Roosevelt (95 page)

Most studies of the New Deal and foreign affairs stress the detail of foreign policy; a comprehensive analysis of Roosevelt as foreign policy maker and of the political considerations that dominated his actions is badly needed. Excellent studies are available on the mechanics and the politics of foreign policy making in general. For well conceived and researched accounts of the governmental institutions and political forces that Presidents must deal with in foreign policy making, see Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr.,
American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) and Robert A. Dahl,
Congress and Foreign Policy
(Harcourt, Brace, 1950). A highly original study of rigidities and fluidities in popular and elitist
attitudes on foreign policy, and one that makes considerable use of socio-psychological studies, is Gabriel A. Almond,
The American People and Foreign Policy
(Harcourt, Brace, 1950). Thomas A. Bailey,
The Man in the Street
(Macmillan, 1948) is a series of wise, witty, and wide-ranging essays on the impact of popular attitudes on foreign policy by a leading student of American diplomatic history. The quotation of Roosevelt on page 248 is from letter to Harry Emerson Fosdick, PPF 21, FDRL.

Good Neighbors and Good Fences.
My analysis of Roosevelt’s foreign policy is based in general on Hull (B) and on Moley (B); Nevins [chap. 8]; Beard (B), a necessary corrective to glorified treatments of Roosevelt’s “world-minded” foreign policy during his first term, but one that suffers from Beard’s ruggedly isolationist views and from a stubborn insistence on seeing more continuity and design in Roosevelt’s foreign policies than actually existed; C. Tansill (B), which, whatever its controversial thesis, has the great virtue of being based on exceptionally wide sources, including files of the State Department; and, not least, Donald F. Whitehead, “The Making of Foreign Policy during President Roosevelt’s First Term, 1933-1937” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1951), which amply documents his (and my) proposition that Roosevelt followed no master plan or set strategy but rather day-to-day policies of expediency. In PSF at FDRL valuable material is available on Roosevelt’s relations with Hull, David, Welles, his envoys abroad, and others; further material is widely distributed in PPF, OF, and other files. Ickes (B) and Hull supply useful data on the World Court, and Perkins (B) does so on the I.L.O. Hull is especially informative on the Good Neighbor policy; for an authoritative yet readable history of the Monroe Doctrine, see Dexter Perkins,
Hands Off
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1941).

Storm Clouds and Storm Cellars.
Leonard W. Doob,
Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique
(Holt, 1935) contains an illuminating section on the Nye Committee that is also a tribute to the capacity of a disinterested student of propaganda to see the propaganda implications of a committee with which he himself was associated. The whole story on Nye’s selection as chairman of the committee is not known, but Roosevelt’s passive role seems clear, and his close relations with the progressive and isolationist Republicans help explain his attitude; see also Hull, p. 398, and Connally and Steinberg (B), pp. 211-214. John C. Donovan, “Congress and the Making of Neutrality Legislation, 1935-1939” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1949), emphasizes the relation between the arms inquiry and isolationist feeling. Pittman’s grudging cooperation with the White House and his fear of presidential discretion are shown in the Pittman file, PPF 745, FDRL. On the matter of neutrality generally, see OF 1561, FDRL. Excerpts from internal State Department communications on the approaching Ethiopian invasion, including Long’s dismemberment proposals, are found in Tansill (B); on Long’s earlier view of Italy and fascism, see OF 447, FDRL. Some of the more important of Roosevelt’s letters on Italy are available in PLFDR (his letter to Hull, misdated August 29, 1935, in PLFDR, was actually dated August 20, 1935). Both Ickes
¹
,
op. cit.
, p. 450, and Sherwood (B), p. 79, agree on Roosevelt’s strong sympathy with Ethiopia. As for United States
relations with the League on Ethiopia, Tansill argues but does not establish that Hull and Roosevelt were actually trying to strengthen the League against Italy. My main sources for this period are Hull and Tansill, and an astute contemporary account, Allen W. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
Can We Be Neutral?
(Harper, 1936). Ickes and Hull both suggest that the Administration was ill-prepared for the Hoare-Laval denouement.

The Law of the Jungle.
For data on Roosevelt’s discouragement over the world situation in early 1936, see Ickes
¹
, pp. 479, 514, and PLFDR, p. 555. On the difference between Roosevelt’s public position close to the isolationists and his private position close to the internationalists, especially his cautious policies on neutrality as compared with private expressions, see, for example, Moley, pp. 377-378; Minutes of the Executive Council,
passim
; PLFDR, page 547; Roosevelt to J. David Stern, Dec. 11, 1935, PPF 1039, FDRL. The following are especially useful on developments in Germany: William E. Dodd, Jr. and Martha Dodd (eds.),
Ambassador Dodd’s Diary
(Harcourt, Brace, 1941); William E. Dodd Papers, LC; Frederick L. Schuman,
The Nazi Dictatorship
(Knopf, 1939); and Winston Churchill,
The Second World War
, Vol. I,
The Gathering Storm
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948). On Japan, see Joseph C. Grew,
Turbulent Era
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).

