Napoleon in Egypt (17 page)

Napoleon himself remained in Alexandria until July 7. The day before he left, he dictated a note to the French chargé d’affaires in Constantinople: “We are marching on Cairo. You must convince the Porte of our firm resolution to keep them fully informed of what we are doing. An ambassador is to be appointed [in Constantinople], and will not be long in arriving.”
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If nothing else, this would seem to indicate that Napoleon still believed the Turkish Porte would not regard his invasion of Egypt as a warlike act against what was at least nominally part of the Ottoman Empire—and that he believed Talleyrand would soon arrive in Constantinople to resolve any problems that arose. On this optimistic note he then departed from Alexandria late on the afternoon of July 7, accompanied by his savant friends Monge and Berthollet, together with the French consul Magallon as his adviser. Riding swiftly through the night with his staff, Napoleon soon overtook the columns of the last two divisions, reaching Damanhur the following morning to join up with Desaix and Reynier. Throughout that day and the following night the last two divisions continued arriving at Damanhur.

Napoleon was to remain for two days in Damanhur, during which he held a council of war with his generals. It proved to be a stormy affair. Whether or not it was Mireur who confronted him, there is no doubt that the twenty-eight-year-old commander-in-chief faced some heavy criticism from his generals, who were furious that their men had been forced to undergo such an ordeal without supplies or backup of any kind. The twentieth-century English historian P. G. Elgood, who had some experience in such matters, having been a senior military officer in Egypt, blamed Napoleon’s shortcomings on his staff. They were the ones who had naively accepted the local guides’ assurances that there were sufficient wells en route, without troubling to investigate the actual situation. But it is difficult to see how they could have done this: they had no time to check their information, and any scouting party would have been picked off by hostile Bedouin. This said, there is no doubt that there were deficiencies amongst Napoleon’s staff. His chief of staff, Berthier, had certainly proved his merit on the Italian campaign, but according to Elgood, amongst the “headquarters staff of 142 officers . . . the quality of some of its members was uncertain. Influence in Paris played a part in the appointments.”
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Although the generals for the expedition were all picked by Napoleon himself, there is no doubt that the Directory had a hand in other, more cushy appointments. However, all are agreed that one of the main factors, if not the leading one, in the debacle of the march on Damanhur was Napoleon’s haste to reach Cairo. His thinking was evident: he was banking on a quick, decisive victory, which would present the Porte with a fait accompli, rather than a longer campaign with large enemy loss of life, which was liable to antagonize them.

Years later, during his exile in St. Helena, Napoleon admitted, “It would be difficult to give an idea of the disgust, the discontent, the melancholy, the despair of that army during its first weeks in Egypt.”
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And he recalled his council of war at Damanhur: “The generals and officers gave voice to their discontent with even greater force than the men.”
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Some admission: his generals were a tough, campaign-hardened, and in many cases foul-mouthed lot, who were not known for mincing their words. But the young, diminutive Napoleon evidently stood his ground. Nothing was resolved at this meeting. Napoleon remained adamant in his insistence upon haste, and the generals remained furious. The chief discontents seem to have been amongst the cavalry. One officer remembered “seeing his most distinguished generals, Lannes and Murat, in a fit of rage flinging their braided hats to the sand and stamping on them, in the presence of their men.”
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This was the dashing Murat who had served with such loyal devotion in Italy. The army was in open disarray, a situation which so angered Napoleon that on one occasion “he strode up to a group of discontented generals, confronted the tallest amongst them, and told him vehemently: ‘What you are saying is sedition. Watch out, or I’ll have you on a charge. Don’t think your five foot ten inches will prevent you from being hauled in front of a firing squad in a couple of hours.’”
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This tall general was almost certainly the charismatic mulatto cavalry commander Dumas, who had from the outset made it clear that he had little respect for Napoleon, and quickly became a focus of opposition to him (perhaps the reason why discontent was greatest amongst the cavalry).

