliber') currently has at his disposal, and
whether he is ready to begin working with us."' Moscow also asked New
York to find out if Greenglass could go back to work at Los Alamos or, alternatively, set up safe houses in the New York area. A KGB New York
station letter to Moscow in early August reported that Greenglass was in
business with Rosenberg. As instructed, KGB officer Gavriil Panchenko
had suggested that Greenglass try to rejoin Los Alamos but also asked if
Greenglass's links to Rosenberg might be a problem in view of the Signal
Corps' having fired Julius because of his radical associations. Rosenberg
assured Panchenko that Greenglass already had been through security
checks without difficulty and noted that his brother-in-law "`had kept a
small amount of plutonium in a lead box"' as a souvenir from Los Alamos
but on Julius's orders had thrown it into the East River. (A sample of
U-z38 that Greenglass had kept was not thrown away but forwarded to
Moscow in 1948.) Panchenko suggested to Julius that he assign both
Greenglasses to assist in photographing William Perl's heavy volume of
materials on jet propulsion at one of the network's safe houses in New
York.170

By the end of 1948, Moscow concluded that even if Greenglass could
get a Los Alamos job, "`his limited education and area of specialization"'
would preclude a position that would yield significant information. "`He
could be far more useful as a courier- or assistant for Julius Rosenberg. Another option the KGB New York station suggested was for Greenglass
to attend the University of Chicago and renew friendships with four Los
Alamos veterans whom Greenglass had identified as sympathetic to the
CPUSA and who were either studying or teaching there. Moscow Center responded that the four were "of great interest" and assigned them
cover names. The New York station cabled Moscow in June 1949 that it
wanted Greenglass to enroll at Chicago to study physics, cultivate his old
friends with the aim "`of using them for our work in the future,"' and
"`seek out people whom we could recruit for our work."' He needed to
be discreet: "`under no circumstances should he talk to anyone about our
work or try to recruit anyone for our work."' Every two months he would
prepare a report, photograph it, and give it to Ethel Rosenberg, who
would serve as a courier and store it in Julius's apartment until it could be
passed along to the KGB. The KGB was agreeable to paying all of Greenglass's educational and living expenses plus $125 a month. This ambitious
plan did not go anywhere. In late August 1949 Julius Rosenberg told the
KGB New York station that he had discussed the issue with Greenglass,
who had "`neither the opportunity nor the desire to enroll"' at Chicago.
He had applied but not been admitted, and, in any case, his wife, expecting a baby, had flatly refused to leave New York.'7'

Rosenberg met Panchenko on ii October 1949 and reported that
Greenglass had obtained a temporary job at the Arma Corporation in
Brooklyn, working nights. If the KGB was interested, he could make
copies or reconstruct from memory the devices Arma was manufacturing
for the U. S. military. While Greenglass was hoping to get a job at the Syn-
chromatic company, which did atomic-related work, his work at Arma involved "manufacturing radar stabilizers for tank guns. He has access to secret projects." A later report to Moscow explained that the stabilizer
11 'would keep the gun constantly trained on the target regardless of the oscillations of the tank itself during movement in battle."' The model was
already undergoing testing; Greenglass "`offered to take the camera with
him and copy out all the blueprints at work."' The station more cautiously
proposed that he do a sketch from memory and have Julius photograph
it. The stabilizer was of interest to Moscow, which also offered to pay
Greenglass's costs to attend New York University's engineering school.
(Greenglass's willingness to undertake additional espionage tasks in 1949
diverges from his later statements to the FBI that minimized his continued assistance to Soviet intelligence after his having left Los Alamos.)'72

Amid all these grandiose plans, a specter was haunting the KGB.
Harry Gold, the KGB accurately feared, was increasingly vulnerable and could expose both David and Ruth Greenglass. In September 1949 the
Center told New York that the Greenglasses needed a cover story for
their meeting with Gold in Albuquerque. If there were no witnesses, they
should deny it ever took place. Even before Gold implicated them, however, David got an unpleasant visit from the FBI in late January 1950.
The agents claimed to be investigating some unaccounted-for uranium
from the shop where Greenglass had worked at Los Alamos. He denied
any knowledge of the matter and they went away. He waited a week to
make sure he was not under surveillance and then told Rosenberg, who
informed the KGB New York station. Panchenko assured Rosenberg that
the Americans had no proof that Greenglass had collaborated with the
KGB. Nonetheless, the KGB officer also briefed him on how he should
instruct the Greenglasses to behave if the FBI came back, canceled
Julius's regularly scheduled meetings with the KGB, and replaced them
by communicating through "dead drops" and meeting in person only after
use of a prearranged signa1.173

The KGB pondered whether the FBI's interview with Greenglass had
anything to do with Fuchs's recent arrest in Britain or was simply part of
a general investigation of all former Los Alamos employees. Whatever
the reason, it feared that Greenglass would remain a person of interest
and his ties to Rosenberg would be discovered, possibly leading to "`a
thorough investigation"' of Rosenberg's network of engineer spies. David
and Ruth Greenglass had to "categorically deny involvement in intelligence work or passing anyone materials of any kind. The competitors do
not have information about the work of W. ["Wasp"/Ruth] and C. ["Cal-
iber"/David], but they could set up a trap. Proceed with caution ."174

By April 1950 Moscow feared that what had once seemed a secure
as well as a highly successful intelligence operation had become a house
of cards that was about to be blown down. Klaus Fuchs had been arrested, confessed, tried, and imprisoned. Even if Harry Gold had not
betrayed Fuchs, it feared that Fuchs had given up Gold as part of his
confession (he had). In either case, Gold, whose cover name was
changed from "Arno" to "Mad," could lead the FBI to David and Ruth,
now called "Zinger" and "Ida," and endanger Julius Rosenberg, now labeled "King," and his entire network. The price of the decision in mid1945 to save a separate courier run by having Harry Gold pick up espionage material from Greenglass in Albuquerque as well as from Fuchs
in Santa Fe was going to be heavy. Additionally, while one set of FBI
agents was following up the information Fuchs had provided in his confession, another was attempting to attach real names to the cover names in the KGB cables that were being deciphered by code breakers of the
National Security Agency's Venona project. For example, one deciphered cable about "Liberal" stated "Liberal's" wife of five years was
named Ethel and was twenty-nine years old. Another cable identified
Ruth Greenglass by her real name and noted that she was married to
the brother of "Liberal's" wife. As soon as Julius Rosenberg came to the
attention of the FBI agents working on Venona, his identification as
"Liberal" was a certainty. In total, Venona cryptanalysts eventually deciphered twenty-one messages that discussed Julius Rosenberg's work as
a leading Soviet agent-handler.'' 5

In April 1950 Moscow Center warned the New York station about
the risks that flowed from Fuchs's confession: "There are threads leading
from Charles [Fuchs] to Zinger [David Greenglass], Ida (Wasp) [Ruth
Greenglass], and King (L-1) [Liberal/Julius Rosenberg]. It is possible that
Mad (Arno) [Gold] will fail or turn traitor." In view of these risks, Moscow
advised:

"In the case of Zinger and Ida [David and Ruth Greenglass], what the competitors [FBI] have on them is not only their clear and incontrovertible involvement in our work, but also evidence that they passed secret materials on
the atomic bomb to us. On this basis the competitors will exert strong pressure
on Z. and Ida, using intimidation and other means, even to the point of arresting them, and eventually will compel them to give testimony, with all of the
concomitant implications for King, his group, and all of our work in the country. (Discuss with King the possibility of Z. and I. leaving the country.)"176