Operation Dark Heart (39 page)

We can win in Afghanistan, but the emphasis here is “we.”

We (the United States) will never win this war in the conventional military sense. We must also abandon this notion.

The victory must be one that resembles the conclusion of World War II—with all participants sharing in the success. This victory should include the warlords, the people and tribes of Afghanistan, the people of Pakistan, and our NATO/ISAF allies. Let’s not forget, “we,” the United States, did not win in Afghanistan in 2001. It was the Northern Alliance, with some operational support from us that resulted in that victory. We must accept this—embrace this—and move back to focus on how to get “us,” the United States, out of the middle.

In the larger context of the international “we,” we cannot think of winning in Afghanistan without winning in Pakistan. To win in each country requires careful strategic considerations and actions, and a complete departure from the current, clearly failing, strategy.

Here are my thoughts on how to achieve victory:

ESTABLISH A TRUE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

To win in Afghanistan without winning in Pakistan is not possible. After all, the Pashtu tribe saddles the border, and there is no such thing as an Afghan-Pakistan border for either the Taliban or al Qaeda—or what remains of it—as well as for the Pashtun people who inhabit the area. There is only the land that the indigenous Pashtun population—including the native members of the Taliban—has known for thousands of years. We also know that the Taliban “intel net” stretches from Bagram all the way into the interior of Pakistan. We need to understand these facts, and accept that the Taliban have created a “shadow government” that now touches the lives of virtually every Afghan in one way or another. Then we need to adjust our strategy around this understanding.

We must create the “Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces—Afghanistan-Pakistan,” and name an Allied Forces commander who would have command and control over all military forces, including Afghan and Pakistani forces, on
both
sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. We need to have one commander who can conduct operations on both sides in real time, with unity of command and control. We must have the military equivalent of a hammer and anvil.

Radical? Yes. Huge issues of sovereignty and national pride of all the nations involved will have to be addressed and managed, just as they were during World War II when everyone had to swallow their pride and focus on the common adversary. The bottom line here is this: We need a commander who can exercise supreme authority, just as we did when the supreme commander was created during World War II; all countries within the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces—Europe (SHAEF) performed under Dwight D. Eisenhower. That is what it will take to win here. Granted, this is only the military fight. It doesn’t include the civil fight—the hearts-and-minds fight—but it’s a start.

Eisenhower would not have been successful in Europe if he was told, “You can conduct all the operations you want in France—but leave Germany to the Russians.” For that matter, General Douglas MacArthur would not have been successful in the Pacific if he was told to go only as far as the Solomon Islands and leave the rest to the British.

Once unity of command is established, we will require a much smaller operational force footprint. Combat units will be able, due to the fact that truly synchronized operations can occur on both sides of the border, to focus on achievable objectives. I believe we could cut U.S. troop strengths in half through gains in efficiency and by enabling our Afghan and Pakistani allies to work in synchronization under the guidance of a supreme commander.

We can make this “SHAEF—Afghanistan-Pakistan” of a limited time duration (perhaps two years with options to renew), and limit the scope of operations (to only the Federally Administered Tribal Areas). No matter, it has to be a real military force, with real teeth, able to conduct combined missions.

We must change the very fabric of the types and numbers of combat forces engaged in the conflict—more on this later.

APPOINT A LEADER WHO IS A COMBINATION OF
ULYSSES S. GRANT AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Someone who is respected by both sides, Afghan and Pakistani, a man who is permitted to run both sides of the border as a unified command—and who is out to win.

Let’s examine these two different leadership types for a moment within the context of their eras.

General Grant was dogged in his pursuit and containment of his adversary, as well as committed to finishing the Civil War with a victory. The Civil War was one that could well have ended without a Northern victory; there was talk (and it was the South’s military objective) of a negotiated peace in which the South would have remained an independent country. Grant was selected not because of his pedigree or his politics, but because he could win—and he did.

As for General Eisenhower, his brilliance was in being a master organizer, diplomat, and politician. He understood the concept of cooperation and was able to organize the Allied forces to focus on a single purpose: defeat of the Germans.

Will General David Petraeus be given this authority? Is he the right leader to perform this mission and achieve positive results? Could he be the hybrid of Eisenhower and Grant if the border can go away and he can be given the authority to win? I’d like to believe so.

CREATE AN INTERNAL OPERATIONAL POLICY
FRAMEWORK—THE INTERNAL DEFENSE AND
DEVELOPMENT (IDAD) PROGRAM

Take lessons from General Creighton Abram’s IDAD program from the Vietnam era, whose goal was to eliminate the Vietcong in South Vietnam. The problem then—as now—was that the back door was not closed, so there was an endless resupply of insurgents coming in to replenish the Vietcong from North Vietnam since Laos and Cambodia remained safe havens for the insurgents. (Sound familiar?) The IDAD would create a framework for local units to work in their region, but coordinate in an interlocking and synchronized way, and this would have to be done
without
regard to the international border. Units would have to work in full synchronization at the local level. In Vietnam, this format was not fully successful because the spigot of insurgents was not turned off. This time, we need to turn off the spigot.

We must look at enhancing our relationships with the leadership of the thirty-four provinces of Afghanistan. We cannot count on, or become part of (in perception or reality) the central Afghan government—we are not President Karzai and he is not us.

We can (and should) reduce our operational footprint back to 2003–2004 levels, and focus our efforts at the local level, using Special Forces elements (from all nations), and step away from the use of conventional forces. Yes, their activities should be centrally coordinated, but one of the problems we have been up against is the misguided attempts to foist upon the country a central government that cannot function due to both cultural issues and corruption.

