Napoleon in Egypt (18 page)

Napoleon now ordered his main force to advance along the west bank of the Nile; at the same time Captain Perrée’s flotilla of sixty craft was to proceed in parallel upstream. The twenty-five vessels forming the armed vanguard of the flotilla served the purpose of protecting the French flank against attack from an enemy flotilla, which Napoleon had learned was advancing downstream from Cairo. The other thirty-five vessels would enable him to transfer troops quickly across the Nile if he needed to confront the enemy on the far bank.

For safety, and to prevent any hindrance to his fighting troops, Napoleon transferred some of his pack animals as well as all noncombatants onto Perrée’s flotilla. These included his secretary Bourrienne, the officers’ wives and women, who were no longer traveling incognito, as well as Monge, Berthollet and the accompanying savants. However, some of the pack donkeys and non-combatants must have been left behind, for it was now that the presence of the savants began to attract the suspicions of the soldiers, who noticed them making observations, gathering plant samples, and writing down notes as the army advanced. Denon, in particular, was always conspicuous, making his sketches. Rumor soon spread that these “braying donkeys” were in fact the reason for the entire expedition. They were the ones who had persuaded Napoleon to embark upon this madcap scheme, in the course of which good soldiers were suffering and dying. The growing distrust and positive dislike for the savants was only partly alleviated when the officers made public fun of them: as the troops lined up in their formation squares ready to begin their advance the officers would call out, to the widespread merriment of the soldiers, “Donkeys and savants into the middle!”

During the evening of July 12, the remaining four divisions—commanded by Reynier, Vial, Bon and Dugua—set off behind Desaix. The close presence of the Nile reassured the soldiers that this was not to be another desert ordeal, and they covered the nine miles to the outskirts of Shubra Khit undercover of darkness with revived spirits, despite the arduous business of being made to maintain line and march in squares. On arrival each division took up its position in a square six deep, rather than the usual three, with artillery stationed at each corner. Napoleon had decided upon this extra defensive mode as a precaution against any unforeseen Mameluke tactics.

The fact was, neither he nor anyone else really knew what to expect from the Mamelukes. They retained a forbidding historic reputation, largely on account of their crushing victory over St. Louis’ crusade in the thirteenth century, when they had been the most formidable fighting force known to the Western world. French military tactics had made great advances during the ensuing five centuries, to the point where
they
were now the most formidable fighting force known to the Western world; yet no one knew whether the Mamelukes had made their own similar advances. Napoleon had read Volney’s description in
Voyage en Égypte
of their fearless but chaotic cavalry charges, but these had been their tactics (or lack of them) in their small-scale disputes amongst rival groups. What would they do when they united to form an army, and came face to face with a foreign enemy? It was known that they now possessed artillery, and if their battle tactics had improved over the centuries as much as those of the French, they might well prove invincible.

Napoleon allowed his soldiers a short snatched sleep at their stations, before having them roused at sunrise by the stirring sound of military bands playing “La Marseillaise.” The men took up their battle positions, their choruses ringing out through the sunlit desert air from division to division:

Aux armes, citoyens!
Formez vos bataillons . . .

(To arms, citizens!
Form your battalions . . .)

Meanwhile the Mamelukes appeared out of the desert before them in battle formation, standing in one long line. According to cavalry officer Desvernois, presumably with the aid of a telescope:

It was a magnificent sight. In the distance, the desert beneath the blue sky, before us these beautiful Arab steeds, sumptuously harnessed, snorting, neighing, prancing lightly and gracefully beneath their martial riders, who were covered with dazzling arms inlaid with gold and jewels. They were clad in varied brilliantly-colored costumes, some wearing turbans bedecked with egret feathers, others wearing golden helmets, armed with sabers, lances, maces, spears, rifles, axes and daggers, each with three double-barreled pistols, two attached by cord to the twin pommels of their saddle, the other tucked into a belt on the left side of their stomach.
³⁶

Years later, at the end of his life, Napoleon would remember how “the sun touched their helmets and coats of mail, making their fine line glimmer in all its brilliance.”
³⁷
According to Desvernois: “The novelty and richness of this spectacle dazzled our soldiers,” but not in the sense that they were intimidated; far from it, for “from then on they began to dream of pillage.”
³⁸

