Authors: Jeremy Bowen
Introduction
âThe biggest Palestinian attack': Israeli government website,
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa
.
âAn investigation by': Human Rights Watch report on Jenin,
www.hrw.org
.
âLyndon Baines Johnson': Memo for the Record, 7 June 1967, NSC, Box 18.
âFour days after the war': Notes of NSC Special Committee meeting, 14 June 1967, NSC, Box 19.
Pre-war
âso bone-tired': Uzi Narkiss,
The Liberation of Jerusalem,
p. 17.
âfrom guilt that Jerusalem': ibid., p. 14.
âa multitude of inhabitants', âthe inhabitants of the town became panic-stricken' and âNobody will ever know': Morris, pp. 203â10.
âcould not leave Lod's': David Horovitz (ed.),
Yitzhak Rabin,
p. 26.
âIn Deir Yassin': Morris, pp. 113â15; see also Salim Tamari (ed.),
Jerusalem, 1948.
âHe concentrated on the rapes': interview with Hazem Nusseibeh, Amman, May 2002.
âA meeting was arranged': Dan Kurzman,
Soldier of Peace,
pp. 148â53.
For details of Abdullah's assassination, see Roland Dallas,
King Hussein,
pp. 1â3; Peter Snow,
Hussein,
pp. 33â5.
For secret contacts between Abdullah and the Israelis, see Avi Shlaim,
The Politics of Partition.
âDespite lessons from his driver': Yitzhak Rabin,
The Rabin Memoirs,
pp. 32â3.
âBut both sides, blaming each other': see Itamar Rabinovich,
The Road Not Taken.
âFrom around 1952': interview with Meir Pa'il, Tel Aviv, 3 May 2002.
âNasser's followers': PRO/FCO 17/456, 9 July 1968: Saunders (Baghdad) to Eastern Dept, FCO.
âAs a young officer': interview with General Abd al-Muhsin Kamil Murtagi, Cairo, 14 December 2002.
âOfficers regarded Amer': interview with General Salahadeen Hadidi, Cairo, 12 December 2002.
âAmer and his cronies': Anthony Nutting,
Nasser,
pp. 262â3.
âThe last straw': Patrick Seale,
The Struggle for Syria,
p. 42.
âThe Syrian officer class': Seale,
Asad of Syria,
pp. 24â40.
âIf the same conditions': PRO/FCO 371/186923, 25 January 1966: annual report on Syrian armed forces.
âColonel Rowan-Hamilton': ibid.
âThe Syrian army': see Galia Golan,
Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev.
âIts aggressive behaviour': Shlaim,
The Iron Wall,
p. 235.
âService on this front': ibid., p. 229.
â“We will throw them into the sea”': PRO/FCO 371/186923, 25 January 1966: annual report on Syrian armed forces.
âtotally inadequate': IsraeliâArab confrontation, National Military Command Center, May 1967, NSF, Box 104.
âthe hopelessness of it all': PRO/FCO 371/186382, 15 October 1966: Evans (Damascus) to FCO.
because of Israeli provocations': Shlaim, p. 235.
âLads, let's sing a bit': Teveth,
Tanks of Tammuz,
p. 54.
âHow many Syrian tanks': ibid., p. 56.
âUsing the Syrian border': ibid., p. 59; interview with Israel Tal, Tel Aviv, 6 May 2002; Patrick Wright,
Tank,
pp. 343â5.
âover 50 per cent':
Maariv,
7 April 1972, quoted at
www.searchforjustice.org
, 4 November 2002.
âno amount of pseudo-legality': PRO/FCO 17/576, 5 January 1967: briefing on demilitarised zones.
âGeneral Odd Bull': Bull, p. 55; John Gee, âThe Borders Between Syria and Israel',
www.caabu.org
.
âstrange names like de Gaulle's nose': Van Creveld, p. 170.
âThis is our home':
Yediot Aharonot,
14 April 1967, quoted in Bondy, p. 337; PRO/FCO 17/473, 10 January 1967.
âIt went this way':
Yediot Aharonot,
27 April 1967.
âAlong the Syrian border': Dayan quotes from Shlaim, pp. 235â6 and AP report, 11 May 1997,
www.codoh.com
.
âA small team of Palestinians': Sayigh, p. 107.
âOther groups appeared': Hirst, pp. 276â8.
âthe military punch': PRO/FCO 371/186838/R109/207, 19 October 1966.
âHe installed Ahmed Shukairy': Kerr, p. 115.
âlarge-scale operation': PRO/PREM 13/1617, 17/18 October 1966: Hadow (Tel Aviv) to FCO.
âearly in November': Tessler, pp. 367, 378.
âIt was bigger': Pollack, p. 295.
âThe major and his men': PRO/FCO 371/186838, 3 November 1966: Hadow (Tel Aviv) to FCO.
âNobody had died': PRO/FCO 371 186840, 21 December 1966: Dispatch No. 56 to SoSFA, George Brown.
