Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (51 page)

In contrast to the borders between the Mamluk sultanate, the Īlkhānid state and the Armenian kingdom, there was no river or mountain range to mark a border or frontier between the Sultanate and the Crusader kingdom and principalities. The borders of these two entities can not be defined.
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The reconstruction of fortresses along the Euphrates and south of the
was directly linked to the arrival of the Mongols, the establishment of the Īlkhānid state and the Īlkhānid-Armenian alliance. Most Mamluk fortresses, however, are distributed in central Syria and Trans-Jordan. Explaining the Mamluk investment in refortifying fortresses in these regions can only be done by examining each fortress separately, taking into account regional conditions, possible threats, the needs of the central government, and the local population. The decisions made y Baybars and the sultans who succeeded him do not always relate directly to the defense of the frontiers or to threats from the Mongols, Armenians or Franks. This probably can best be seen when studying fortresses in Trans-Jordan. While some served as local administrative centers before the Mamluk period, others were rebuilt in order to serve the logistics of the Mamluk communication lines – guarding and maintaining the
barīd
routes. An important group of fortresses served as stages along the
, and were charged with the safety of pilgrim and merchant caravans.

The influence of climate and topography on borders and the spatial distribution of fortresses

The following section gives a description of the topography and climate along the Sultanate’s borders, and particularly of regions that could be defined as natural barriers which armies would avoid confronting. The topography was carefully considered when the Mongols and later the Īlkhānids planned their invasion routes into Syria. These routes determined Mamluk priorities concerning the location of their fortresses.

The eastern frontier

The Mamluks’ longest frontier ran parallel to the middle course of the upper Euphrates. The rier can not be perceived as a natural barrier. The ongols could and did cross it at various points. Although they preferred shallow ford crossings, there are descriptions of how they crossed rivers holding on to the tails of their ponies, with all their equipment and weapons.
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Geographically this section is a coherent unit. Both sides of the river can be defined as a semi-arid hilly region;
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the annual rainfall average is between 100 and 200 mm and the river is in flood during the spring months of April and May.
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Crossing the Syrian Desert (Bādiyat al-Shām) that stretches along southern Syria was a route few armies attempted due to meager pasture and few reliable water sources. The annual rainfall in this egion is 100 mm.

All the fortresses along this stretch of the river had already been built by the end of the Ayyubid period.
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It was impossible, practically speaking, to build defenses along the entire length; thus the only section where the Mamluks rebuilt and maintained strongholds was the stretch closest to the northern and central Syrian cities. The Mamluks never possessed a fortress along the fords south of
.

Other than the location of the Syrian cities, what determined the position of the Euphrates fortresses from the outset was the topographical nature of the river and the character of the river flow. Where the river flows in a steep valley, the current is fast and the banks difficult to climb. All the fortresses were thus built beside comfortable crossing points, fords where the water is shallow, the current relatively slow and the river not too wide or boggy. The thee most important fords are located near al-Bīra,
and
.
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This section of the river runs parallel to the two major northern Syrian cities of Aleppo and Hama. The distance between Aleppo and al-Bīra is approximately 140 km.
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Defending this stretch was easier as reinforcements could be called upon from those cities. However, if the Īlkhānid armies were not stopped on the Euphrates the central Syrian cities were in immediate danger and faced a numerically superior army. A good illustration is the conquest of Damascus by Ghazan in December 1299. Shams al-Dīn
Allāh, an eye-witness, claims the Īlkhānid army numbered 100,000 men, three times the size of the Mamluk force inside the city.
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This enabled Ghazan to gain control over the city almost without a struggle.

While the Syrian littoral underwent several political changes due to the conquest and destruction of Frankish cities and fortresses, the eastern frontier remained unchanged for the next sixty years, until the fall of the Īlkhānid state (1335). The fortresses along the Euphrates still retained their importance and continued to serve the Sultanate during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries following the invasion of Temür (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) and the rise of local rival entities that gradually settled in Īlkhānid territories.

Although Mamluk investment in both fortresses and garrisons was considerable, the eastern frontier could not be sealed and the fords could not be completely barred against the Īlkhānid armies. Of the six invasions that took place between 1280 and 1312 the Īlkhānids managed to cross the river and march towards central Syria on four occasions: the second invasion by Abagha (1281); the first and second invasions
by Ghazan (1299–1300, 1301); and during Ghazan’s third invasion when his auxiliary forces crossed the river and reached Damascus (1303).

The fact that the river was crossed on several occasions demonstrates the faults and flaws of the Mamluk defenses. Garrisons could carry out raids in the vicinity of the fortress, but they could not confront a full-scale army. Their main tasks ere to alert the Mamluk army, to warn and inform the sultan of the coming of Īlkhānid forces and to try and delay them until the arrival of the Mamluk reinforcement from the central Syrian cities and/or Egypt.
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As long as the Mamluk army was well organized and capable of sending relief forces, this array of strongholds functioned and held the eastern frontier secure.

The northern neighbor

The northern frontier of the Sultanate bordered the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, a vassal and a close ally of the Īlkhānid state.
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The regions northeast of Ayn Tāb are semi-arid, with hills rising as high as 400–600m. The land gradually descends as it nears the banks of the Euphrates. The western region is dominated by the Amanus mountain range, averaging 1800m in height. Steep ravines carve the mountain slopes,
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and large areas are covered with dense Mediterranean forest. The area has a high rainfall averaging 1,000–2,000 mm a year. The Amanus acted as a barrier between the Mamluk sultanate and the Armenian kingdom. The four passes along it, however, are all accessible to both infantry and cavalry (
Map 3.1
).
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Reckoning from the south, the Belen pass is guarded by two fortresses, Baghrās and Darbassāk. The second pass, narrow and 12 miles long leading from Iskandarūn to Payas (Bāyās), is known in the Mamluk sources as Bāb al-Malik. The third is the Quwara pass along the northwestern slope, known today in modern Turkish as Demir Kapi. Once across, one could continue on the Cilician plain to Adhana, al-Massīsa and Ayās. The last pass is Darband Arslān (Amanus Gate), a narrow valley stretching eastwards across the range.
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Like the Quwara pass it leads into the Cilician plains. On the western side of this valley stands one of the best preserved fortresses – Tall
. The fortresses guarding the four passes were often attacked by the Mamluk armies. Although the Sultanate wished to add them to the array already in its possession they were often won and lost, and this cycle continued during much of this period. At the same time the Armenians fought to acquire and control the passes and fortresses that were the key to the defense and economy of their kingdom. Any army that wished to march from Cilicia to northern Syria had to cross one of these mountain passes. They were a military asset that all entities in the region wished to hold. The Mamluk city closest to the Amanus range was Aleppo. It was both a target for the joint Īlkhānid-Armenian armies and a point of departure for the Mamluk armies that raided the Armenian territories. In addition to their strategic importance one must note the economic value of this region. The shot distances between the northern Syrian cities and the trade routes that passed through Cilicia down to the Mediterranean ports turned the mountain passes along the Amanus into a military arena. However, throughout much of the second half of the thirteenth century and the early fourteenth no one managed to dominate the region.