The line of Mameluke cavalry extended west in one long sweep from the bank of the Nile out into the desert, outflanking the French squares. Murad Bey’s Mameluke force had by now been joined, in a rare display of solidarity amongst such independent chieftains, by the beys and their men from the various delta regions they controlled. Assorted Bedouin groups could also be seen riding about in the desert to the west of the French squares. Behind the line of Mamelukes was a mixed force of Egyptian foot soldiers and armed attendants of the Mamelukes; estimates vary, but most sources agree that the French force of 18,000 men, with 2,000 held in reserve, now probably faced an almost equal number of Mamelukes and attendant infantry. The French squares were in fact oblongs, extending 300 yards or so at the front and back, and fifty yards at the sides. These contained thirty-six artillery pieces ranged at their corners, allowing each to fire over a 180º arc, yet also allowing the front eighteen to focus their fire on any particular point at the same time. But to Napoleon’s irritation, his left flank remained exposed: he could see no sign of Perrée’s flotilla beyond the palm trees lining the banks of the Nile.

As the sun rose in the sky, the opposing forces remained warily watching one another amidst an uncanny silence. This state of affairs went on for a seemingly unending hour, during which the tension rose to an all but unbearable pitch amongst the French ranks. Then the French soldiers became aware of cries and movement along the Mameluke line, various horsemen galloping wildly up and down in front of the others, brandishing their arms, with no apparent purpose except presumably to encourage their men. After this a number of individuals, and then some seemingly disordered groups, began charging down towards the French squares, pulling up in the face of the gleaming bayonets, then turning and galloping between the squares, and around the back, apparently seeking a way into this porcupine of steel, finally riding back between the squares to their own lines. The French sharpshooters opened fire whenever the charging Mamelukes came within range, and a few of them fell.

Suddenly, amidst this sporadic gunfire came the sound of artillery to the west. Captain Perrée’s flotilla had at last arrived, but it had seemingly overshot the French line and sailed into an ambush consisting of Murad Bey’s armed flotilla and a number of concealed gun batteries on the river banks. There was nothing Napoleon could do but watch from a distance. His forces were too far away and committed to their squares, as the charges from the Mameluke line now began increasing in ferocity and number.

A charging Mameluke was indeed an impressive sight. At full gallop he could fire his carbine with some accuracy, and he would follow this by discharging his pistols at closer range. Next he used his
djerid
, a short, light spear, flung like a javelin, and in closer hand-to-hand combat he wielded his razor-sharp scimitar with deadly accuracy and power, capable of slicing off a human head with one blow. Some Mamelukes could even slash with scimitars in both hands, whilst holding their horse’s reins between their teeth. As Napoleon himself observed with some admiration: “The Mamelukes displayed all their skill and courage. They were at one with their horses, which appeared to sense their every wish . . . having fired their six weapons they would outflank the line of sharpshooters and pass between the squares with marvelous dexterity.”
³⁹
But all this quixotic heroism was to no avail. When the Mamelukes eventually made a concerted grand charge they were met with barrages of artillery fire, grapeshot and more general rifle fire from the French squares. After ineffectually swirling about in a vain quest for a weak spot, they rode back to their positions, leaving over 300 dead scattered over the sandy wilderness before and behind the French squares. During what appeared to be a hurried conference between Murad Bey and the other Mameluke leaders on a hillock overlooking the field of battle, there was a thunderous explosion from the direction of the river, where Perrée’s flotilla was still trying to fight its way out of the ambush. A few moments later the entire Mameluke force turned and galloped away across the desert, simply abandoning the nine guns they had set up on the outskirts of Shubra Khit. Napoleon watched impotently: he had only 200 operational cavalry, and could not risk sending them in pursuit. His tactic of concentrating his men in defensive squares had been vindicated, and his soldiers had experienced for themselves their ability to withstand the dreaded Mameluke cavalry. Yet the undeniable fact remained: most of the enemy had lived to fight again. As soon as it became plain that the Mamelukes would not return, Napoleon hastened to the river to discover what had happened to Perrée’s flotilla.