âTheir plan was': PRO/FCO 371/186839, 21 December 1966: Defence Attaché Amman's report on Samua and Defence Attaché Tel Aviv's report attached to PRO/FCO 371 186840, Dispatch No. 56 to SoSFA, George Brown.
âdazed and frightened': Bishop's account is in PRO/FCO 371/186838.
âHe had been having secret meetings': Amman Cables 1456, 1457, 11 December 1966, NSF, Box 146.
âa quite extraordinary revelation': Memo from Walt Rostow to LBJ, 12 December 1966, NSF, Box 146.
âThe King concluded': PRO/FCO 371/186839, Ambassador Adams to London.
âHe told the diplomats': US Current Intelligence Bulletin, 15 November 1966 â filed in PRO/FCO 371/186839.
âhe summoned all the ambassadors': PRO/FCO 371/186839, 17 November 1966.
âThe United States was so concerned': Memo from Rostow to Johnson, 15 November 1966, NSF Country File: Israel, Box 140.
âThe US airlifted': Memo from Robert McNamara to Johnson, 17 April 1967, NSF Country File: Israel, Box 140; Memo from Amos Jordan to Rostow, 1 December 1966, NSF, Box 146.
âThe CIA believed': CIA Memo for the Director: âThe Jordan Regime, Its Prospects and the Consequences of Its Demise', 13 December 1966, NSF, Box 146.
âThe people of Samua': PRO/FCO 371/186839, 15 November 1966, US Embassy Amman to SoSFA.
âWhat do they expect':
Washington Post,
15 November 1966, quoted in Neff, p. 42.
âA senior security official': Amman Cable 1456, 12 December 1966.
âarmy officers':
Washington Post,
15 November 1966, quoted in Neff, p. 42.
âHussein's troubles': PRO/FCO 371/186839/272, 17 November 1966: Tesh (Cairo) to FCO.
âDamascus was relieved': PRO/FCO 371/186839/266, 16 November 1967: Evans (Damascus) to FCO.
âEven if the Syrian government': PRO/FCO 17/473, 21 January 1967: Damascus to FCO.
âLet the Israelis shoot at us': ibid.
âon 7 April': details of kibbutz in
Yediot Aharonot,
14 April 1967, quoted in Bondy, pp. 337â42.
Account of battle: PRO/FCO 17/474: Report of ground/air action on Israeli/Syrian border on 7 April 1967, from Defence and Military Attaché's office, Tel Aviv, 11 April 1967; also PRO/FCO 17/473: Syria/Israel, account of incident from Eastern Department; attack on Sqoufiye reported by UNTSO; PRO/FCO 17/473, 10 April 1967.
âa stunned awe': PRO/FCO 17/473, 12 April 1967.
âIsrael basked': PRO/FCO 17/473, 10 April 1967.
âAre you out of your minds?': Weizman, p. 197.
âThe British government': PRO/FCO 17/498, 14 August 1967.
âThe CIA picked up': President's Daily Brief, 13 May 1967, NSC, Box 19.
âcontemplating an attack': text of article from
al-Ahram
read out on Cairo Radio Home Service, 0500 GMT, 13 May 1967, SWB, Vol. 2453â78.
âA high Israeli source':
MER,
p. 187.
âtook the threats and warnings': ibid, p. 179.
âThere were some': Brecher, p. 359.
âThe message received': Riad, p. 17.
âthe Israeli leaders had announced': Nasser speech, 22 May 1967, quoted in Brecher, p. 359.
âThe Egyptians claimed': NSF, Paris Cable 18806, 23 May 1967, Box 104.
âAtassi, the head of state': Nutting, p. 397.
âthe foster child state of bandits': Syrian propaganda from Damascus Cable 1163, 22 May 1967, NSF, Box 104.
âthe Russians pricked the Egyptian donkey': PRO/FCO 17/498, 14 August 1967.
âThey told me': Sadat, p. 172; Parker,
The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East,
p. 5; Heikal,
Sphinx,
pp. 174â5.
âBy the evening': Gamasy, p. 21.
âThe Soviets seem': NSF, Moscow 5078, 23 May 1967, Box 104.
âThe Soviets wanted': interview with Amin Howedi, Cairo, 14 December 2002; Lior, p. 150; Golan, pp. 58â62; the most comprehensive discussion of the Soviet warning is in Parker, pp. 3â35.
âA “medium level”': CIA to White House Situation Room; Soviet official's comments on Soviet policy in the Middle Eastern war, date sanitised, NSC, Box 18.
âI think this is difficult': comments of Gregoriy Petrovich Kapustyan, Soviet first secretary in Kuwait and KGB officer in CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 25 May 1967; Soviet intelligence officer's comment on the current ArabâIsraeli crisis, NSF, Box 105.
âSoviet advice to the Syrians': Memo, âTerrorist Origins of the Crisis', Saunders to Bundy, dated âSometime prior to June 19th 1967', NSC, Box 17.
