Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (57 page)

Another lucky stroke for the Communists was the fact that they were given control of Antonescu and the other prisoners once the coup was over. Once again, there were good reasons for this. It was not thought to be a good idea to allow the military to take charge of Antonescu and his cabinet, since the soldiers might still feel some loyalty to their old commander and release him. The police were not to be trusted for the same reason. The plotters had therefore decided to hand the prisoners to a civilian militia group. The most likely group was Maniu’s National Peasant Party volunteers; however, at the time of the coup they had already been sent to Transylvania to help fight against the Germans. The only other anti-fascist civilian militia was the Communist-trained ‘Patriotic Guards’. Handing over the dictator to this group once again gave the impression that the Communists were far more influential in the coup than they actually had been.

The greatest gift to the Communists, however, was provided by the Allies during the armistice negotiations. While all sides had already accepted the general terms of the armistice by the time of the coup, the actual text was not finally agreed for another three weeks. One of the sticking points was over who amongst the Allies would be responsible for the country. The Soviets argued that since it was their army that had occupied Romania, they should be the ones to control it. Some British and American officials were concerned that the Soviets were acting as though Romania was ‘Russia’s own business’: they argued that all three of the major Allies should take
joint
responsibility. In the end, however, it was the Soviets who got their way. The final wording of the armistice specified that the country would be controlled by an Allied Control Commission ‘under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command’. This would open the country to Soviet domination later on.
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The Communist Fight for Power

After the coup of 23 August 1944 there were three governments in quick succession. The first of these was a provisional government under General S
n
tescu, which lasted just ten weeks. The Soviets were keen to dismiss this government for the simple reason that the Communists held very few positions of any power in it. S
n
tescu was vulnerable on a couple of counts. Firstly, he had great difficulty in meeting Soviet demands for reparations, which led to accusations that he was reneging on his commitments as laid out in the armistice agreement.
⁵
But his true downfall lay in his failure to purge ‘fascist elements’ from society. In the first six weeks after the August coup, according to a report by the American Office of Strategic Services, only eight Romanian officials were dismissed for collaboration with the Germans.
⁶
While a handful of senior intelligence officers were arrested, the vast majority of the state security apparatus remained untouched. Worse still, former members of the fascist militia, the Iron Guard, could still be seen in Bucharest’s bars and hotels ‘boasting that no Government would dare to touch them’.
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Some cabinet members did call for the immediate establishment of a tribunal for the trial of war criminals, but these calls were dropped when Iuliu Maniu raised legalistic objections. The Peasant Party leader claimed that his opposition to such a purge was in order to avoid further bloodshed, but there were widespread suspicions that he was really just trying to avoid anything that would cause thousands of former Iron Guards to switch their allegiance to the Communists overnight.
⁸

Some sections of the population were understandably infuriated by such inaction, which made even the feeble purge in Italy look effective by comparison. The Romanian Communists capitalized on this popular anger, and did their best to stoke it up further. On 8 October they organized their first large demonstration in Bucharest, with some 60,000 protestors amassing in the city centre to demand that S
n
tescu and his government resign. A large number of the protestors were undoubtedly genuine – but the Communists also used their influence within the trade unions to coerce more people to attend.
⁹

Under pressure from both the Soviets and internal forces, General S
n
tescu resigned on 2 November. However, he was immediately asked by the king to form a new caretaker government until an election could be organized. S
n
tescu’s new government contained more posts for the Communists, the most important of which was the appointment of their leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, as Minister of Transport. The Communist stooge Petru Groza, leader of the Ploughman’s Party, was made vice-premier. However, the all-important Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the country’s police forces, stayed with the National Peasant Party. Much to the disgust of the Communist Party it was awarded to Nicolae Penescu, who was fervently anti-Soviet. In an attempt to discredit the new Interior Minister, more demonstrations were organized, in which protestors were given the specific instruction to chant ‘Down with Penescu’.
¹⁰
Such agitation increased steadily as the Communists tightened their grip on the trade unions, using both rhetoric and coercion to mobilize more and more people.