Ironically, it was Napoleon’s insistence upon haste, as much as anything, which now held the disparate parts of his army together, uniting them in their dissatisfaction with their commander. The divisions of Desaix and Reynier had less than forty-eight hours’ rest before they were ordered to continue; the others had even less. Throughout the night of July 9-10, the four divisions departed from Damanhur. It was just fifteen miles from Damanhur to the rendezvous with Dugua and the supply flotilla on the Nile at El Ramaniyah. The terrain on this stretch of the march was much less forbidding, there were even stretches showing signs of remnant cultivation, and the men were motivated by the prospect of proper rations. Even so, the wells remained for the most part inadequate, or sabotaged, and once again the men were soon suffering from the effects of severe dehydration.

The first columns reached the banks of the Nile on the afternoon of July 10 (22 Messidor). Although the river had sunk to its lowest level since the annual flood just under a year previously, it nonetheless proved an inspiring sight. According to Desvernois, “When the soldiers caught sight of the Nile they broke ranks, rushed forward, and threw themselves into the water. Some leapt in fully clothed, complete with their rifles, others took time to undress before running and plunging in, and they remained bathing in the water for several hours. Some even drank themselves to death with so much water.”
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On the banks of the river the soldiers came across fields of watermelons and began gorging themselves; the men quickly christened 22 Messidor “The Feast of St. Water Melon.”

The excessive diet of watermelons would soon wreak its effect on the weakened digestive systems of the soldiers. Within two days, diarrhea was so rife that after consulting with his chief medical officer Napoleon issued orders that “commanders will instruct their soldiers to eat very little of the fruit they call pumpkins or watermelons unless these are cooked: only then are they healthy and nourishing.”
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The following day Dugua’s division arrived from Rosetta, but to Napoleon’s fury it was not accompanied by Perrée’s flotilla on the Nile. In his effort to reach the rendezvous at El Ramaniyah on time, Dugua had disobeyed orders and gone ahead of the slow-moving flotilla. The original flotilla had been augmented by a number of craft requisitioned at Rosetta, most of which were
chebeks
(three-masted Levantine sailing craft, which could also be rowed), so that the flotilla now numbered sixty vessels, of which twenty-five were armed. This unwieldy group had encountered considerable difficulty in navigating the Nile channels. These were now at their lowest, and at several bends in the river some of the flotilla’s craft became grounded on sandbanks, taking time and considerable maneuvering to drag them free. Then there was trouble with the wind, which frequently dropped, or changed direction. It would be over twenty-four hours later before the flotilla finally arrived at El Ramaniyah.

