Spies and Commissars: The Bolshevik Revolution and the West (46 page)

Lloyd George’s life would have been easier if the influential business lobby in favour of resuming trade had been willing to come into the open. But no company chairman wanted to push the case too hard in public. Sovnarkom’s record in ripping up property rights, persecuting religion and conducting a Red terror was notorious. The men of business were using the Prime Minister as their battering ram without putting their shoulders to the charge. As for the British labour movement, its sympathies with all or some of Lenin’s and Trotsky’s policies made it less than helpful in persuading the doubters. If an Anglo-Soviet commercial treaty was going to be realized the impetus had to come from the government. Lloyd George was willing to give this a try – and Soviet leaders were hoping that he would succeed.

PART FOUR

STALEMATE

25. BOLSHEVISM: FOR AND AGAINST

From November 1919 a group of leading British anti-Bolsheviks met together in the Savoy Hotel and the Café Royal for ‘Bolo Liquidation Lunches’. Bolo was the slang term for Bolshevik used by British and American officials at that time. Those seated around the table included Stephen Alley, Paul Dukes (who signed the menu in Cyrillic script), George Hill, Rex Leeper, John Picton Bagge and Sidney Reilly. All were old Russia hands and were connected with the Foreign Office or the Secret Service Bureau. As ardent foes of communism, they organized the lunches to discuss how to toughen British policy and bring down Lenin and the Soviet order.
¹

Paul Dukes, when his cover was blown in Russia, began to write articles for the London
Times
. He recounted the terrible food shortages and blamed them on Soviet economic policies rather than war or the weather.
²
He ridiculed the idea that the workers and peasants were on the side of the Bolshevik party and said that the public displays of joy on May Day were an artificial confection. He pointed out that Bolsheviks treated their critics, including factory labourers, as counter-revolutionaries. He hailed the spread of peasant rebellions against communist rule and wished the Greens well in their struggle with the Reds.
³
(The Greens were peasant partisans who fought the Reds and Whites with equal ferocity.) The final article in his series depicted the intimidation, fraud and lying propaganda involved in a local soviet election he had witnessed.
⁴
He called on the Western political left to shed its illusions: ‘Bitterly as they revile the
bourgeoisie
, the Bolshevist leaders reserve their fiercest hatred and their last resources of invective and derision for all other Socialists – Russian, English, German, and American alike. They are never spoken of otherwise than as “social-traitors”.’
⁵
Dukes bragged that he had visited Russia not as an accredited journalist but as a private traveller who had conversed with every section of the Russian people – he of course omitted to mention his employment by the Secret Service Bureau.
⁶

According to Dukes, the ‘National Centre Party’ enjoyed support across the whole political spectrum, apart from monarchists and communists. The National Centre, however, was not a party but a combination of public figures of diverse political opinions. Dukes was deliberately misleading his readers to win their sympathies. He also made the unfounded claim that ‘the large majority of socialists have joined [the party]’ and were in productive contact with General Denikin.
⁷
Although Dukes did admit that the so-called National Centre Party aimed to install a temporary dictatorship, he declared that democracy was its ultimate aim. The peasants would be left in possession of the land. The Soviet separation of Church and state would endure and the universal educational provision introduced by the Bolsheviks would be maintained. The National Centre Party would hold elections to a National Assembly and had no desire to restore the survivors of the Romanov dynasty to power. By focusing on the National Centre Party and exaggerating its status as a rallying point for anti-Soviet opinion in Russia, Dukes downplayed the extremism of the officers in Denikin’s forces. If anything united the Whites, in fact, it was Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism. They despised all liberals and socialists; they believed that democratic institutions had been tried and found wanting between February and October 1917. The political future they wanted would have little space for politicians, and Russia’s fate would have been grim and chaotic under their rule.

