Operation Dark Heart (40 page)

ESTABLISH A REAL PEACE PROCESS

The most important thing we must do to win the conflict in Afghanistan is to find a path to reduce the violent conflict to a level of social competition—and to do this we must learn from the Northern Ireland Peace Process. We are naïve and setting ourselves up for failure to believe we can resolve the current Afghani issues within an 18–24 month period. I also believe if we walk away now, our problems will not only follow us home, they will be made worse by our inattention.

President Karzai recently proposed that senior members of the Taliban be exiled. This is the wrong answer. The Black Taliban (the most committed) must be allowed to return to the political process of the country in some form, or else the process is doomed before it starts. Exiling them will only permit them to fundraise and plot terrorist attacks, and ultimately, violent revolution that would lead to their return to power.

We must focus on methods to reduce the current regional war/insurgency to the level of sporadic conflict and then ultimately transmute violent conflict into civil and sustainable competition conducted through the political process. This is why Northern Ireland is an excellent example to study. The peace process there began to take hold in 1992–1993, with serious political negotiations for the next decade. There were setbacks and terrorist attacks during this period, but the process proceeded.

One of the most direct parallels between Afghanistan/Pakistan and Northern Ireland is that the Republic of Ireland was the safe haven and source of terrorists’ material and logistical support. Pakistan is now playing the same role for Afghanistan. In Northern Ireland, the Omagh bombing of August 15, 1998, became one of the most decisive points in the conflict. It resulted in 29 deaths and 220 injuries. In this horrific attack nine children, a woman pregnant with twins, and people from multiple Christian faiths were murdered. Afterward, the Republic of Ireland stopped terrorist organizations from using its land as a safe haven and ensured that terrorists could not receive material support. The loss of that safe haven was a crucial point in their progress on the path to the present peace. Similarly, the elimination of safe havens in Pakistan is a critical step toward forcing the Taliban into real negotiations and into a sustainable political process.

Northern Ireland is prospering and both sides—the loyalists and the republicans—live in peace. Belfast is now a center for economic development. Yes, there are still periodic terrorism incidents (the Real IRA conducted an attack in March 2010 against MI5 that caused no casualties and only material damage), but the process has worked and is working.

In addition to the “carrot” of economic development, there is still the “stick” of force. There are still police garrisons around the city (mostly toned down in the cityscape), and the ability of the authorities to call in overwhelming military force that can be deployed within a four hour period.

Former enemies now live side by side in peace. I heard an account of how two of these men, from opposite sides, will not talk to each other as they pass in the halls of the Northern Ireland Assembly—but they no longer work to kill each other, either.

We need to look at how this path from “conflict to competition” worked and how we can apply it. “Victory” in Afghanistan will need to look a whole lot like what we see in Northern Ireland, and less like Iraq.

ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSE OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY:
THE PAKISTANI-INDIAN COLD WAR

The real reason the ISI and the Pakistani army will only go so far in supporting the United States and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan has nothing to do with Afghanistan, and everything to do with their perception of security, and their need to ensure that the Indians do not gain advantage through Afghanistan. The Taliban have been used as an active extension of national will by elements of the ISI and Pakistani army, much like Hezbollah has been used by the Iranians as an extension of their national power. We must accept the Pakistani perception of their self-interest and security as being focused on its regional nuclear competitor, India, and work from there.

The primary focus of the U.S. diplomatic effort must be to reduce tensions between Pakistan and India. There are ways that the United States can participate and ensure regional stability by direct engagement and real reforms that would allow for a lowering of tensions between the two countries. America must create incentives for the Pakistani government (and the ISI and army) to stop its support of the Taliban. As long as the ISI and Pakistani army continue to provide material support to the Taliban, Afghanistan will not be secure. The Taliban is a tapestry of organizations and there is no single “point” within its structure that could be targeted to affect the whole of the structure, however, if you are able to cut off funding, logistics, and operational support, they will eventually fade in their effectiveness and be forced into a political process.

By extension of this logic, as long as the Taliban exists in fragments and are not fully controlled by the Pakistani government, there is the likelihood that they will continue to pursue their attacks against Pakistani targets and even pursue stealing nuclear weapons (as they and al Qaeda have stated as one of their operational objectives). It is clear that should the Taliban obtain a nuclear weapon and are able to find the expertise needed to move it and explode it, there is little doubt they would do so. The United States or an ISAF member nation would be the target of such a device.