The previous day, after embarking from El Ramaniyah, the flotilla had kept alongside the advancing land army, but during the night they had lost contact with the forces onshore and apparently become becalmed. Not until eight in the morning, well after sunrise, had the favorable north wind arisen, allowing them to proceed down the Nile. In the words of Lieutenant Laval Grandjean, who was aboard the flotilla, “We did not know whether the army was ahead of us or behind us. We therefore sailed on with the idea of stopping at the first village we came across, to find out whether or not the army had passed.”
⁴⁰
Partly because of an increasingly strong north wind, and partly because they had no idea of the French army’s position, Perrée’s flotilla had then sailed ahead of the land forces and run into the ambush.

Murad Bey’s flotilla was commanded by his naval adviser, a Greek called Nikola, an expert Nile sailor who knew the strengths and weaknesses of all the vessels capable of navigating the river. His flotilla consisted of a dozen or so vessels, half of which were heavily armed and manned by experienced Greek, Egyptian and black Nubian crews. Nikola had stationed his armed vessels just upstream from where the channel narrowed and flowed through an embankment at Shubra Khit; he had then positioned a battery of nine-pounders on the embankment on either shore: a perfect spot for an ambush.

Captain Perrée was on his command ship, the
chebek Le Cerf
, which also had on board Napoleon’s secretary Bourrienne, as well as the senior savants Monge and Berthollet. Along with the rest of the vanguard, three gunboats and a galley, this unwittingly sailed straight into the ambush, and was soon under heavy fire from Nikola’s gunboats and the batteries on either shore. The gunfire attracted attention in the village of Shubra Khit. According to Lieutenant Grandjean, “The Mamelukes, Arabs and peasants ran out in a crowd, swarming towards us with hideous cries, some began hauling their boats down from the bank, others threw themselves into the water, all coming to attack us on board.”
⁴¹
Those remaining on shore fired rifles at Perrée’s stalled flotilla; and some of the Bedouin even had small guns mounted on their camels.

Nikola’s vessels came alongside two of the French gunboats and the galley. According to Bourrienne, “Soon several of our ships had been boarded by the Turks [as the French called the enemy], and before our eyes they began massacring their crews with barbaric ferocity, holding aloft their decapitated heads by the hair.”
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In no time the Nile was awash with bodies, as
Le Cerf
and the remaining gunboat did their best to pick up the survivors who had dived into the Nile. One of the vessels in Perrée’s convoy was carrying several hundred cavalrymen, who had no horses, and these began valiantly repelling the boarders with their sabers. Amidst the chaos, Perrée did his best to direct operations, suffering a gunshot wound in his left arm in the process. The mathematician Monge, despite his fifty-two years, began helping to reload the guns, whilst the fifty-year-old chemist Berthollet adopted a more stoic stance. According to a fellow savant, “He began filling his pockets with stones, much to the indignant astonishment of his companions who had found better things to do at this juncture; he explained that this was so that he could sink more quickly if things became mortally dangerous, enabling him to escape the savagery of the Mamelukes. But he was eventually persuaded to take up arms and join in the defense of the group.”
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Bourrienne remembered how “towards 11 o’clock, Perrée informed me that things weren’t getting any better, that the Turks were inflicting more damage on us than we were on them, and that we were going to run out of ammunition.”
⁴⁴
But the situation was to be suddenly and dramatically relieved. One of the guns on
Le Cerf
scored a direct hit on the commanding Mameluke gunboat, just at the point where its ammunition was stored. The result was a huge explosion. “As it exploded the men flew up into the air like birds,” recorded Nicolas Turc (who could not have been present, but was almost certainly repeating the picturesque phrase of an Arab eyewitness).
⁴⁵
There was an immediate panic amongst the Arabs, Mamelukes and Greeks. Those on shore ran away, those in boats made for the shore, and Nikola’s remaining flotilla beat a hasty retreat upstream. This was the detonation heard by Murad Bey and his cavalry commanders as they were conferring after the first concerted Mameluke charge, and it seems to have played its part in the Mameluke abandonment of the battlefield and final flight. Whether this flight resulted from Murad Bey’s order or was spontaneous is not clear; what
is
clear is that the Mamelukes could not have known for certain that it was one of their own gunboats that had blown up.