Dukes reminded his readers that the leadership in the Kremlin had set up a Communist International with the purpose of subverting governments in Europe and North America.
⁸
His pronouncements did not go unnoticed by the Bolsheviks. When he joined the Christian Counter-Bolshevist Crusade and began to speak at its meetings, supporters of Soviet Russia attended his appearances to heckle.
⁹
Dukes responded that since he had served in the Red Army he was speaking from personal knowledge; but in February 1920 his speech at a public meeting in Westminster Hall led to an affray that the police had to quell.
¹⁰
When the Soviet government’s newspaper
Izvestiya
accused him of subversive machinations he at last admitted to having been in charge of British intelligence operations in Russia, but he still held that he had only been gathering information.
¹¹
Dukes received a knighthood for his services in December 1920 – George V had in fact wanted to award the Victoria Cross but was overruled by
the army chiefs of staff who insisted that the medal could be received only by members of the armed services.
¹²

Conservative and liberal figures such as Professor Bernard Pares at London University’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies joined Dukes in signing a letter to
The Times
denouncing Soviet outrages.
¹³
Dukes also wrote to the
Manchester Guardian
protesting against its indulgent editorial line on Soviet Russia – he was angered by the mild critique of communist rule offered by its reporter W. T. Goode, announcing his own credentials as follows: ‘I was at Moscow at the same time as Professor Goode, and I left Russia later than he. I was not, however, a guest of the Bolshevik Government, but, knowing the language thoroughly, lived as a Russian amongst the Russians. My object was to study the effects of Bolshevism on the people.’
¹⁴
Although this was another of his misleading descriptions of what he had done in Russia, he efficiently made his point that it was inadequate to find the October Revolution and its leaders merely ‘interesting’ instead of offering a basic analysis of the revolutionary order. According to Dukes, Goode had praised the new educational system while failing to mention that schools had been compelled to stop teaching morality; he had also overlooked the antipathy of Russians to their Bolshevik rulers and their policies and ideology.

America had few writers on the anti-Soviet side of the debate with the direct experience of Soviet Russia that Dukes could muster. Dukes tried to do something about this by going on an American lecture tour in February 1921.
¹⁵
While there he supported the attacks on Bolshevik rule made by Princess Cantacuzène, who before 1917 had belonged to the highest social circles. She printed her reminiscences of the October Revolution in the
Saturday Evening Post
, republishing them in a book. She condemned the daily illegalities in Petrograd, picking out Trotsky for harsh criticism.
¹⁶
Her fellow Princess Catherine Radziwill, a best-selling author, concentrated on the secret deals between the Bolsheviks and the German government, but her research methods were less than exemplary since she felt entirely free to invent conversations and incidents involving Lenin and Trotsky.
¹⁷

The Kadet leader Pavel Milyukov produced a steadier work, which appeared on both sides of the Atlantic, about Bolshevism’s foreign pretensions. Looking at Soviet efforts to spread revolution abroad, he noted the Russian linkage to the communist episodes in Budapest
and Munich and sounded an alarm about Comintern. Milyukov stressed that ‘Mr Lenin’ and ‘Mr Trotsky’ were open about their global ambition; and he argued that the Bolsheviks had planned to use President Wilson’s proposal for a Prinkipo peace conference as a way of securing a diplomatic presence in Washington, London and Paris. He mentioned the huge grain fund and military resources gathered by Sovnarkom for future use in the revolutionary cause in central Europe.
¹⁸
He wanted to depict himself as the constant Russian patriot and therefore omitted any reference to his own less than illustrious record in 1918 when he had sought Germany’s military assistance in overturning the Bolsheviks. He declared that the Hands Off Russia campaign was damaging the interests of his country and the world.
¹⁹
He regretted the way the European and American socialist parties, despite deep disagreements with Bolshevism, were urging their governments to grant recognition to Sovnarkom.
²⁰
He warned, too, against listening to prominent American and British sympathizers with Bolshevism.
²¹

