"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (67 page)

II. Poles

The treatment of the Poles followed different rules. Their treatment under special law did not aim to eradicate their physical and economic existence but “merely” to reduce their existence to the level of a leaderless pool of unskilled labor for the purposes of the Reich.
²⁰
Because the treatment of the Poles was thus determined by pragmatic rather than systematic considerations, it is not possible to identify any set phases in an orderly, unwavering sequence dictated by racial hatred alone—in contrast to the treatment of the Jews. The key factor for the special legislation was solely the “real” needs of political opportuneness. These comprised first denationalization—the extermination of the economic, political, and cultural lives of the Poles—then their greatest possible isolation from the German “ruling class,” and finally the reduction in the Polish standard of living where this was necessary in the interests of the German economy.

If at all possible, any memories of the era of the Polish nation-state were to be eradicated. Expressions of this objective included the prohibition on the wearing of Polish decorations and insignia, the prohibition on the use of Polish national emblems, and the removal of Polish monuments and places of remembrance, including such things as memorial plaques in the churches,
²¹
which was a particularly painful blow to the Poles. Comprehensive research work was intended to prove that German superiority had always existed in all domains.
²²
Fanciful plans to rebuild the larger Polish cities were intended to immortalize the “German character” of these places.
²³
This was all accompanied by broadranging segregation and special legislation that, as in the Eastern Territories, was meant to emphasize the subordinate status of the “non-Germans” and the special status of the Germans in everyday life. Absolute segregation was also to be universally enforced in the economic and private spheres.

Examples of this are the compulsory identification of German and Polish businesses; the compulsory wearing of insignia by members of the Party and its organizations; the compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
between persons in uniform and members of the public administration, which served to segregate the Germans from the “non-Germans” and encourage German solidarity; and the compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
to NSDAP flags;
²⁴
in contrast to the practice in the Annexed Eastern Territories, no compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
by Poles to Germans was introduced because it was impossible to control this. The compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
by Jews to all Germans (especially those in uniform), introduced in some areas at
Kreis
level, had to be repealed because it was “undesirable” for Germans to be greeted by Jews at all.
²⁵
All Germans, in particular members of the German administration, were instructed to avoid all private contacts with Poles and Jews, as well as all opportunities for making such contacts. Attendance at Polish church services was also incompatible with the conduct of an “honor-conscious”
Volksgenosse.
²⁶

Further examples of the segregation policy are the “identification measures” for “non-Germans” issued on the first day of the civil administration, which always represented the first stage of special law. As one of his first legislative acts, the governor general had introduced compulsory identification cards for all “non-German” inhabitants of the General Government above the age of 15, except for foreigners, on October 26, 1939.
²⁷
It was not so much the compulsory identification cards themselves that represented the actual special legislative character but rather their administration: for Jews and Gypsies, yellow ID cards with a black
J
or
Z
(for
Zigeuner
[Gypsy]) were designated; for minorities (Górales, Ukrainians, etc.), blue cards; and for all other persons, that is, Poles, gray cards.
²⁸
Whether the compulsory identification cards were actually implemented in full is a matter of doubt, since for technical reasons they were not issued until 1941.
²⁹

B. The Nature of the System of Special Law: A Normative System instead of Secret Guidelines

With regard to the techniques of the special legislative measures, the administrative leadership in the General Government had an easier start than that in the occupied territories, because the General Government was a new colonial territory in which the administration enjoyed complete autonomy.
¹
In this respect, the General Government offered limitless opportunities for special-law practices; totally new ground could be broken in terms of racial policy and the treatment of “non-Germans” without being bound to the principles of Reich law (“The methods”—the “implementation of a hard racial struggle”—“will be irreconcilable with our other principles”).
²

With regard to the organization of the details of a special legislative system, however, there soon arose a deep contradiction among the original political objectives, practical requirements, and the plans followed by the administrative leadership of the General Government.
³
Whereas Hitler himself was convinced that “all ideas of consolidation … have been eliminated”
⁴
because of the designated purpose of the occupied Polish territories as a military staging area, Governor General Frank, unable to conceal his legal background, prepared to develop a new National Socialist order in the General Government, or at least some sort of order, and did exactly what should not have been done according to Hitler’s will (there was to be no “model province or a model state based on German order.”
⁵

