53
“Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 24, 1972, 5:15–8:05 p.m.,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed.,
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976,
vol. 17,
China 1969–1972
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 766.
54
Talbott, trans. and ed.,
Khrushchev Remembers,
265.
Chapter 7: A Decade of Crises
1
Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–1957,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed.,
The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 74.
2
Jonathan Spence,
The Search for Modern China
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 541–42.
3
Lorenz M. Lüthi,
The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 76.
5
For an elaboration of this point, and of the links between Mao’s foreign and domestic policies, see Chen Jian,
Mao’s China and the Cold War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 6–15.
6
Grim accounts of this singularly destructive episode are available in Jasper Becker,
Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine
(New York: Henry Holt, 1998); and Frederick C. Teiwes,
China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward, 1955–1959
(Armonk, N.Y.: East Gate, 1998).
7
Neville Maxwell,
India’s China War
(Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 37.
8
John W. Garver, “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds.,
New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 106.
16
“Workers of All Countries Unite, Oppose Our Common Enemy: December 15, 1962” (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962) (reprint of editorial from
Renmin Ribao
[
People’s Daily
])
.
18
Pravda,
April 5, 1964, as quoted in Hemen Ray,
Sino-Soviet Conflict over India: An Analysis of the Causes of Conflict Between Moscow and Beijing over India Since 1949
(New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1986), 106.
19
John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman,
China: A New History,
2nd enlarged edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 392.
20
Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenals,
Mao’s Last Revolution
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 87–91.
21
Mark Gayn, “China Convulsed,”
Foreign Affairs
45, issue 2 (January 1967): 247, 252.
22
Renmin Ribao
[
People’s Daily
] (Beijing), January 31, 1967, at 6, as cited in Tao-tai Hsia and Constance A. Johnson, “Legal Developments in China Under Deng’s Leadership” (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Far Eastern Law Division, 1984), 9.
23
Anne F. Thurston,
Enemies of the People
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), 101–3; MacFarquhar and Schoenals,
Mao’s Last Revolution,
118–20.
24
MacFarquhar and Schoenals,
Mao’s Last Revolution,
224–27.
26
See Chapter 14, “Reagan and the Advent of Normalcy,” page 400.
28
John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,”
Foreign Affairs
36, no. 1 (October 1957): 50.
29
Wu Lengxi, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen,” in Li, Chen, and Wilson, eds., “Mao Zedong’s Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958,”
CWIHP Bulletin
6/7, 208.
30
Yafeng Xia,
Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 109–14, 234; Noam Kochavi,
A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 101–14.
31
Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy: July 12, 1966,” no. 325,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), book 2, 719–20.
32
Xia,
Negotiating with the Enemy,
117–31.
33
“Communist China: 6 December 1960,”
National Intelligence Estimate,
no. 13–60, 2–3.
34
Li Jie, “Changes in China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. Relations,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds.,
Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 302.
Chapter 8: The Road to Reconciliation
1
Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,”
Foreign Affairs
46, no. 1 (October 1967): 121.
3
Edgar Snow, “Interview with Mao,”
The New Republic
152, no. 9, issue 2623 (February 27, 1965): 21–22.
4
The extent of Chinese support is shown in the records of recently declassified conversations between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders. For a compilation of key conversations with editorial commentary, see Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1998). For an analysis of the People’s Republic’s involvement in Hanoi’s wars with France and the United States, see Qiang Zhai,
China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
5
Zhang Baijia, “China’s Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds.,
Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 201.
6
Snow, “Interview with Mao,” 22.
8
Yawei Liu, “Mao Zedong and the United States: A Story of Misperceptions,” in Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong, eds.,
Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 202.
9
Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address at Johns Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest: April 7, 1965,” no. 172,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 395.
10
“Text of Rusk’s Statement to House Panel on U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,”
New York Times
(April 17, 1966), accessed at ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851–2007).
11
Liu, “Mao Zedong and the United States,” 203.
12
Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69,”
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.
15
As described by Donald Zagoria in a farsighted article in 1968, an influential cross-section of the Chinese leadership, including Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, favored a conditional reconciliation with Moscow. In a conclusion that outpaced the analysis of many observers, Zagoria suggested that strategic necessities would ultimately drive China toward reconciliation with the United States. Donald S. Zagoria, “The Strategic Debate in Peking,” in Tang Tsou, ed.,
China in Crisis
, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
16
Chen and Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos,” 161.
17
Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao,
trans. Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), 514.
18
Richard Nixon, “Inaugural Address: January 20, 1969,” no. 1,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 3.
19
See Henry Kissinger,
White House Years
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 168.
20
Chen Jian,
Mao’s China and the Cold War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 245–46.
21
Chen and Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos,” 166.
25
Xiong Xianghui, “The Prelude to the Opening of Sino-American Relations,”
Zhonggong dangshi ziliao
[CCP History Materials]
,
no. 42 (June 1992), 81, as excerpted in William Burr, ed., “New Documentary Reveals Secret U.S., Chinese Diplomacy Behind Nixon’s Trip,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, no. 145 (December 21, 2004),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/index.htm
.
27
Chen and Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos,” 170.
30
For an account of the incident synthesizing recent scholarship, see Michael S. Gerson,
The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969
(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010), 23–24.
31
See Kissinger,
White House Years,
182.
32
“Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting, Subject: U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63),” 134–35. See also Gerson,
The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,
37–38.
33
Elliot L. Richardson, “The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration: Address to the American Political Science Association, September 5, 1969,”
Department of State Bulletin
61, no. 1567 (September 22, 1969), 260.
34
Gerson,
The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,
49–52.
37
“Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, March 10, 1970,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed.,
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976,
vol. 17,
China 1969–1972
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 2006). 188–91.
38
See Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969–1976,”
Diplomatic History
34, no. 2 (April 2010).
39
Edgar Snow, “A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung,”
LIFE
70, no. 16 (April 30, 1971), 47.
47
See Zhengyuan Fu,
Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 188; and Li,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, 120. Mao’s physician surmised that Mao’s translator, who lacked a background in literary Chinese, missed the hidden meaning and translated the phrase literally. Another possibility is that Mao’s translator understood the expression quite well, but was too terrified to translate a pun that Mao had merely implied, and that—if volunteered in English—would have seemed dangerously disrespectful. Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, shouted the same line in defiance at the close of her trial in 1980. Ross Terrill,
Madame Mao: The White-Boned Demon
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 344.
48
Oxford Concise English-Chinese/Chinese-English Dictionary,
2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), 474. I am indebted to my research assistant, Schuyler Schouten, for the linguistic analysis.
49
“Editorial Note,”
FRUS
17, 239–40.
52
Snow, “A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung,” 47.
54
“Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1971,”
FRUS
17, 254.
55
Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 401–2.
56
Ibid., 405, citing Lin Ke, Xu Tao, and Wu Xujun,
Lishi de zhenshi—Mao Zedong shenbian gongzuo renyuan de zhengyan
[
The True Life of Mao Zedong—Eyewitness Accounts by Mao’s Staff
] (Hong Kong, 1995), 308. See also Yafeng Xia, “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969–February 1972,”
Journal of Cold War Studies
8, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 13–17.