On China (73 page)

20
Chen Jian,
China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 87–88 (citing author interview with Shi Zhe).

21
Kathryn Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’: Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 39 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2002), 9–11.

22
“M’Arthur Pledges Defense of Japan,”
New York Times
(March 2, 1949), from
New York Times
Historical Archives.

23
Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” 116.

24
Ibid.

25
Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’” 11.

26
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners,
144.

27
Ibid.

28
Ibid., 145.

29
Chen,
China’s Road to the Korean War,
112.

30
Shen Zhihua,
Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War,
trans. Neil Silver (forthcoming), Chapter 6 (originally published in Chinese as
Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng
[Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2003]).

31
Ibid.

32
Ibid.

33
Yang Kuisong, Introduction to ibid. (as adapted from Yang Kuisong, “Sidalin Weishenma zhichi Chaoxian zhanzheng—du Shen Zhihua zhu ‘
Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng
’” [“Why Did Stalin Support the Korean War—On Reading Shen Zhihua’s ‘Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War’”],
Ershiyi Shiji
[
Twentieth Century
], February 2004).

34
Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, June 27, 1950,” no. 173,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 492.

35
Gong Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds.,
Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 144.

36
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376(V), “The Problem of the Independence of Korea” (October 7, 1950), accessed at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/059/74/IMG/NR005974.pdf?OpenElement
.

37
For a fascinating discussion of these principles as applied to the Ussuri River clashes, see Michael S. Gerson,
The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969
(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).

38
On Mao’s war aims, see for example Shu Guang Zhang,
Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 101–7, 123–25, 132–33; and Chen Jian,
Mao’s China and the Cold War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 91–96.

39
Chen,
China’s Road to the Korean War,
137.

40
Shen,
Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War,
Chapter 7.

41
Ibid.

42
Chen,
China’s Road to the Korean War,
143.

43
Ibid., 143–44.

44
Ibid., 144.

45
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners,
164–67.

46
Chen,
China’s Road to the Korean War,
149–50.

47
Ibid., 150.

48
Ibid., 164.

49
“Doc. 64: Zhou Enlai Talk with Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar, Oct. 3, 1950,” in Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners,
276.

50
Ibid., 278.

51
Ibid. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had written to Zhou, as well as to U.S. and British representatives, regarding prospects for limiting the Korean conflict.

52
“Letter from Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov): October 8, 1950,” APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65–67 (relaying text asserted to be Stalin’s cable to Mao), from
Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at
www.cwihp.org
.

53
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners,
177.

54
Ibid.

55
Ibid.

56
See Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,”
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
8/9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1996), 240.

57
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners,
200–201, citing Hong Xuezhi and Hu Qicai, “Mourn Marshal Xu with Boundless Grief,”
People’s Daily
(October 16, 1990), and Yao Xu,
Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian
[
From the Yalu River to Panmunjom
] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1985).

58
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,
Uncertain Partners,
195–96.

1
“Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk addresses China Institute in America, May 18, 1951,” as reproduced in “Editorial Note,” Fredrick Aandahl, ed.,
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1951,
vol. 7,
Korea and China: Part 2
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1671–72.

2
Due to differences in dialect and methods of transliteration, Quemoy is elsewhere known as “Jinmen,” “Kinmen,” or “Ch’in-men.” Matsu is also known as “Mazu.”

3
Xiamen was then known in the Western press as “Amoy”; Fuzhou was “Foochow.”

4
Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union: February 2, 1953,” no. 6,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 17.

5
John Lewis Gaddis,
The Cold War: A New History
(New York: Penguin, 2005), 131.

6
Robert L. Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds.,
Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 254.

7
Ibid., 255.

8
“The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb: January 28th, 1955 (Main points of conversation with Ambassador Carl-Johan [Cay] Sundstrom, the first Finnish envoy to China, upon presentation of his credentials in Beijing),”
Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works,
vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 152–53.

9
“Text of the Joint Resolution on the Defense of Formosa: February 7, 1955,”
Department of State Bulletin,
vol. 32, no. 815 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 213.