The Politician as Foreign Policy Maker.
So consistently did Roosevelt reflect a moderately isolationist view in his public pronouncements that Beard could fill page after page with quotations from Roosevelt along that line; of course, Beard’s method of emphasizing public statements and paying little attention to political pressures and complexities made difficult an understanding of Roosevelt’s real position. For Roosevelt’s “without entanglements” statement, see PPAFDR, Vol. IV, p. 346. C. Richard Cleary, “Congress, the Executive, and Neutrality: 1935-1940” (Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1953), sees the possibility that Roosevelt was not clear about neutrality in his own mind, aside from the political difficulties of public statements; I would stress that Roosevelt’s public position affected his private stand and caused some unrealism and confusion, for Cleary also finds much data showing that Roosevelt at no time strongly favored the isolationist concept of neutrality. “Roosevelt’s retreat into obscure and ambiguous generalities” Cleary sees as reflecting not confusion but an attempt to cloak his basic disagreement with Congress; I think that both elements were involved. PPAFDR, Vol. IV, pp. 460-461, records both Roosevelt’s and King’s statements on signing the trade agreement, including the latter’s reminder that it carefully safeguarded every interest. For further sources and ideas on the problem of the democratic politician dealing with the needs of political leadership, see bibliographies for chapters 18 and 19.

Mrs. McCormick’s description of Roosevelt is from
The New York Times Magazine
, June 21, 1936, page 1. The picture of the President at work and in his various other activities is drawn from Tully, Ickes, Moley,
Perkins (all B), and other works cited. Gundier’s notes on a press conference are reprinted in his
Roosevelt in Retrospect
(B), pp. 21-22; and Ickes’ intimate glimpse is taken from his
Diary
(B), Vol. I, pp. 421-422. Ickes’ later changed impression is evident in the subsequent volumes of his diaries; see also Frances Perkins, and Lindley
²
(B), both cited above, and Molly Dewson’s unpublished autobiography, FDRL. The Roosevelt-Moley quarrel is narrated both in Moley, pp. 345-346, and in Rosenman {B), p. 105. A useful volume on the kitchen cabinet is Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner,
Men Around the President
(Doubleday, Doran, 1939).

The Politics of the Deed.
Dependable information on the impact of New Deal programs on the American people is surprisingly hard to come by. For data on recovery I have relied largely on the statistical tables in Mitchell,
Depression Decade
[chap. 7]. My unemployment figures are a rough average of his data showing estimates from eleven different sources; unemployment figures are notoriously unreliable, especially in this period, because of the difficulties of collecting data and of defining unemployment, among other reasons. Early’s memorandum to the N.E.C. can be found in OF 788, FDRL, dated Feb. 24, 1936. Roosevelt’s indecision on campaign tactics early in 1936 is pictured in Moley and in Ickes. For the 1936 legislative session see O. R. Altman [chap. 12], pp. 1086-1107. Max Lerner, reporting from Washington, noted Roosevelt’s unaggressiveness on the corporate surplus tax, in
The Nation
, May 27, 1936, pp. 669-671; on housing legislation, see PPF 67, FDRL; on this session of Congress generally, see OF 598 and OF 1650, FDRL. Data on the organizing and financing of the Good Neighbor League can be found in PPF 1792, PSF 17, and OF 300 (Democratic National Committee), all in FDRL. I have relied largely on Moley in describing Roosevelt’s attitudes and indecision in the spring of 1936. See Cantril,
Public Opinion
(B), pp. 590 ff., for public opinion polling data on popular attitudes toward Roosevelt during 1936. OF 1663, FDRL, relates especially to third parties in 1936, including rumors that the Al Smith Democratic faction might set up a third party.

“I Accept the Commission …”
Even the main participants in the 1936 Democratic convention pay it little attention in their memoirs, but Farley
¹
(B), Rosenman, and Ickes
¹
provide some data. The official source is
Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention
(Washington, D. C, 1936). Roosevelt’s exclamations to Mack, taken down by a stenographer, are found both in Tully and in PSF 16, FDRL. Both Moley and Rosenman report on the preparation of the acceptance speech. Michael F. Reilly and William J. Slocum,
Reilly of the White House
(Simon and Schuster, 1947) relates in detail the incident of Roosevelt’s fall at Philadelphia. PPF 16, FDRL, provides some material on labor’s participation in the 1936 campaign; for a fuller treatment see the detailed examination in William H. Riker, “The CIO in Politics, 1936-1946” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1948). Roosevelt’s personal handling of campaign detail is shown in PPF 236 and 3565, and in OF 300 (Democratic National Committee), Special Correspondence, James A. Farley, Box 96, FDRL. OF 200-EE contains a stenographic transcript of the conferences with governors during the drought inspection trip; there are
indications that Roosevelt was specially briefed to talk with Landon about pond water. According to memoranda in PSF 17, FDRL, the La Follette brothers late in July urged on Roosevelt a drought conference toward the end both of planning a drought program and of compelling Landon to take a definite stand on drought relief; there was, however, some opposition to the idea at the White House.