Special Forces teams are best suited for this type of warfare. They can run clinics and conduct training during the day, and advise and assist the Afghans (and Pakistanis under a supreme allied command) in conducting military operations at night. We need to put the war effort squarely back onto the shoulders of the Afghans (and the Pakistanis on their side of the border), and limit our role to surgical military strikes focused on specific terrorist targets. We must replace conventional forces with true special operations forces who understand how to conduct the full spectrum of operations at the local level. We must not take on the appearance of an army of occupation.

We should train, advise, and equip the Afghan Army, Air Force, and National Police (and the same on the Pakistani side of the border if necessary), but we should not do their job for them. The best way to address this is by decentralized execution by small units. We do not need a dozen general officers in Afghanistan with layers of bureaucracy; we need one corps level commander, with smart colonels, and the appropriately trained special operations soldiers, to help bring regional stability.

CONTROL THE BORDER

This must also be done at the local level, from Afghan border policemen to Pakistani border policemen. We must help both countries create a professional, uncorrupted force. Again, think strategically, but encourage and guide action locally. This may mean strategic teams working directly with border units, but we need to advise and assist—and make them do the work. Border guards on both sides of the border should talk daily, see each other, and work together to control the territory against insurgents.

FOCUS ON A PROGRAM TO REDUCE ALL VIOLENCE
IN THE LIVES OF THE CITIZENS—EVEN
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE

Make sure that every act of violence on our part is backed up by good intelligence and an understanding of the expected outcome—best case and worst case. As we all know, some commanders are too willing to accept “collateral damage” in their directed attack. Would any commander make such brash decisions if he were ordering an air strike on insurgents operating within his hometown in the United States? I think not.

With the correct unified command and control as the overarching strategy, and with an emphasis on fixing things at the local level without regard to the border, we can help shape the future toward the elimination of violence. This reduction in violence against the civilian population must occur on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The Predator drone program in its current focus is not bringing us closer to victory, and is helping to create a whole new generation of radicals who will likely turn to terrorism as a method of revenge. The use of deadly force, especially when you are shooting through a straw at targets half a planet away, must be applied with precision, not at random. When we take out one terrorist, and kill three civilians in the process, you have only added to the problem. By this killing of innocents you have now created the potential for twelve terrorists (the family members of both the terrorist you killed and the newly created radicals who will self-recruit based on the killing of their family member).

RADICALLY RETHINK OUR ANALYTICAL APPROACH

We need to comprehend and evaluate our adversary through his eyes—not ours. We must understand our enemy to defeat our enemy. He certainly seems to have our number.

We continue to use a twenty-first century lexicon with Western conceptual overlays in dealing with this region of tribes and families. Constant mistakes are made because we put Western cultural filters on top of a tenth-century situation and react with Western tendencies that often antagonize the very people we are trying to help. Why has the $25 million reward for the capture of Osama bin Laden remained uncollected? Because the people who protect him and support him have no concept of $25 million. It means nothing to them. This is what is called a “clue” in the intelligence business.

We do better when we deal with cultures similar to ours. At the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, I teach a class on World War II and use Operation Body Guard as an example of brilliant deception that was successful because of a clear understanding of the German mind-set and culture. Operation Body Guard was designed to keep the Germans from finding out that the Normandy beaches, not Pas de Calais, were to be the D-day point of attack. Pas de Calais was the location Hitler judged would be the place, and that bad judgment was reinforced through double agents, false radio broadcasts, and a general manipulation of the perceptions of the Germans.

That was the key to the success of both Body Guard, and the path it made to the D-day invasion: We understood the Germans, and we could manipulate them because their culture and method of filtering information was not dissimilar from the Allies.

No such luck in today’s war. We are dealing with an adversary who lives in a tribal culture that has not changed much since the tenth century. We have to accept the adversary for what he is, trapped in that mind-set in which international borders are not recognized and much of what he sees is filtered through religious extremism.

Let’s not forget that this is
not
a battle against an organized army. This is to win the soul of a people, some of whom have been seduced by the siren call of a faction of a religion that will kill anyone, even other devout followers, simply because they do not share the same radical view. We need to understand the mechanisms the radicals use and break the cycle by replacing it with something that will draw them into the mainstream of their belief system. Simply creating “conditions for success” with enhanced security and economic progress is not enough. We have to become involved in helping to shape and improve the message of the true Muslim faith.

CHANGE OUR LOGISTICAL FOOTPRINT

It is far too large and tends to alienate the very people we are trying to help. Western culture offends the local population. Let us be realistic and examine the real “thorns” that do not give us any operational advantage and wind up serving as cultural blemishes. We do not need to have Burger Kings on our bases. We do not need to build America in Afghanistan; we end up putting creature comforts in places that net us nothing.

Don’t get me wrong. Our troops deserve the best. I did not enjoy living in a tent in Bagram for six months, but it kept me focused and it made me want to get the job done and get home—not hang out at the base Starbucks and talk about how great the food is at the new Romeo’s Pizza.

FOLLOW THE MONEY

Much warfare can be conducted at the basic level without money, and it has been that way for thousands of years. However, the enemy cannot conduct operations against a modern military, like that of the Pakistanis or the United States, without technology. Basic material, such as telephones, guns, and logistical support, are necessities. Target these necessities, and follow where the money comes from and goes to. We have not done this well, and since the drug trade has not been greatly affected, we need to understand how the money is moved and spent by the Taliban.