âIt is probable': Memo for Rostow from Nathaniel Davis, 2 June 1967, NSC, Box 20.
âthe sad capital city': Amos Oz,
Seventh Day,
pp. 215â16.
âGeneral Bull':
MER,
Vol. 3, 1967.
âa clear violation': President's Daily Brief, 13 May 1967, NSC, Box 19.
âbattle order number one': document captured by Israel, quoted in
MER,
p. 185.
âastonished and alarmed': Gamasy, pp. 21â2.
âI did not': quoted in Gamasy, p. 23.
âTraining, never a religion': interview with Hadidi.
âwe incurred heavy losses': interview with General Abdel Moneim Khalil, Cairo, 13 December 2002.
âBy 1967 the Egyptian High Command': Field Marshal Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy,
The October War,
pp. 37â8.
âNasser is going': President's Daily Brief, 16 May 1967, NSC, Box 19.
âdefensive-deterrent in character': PRO/Telegram No. 301, Tel Aviv to FCO, 17 May 1967.
âWe cannot leave the south': Lior, p. 148.
âOutside the stadium': Michael Bar Zohar,
Embassies in Crisis,
pp. 16â18.
âAs soon as he could': interview with General Yeshayahu Gavish, Tel Aviv, 21 November 2002.
âIn just over a decade': Rikhye, p. 14.
âEgypt promised': Brian Urquart, quoted in Parker,
Six-Day War,
p. 87.
âTo your information': Rikhye, p. 16.
âThey were being': General Mohamed Fawzi in
Al-Ahram Weekly
online, 5â11 June 1997.
âwar would be inevitable': Rikhye, p. 17.
âGeneral, what's the occasion?': ibid., p. 21.
âwilly-nilly be dragged in': PRO/FCO 17/479, 17 May 1967: Damascus to FCO.
âslogan of the unity': PRO/FCO 17/479, 19 May 1967: Damascus to FCO.
âOn 17 May': Tel Aviv Cable 3641, 18 May 1967, NSC, Box 22.
âbefore taking any unilateral action': PRO/FCO 17/479, 16 May 1967: Tel Aviv to FCO.
âBut other high-ranking': PRO/Tel Aviv to FCO, 19 May 1967.
âin the strongest terms': message to PM Eshkol, 17 May 1967, NSC, Box 17.
âA long-delayed': âThe President in the Middle East Crisis', 19 December 1968, NSC, Box 17.
âone scrofulous room': PRO/FCO 8/39, 18 November 1967: Parsons, British Political Agency, Bahrain to Balfour-Paul, British Political Residency, Bahrain.
âBy 1959': Albert Hourani,
A History of the Arab Peoples,
p. 393; also Winston Burdett,
Encounter With the Middle East,
p. 23.
âThe wire services': wire service reports, 22 May 1967, NSC, Box 17.
âif we come through': letter and draft of letter, 22 May 1967, NSC, Box 17.
âthrough sweaty, heaving, arm-flinging bodies': Rikhye, p. 64.
âOn the evening': and other details of the Nasser-U Thant dinner, Rikhye, pp. 63â79.
âout to kill him': USUN 5496, 27 May 1967, NSF, Box 105.
âGeneral Yariv': Bar Zohar, p. 72.
âdecisive day': Press review, 23 May 1967, NSC, Box 17.
âwithin ninety minutes': Amos Elon, p. 7.
âThe message passed down': interview with General Shmuel Eyal, Head of Personnel IDF, Rishon le Zion, 27 November, 2002.
âI was leaning': Henry (ed.),
The Seventh Day,
p. 32.
âOne persistent 63-year-old': Elon,
A Blood-Dimmed Tide,
p. 7.
ârefusal to panic': Bar Zohar, p. 78.
ârapacious animals': Ruth Bondy, Dvar Hashavua, 2 June 1967, quoted in
Mission Survival,
p. 30.
âYou have brought this state': account of his collapse in Rabin, pp. 58â65.
âAt about eight': Weizman, pp. 202â3.
âa crushing burden': Leah Rabin, p. 107.
âhe was alone': Horovitz (ed.), pp. 40â1.
âAbdel Moneim Khalil': interview with General Abdel Moneim Khalil, Cairo, 13 December 2002.
âwith the same deep chasm': Field bulletin quoted in
Mission Survival.
âFifteen years of hard work': interview with Meir Pa'il, 4 May 2002; also Martin Van Creveld,
The Sword and the Olive.
âby the superior training': PRO/FCO 17/576: âAnnual Report on the Israeli Army', 27 January 1967.
âmilitarily unchallengeable': âIsraeliâArab confrontation, May 1967', NSF, Box 104.
âThe British estimates': PRO/CAB 158/66, 17 April 1967: âA comparison of the Armed Forces of Israel and those of certain Arab states up to the end of 1967', JIC.