Milyukov’s book was all but ignored on both sides of the Atlantic. In frustration he wrote to the London
Times
, repudiating criticism of the White armies and their commanders. He insisted that Alexander Kerenski was wrong to advise against support for Kolchak and Denikin and intimated that if only Kerenski had taken a stronger line in 1917, Russia might have been spared its later torment.
²²
This was not the fairest of comments. If it was true that Kerenski had had a genuine chance in summer 1917, Milyukov had been given his own in the spring of that year. Russian political refugees all too frequently subsided into internal polemics. Disputes were bitter as conservative and liberal writers re-examined the events between the fall of the Romanovs and the rise of the Bolsheviks with the same intense disputatiousness that had made the émigré socialist colonies notorious before the Great War.

Such a reputation had also begun to attach itself to those in the West who were outspoken in their support for the Whites. On 17 July 1919 Winston Churchill had given a talk at the British-Russian Club in London and paid tribute to the achievements of the Russian Imperial army on the eastern front, saying that its valour had saved Paris from the Germans in 1914–15. The Secretary of State for War was on sparkling form: ‘Some people are inclined to speak as if I were responsible, as if I was at the bottom of all this trouble in Russia.’ When the laughter had subsided Churchill explained that he believed
in the ‘inherent weakness of Bolshevism’. The Red Army, he declared, was weaker than many supposed. He fulminated against Lenin and Trotsky but did not confine himself to the Russian question. Turning to Hungary, he described the communist leader Béla Kun as ‘another fungus, sprung up in the night’. European civilization was under threat. He summarized his standpoint as follows: ‘Russia, my lords and gentlemen, is the decisive factor in the history of the world at the present time.’
²³
Using extravagant vocabulary as usual, Churchill had a clear understanding of communism’s threat to the freedoms fully or partially available in the West; and, ignoring the reproaches of Lloyd George, he gave encouragement to active anti-Bolsheviks in London.
²⁴

Friends of the Bolsheviks meanwhile queued up to extol what was happening in Russia. Arthur Ransome’s
Russia in 1919
was a rapidly written memoir that described the communist leaders in the blandest personal terms, Ransome blithely acknowledging that he was not going to cover the Red terror.
²⁵
And although Morgan Philips Price mentioned the terror in his own account, he claimed that it had lasted only six weeks. He chose instead to stress the sustained awfulness of the White terror while praising the Soviet system of government.
²⁶
Ivy Litvinov, when left behind in London by Maxim, published a booklet in the same spirit. Drawing on Maxim’s notes, she asked what worth there could ever be in the Constituent Assembly. She accused the Whites of worse violence than anything done by the Reds, stating: ‘As a matter of fact, the Soviet regime has been much less sanguinary than any known in history.’
²⁷

But of all the books about the new regime, whether favourable or otherwise, the one with the greatest impact was John Reed’s
Ten Days that Shook the World
, which appeared in March 1919.
²⁸
His chapters concentrated on the brief period before and after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and were based on his own notes and memories as well as on his file of
Le Bulletin de la Presse
issued daily by the French Information Bureau.
²⁹
He offered what he called ‘intensified history’, but he was also providing disguised propaganda. Reed claimed that until the October Revolution Russia had been an ‘almost incredibly conservative’ country: he entirely overlooked the surge of revolutionary action that had taken place in factories, garrisons and villages long before the Bolsheviks took over. The ‘masses’ appeared in his pages only when listening to speeches by Lenin and the other communist leaders. Reed wrote about the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries
only to indicate how little they understood the scale of the external and internal emergency in Russia. Lenin and Trotsky were his heroes, and Kerenski was depicted as an incompetent fool: no attempt was made to explain the rationale for the Provisional Government’s policies. Reed wrote: ‘It is still fashionable . . . to speak of the Bolshevik insurrection as an “adventure”. Adventure it was, and one of the most marvellous mankind has ever embarked upon, sweeping into history at the head of the toiling masses, and staking everything on their vast and simple desires.’
³⁰
Bolshevism and popular opinion according to Reed were one and the same thing.