“We Have Only Just Begun to Fight.”
Reliable information on political maneuvers, especially intraparty maneuvers, in most states is not available in any abundance. On Idaho I have used PPF 2358, FDRL (the Borah file, which includes correspondence relating to 1936); OF 300, Box 96, FDRL; and a discerning, sympathetic biography, Claudius O. Johnson,
Borah of Idaho
(Longmans, Green, 1936). On Norris, two excellent biographies treat extensively his relations with Roosevelt: Richard L. Neuberger and Stephen B. Kahn,
Integrity
(Vanguard Press, 1937), and Alfred Lief,
Democracy’s Norris
(Stackpole Sons, 1939); see also PPF 880, FDRL; Democratic National Campaign Committee (1936), Box 12, FDRL; Hopkins Papers; and Roosevelt’s speech endorsing Norris, PPAFDR, Vol. V, pp. 431-439. On the political situation in Wisconsin and Minnesota see memorandum Leo Crowley to McIntyre, Sept. 8, 1936, PPF 6659, FDRL; on Minnesota see Arthur Naftalin, “A History of the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1948). On the advice to Roosevelt to break off relations with the Soviet Union see PPF 4075, FDRL. The quotation from the Beards is from their
America in Midpassage
[chap. 5], p. 326. Ickes mentions Roosevelt’s comment on the New England crowds, Vol. I, p. 695; so does Richberg
¹
(B), p. 205. My excerpts from the Madison Square Garden speech are taken not from PPA but from a recording of the speech at FDRL. Miss Tully reports, p. 214, that Roosevelt late in the campaign dictated this speech quickly and emphatically “because he felt strongly.” The Williams College Library has a collection of 1936 campaign propaganda.

Roosevelt as a Political Tactician.
Molly Dewson quotes Roosevelt on his catlike qualities in her unpublished autobiography, FDRL. His sense of the shifting qualities of American public opinion has been vindicated in Almond’s study [chap. 13], among other works. On Roosevelt’s sense of timing see Rosenman, p. 99, and Ickes
¹
, p. 602. On Roosevelt’s use of polls, see OF 857; on his use of trial balloons, see Creel (B), pp. 289 ff. The story about Lewis’s campaign contribution is also from Creel, pp. 297-302. The examples of political detail are from OF 200 and PPF 4128, FDRL. Roosevelt’s comment on attacking the Republican leaders is from Rosenman, pp. 41, 129. My only sources for Roosevelt’s expression of concern over the decreased Republican opposition in Congress are Turner Catledge, the New York
Times
, November 8, 1936, Sect. 4, p. 4, and
Newsweek
, Nov. 14, 1936, p. 13. Roosevelt commented on the election results in a letter to Josephus Daniels, Nov. 9, 1936, PPF 86, FDRL; see also Hopkins to Miss LeHand, Nov. 14, 1936, OF 1113, FDRL. The nature of Roosevelt’s class support in 1936 has received considerable attention. The Gallup polls, and the failure in 1936 (but not in 1932) of the
Literary Digest
poll, which relied largely on lists of car owners and telephone users, have led to the general assumption that a relatively sharp
class cleavage existed; on this see Edward G. Benson and Paul Perry, “Analysis of Democratic-Republican Strength by Population Groups,”
Public Opinion Quarterly
, Vol. IV, No. 3, September 1940, pp. 464-473. Some doubt on the matter is thrown by William F. Ogburn and Lolagene C. Coombs, “The Economic Factor in the Roosevelt Elections,”
The American Political Science Review
, Vol. XXXIV, 1940, p. 719. For treatments of particular areas, see Harold F. Gosnell and William G. Colman, “Political Trends in Industrial America: Pennsylvania as Example,”
Public Opinion Quarterly,
Vol. IV, No. 3, September 1940, pp. 473-486; Gerhart H. Saenger, “Social Status and Political Behavior,”
American Journal of Sociology
, Vol. LI, No. 2, September 1945, pp. 103-113; and, for a more long-range study, Samuel J. Eldersveld,
A Study of Urban Electoral Trends in Michigan, 1920-1940
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1946). The “rule of economy in politics” is from the brilliant and pioneering study of American political processes by E. E. Schattschneider [chap. 10], p. 96. Roosevelt’s misgivings about European developments are found in a letter to James M. Cox, Dec. 9, 1936, PPF 53, FDRL, as well as in one to Eleanor Roosevelt, Nov. 30, 1936, PLFDR, p. 635.