10
“Editorial Note,” in John P. Glennon, ed.,
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),
vol. 19,
National Security Policy, 1955–1957
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 61.

11
Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” 258.

12
Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed.,
Khrushchev Remembers : The Last Testament
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 263.

13
“Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing: 2 October 1959,”
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
12/13 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Fall/ Winter 2001), 264.

14
Jung Chang and Jon Halliday,
Mao: The Unknown Story
(New York: Random House, 2005), 389–90.

15
Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds.,
Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 185.

16
Steven Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955–1970,” in Ross and Jiang, eds.,
Re-examining the Cold War
, 200. For a compelling history of the talks making use of both Chinese and American sources, see Yafeng Xia,
Negotiating with the Enemy: U. S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

17
“Text of Rusk’s Statement to House Panel on U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,”
New York Times
(April 17, 1966), accessed at ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851–2007).

18
Ibid.

19
Talbott, trans. and ed.,
Khrushchev Remembers,
249.

20
Lorenz M. Lüthi,
The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 38.

21
The October Revolution refers to the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.

22
Stuart Schram,
The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 113.

23
Ibid., 149.

24
Lüthi,
The Sino-Soviet Split,
50, citing author examination of 1956 Chinese “Internal Reference Reports” and Wu Lengxi,
Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966: ZhongSu guanxi huiyilu
[
Ten Years of Debate, 1956–1966: Recollections of Sino-Soviet Relations
] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1999), (memoirs of the former head of China’s official Xinhua news agency).

25
Ibid., 62–63.

26
Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao,
trans. Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), 261–62.

27
Talbott, trans. and ed.,
Khrushchev Remembers,
255.

28
Ibid.

29
Ibid., 260.

30
“Playing for High Stakes: Khrushchev speaks out on Mao, Kennedy, Nixon and the Cuban Missile Crisis,”
LIFE
69, no. 25 (December 18, 1970), 25.

31
The Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang.

32
“First conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: 7/31/1958,”
Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at
www.cwihp.org
.

33
Ibid.

34
Ibid.

35
William Taubman,
Khrushchev: The Man and His Era
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 392.

36
“Discussion Between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: October 03, 1959,” Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), fond 52, opis 1, delo 499, listy 1–33, trans. Vladislav M. Zubok,
Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at
www.cwihp.org
.

37
Ibid.

38
Lüthi,
The Sino-Soviet Split,
101; Wu Lengxi, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen” (
Zhuanji wenxue
[
Biographical Literature
], Beijing, no. 1, 1994), as translated and reproduced in Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson, eds., “Mao Zedong’s Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,”
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
6/7 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1995), 213–14.

39
Wu, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen,” 208.

40
Ibid., 209–10.

41
Gong Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Ross and Jiang, eds.,
Re-examining the Cold War,
157–58; Chen Jian,
Mao’s China and the Cold War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 184.

42
Chen,
Mao’s China and the Cold War,
184–85.

43
“Statement by the Secretary of State, September 4, 1958,” in Harriet Dashiell Schwar, ed.,
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–1960,
vol. 19,
China
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 135.

44
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, Moscow, September 7, 1958, 9 p.m.,”
FRUS
19, 151.1.

45
Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R., on the Formosa Situation: September 13, 1958,” no. 263,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 702.

46
Andrei Gromyko,
Memoirs
(New York: Doubleday, 1990), 251–52.

47
Lüthi,
The Sino-Soviet Split,
102.

48
Ibid., 102–3.

49
“Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, September 19, 1958, 8 p.m.,”
FRUS
19, 236.

50
“Discussion Between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: October 03, 1959.”

51
Xia,
Negotiating with the Enemy
, 98–99.

52
On September 30, 1958, six weeks into the second offshore islands crisis, Dulles gave a press conference in which he questioned the utility of stationing so many Nationalist troops on Quemoy and Matsu, and noted that the United States bore “no legal responsibility to defend the coastal islands.” Chiang Kai-shek responded the next day by dismissing Dulles’s remarks as a “unilateral statement” that Taipei “had no obligation to abide by,” and Taipei continued to defend and fortify the islands. Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” 163.