THE PRICE OF FAILURE

The consequences of our failure in Afghanistan and throughout the region would be massive. It would take several things going catastrophically wrong—perhaps not right away, but within three to five years of our troops departing. The degrees of consequence will vary, but ultimately, the price of failure will be another 9/11 attack or series of attacks that will dwarf the original in destructive effect and loss of life by orders of magnitude.

First, the central government of Afghanistan could lose whatever tenuous control it has of the country. The army and national police would quickly fail and become completely ineffective in maintaining civil order in any form. While the Taliban may not be able to take control of the country, they will be strong enough to keep the entire country destabilized and ensure that their allies, such as al Qaeda, can resurge into the country.

Second, with the ability to move with impunity within Afghanistan and through the Swat Valley in northwest Pakistan, there would be a rapid increase of jihadist strength and audacity, and they would move on the Pakistani central government. If economic conditions remain poor in Pakistan, the chances of a successful coup or other radical and violent change of elected government would occur, and the Pakistani army would attempt to come to the rescue, as it has several times before, to stabilize the central government, and by extension, the entire country. In this case, in this post-U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, they would not have sufficient forces to take control. That is because the leadership ranks of the army, formerly filled by Punjabi officers, would not be able to sustain control even of the Punjabi because minorities now make up a larger proportion of the Pakistani army and do not have the same commitment to stability. The army, too, would fall into chaos.

The security measures around the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would continue to degrade, and eventually, one or more of the country’s nuclear weapons would be obtained by one of the radical elements. This weapon would be moved, via a network of conspirators, out of Pakistan and to one of a dozen potential targets. Yes, there would be massive efforts to find and contain these weapons, but if even one makes it to a Western target, there is a potential for huge property damage and thousands killed.

Many feel that this view is alarmist and that this scenario could never take place.

Nevertheless, many believed that the Shah of Iran would never fall and that Iran would always remain an ally of the United States. History proves that with the right leadership and circumstances, radical groups can be successful in taking control of nation states. There is no reason to believe that Pakistan is somehow immune from radical change because there are radical elements operating there—and operating, even now, with great effectiveness.

We must be vigilant and realistic, and craft a path to victory. If we don’t, we will, as a nation, suffer the consequences. We need to make the correct choices
now
to shape the future. These are costs that neither we, nor our children, should have to bear.

INDEX

The index that appeared in the print version of this title does not match the pages in your eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below.

Abizaid, John Philip

Able Danger

9/11 attacks and

9/11 Commission and

Atta and

Brooklyn cell

Dark Heart compared with

data mining

initial involvement in

*** *** and

Schoonmaker and

Abrams, Creighton

Abu Ghraib prison

ADVON (advanced operations)

Afghanistan.
See also specific places

heading into

how to win.
See
winning in Afghanistan

second voyage to

Afghan Militia Forces (AMF)

Afghan National Army

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al Qaeda

Able Danger.
See
Able Danger

Brooklyn cell

in Federally Administered Tribal Area

goals against

Nairobi embassy bombing

9/11 attacks (2001)

Operation Dark Heart.
See
Operation Dark Heart

Operation Winter Strike

in sub-Saharan Africa

Task Force 1099.
See
Task Force 1099

Task Force Stratus Ivy

videotape propaganda

World Trade Center bombing (1993)

Al Qaeda Hotel

Amanpour, Christiane

American Airlines Flight 11

AMF (Afghan Militia Forces)

Anderson, Mike

Apocalypse Now
(movie)

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Army Rangers

by-name request

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Army Reserve

Asadabad

asymmetric warfare

Atta, Mohamed

Ault, Colonel Robert

Austin, Lloyd James, III

Bagby, Byron S.

Bagram

Disney Boulevard

improvised explosive device

Russian Road

secret prison

Bagram Air Base

Bagram Collection Point (BCP)

Baldwin, Alec

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Barno, David

Operation Dark Heart

Operation Shadow Matrix

BDUs (battle-dress uniforms)

beards

Beatles, the

Beatty, Ned

Big Bad John
(movie)

bin Laden, Osama

Black Hawk helicopters