By this time Napoleon’s scouts, aided by their Arab guides, had learned that the fearsome Mameluke leader Murad Bey had set out from Cairo, heading north along the west bank of the Nile with a force of 3,000 Mameluke cavalry and 2,000 attendant infantry. According to Napoleon,
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he himself had a force of 20,000 men. Most of these were foot soldiers, although he did by this stage have limited cavalry properly horsed and some extra artillery unloaded from Perrée’s flotilla. Napoleon now took the opportunity to address his troops, and ordered a full-scale review of all five divisions for the afternoon of July 11. The refreshed troops spent all morning polishing their boots, cleaning and brushing their uniforms, bathing and shaving, checking their equipment, their packs and their rifles. This was intended as a timely exercise in re-establishing discipline and military pride. The men of each regiment were stirred by marching before their colors, each in their distinctive uniforms.
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By mid-afternoon, the five divisions of the Egyptian expedition were drawn up outside El Ramaniyah. At three
P.M.
the drum-roll sounded, and Napoleon appeared on horseback before his men; he and his cavalcade of staff officers now passed in review along the lines of the five divisions, stopping before each one to call forward its senior officers, to whom he gave a rousing address, intended to be relayed on to the men. In this he informed them that their sufferings were at an end; perhaps as early as the morrow they would be confronting the Mamelukes, and the veteran heroes of the Army of the Rhine would triumph gloriously over these barbarians. There would be victories to be won and deserts to cross, but “after this we will arrive in Cairo where we will have as much food as we want!”
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Vertray recalled: “This speech had a great effect. It looked as if [Napoleon] had at last convinced us all of the purpose and greatness of his plans. Each commander proclaimed to his soldiers that we would soon be going into battle. The news filled the whole army with enthusiasm, and after they were dismissed and broke ranks they began meticulously checking their rifles, sharpening their bayonets, testing their firing flints, at the same time breaking into song.”
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Other firsthand sources suggest that not all the men were quite so easily won over. Napoleon evidently went out of his way to address some smaller groups of soldiers directly, and here the men who had survived their ordeal in the desert gave him a somewhat less rapturous reception. At the end of one badly received speech a soldier called out: “Well, general, are you going to take us to India?” “I wouldn’t set out on such a journey with soldiers like you,” replied Napoleon dismissively.
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This indicates that by now the men had got wind of the fact that Egypt was not intended as the expedition’s final destination. Other generals found themselves facing similar insubordination when they passed on the gist of Napoleon’s speech to their men. Engineer General Caffarelli, who had lost his leg on the Rhine, was heckled by a wit: “It’s all right for you, general, you’ve still got one foot in France.” Caffarelli took this in good humor, and the men responded with cheers as he stomped off.
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Caffarelli was a popular figure; indeed, the generals closer to their men, such as he and Desaix, appear to have played an important role in winning over many of those not convinced by Napoleon’s charismatic oratory. (It is noticeable that in his speech Napoleon specifically appealed to the men from the Army of the Rhine; he could be more sure of the men who had fought with him in the Army of Italy.) Napoleon now gained intelligence that Murad Bey and his Mamelukes were preparing to make a stand at the village of Shubra Khit, on the Nile some nine miles upstream on the direct route to Cairo. Desaix was ordered to advance along the western bank of the Nile, with his men formed into squares in order to resist any attack from Mameluke cavalry. These squares usually consisted of lines of men three deep; when attacked they took up their positions: the outer rank kneeled, the second rank crouched, the inner rank remained upright. All had their bayonets at the ready and were also able to open fire. As long as the men held steady, such a line was sufficient to deter all but the most determined heavy cavalry attack. Few horses could be induced to plunge into a three-deep barrier of steel bayonets. This square formation had the effect of giving the men solidarity, both material and psychological; it also made retreat or flight all but impossible. Like the men’s uniforms, this military item had its double edge.

As Desaix’s division moved forward, it caught sight of some advanced units of Mameluke cavalry.
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Initially these consisted of just a few scouts, reconnoitering the advancing French vanguard, but they were soon joined by a larger group around 300 strong. These charged diagonally across the French line of advance, apparently with the aim of driving between Desaix’s left flank and the Nile. Noting this, Desaix ordered his men to halt, fix bayonets, and take up their positions in a stationary square. At the same time he ordered his small detachment of cavalry, which included General Murat, to try and cut off the Mamelukes’ line of retreat. The Mamelukes quickly realized what was happening and fell back. This particularly disappointed Murat, who was hell-bent on glory. Indeed, his lust for glory and women had now led him to engrave his cavalry sword with the slogan “
I’honneur et les dames
” (honor and women). Murat may have flung down his hat in disgust at Napoleon’s conduct of the campaign, but he was not about to miss an opportunity for heroism. When he saw the Mameluke cavalry retreating, he set off alone at full gallop in pursuit. After a while they turned to confront him, whereupon he halted and called for them to send out their best man to fight him in single combat. The Mamelukes stood their ground uncertainly; although they did not understand Murat’s words, his actions were plain enough. But they had no tradition of single combat taking place between an assembly of two confronting foes, and suspected that Murat’s action was part of some deceptive tactic. Ignoring his taunts, they turned on their heel and rode back to rejoin their main force at Shubra Khit.