In contrast to the Annexed Eastern Territories, with their often chaotic legal situation, the General Government saw an orderly system of legal rules, carefully matched and formulated,
⁶
a system that was undoubtedly envisaged as a model for legislation in countries not scheduled as colonies. Technically, the organization of a system of special law in the General Government was much easier to achieve than in the Annexed Eastern Territories, where special legislative provisions had to be either incorporated into Reich law or established
alongside
Reich law; in the General Government, with its approximately 10.5 million inhabitants, over 90 percent of whom were “non-Germans,”
⁷
there was no competition with Reich law from the outset, so almost the entire legal system had the nature of special law. The form of special law chosen by the leadership of the General Government also offered more order and thus more legal security in the formal sense than the totalitarian omnibus provisions and the secret guidelines in the Annexed Eastern Territories.
⁸
On the basis of its extensive legal and administrative autonomy (sec. 5 of the Führer decree of October 12, 1939),
⁹
almost all provisions of special law were issued not in the form of guidelines but by
legal rules,
decrees, which—although the General Government was essentially dependent upon the Reich authorities
¹⁰
—were largely based on Reich law and each of which was also formally published.
¹¹
However, these decrees, as well as their associated administrative acts, were not subject to review by administrative courts,
¹²
in contrast to the situation in the Reich, where a court review of state acts was possible under the enumeration principle, albeit to no more than a modest extent. The principles of the legislative
process
of the Reich (with a heavy emphasis on the Fühere principle)
¹³
were similarly applied with a zeal sometimes approaching perfectionism.
¹⁴
A stabilizing factor of the legal system was also the fact that the pernicious influence of the Party was almost totally excluded in the General Government;
¹⁵
many of the radical special regulations in the Annexed Eastern Territories can be traced back to Party pressure or influence,
¹⁶
which took the view that the “non-Germans” were best dominated not by legal rules but by guidelines.

C. Special Topics

This description of the practice of special law in the individual sectors is structured using the same classification as in section 2 on the Annexed Eastern Territories, because the top administration in the General Government (the governor general) also controlled
all
branches of the administration (he had global jurisdiction).
¹
Nonetheless, only the most important sectors of the internal administration will be covered; the vast number of regulations in the special administrations (cultural, economic, and labor administrations)
²
precludes anything more than a brief survey. The practical importance of the activities in these special administrations was also in the forefront in the General Government in the early days. As with the Annexed Eastern Territories, this survey will therefore be given precedence, with the internal administration covered thereafter.

I. The Cultural Sector

The principal aim of the policy of denationalization mentioned previously, which aimed to prepare the Poles for the status of leaderless laborers, was to promote German interests (by granting privileges to Germans) and extinguish or repress Polish cultural life as far as possible (through discrimination). In this context, Polish cultural life was regarded as the “main enemy of
Deutschtum,
” to be destroyed as soon as possible, as were all nation-state traditions in Eastern Europe.
³
Whereas the authorities dedicated substantial personnel and financial resources
⁴
to the organization of German culture
⁵
and sports,
⁶
to show that “German Man” was the more superior bearer of culture,
⁷
Polish education and culture were largely extinguished. After much uncontrolled looting (by departments of the RFSS),
⁸
Polish art treasures were confiscated and some of them removed to the Reich.
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Cultural policy was decided by the “cultural policy guidelines” issued by the governor general in 1940, under which Polish cultural life was not to be encouraged but was still to be permitted as long as it “serves a primitive need for entertainment and diversion”; the Jews, however, were forbidden all cultural activities.
¹⁰
The cultural life of the Poles was therefore tolerated only to the extent that it could be expected to keep the workers in line and show them that “the fate of their
Volk
offered no future prospects”; all that could be considered was “at the most poor-quality films or films that demonstrate the size and strength of the German Reich”;
¹¹
for the same reasons, the Poles were permitted limited access to information via censored press publications.
¹²
Of course, these restricted activities, described as “autonomy” (which also met stiff resistance from the police),
¹³
were no autonomy in the proper sense; in fact, the situation was just the opposite, with the aim to extinguish all cultural life at a higher level and to achieve strict control of the remaining minimal cultural program.

In all the measures adopted, there was an almost panicky fear of a revival of the “Polish intelligentsia,” which had always been regarded as “hostile to Germany”;
¹⁴
until around 1942, however, an understanding with the working and peasant classes was believed quite possible and was even practiced.
¹⁵
The key concepts for the special legislative measures in the education sector are described below.
¹⁶

All Polish high schools, higher education establishments, and seminaries
¹⁷
were closed, but this did not achieve the intended purpose because it only resulted in the development of a widespread underground education system;
¹⁸
after being closed for a brief period in 1940, the technical, industrial, and vocational colleges were reopened in the interests of gaining skilled workers; private schools and private tuition required the approval of the authorities.
¹⁹
The Polish primary schools, which had initially been closed, were also reopened, but the segregation principle was strictly maintained, and only the basics were to be taught, under German supervision and in accordance with German guidelines;
²⁰
the shortage of teaching aids and teachers (caused in part by the Germans) as well as increased class sizes
²¹
were destined to make school education “poor of its own accord.”
²²